|
English Language Page Alexander Cherkasov, “Memorial” Human Rights Center The second war in the Chechen Republic has been going on for more than four years now. And all this time Chechnya has seen war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes are numerous and they could be discussed endlessly. During initial months of the combat, they took the form of blanket non-selective bombings and shellings, in which thousands of people were killed. The total death toll of the “first” war of 1994–1996 was about 50 thousand civilians, and of the “second” war — from 10 to 20 thousands. Then, for several years on end so-called mop-up operations by the enforcement agencies were conducted in towns and villages of Chechnya. These operations were accompanied by massive non-selective violence, “disappearances” of people, and sometimes mass killings. It is impossible to say how many people were detained, beaten up, tortured and abused. Even more were robbed and humiliated. It is hard to say how many women were raped. There have been practically no mop-up operations during the past year but “disappearances” and extrajudicial executions continue. People get detained at night and taken away by “gunmen wearing camouflage uniforms and riding APCs.” The total number of those disappeared during the “second” war exceeds 3,000 — and this is official information only. It should be noted that Chechnya has a very small territory — only one thousandth of the Russian territory. The current ratio of Chechen population against the population of Russia is 1/250. That is why violence and crime are so consolidated there. If we consider the number of those killed and disappeared against the population of the republic, we’ll see that for the past decade Chechnya has lived through half of the Second World War and a whole period of Stalin’s repression. Yes, terrorists exist, they commit crimes, crimes against their own people. The sound proof is explosions in Znamenskoye, Mozdok, Moscow, the Nord-Ost hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theater last year. Does that mean that the authorities’ statements about the “counter-terrorist operation” in Chechnya are true? But the Russian authorities always interpret terms and notions in their own way. In order to understand them one has to resort to Geîrge Orwell’s books. They mention a “counter-terrorist operation,” which normally means highest selectivity of actions. The objective of such an operation must be, first and foremost, to save human lives, and then to capture or destroy terrorists. The practice proves that the hierarchy of values of Russian enforcement structures is significantly different. They try to achieve their goals at all cost. The evidence of this is scores of thousands killed in Chechnya, and 130 people who had died in the Nord-Ost tragedy. We run into such interpretations everywhere. They speak of “targeted hits,” which in fact were blanket and non-selective bombings and shellings. They speak of “humanitarian corridors” which in fact happened to be “corridors of death,” since the roads were bombed and shelled all the time. As for the talk about counter-terrorism, it is used as a pretext for State terror. Generally speaking, the counter-terrorist terminology serves as a cover for a real war against separatists. But such problems ought to be tackled by Russia politically. They are speaking about restoring constitutional order, but in reality a legal vacuum has been artificially created in Chechnya. This gives an opportunity to enforcement bodies to operate even in a more cruel and uncontrolled way than during Stalin’s times. Crimes go unpunished. People’s claims are not accepted, criminal cases are not investigated. Only several dozen of cases were considered in a court of law, only few perpetrators were sentenced. This “conditional justice,” this organized impunity can’t help provoking new crimes. Russia is waging a war and whatever is happening in Chechnya tells on the life of the Russian Federation as a whole. Personnel of all the law enforcement agencies from all the regions of Russia go to Chechnya on rotation. The experience of uncontrolled and unpunished violence cannot but leave its traces. The experience of routinely violating the law also leaves its scars. And again, Orwell's language comes to mind, the experience of substituted notions. There is no guarantee that Russia will not see the return of the totalitarian past, which has for the time being settled on one thousandth of its territory. What is to be done? Obviously use each and every opportunity to talk about crimes and impunity. Stress that leaders of democratic countries must not make friends with spiritual successors of Molotov and Ribentrop. * * * Big bloodshed goes hand in hand with a big lie. Russian mass media provides practically no coverage of Chechnya events or to be more precise —practically no truth in this respect. The informational arena is filled with official data, with all kinds of things but the reality of life and death. These issues are dealt with through the use of official lies. But there are some journalists and outlets which do cover important events, and they write the truth. However such publications are marginal. There is no nation-wide debate on the problem of Chechnya, which is so essential for Russia. How did this happen? Everything started with true statements — in Dagestan, after the invasion by the Basaev detachments in August, September of 1999, the Russian military, for the first time in decades, were operating and perceived as liberators. Both journalists and laypeople wanted to get “good news” and they got what they wanted. There was a euphoria of “a small-scale victorious war.” And when the war moved on into Chechnya a strict censorship was imposed. At first, it was public censorship: “How dare you write bad things about our glorious army?” Then, blatant lies started substituting for information. For instance, on October 21, 1999, tactical missiles tipped with ball-scattering cluster warheads killed more than a hundred people and wounded hundreds more — most of them on the market place. Right after that, the then-Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said at a news conference, “I can confirm that some explosion did take place in Grozny on a market place. But I would like to draw the attention of the press to the fact that it is not just an ordinary market. We are facing a weapons market here — that’s the way it is referred to in Grozny. Actually it is a weapon warehouse, an arms supply base. This place is one of the headquarters of the bandit detachments. We do not rule out a possibility that this explosion resulted from clashes between some rival groupings.” Such “truthfulness” is still reamains a distinguishing feature of our President. Then, police censorship came. The story of the RFE/RL journalist Andrei Babitsky who had been detained by Russian enforcement officers and had gone through “filtration” in Chernokozovo. Then, he was allegedly handed over to the Chechen resistance forces, but in fact — to a detachment controlled by FSB. He managed to get to freedom, but was soon arrested on the basis of a forged accusation. After that, only the most “dim-witted” journalists continued to write objective reports about what was happening in Chechnya. It was Chechnya of all possible places that started the current flow of “good news” in all Russian media outlets. Independent TV channels NTV, TV-6, TVS were either liquidated or became controlled through various means. Then, others victims followed. Within just a few years, a comprehensive mop-up operation was successfully completed in the informational arena. Objective information is non-existent not only on Chechnya, but practically on all problems vital for Russia. It is replaced with silence, meaningless words or official lies. Only very few journalists and outlets raise important problems and dare tell the truth. But they are marginal. Almost no important problems are discussed publicly. What’s to be done? What do we need? Solidarity and pressure. First, it goes without saying that independent outlets, independent journalists and non-governmental organizations must be supported. This support, this assistance will help them overcome this marginal state. If they get in touch with European NGOs and mass media, they will gain a forum, or at least its ersatz — for a discussion. This could be an “escape avenue” from marginality in the Russian information environment. Second, it is essential to bring some pressure upon Russia both with a more specific slogan, “Stop Lying about Chechnya,” and with more general demands regarding restoring freedom of speech. Third, our colleagues —human rights activists from democratic countries— should exert pressure on their politicians engaged in different negotiations with their Russian counterparts: “If they tell lies about Chechnya, how can we trust them in other things?” * * * Through their control over the information arena, the Russian authorities acquired effective manipulation tools for the political environment. It was the second Chechen war that made Putin — at the time a little known bureaucrat —President of the country. In the fall of 1999, Russia at last got a leader who, under a covenant with lethargic Eltsyn, displayed some response to the on-going events, who was saying something and actually doing something. Details appeared to be of no significance. Putin met the popular need to have at least some liking towards authority. This liking happened to be reciprocal, but perverted — as is always the case with those in power. In the fall of 1999, in the atmosphere of the counter-terrorist hysteria, after explosions in residential buildings in several Russian cities, showing any doubts in the state politics seemed completely out of the question. “Yabloko” happened to be the only political party which did so and its rating plummeted immediately. Supporting the war was liked to supporting Putin — and the other way round. As a result, pro-Putin parties won the majority in the State Duma — Lower House of the Russian Parliament. In March of 2000, Putin himself became President. However it is impossible to win two election campaigns separated by four years under one and the same slogan of “small-scale victorious war.” That is why in 2000–2004 Chechnya has always come together with the word ‘settlement” in the course of the election campaigns of 2003 and 2004. * * * This “settlement” is yet another word from Orwell’s vocabulary. Instead of a real political process we are dealing with a mock-up, a puppet theater. The federal side, as I have mentioned above, referred to the separatists as to terrorists. That was the rationale for turning down any dialogue with Aslan Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, recognized by Russia in 1997 when Eltsyn received him at the Kremlin. If we are to believe the Russian Prosecutor’ Office, Akhmed Zakaev, who was standing behind Eltsyn’s back against the background of a curtain with a double-headed eagle, is a criminal. Fortuntely, Zavgaev’s case was considered by European courts — in Copenhagen and London. But no negotiations are held. As a political process substitute, instead of having talks with separatist leaders the authorities offer to the public a “dialogue” with their own protege, Akhmat Kadyrov. Instead of an amnesty for rank-and-file members of the Chechen armed formations that confronted the federal side, the authorities came up with an option of inviting them as reinforcement for the personal guard units of Kadyrov himself, under his guarantees of their loyalty. The results of the 2002 All-Russia Census were presented as yet another proof of normalization of the situation in Chechnya. In October 2002, the republic “counted” 1,088,000 people, much more than prior to the “second” war. It is even more ridiculous that just two months earlier bureaucrats had been using a different, realistic figure of 600,000… It is also quite entertaining to see the RF State Committee of Statistics operating with the figure of 815,000 inhabitants, simply ignoring the official census data. But hundreds of thousands of those “dead souls” make a most powerful election resource, which the authorities were effectively using during the March “referendum” on the Chechen Constitution, during the October elections for Chechen President, and at the federal parliamentary elections of December 2003. * * * The elections in Chechnya is a look into the future a climax of controlled democracy, of the very model which is being imposed on the whole of Russia. In accordance with international standards, conducting elections, referenda, or census during a war or a state of emergency is out of the question. But we are not waging war: what we carry out is a “counter-terrorist operation.” And the state of emergency was not declared officially, though de facto it’s been in place for years. As a result, the terror per se has become the key element of the election campaign. The election results had been programmed, everything was controlled from the Kremlin. Real opponents, that is the separatists, were timely removed from the list of candidates. And in the course of the “election campaign” erased from the list were the Chechens loyal to the Kremlin who could successfully compete with Kadyrov. Khussein Dzhabrailov was threatened, Aslambek Aslakhanov was offered a lucrative position. And the last one — Malik Saidullaev — was withdrawn from the race on the basis of a court decision. That’s it. The mop-up operation in the political arena is over, only the extras remained. Some were reduced to nothing, others were promoted by the authorities. The meeting of Kadyrov and Putin telecast by all channels — is it not the kind of propaganda strictly prohibited by the Russian election law? And another pre-election trip by Kadyrov to the United States? (At least, it was not crowned with a handshake — President Bush got squeamish…) We don’t have to add that for other candidates in the Chechen presidential “race” such promo actions with were unthinkable? How much does it differ from the overall situation in Russia? Shakespeare wrote about the world being a theater and people being actors. But in Russia it is nothing but a puppet show, where creative freedom of an actor is supplanted with a controlled dance of the dummies. Opponents — parties or individuals —are removed from the political environment under false pretexts, only clowns are left. However, terror remains an extreme measure in the political process — though appetite comes in the course of a meal. And pressure on obstinate actors is a common practice. And courts in Russia also make the “necessary” decisions at the “right” time. Propaganda green light is there for own candidate only. For “alien” candidates — arrest of the agitation materials; for own candidate — any kind of promotion, including meetings with the President and talks about a rain of gold pouring into the region if that candidate wins. The predetermined victory of Valentina Matvienko in the gubernatorial elections St. Petersburg from this point of view does not actually differ from that of Kadyrov in Chechnya. What's to be done, then? We must use every opportunity to remind everyone in Russia and abroad of the farce with Kadyrov’s election. Such reminders are for the benefit of Chechnya, Russia, and the West. * * * The problems of Chechnya are in fact concentrated, condensed problems of Russia. And now the negative experience gained in Chechnya is inevitably spreading throughout Russia. Today, these problems also become European problems, problems of the whole international community. Not because of the Chechen refugee issue. Refugees represent a valuable resource, like Jewish refugees in the last century who were scattered throughout the world. The problem belongs with the Russian authorities whose ruling style can be gradually borrowed by those in power in other countries. This threat must not be underestimated, and it should be countered here and now. Back |
Íàøà êíîïêà  |
|