|
English Language Page Leonid Ruzov, free-lance journalist September 11 has become imbued with a new meaning. On the same day as Felix Dzerzhinsky was born, the Twin Towers came crashing down, and the successors to the KGB overran the sacred borders to Russia—on this very same day, the hope for elections in Chechnya came to an end. While it is true that on October 5th, the Election Commission will probably carry out its procedures properly, still this will not be sufficient to fix things. All it took was one day for the genre of future political events in Chechnya to change. What had been a fascinating action, a thriller, then became an equally-exciting whodunit, but now has devolved into a comedy of the absurd. To be completely honest, however, the struggle for power in Russia now looks like a dogfight under a carpet. This is all thanks to the new Russian election law. Journalists are not allowed to really talk about election candidates. Today, though, we got a lucky break because they had all dropped out of the electoral race. So, now we are able to name—without breaking the law—all those who had been serious contenders in Chechnya. We are finally able to talk about Malik Saidullaev, Aslambek Aslakhanov, and Khussein Dzhabrailov. In fact, it would be interesting to view this like a scene out of “The Highlander,” where the Council of Watchers has “chats” with the various challengers to decide who will be their champion to fight Duncan McLeod. For those the Council deems unworthy, they are sent off on other missions or they withdraw from the contest. Yesterday, the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic ruled that Saidullaev had to be removed from the election. Yesterday as well, Aslakhanov cancelled his visit to the University of Grozny and “with great thanks” announced that he would be accepting the offer of President Putin to become his assistant. And earlier, on September 2, Dzhabrailov withdrew from the race after talks with the Putin’s administration officials. Not a lot of action if this is supposed to be in the genre of a thriller. You could call all of this administrative pressure politics. But isn’t that too simplistic? Perhaps the disappearing candidates are the only public part of what is essentially a very private process? The policy by Putin’s first administration during the Second Chechen War will likely change given there now is a peace settlement in Chechnya. What is meant by “settlement” and how we got there has always been disputed. The public always insisted that elections come before any peace agreement, thereby making negotiations with the President elected in 1997, Maskhadov, a pivotal part of the formula. The government by contrast has repeatedly maintained that Maskhadov is no President, and the old order of things seems sure to change with elections, because the question of the leader of Chechnya would be settled. A shift to a new beat looks certain, this is at least how it seemed until September 12, 2003, when Putin’s Special Envoy to Chechnya, Sergey Yastrzhembsky, unexpectedly recognized the separatist Ichkeria government. On the same day, everyone’s favorite Isa Temirov, now “vice-speaker of the parliament of Ichkeria” (he was also called “acting speaker”), announced at a press conference in Moscow that as of September 5, 2003, Maskhadov was no longer the Ichkerian President. As the line went, Maskhadov had contravened the Ichkerian Constitution, because he had misappropriated power and impermissibly introduced Islamic Shar’ia law, thereby undermining the Ichkerian Constitution. Maskhadov, therefore was guilty of a “severe crime.” As the author of the present article does not possess Athenian wisdom, he shall not attempt to determine the standard set forth by these Ichkerian legal documents, nor does he recommend that other people attempt this. Simply put, these documents are full of vagueness and contradictions. Equally unclear is the purpose of the prior week’s meeting, on the eve of the 12th anniversary of the independence of Ichkeria. It is also not known where the resolutions were taken, whether there was a quorum, and who called the meeting to order. Speculations about when and how this was going to happen have been flying around since August, putting particular strain and stress on the deputies set to attend, as well as on their families. Something equally mysterious is who allowed Temirov to become the speaker and take the place of the missing Ruslan Alihadjiev. Indeed, what was Temirov doing at the press conference in Moscow, given that he was involved in Basaev’s raid on Budennovsk for which he is under indictment? Probably, the person with the answers to these questions would be Vagap Tutakov, Maskhadov’s representative who was allowed back into Chechnya from Europe by Russian officials this very week. However, he was indisposed at the time of the events, given that the security service official were detaining him in a hotel since the morning of September 11. Nonetheless, the most interesting thing about all this internal Ichkerian intrigue is the external reaction by the Federal Government. Yastrzhembsky’s recognition of the Ichkerian Parliament’s impeachment of Maskhadov according to the Ichkerian Constitution is in contrast with his long-standing insistence that Ichkeria did not even exist. This seems like the stories told about Sir Isaac Newton, who after re-ordering how we think of the universe, reverted in his old age to an obsession with the possibility of a universe ruled by warring demons and angels. Perhaps in the Chechen case, the “flip-flop” is more stark. If Yastrzhembsky recognizes an independent Ichkerian state, then on October 5, need there be two Chechen presidents chosen? One for the federal subject-republic, and one for the Ichkerian? The possibility of this in the background is what gives it all a taste of the absurd. Generally speaking, whereas Maskhadov’s legitimacy was indisputable in 1997, it is now quite open to questions. His inability to stop the crime and kidnappings, to prevent the Dagestan incursion in 1999, and the Moscow theater hostage-taking in 2002, this all undermines the legitimacy of a sovereign Ichkeria. How much legitimacy remains? And Maskhadov’s representative, Salambek Maigov, fired for not condemning the acts of terror this summer—is this not the straw that broke the camel’s back? The answer is uncertain. The only thing that is clear is that the legitimacy of the current Acting President is even less sure. An opinion poll carried out by the Sergey Khaykin Institute shows that neither of the two regime leaders is truly understood by the Chechens as the head of Chechnya. In such a situation, any leader who comes forth and is trusted by the people would be a blessing, or at least better than the situation that we now have on hand. So, who is left on the election list? There once was an army chaplain for the separatists in the First Chechen War, who perhaps involuntarily came to oppose the Wahhabis, the extremists, the terrorists. He also perhaps involuntarily became ally to the federal forces at the start of the Second Chechen War. He was a gift to the Federal Government. In the middle of 2000, Russia chose to deal with him rather than go through the politically difficult process of having to work with the “moderate” separatists and the radicals. Of these more difficult paths, one possible negotiator, Ruslan Alihadjiev, simply disappeared, while another, Turnal Ali-Atgeriev, was arrested and died in prison. When you do this type of things, eventually you have to pay the piper. Starting in the second half of 2000, a new large-scale guerilla war began. It continues through to this day. At the same time, the reliance on this man from the mountains, this Chechen chosen immortal did not fade away, but in fact grew. The most recent example of this was the Chechen amnesty, which the leader of the republic was able to apply to all those fighters who would take up arms on his behalf and become his personal army. There is the old saying, “If you borrow a rouble, then the borrower is endebted to the lender. If the borrower gets a million roubles from the lender, then it is certain almost that the lender becomes dependent on the borrower.” In a similar fashion, if the current leader abdicates, then much of the previous investment is lost. If the federal forces block the abdication, then even more is lost in the short run, but perhaps things will not look so bad in the future. The mandate of the current Acting President, the budget expenditures (including monies for restoration of buildings), the creation of his fighting force, all this is done with full official backing. In many ways, the current Chechen administrative scheme looks a lot like a pyramid. To do anything at the beginning but start on this path seemed hard, it was all so simple and free. Then, however, the costs start to get great. And in the future, it may be catastrophic. And so what are the federal forces going to do with the Chechen question—for a long time the head of Chechnya has been a thorn in the their side, independent and uncontrollable. So, when are the Russians going to balk, and how are they going to do it? One such chance is the elections coming up on October 5. A recent opinion poll shows the Acting President’s support rating is low and falling, as even his own security forces engage in banditry. This is surprising considering the tendency in times of upheaval for people to cling to whatever signs of authority exist. Someone has expressed the idea that perhaps the way the Federal Government is going to change things is via the elections—simply hold them and count the votes fairly, or at least carry out an election as fairly as can be expected in a civil war and under de facto a state of emergency. They would do this because at least it would be a change of power. This is one way to get rid of the Acting President and his praetorian guard—have him lose an election. Maybe, this will not force him to lay down his arms, and a small war against him will be necessary, but at least there is an impressive pretext that can be used before all of this unravels. The favorite who could have replaced the Acting President in the elections might have been Saidullaev, for he is known to have helped his clansmen in Chechnya financially as well as in other ways over the last four years. In December 1999 in particular, he seems to have stopped the Shamanov-caused chaos in his native town of Alkhan-Yurt. Saidullaev was not the only person running for election. There were also two other well-known figures on the candidates list, the businessman Khussein Dzhabrailov and Aslambek Aslakhanov, the member of parliament. These two figures would surely have drawn votes off of Saidullaev. If this was the plan, then the withdrawal of both these candidates (see above) could be seen as the unfolding of the Kremlin’s envisioned architecture for Chechnya’s future. The same plan seems to have had election monitoring as part of it—this part of the plan was voiced by the Presidential Commission on Human Rights. The more the election was legitimate, the more the results could be used as a pretext for removing the old power. Although five hundred human rights activists were sought for the voting and results of the election, nothing really came of the idea because the Russia and Chechen human rights communities rejected the idea. The idea however, is still being floated out there by Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Presidential Human Rights Commission. Strange combination for success, on the one hand forcing people out of the race, while on the other hand, earnestly trying to have the election fully legitimized by international standards. And so the nullification of Saidullaev’s candidacy by the Chechen Supreme Court on September 11th seems not to be part of this plan. This was very much a local decision, though it is true that the Election Commission agreed with the decision of the court. But how will the Federal Government react to this? Perhaps it will be the beginning of a gripping intrigue, and the nullification will in turn be nullified itself, such that the persecuted hero will finally get his deserved victory? To tell the truth, we may already have seen the reaction of the Federal Government. On the same day as the court ruling, Putin met with Kadyrov, discussing how compensation for demolished houses would be spent and demanding that this money not be stolen. Kadyrov listened and agreed, the order to return some stolen funds had already gone out. If this is not a form of active campaigning, is it at least the official government position? We can of course wait. One can hope for miracles, and this is exactly what some human rights defenders are doing, those who are still planning to do election observing. It will only be a miracle however if Chechens come to the ballot boxes at all on October 5th. But a miracle seems out of sorts when we are no longer dealing with a genre where that can happen. Action fiction, heroic fairytales, and crime fiction, these are all story lines from the past in Chechnya. And the Federal Government does not change things mid-stride, so we are not going to revert to these until the race is done. The scheme to change the power structure in Chechnya using elections was fraught with danger from the beginning — and this while the powers that be had to deal with their own parliamentary and presidential elections. Such plans, risky and uncertain as to their outcome could not have held universal support at the Kremlin, and so what do we have? We are left with an empty set now in Chechnya, where the producers have simply walked off. The only reason for viewers to stick around is if they want to catch the sequel to this movie about the mountain man, the Highlander. Beware though, only stay if the types of movies you watch are tragic comedies done in the style of the absurd. Back |
Íàøà êíîïêà  |
|