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English Language Page Tanya Lokshina & Sergei Lukashevsky, Moscow Helsinki Group Russian human rights defenders have been monitoring the situation in the Chechen Republic in recent years not only because of the ongoing systematic violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also because of the ambiguous legal situation in the region, which constitutes a legitimacy crisis in a broader sense. The lingering military conflict in Chechnya, caused mainly by the desire of the federal center to restore its sovereignty, has been accompanied by massive and brutal violations of human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time, when the republic was granted de facto independence from the federal center, its leaders were unable to defend human rights, prevent a wave of criminal violence or effectively counter extremist groups. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, elections in Chechnya were carried out under control of international monitors only once, in 1997. All other elections conducted in the republic were either outright farcical or quite dubitable. Most Russian and Chechen human rights defenders expressed strong distrust as to whether it would be possible to conduct free and fair elections in autumn 2003. The impossibility of ensuring conformance of the elections with international standards under conditions of military conflict seemed obvious. Not only could candidates in the electoral campaign be guaranteed security, but the same rang true even for voters. Accordingly, an unhindered election campaign was impossible from the beginning. In addition, supporters of Chechen independence, who, according to sociological data, represent more that 20% of the population, were practically excluded by the federal center from this “political settlement.” The impossibility of conducting free and fair elections in Chechnya in October 2003 was confirmed by reports of violations of election laws, massive abuse of official powers, numerous cases of violence against campaigners of candidates opposing the Acting President, Akhmat Kadyrov, as well as against electioneers and their relatives. There was a dim hope that the elections would at least be in part competitive, thereby giving the residents of Chechnya a small window to exercise their right in forming republican bodies of power. The elections then might have helped to stabilize the situation in the Republic. The events of the beginning of September, however, dispelled any illusions with regard to the forthcoming elections. In fact, the sole candidate — Akhmat Kadyrov — was imposed on voters, and persons who might have competed with him either withdrew their candidacy or were withdrawn. Such tactics are not new to Russian electoral campaigns — it is sufficient in this regard to mention the Yakutiya Republic, the Kursk region, the Far East, and the Republic of Ingushetia. However, the case in point in Chechnya differs in principle from any other RF subjects, because the elections in Chechnya were presented by the federal authorities as a “key step towards peace” that logically followed the March referendum. It is critical that citizens are able to express their free will regularly, and that they are free in nominating persons, even under the limitations given through the ‘loyalty to the Russian authorities’. The failure to secure free elections, with an imposed (or self-imposed) winner, does not go any way in resolving the conflict in Chechnya. On the contrary, such conditions threaten to deteriorate the situation even further. It is clear to everyone today that it is not possible to solve the problems in Chechnya by firepower and force, and that a political decision is urgently required. However, the presidential elections in the republic bore no relation to such a political decision, because a president who is elected in such a way will never be accepted as legitimate by the people. The “personal army” of Akhmat Kadyrov is rapidly growing in number, now comprising between 1 500 and 4 000 bayonets: but “one can do many things with a bayonets, but one won’t be able to sit on it for a long time.” * * * After Akhmat-Hadji Kadyrov’s victory had been officially announced, we recalled something that we had completely forgotten during the election monitoring, given all the different election law violations and electoral campaign violence. Namely, that these elections were undertaken as a key link in a chain of measures to stabilize the situation in Chechnya. But what stability did the Kremlin achieve by upholding acknowledging Kadyrov as President? They did get stability in the literal sense of the word. For several years already, Russian authorities have relied on force to solve the Chechen problem, and have treated the legality of their actions as a mere formality. The military actions on the territory of the Russian Federation with thousands of soldiers, ground support, aircrafts, and heavy armored vehicles were labeled an “anti-terrorist operation.” And if the current processes are a rhetorical formula used to define the continuation of the same policy of force — but using other means (i.e. the “chechenization” of the conflict) — it now becomes clear why the authorities needed no democratic elections in the republic. Continuously mentioning “political process” in this case is nothing but a fig-leaf for violence. Kadyrov became a Kremlin favorite because of his readiness and eagerness to rule Chechnya brutally, because he was not afraid of blood and violence. He convincingly demonstrated this once again in his speeches right after the election day. For example, in his interview to “Kommersant” on October 7, 2003, Kadyrov affirmed his position with the following comments, If I am the head of the republic, then my people should be everywhere”; “In the future I am going to be even tougher. Nothing else is possible, they must be totally subordinate to the President”; “I am not going to allow anybody to rule the Republic. If somebody still thinks this, they are sadly mistaken. The way the President of Chechnya is going to act is quite clear. And considering the infamy of Kadyrov’s men, his growing personal army, it is just as clear how these brutal policies will be implemented in real life. Not only the people of Chechnya, but federal servicemen in the region are afraid of Kadyrov and his men, and practically no one dares say “boo.” * * * We believed monitoring of the election situation in Chechnya to be our professional duty, taking into consideration the specifics of the presidential elections in the republic, connected with brutal violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Such monitoring effort was also essential, as the impunity of the ruling authorities was increasing in the absence of strong competitors. We collected detailed data on the events of August — mid-October 2003 and attempted to create a full and objective picture of the conduction of elections in the situation of a continuing armed conflict. An electronic bulletin was being issued twice a week by the MHG, starting on 22 September. It comprised news about the election campaign, prepared on the basis of federal and Chechen documents, mass media, information from local NGOs and from candidates for the presidential office. Also, the bulletins included thematic articles by the MHG monitors that traveled to the republic with the aim of gathering fresh evidence. Six bulletins were published all-together and widely disseminated in Russian and in English among the Russian public and the international community. A thematic section “Presidential Elections in Chechnya: Human Rights Monitoring” was open on the web site of the Moscow Helsinki Group ( www.mhg.ru) to feature comprehensive and daily updated data about the elections in the Chechen Republic, and particularly the violations of the electoral law and human rights violations. Then, during the period of mid-October to the close of December 2003, we carefully analyzed all materials gathered in the course of the aforesaid monitoring effort. A representative of the MHG made another trip to the republic to assess the post-October developments and assess the impact of the elections on the human rights situation in Chechnya. Based on the results of all this work, we are glad to bring to you attention the final product of our efforts, this book titled “Chechnya 2003: Political Process through the Looking Glass.” While the given publication revolves around the topic of the Chechen elections, the book’s significance and scope are much broader than that. For that reason the whole book is permeated by the theme of unending violence and human rights violations — the context within which all events in this region are taking place, the context within which people in Chechnya live their lives from day to day. This book is not so much about violations of the right to free and fair elections in our country, but rather about the imitation of a political process in the Chechen Republic. We stress that in reality there is no political process, and no solution to the conflict has been found. For the Chechen war, the past elections do not signal “full stop” — they are nothing but suspension points. Hence, our book is primarily an invitation for the Russian public and the international community to open a wide debate on the situation in Chechnya, to look for a way out from this crisis of many years. * * * Our work would have been impossible without the generous help we received from our colleagues. We thank the Human Rights Houses Network and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights for their assistance in the preparation, translation and dissemination of the bulletins and of this book. We express our utmost appreciation to the Internet-media “Kavkazskii Uzel” (Caucausian Knot) — ( kavkaz.memo.ru) — for their systemic informational support. We are particularly grateful to our friends and colleagues from the “Memorial” Human Rights Center for the information, materials and consultations that they provided to us. We thank the Russian-Chechen Friendship Society for regular provision of information as well as for their direct participation in our monitoring effort. We are also glad to acknowledge that in this book we used some of the materials of the Chechen Committee for National Salvation. Íàçàä |
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