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6. Composite Tables

The hate speech monitoring project’s total number of hate speech types and targets is much higher than the total number of articles selected for investigation. As a result, the comparison of these numbers is somewhat arbitrary.

In addition, many hate speech types and targets overlap and have indistinct boundaries.

One solution would be to cluster the types and targets into a smaller number of groups, the variations of which are many.

Thus, we suggest that the following kinds of groupings.

It is advisable to group hate speech types according to the degree of severity. We are fully aware of the subjective nature of this type of assessment. First, it is hardly possible to clearly and definitively distinguish between levels of “hardness.” Second, the severity of hate speech is not only the result of the given type but also of the expressive intensity of each case.

Thus, we suggest that the hate speech types should be condensed into the following three groupings:

The hard hate speech types can be grouped as follows:

  • Making direct and straightforward calls for violence;
  • Calling for violence in the form of generalized slogans;
  • Advancing direct and straightforward calls for discriminatory practices;
  • Issuing calls for discriminatory practices in the form of generalized slogans;
  • Releasing veiled calls for violence and discriminatory practices.
  • The medium (not so hard) hate speech types can be grouped as follows:
  • Justifying historic cases of violence and discrimination;
  • Releasing publications and/or pronouncements designed to cast doubt on universally recognized historical facts of violence and discrimination;
  • Claiming that certain historical crimes had been committed by an ethnic community or religious group;
  • Pointing out (for the purpose of getting the target discredited) that an ethnic community or religious group has been maintaining links with Russian or foreign political or government structures;
  • Claiming that an ethnic community or religious group is criminal by nature;
  • Making remarks that an ethnic community or religious group is disproportionately well-off, over-represented in government structures or mass media operations, etc.;
  • Accusing an ethnic community or religious group of negative influences on the society or government (for example, “The Russian national identity is being diluted by…”, etc.);
  • Calling for action to prevent migrants of an ethnic community or religious group, from settling in the given region (community, neighborhood, etc.).

    And finally, the soft hate speech types, or impolite comments and improper attitudes on the part of reporters can be grouped as follows:

  • Creating a nefarious image of the given ethnic community or religious group;
  • Portraying certain ethnic communities or religious groups or their representatives in a derogatory or insulting context;
  • Making statements to the effect that an ethnic community or religious group is inherently deficient (i.e. lacking in culture or intellectual capacity, being unable to undertake creative pursuits);
  • Pointing out that an ethnic community or religious group has some inherent moral deficiencies;
  • Portraying certain ethnic communities or religious groups or their representatives in a derogatory or insulting context;
  • Providing quoted observations or phrases without commentary.

    In the tables below, we shall simply call the groupings “hard,” “medium” and “soft.”

    Grouping the hate speech targets is a much more challenging task. Any effort to do so would be somewhat artificial.

    We suggest the following grouping, not so much to link the targets together but to simplify our efforts of analysis.

    These are the categories:

    1. Residents of (or emigrants from) non-CIS Muslim countries. This category also includes “Muslims” and “new Muslim teachings” (the relevant corrective factor being 0.5) whose mention might be attributed either to non-CIS Muslims or to domestic Muslims. In the tables below, this grouping is called “non-CIS Muslims”:

    • Asian ethnic communities;
    • Muslims;
    • Arabs;
    • Afghans;
    • Pakistanis;
    • Kurds;
    • New Muslim teachings.

    2. Residents of (or emigrants from) Caucasus and Central Asian communities. By “Caucasus,” we mean both trans-Caucasus countries and Russian northern Caucasian regions. (We are discussing ethnic communities only; ethnic Russian residents of the northern Caucasus are considered “Russians”). The same corrective factor of 0.5 is applied here. In the tables below, this grouping is called “Caucasus and Central Asia.”

    • Caucasus and trans-Caucasus ethnic communities;
    • Central Asian ethnic communities;
    • Chechens;
    • Azeris;
    • Muslims;
    • Armenians;
    • Meskhetian Turks.

    3. All non-Russian -Orthodox religious groups (Jews are not considered as a religious group because they have rarely been targets of religious hatred, except for attacks from the radical and nationalistic media). In the tables below, the grouping is called “non-Orthodox.”

    • Non-Christians;
    • Non-Orthodox (possible Christians);
    • Muslims;
    • Catholics (and Uniats);
    • Jehovah’s Witnesses;
    • Scientologists;
    • New and small-sized religious groups;
    • New Muslim teachings.


    4. Americans.

    5. Jews.

    Group 4 and Group 5 can hardly be put into any other category, so they need to be distinct judging by the quantitative indicators.

    6. Others. This category includes the less often mentioned targets that could not be put to other categories (“Roma,” for example) and all other “non-Russian” groups. As was previously mentioned, the latter is often a target for xenophobic sentiments and is a catch-all for small ethnic communities that could not be placed in any of the aforementioned categories.

    • Non-whites;
    • Non-Slavs;
    • Africans;
    • Ukrainians;
    • Roma;
    • Estonians;
    • Russians;
    • Tartars.

    For the sake of brevity, the following tables contain only “positive” and “neutral” data. The numbers in the generalized tables bellow represent fractions from the total number of times each type of hate speech was mentioned.

    6.1. Hate Speech Types

    Hate Speech TypeFederalKemerovoÊubanPermRyazanSt. PetersurgMean value
    Hard0.000.110.030.000.290.000.07
    Medium0.420.210.470.290.450.250.35
    Soft0.580.680.510.710.260.750.58
    Total1.001.001.001.001.001.001.00


    Once again, one can see that on the federal level the “mainstream” media does not engage in hard hate speech. As far as other indicators are concerned, the federal-level data is not different from that obtained in surveys of regional material.

    Now it is perfectly clear how far ahead Ryazan is in this respect. The federal center and the Krasnodar territory display nearly identical indicators for hard hate speech.

    6.2. Hate Speech Targets

    Hate Speech TargetsFederalKemerovoKubanPermRyazanSt. PetersburgMean value
    Non-CIS Muslims0.220.050.050.290.210.130.16
    Caucasus and Central Asia0.370.210.550.430.260.360.36
    Non-Orthodox0.100.050.110.000.130.210.10
    Americans0.050.130.000.140.090.120.09
    Jews0.060.120.010.000.120.050.06
    Others0.200.440.280.140.200.120.23
    Total1.001.001.001.001.001.001.00


    There are few surprises in this table, with the Caucasus and Central Asian ethnic communities clearly the most frequent targets. Understandably, interest in the “non-CIS Muslims” and “Americans” is a result of the September 11 attacks in the United States, with the religious elements of the speech likewise being anti-Muslim to a significant degree.

    It was more or less expected that “anti-Americanism” would turn out to be stronger than “anti-Semitism.” Interestingly enough, the hate speech directed towards “non-CIS Muslims” was found to have been tougher than those directed towards domestic “Caucasus and Central Asian ethnic communities,” although conventional wisdom would suggest that the Afghan war was more removed from Russia than the Chechen war.

    Ideological hatred against “external” Muslims predominates in the Perm region (the reason, possibly, having something to do with the recent conflict between the two local muftis). Moreover, this enmity is above the average level not only in Ryazan but also on the federal level. Notably, the Perm region has no indication of any meaningful level of religious xenophobic sentiments, which appear to be raging rather high (for whatever reason) in St. Petersburg.

    Quite unexpectedly, Perm has shown rather high indications of hate speech towards the Caucasus and Central Asian ethnic communities, with the Krasnodar territory in the lead. Ryazan is far behind the leader this time around. Also, Ryazan performed “poorly” on “anti-Americanism” where the leaders (percentage-wise) are the quiet Perm and Kemerovo regions, along with St. Petersburg. Interestingly enough, the federal center unexpectedly lags behind on this indicator.


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