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English Language Page This term arise in countries that allow practically unlimited freedom of expression. Therefore, the issue is not about mass media constraints or threats of criminal prosecution. In Russia, just like in most European countries, one faces a set of rather rigorous (though rarely applied) administrative and legal bans on actions aimed at provoking racial, ethnic or religious discord. We, therefore, need to make a distinction between various degrees of hate speech Even the term itself should not be translated in a straightforward way as incitement of ethnic or other hostility, because this would precisely reflect the formulas contained in the applicable Russian legal provisions. Meanwhile hate speech often takes the form of negligence or personal gaffs, known in English-speaking countries as breaching the rules of “political correctness.” In order to avoid the error of categorizing as hate speech only that which is prohibited by law, we suggest that the term should be understood as a combination of media materials (including headlines, images and other elements) that either directly or indirectly serve to spread ethnic or religious hatred or animosity. We believe it advisable to proceed from the aforementioned description of the notion of hate speech in order to research its presence in printed material rather than use the term “hate speech” as it is understood abroad. It is necessary to point out from the very start that the goal of this monitoring effort is not to expose specific periodicals, broadcast media, or reporters. While some journalists, indeed, employ racist propaganda knowingly, the majority resort to hate speech without any racist motivations at all. The latter category of writers use inflammatory language for many poorly understood reasons. These journalists are largely unaware of what wordings should, in principle, be taboo in the area of journalism. We do not claim to be wholly unbiased judges in this matter. Of course, we fully realize that the risque nature of many wordings can be subjective and that the boundaries of “political correctness” are tentative and flexible. In our country, all these parameters have yet to be appropriately defined. The categorization of the monitoring results suggested in this report should provide some guidelines for a common broad-based effort to consider why and where hatred comes from and how the relevant issue ought to be covered, rather than just condemning the most able propagators of hate speech. Understandably, hate speech can reveal itself in a variety of ways. Firstly, any given material’s content can be expressed by very different words, some of which may either call for genocide or “simple” disparagement of a nation or people. Therefore, hate speech should somehow be categorized by type, which we shall discuss below. Secondly, hate speech is not necessarily revealed through factual content: it can be found in an article’s thrust or tone, style of chosen headlines, selection of supporting pictures, etc. Though the monitors can hardly be completely unbiased, we should not be particularly concerned about this. After all, hate speech aims at generating a reader’s personalized perception and/or reflects the author’s or another person’s subjective vision of a given reality. Our monitoring effort focuses primarily on hate speech used to arouse ethnic and/or religious hatreds. We do realize that an effort to provoke hatred should generally be preceded by an effort to identify the target for that hatred, a task not without some difficulty. Americans were the most frequent target encountered in the materials monitored during this project. To most scholars, Americans do not form an ethnic community nor, possibly, even a nation. However, we would rather put this largely academic argument aside. To the overwhelming majority of the Russian people, including journalists, Americans are a unique and uniform nation. In this respect, the media merely becomes a reflection of the consciousness of the masses, leaving ethnic identification and related ambiguities aside. The above could be said for the French; a citizen of France may or may not actually be of French origin. It should be also noted that the Jews, for example, could be viewed as both an ethnic group and a religious community. It is important to emphasize that whenever we say “Americans” we normally have in mind the American people or typical representatives of such, rather than the United States government. Politicized enmities, including hatreds of other governments, were not the subject of our monitoring efforts. Given that the Russian Federation currently has a very large number of media sources, we chose to concentrate our efforts on just a small segment of those. A number of federal print media and web-sites, as well as some print media from five regions of the Russian Federation have been the focus of our research. Those regions are: These regions were selected to achieve a diverse sample reflecting the following criteria: known high and low levels of hate speech, more and less advanced economic performance, varied political preferences displayed by the local leadership, and different geographic regions of the Russian Federation. The controlling rationale underlying the choices was that a focused effort to research a megalopolis, two industrial regions with a high number of urban dwellers, a standard “red-belt” region, and a region in southern-Russia whose local authorities are notorious for crudely violating the rights of ethnic minorities would provide a reasonable cross section of the Russian Federation. We chose not to investigate Russia’s ethnic republics, which certainly do deserve to be looked into separately. For the most part, this decision has to do with the fact that the term “domineering nation” carries a double meaning: either an ethnic community or a religious group within a given ethnic republic. As an example, the “domineering” position of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan appears to be at odds with the concept of the “titular” nation of Tartars in the republic, to say nothing of the fact that the “domineering” position of the Russian Orthodox Church exists against the backdrop the proliferation of Islam in the region. In addition, many local periodicals are printed in the local languages, a circumstance that would create extra difficulties for our researchers. We also tried to select representative print media, i.e., periodicals with different levels of circulation (leaders necessarily being included), dailies, weeklies, specialized publications (ranging from newspapers for “decision-makers” to magazines perceived as “gutter” press) that have been suspected of using hate speech. The material selected at the federal-level for expert examination included ten dailies, five weeklies and five news-cast web-sites. Initially, we planned to single out five dailies and two-three weeklies per region. However, as it turned out, most of the selected regions could not boast of so many high-profile periodicals. Given this difficulty, we treated each region individually in selecting local press for researching. From the very start we decided to steer clear of the offensively nationalistic periodicals perceived generally (both regionally and nationally) to be overtly marginal, rationalizing that such operations make using hate speech a matter of policy. Evidently, one should pursue a different approach to assess those sorts of publications (ranging from the Zavtra weekly to assorted low-distribution publications released rather irregularly), discussed briefly in an overview at the end of this report. It should also be noted that the monitoring and analysis of the federal-level mass media were carried out by the Information and Research Center “Panorama.” Monitoring and analysis of regional media, on the other hand, were conducted by the Moscow Helsinki Group and five competent regional human rights organizations, namely, the Ryazan branch of the “Memorial” Society, the Perm Human Rights Center, the Krasnodar Human Rights Center, the Kemerovo Center of Independent Journalism, and the Harold and Selma Light Center of St. Petersburg. Monitoring on the federal-level was begun on October 1, 2001, one month prior to the launch of monitoring on the regional level. This approach enabled us to fine-tune the methodology and revise the database rubricator (see below) before expanding our work from the center to the regions. Then, in order to synchronize the processes and avoid corruption of the comparative analysis, we chose to suspend our federal-level monitoring activities for one month (January 2002). While this monitoring schedule still introduces a certain level of inaccuracy into the comparison of federal and regional data, we believe this inaccuracy to be of little significance as our experience shows that most of the content of the publications is not necessarily, directly linked to events of major significance immediately after their occurrence. The one exception is September 11, but even in that case the difference has proven to be relatively unimportant: the topic of global confrontation was discussed in the press long after the day of the attacks. Thus, the given report covers federal monitoring for the period of October 1 — December 31, 2001, and regional monitoring for the period of November 1, 2001 — January 31, 2002. During this entire period, 260 different entries were introduced into the monitoring database, reports from federal or regional publications containing hate speech statements and remarks of different kinds presented in different ways. It should be taken into account that this report is based on our preliminary findings, calculations and conclusions only. After January 31, 2001, this monitoring effort will continue for another three months both in the center and in the regions. ÌONITORING METHODOLOGY The monitoring methodology was devised by the Informational and Research Center “Panorama” and the Moscow Helsinki Group. As was already pointed out, the presence of printed hate speech (in the broader meaning of the term) has been assessed rather subjectively. We suggested that monitors should primarily proceed by placing themselves in the shoes of the given ethnic community or religious group and judging whether the material in question seemed biased or offensive. On the other hand, we did draft a detailed categorization of hate speech manifestations. The techniques used to categorize were thoroughly explained to each monitor individually and during a special workshop. Project participants continually tracked and developed the reports filed by the monitors. Apart from the standard information identifying each publication, the following two basic hate speech characteristics were recorded: type and target. Initially, the categorization of type was to be rather specific so that a sort of a hate speech hierarchy could be developed. The scale was to range from hard-core (directly criminal) calls to violence or ethnic (religious) discriminatory practices to the mildest possible and seemingly inoffensive jokes about an ethnic community, including perhaps just a mention of the latter in some derogatory context (the classic example being “Ivan Petrov and two persons of the Caucasian nationality [ethnicity] robbed a stand”). Our perception was that one and the same material could carry several types of hate speech. However, things turned out to be much more complex. More often than not, it was impossible to classify a phrase or sentence of hate speech as any specific type. The boundaries of the suggested types were not demarcated clearly and largely overlapped with one another. We do not see this discovery as a major drawback of the monitoring effort, particularly given that the primary goal was to identify some principal landmark for a more focused study at a later date, rather than to provide well-defined categories of hate speech manifestations. Given this objective, a tentative vision of the desired end result appears to be more achievable at this point in time than a definitively fixed pattern. Admittedly, greater challenges emerged from the need to update and review the list of hate speech types as the monitors proceeded with their effort. Understandably, any change to the initial list of types only served to compound the difficulties relating to the project’s implementation. Fortunately, nearly all of the updates were introduced during the initial stage (primarily in the very first month of monitoring). Importantly, in nearly each case the relevant changes could be introduced retroactively, with the pertinent database entries being either corrected or updated accordingly. Nearly all of the aforementioned considerations are fully applicable to the creation of a list of hate speech targets, the only difference being that in this particular matter we never sought to secure a definitive system of classification. On the contrary, the initially-compiled list of targets carried such “broad-based” xenophobia targets as “non-Russians,” “non-Orthodox,” “non-whites,” along with some smaller and less specific target groups that a priori (from personal media-related experiences) also seemed to be relatively common hate speech targets. As a result, the list turned out to be too generous for some and too constricting for other groups, resulting in a measure of corrective inputs. What is more, the events of September 11 (rather the military operations in Afghanistan that produced such hate speech targets as Afghans and Pakistanis) also had their effects. For example, locally-relevant and short-lived targets (e.g., Ukrainians, following a passenger airliner being shot down by a Ukrainian missile) also quite unexpectedly became featured on the target list. The monitor was required to record both the author (or authors) of the text and the character (or characters) in the text, that is, the persons responsible for producing the hate speech effects of a given article. Notably, the character could be the author himself, especially if directly or indirectly he identified with somebody expressing himself in the spirit of hate speech. Though, in principle, the “author” is considered to be different from the “character.” The monitor was also required to indicate the author’s attitude towards the hate speech element contained in his material. While being fully aware of the difficulties inherent in this exercise, we nonetheless recognized the possibility of making a subjective classification into one of the following three levels: “rather positive” (author mostly supportive of the hate speech practices), “rather negative,” or “neutral.” Now, let us look into the lists of hate speech types and targets as they have come to be shaped by the middle of the reporting period. These lists are expected to create the underlying structure for the entire statistics-gathering effort. HATE SPEECH TYPES Based on preliminary analysis of media publications, we have identified the following range of hate speech types: A. Making direct and straightforward calls for violence (related to specific situations and targets); B. Calling for violence in the form of generalized slogans (calling on readers of articles, documents or other print materials to use violence as an acceptable tool, including calls of the type; “down with the Jews!”); C. Advancing direct and straightforward calls for discriminatory practices; D. Issuing calls for discriminatory practices in the form of generalized slogans; E. Releasing veiled calls for violence and discriminatory practices (spreading the knowledge of “positive,” historic or contemporary, examples of violence and discriminatory practices; using the catch-phrases of the type “It is high time they should be given …” or “They certainly deserve to be …”); F. Creating a nefarious image of a given ethnic community or religious group (related to the material’s thrust and tenor, rather than the presence of concrete accusations); G. Justifying historic cases of violence and discrimination (related to the use of such phrases as “After what the Chechens have done, it is only natural that…”); H. Releasing publications and/or pronouncements designed to cast doubt on universally recognized historical facts of violence and discrimination (related, for example, to the Holocaust or the theory that “The Chechens were evicted from their homeland under Stalin for having collaborated with Hitler”); I. Mentioning the name of an ethnic community or religious group in a derogatory way (usually in headlines); J. Making statements to the effect that an ethnic community or religious group is inherently deficient (i.e. lacking in culture or intellectual capacity, being unable to undertake creative pursuits; e.g., “Azeris are only good for working in farmer’s markets” or “Kazakhs are all a bit dim-witted”); K. Claiming that certain historical crimes had been committed by an ethnic community or religious group (pertinent examples include: “Muslims have always spread their religion by sword and fire” or “Polacks have always schemed against Russia”); L. Pointing out (for the purpose of getting the target discredited) that an ethnic community or religious group has been maintaining links with Russian or foreign political or governmental agencies (“The Meskhetian Turks are Turkish agents of influence in Russia” or “Catholics are all Western agents here,” etc.); M. Claiming that an ethnic community or religious group is criminal by nature (for example, “All Gypsies are thieves”); N. Pointing out that an ethnic community or religious group has some inherent moral deficiencies (“Jews will do anything for money” or “Gypsies are liars and cheats”); O. Making remarks that an ethnic community or religious group is disproportionately well-off, over-represented in government agencies or the media, etc.; P. Accusing an ethnic community or religious group of negative influences on society or the government (for example, “The Russian national identity is being diluted by …” or “With all these aliens, Moscow isn’t a Russian city” or “The Mormons are seeking to destroy the nation’s Orthodox identity”); Q. Portraying certain ethnic communities or religious groups or their representatives in a derogatory or insulting context (particularly in crime reports); R. Calling for action to prevent migrants representing an ethnic community or religious group from settling in a given region (community, neighborhood, etc.), an example being provided by “a group of protesters coming out against a mosque being erected in an ‘Orthodox town’”; S. Printing quoted observations or phrases without commentary (an author referring to explicitly xenophobic pronouncements without proper commentary that would enable the reader to distinguish between the opinion of the interviewee and the interviewer; or editors allowing for a piece of clearly nationalistic propaganda to be carried by a periodical without commentary or contrary opinion). HATE SPEECH TARGETS Hate speech targets are likewise listed here in the same order as they have been entered into the database. As was already pointed out, the list contains both very broad groups and rather specific and small ethnic and religious targets. Understandably, not only cases of non-differentiated xenophobia but also more specific manifestations of enmity that happened to be unlisted by category are attributed to the broader categories (“non-Russians,” for example). We believed it was not a good idea to precisely categorize any and all cases. We included a target category only when we confirmed that the given target had received more than a single hit. 1. Non-whites 2. Non-Slavs 3. Africans 4. Asian ethnic communities 5. Caucasus and trans-Caucasus ethnic communities 6. Central Asian ethnic communities 7. Americans 8. Jews 9. Ukrainians 10. Roma 11. Chechens 12. Azeris 13. Non-Russians 14. Non-Christians 15. Non-Orthodox (possible Christians) 16. Muslims 17. Catholics (and Uniats) 18. Jehovah’s Witnesses 19. Scientologists 20. New and small religious groups 21. Estonians 22. Arabs 23. Afghans 24. Pakistanis 25. Armenians 26. Meskhetian Turks 27. Kurds 28. New Muslim teachings 29. Russians 30. Tartars (1) For the compilation of this chapter, materials of the project “Racism and Xenophobia in Russian Mass Media: Monitoring and Public Actions” were used. The project is carried out by the Moscow Helsinki Group in cooperation with the Information and Research Center “Panorama,” Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights, and Glasnost’ Defense Foundation with the support of the Open Society Institute. Back |
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