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English Language Page The situation of Chechens in Russia has become a classic case of persecution on grounds of ethnicity characteristic of our country. The predicament in which Chechens find themselves is well known. Various human rights organizations focus their attention on the status of Chechens in Russia, working for the restoration of the rights of refugees from Chechnya as well as those Chechens who reside permanently in other regions of Russia; the liberal press draws the attention of its readers to the issue by publishing materials on specific violations of their rights. Nevertheless, despite the vast amount of facts accumulated, human rights organizations began summarizing the overall situation in the country only in the last several years. Judging by the annual reports, Human Rights in Russian Regions, prepared by the Moscow Helsinki Group in 1999–2002 and the monitoring of the situation with nationalism and xenophobia conducted by the monitoring network of regional NGOs coordinated by the Moscow Helsinki Group, the cases of persecution of Russian citizens of Chechen origin are both common and similar throughout all regions of the country. A long, detailed account of violations of the civil and social-economic rights of Chechens, including those cases related to the practically universal refusal of registration to refugees from Chechnya, the situation in the refugee camps in Ingushetia and, of course, the data from the ongoing monitoring of the status of civilian population inside the republic, is contained in the reports of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center (The Issues of Ethnic Discrimination in the Regions of the Russian Federation; Migration and Law; Hot Spots) and those of the “Civic Assistance” Committee (Discrimination on the Grounds of Place of Residence and Ethnicity in Moscow and the Moscow Region for the Period of August 1999 — December 1999; Discrimination on the Grounds of Place of Residence and Ethnicity in Moscow and Moscow Region for the Period of August 1999 — December 2000; On the Status of the Refugees from Chechnya in Russia of May 9, 2002) (1) The data provided by all those organizations as well as a number of publications in the mass media were used as the basis for the preparation of this section. DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-CAUCASIAN AND ANTI-CHECHEN ATTITUDES IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY Just ten years ago, no one could have imagined that ethnic discrimination would become one of the major problems in the Russia. Of major concern in liberal circles of the time was the aftermath of Soviet policies of state-sponsored anti-Semitism, an integral part of the Soviet mentality and a prerequisite for the career growth of government administration officials, officers of KGB, army and law enforcement. However, all of the attempts made by conservative Soviet leaders and later on their protegees, the rightist radical organizations, to stir up anti-Semitic attitudes in their fight against the pro-democracy movement turned out to be politically ineffective. The inter-ethnic conflicts that served as the detonator for the collapse of the Soviet Union were being perceived at that time as processes unfolding at the outskirts of the empire, totally unsustainable and not capable of having any serious impact on the political situation in the center. In the meantime, Russian society had already developed latent anti-Caucasian prejudices although they were not being exploited yet by any of the major political parties. This could be explained by the fact that in the Soviet era none of the groups comprising the movement for an independent Russian nation (top officials of the Soviet Union, “back-country” writers, nationalistically oriented dissidents) paid any serious attention to the development of anti-Caucasian attitudes. Society in general apparently became aware of anti-Caucasian sentiments no earlier than the late 1970s — early 1980s. This is corroborated by the emergence of similar themes in such literary pieces as Czar-Fish and Fishing for Gudgeons in Georgia, by a prominent Russian writer, Viktor Astafyev. The subsequent onset of a rigid ideological confrontation during the years of perestroika made it impossible for the ideologists of Russian nationalism to focus also on the development of this relatively new topic. Driven to the margins of social life, anti-Caucasian attitudes were continuously gaining ground among different groups of society without attracting much attention from the government and politicians. One of the most frequent allegations made against Caucasians at that time was an assertion that they were prone to extreme violence. Thus, in 1988, the author of this chapter attended a lecture given by a medical examiner to a group of medical students in a morgue. Pointing to a corpse of a young woman the forensic expert explained that 17 knife wounds in the body of the victim could have been inflicted only by a Caucasian and that this extraordinary cruelty in a homicide was characteristic only of them. The follow-up questions addressed to the other workers of that morgue showed that the convictions of this particular medical examiner were shared to various extents by all of his colleagues. Such beliefs were evidently the result of a generally accepted stereotype common not only to that particular morgue, the employees of which could accumulate information about the ethnic origins of the criminals only occasionally and infrequently, but also to the detectives and officers of the law enforcement bodies working in close contact with forensic experts. Indeed, as was confirmed by subsequent experience with police and prosecutors, the view that similar cases fit an innately Caucasian pattern was deep rooted in their departments. However, criminal motives were not the only basis for anti-Caucasian attitudes. The demise of the Soviet Union and inter-ethnic conflicts that flared up on the outskirts of its former territory brought about massive migrations of people. Many residents of the Caucasus region had to abandon their homes seeking refuge from poverty and unemployment. Once in Russia, they had to compete for jobs with local residents. Unfortunately, the number of previously available positions in state-run enterprises was continuously declining, while the remaining jobs were barely enough for the existing workforce. As a result, the adaptation of migrants became extremely complicated and they had to earn their living by doing odd jobs. This was the main reason for their move into private business. They were forced to rely on their own initiative and this consequently, contributed to their better adaptation to the new social conditions. Under the conditions of the transitional period, the activities of the most successful businessmen (which is characteristic of all businessmen regardless of their ethnic origin) often came into conflict with the law. The criminal communities that were actively evolving and that actually controlled nascent Russian businesses organized themselves both on “territorial” (“Tambov-group,” “Kazan-group,” etc.) and on ethnic bases (“Georgian,” “Chechen,” groups). Fierce criminal wars erupted among various gangs sometimes inflicting casualties on non-criminals. Trying to increase the range of property under their control, they attempted to expand their influence not only to independent entrepreneurs but also to businesses paying protection money to the competing gangs. This resulted in some demonstrative beatings and killings of the defiant businessmen and their relatives, which frightened the rest of the entrepreneurs and translated into extra profits for the gangsters. One of the most frequent practices was to appoint a representative of the criminal community to the top management of controlled companies to exercise better supervision over them and determine the amount of protection money to be paid. Those processes were not a secret to the majority of the economically active population and led to the growth of anti-Caucasian attitudes among the population. As often happens, these attitudes extended not only to the criminals but also to all prosperous migrants from the Caucasus living in Russia. Moreover, the hatred towards all “Caucasians” and especially “Chechens” was actively instigated by their “Slavic” criminal competitors, who proclaimed themselves to be the guardians of the local population. Anti-Caucasian sentiments became omnipresent in Russia. The law enforcement bodies tried but could not cope with the tidal wave of crime and criminal seizures of property. While dealing with ethnic criminal communities, their task was additionally hampered by the absence of informants in the highly impenetrable monoethnic milieu and high level of mobility of the mobsters. As a result, it became close to impossible to solve serious crimes committed by migrants from the Caucasus. The pervasive corruption at all levels also contributed to the failure of law enforcement. Under these circumstances, the regional governments in Moscow, some regions of Southern Russia and the Far East adopted unlawful measures aimed at curbing the migration and in fact targeting “non-Slavic” visitors. Law-enforcement bodies, in their turn, increased pressure against all migrants from the Caucasus region, while a new and offensive cliche, “individuals of Caucasian nationality [ethnicity]” found its way into daily police reports of detained criminals. Since the second half of 1993, first a number of regional populist politicians and then some federal political parties started using anti-Caucasian slogans along with and sometimes instead of anti-Semitic ones. The Russian-Chechen war began in late 1994. With the beginning of the war, the status of Chechens in the internal regions of Russia became worse compared to other Caucasians, although extraordinary policing measures by the authorities were extended to the latter as well. Anti-military sentiments and compassion for the suffering of the population in Chechnya, felt by a large portion of the society at the beginning of the Chechen war were commingled with anti-Chechen feelings directed at local Chechen neighbors. The sentiment prevalent among the people at large was expressed at that time by Alexander Solzhenitsin, who suggested cutting off Chechnya after having resettled all Chechens within its borders. This proposal naturally aroused severe criticism both from liberal politicians, who considered any kind of resettlement unacceptable in principle, and from their opponents, who principally stood up for the idea of the territorial integrity of Russia. After several months, when the substantial number of casualties became known, the war turned into an additional source of hatred towards Chechens living in Russia. During the first military campaign of 1994–1996 and in the following three years of coexistence between the independent Ichkeria Republic and the Russian Federation, the republic was abandoned not only by the remaining few non-Vainakh members of the population, i.e., Russians, Jews, Armenians, as well as other ethnic minorities, which during Soviet times made up about a third of the total population of the republic, but also by a considerable portion of ethnic Chechens. Some of them were supporters of the pro-Moscow government and had to flee persecution from the separatists, while others sought to escape the devastation, banditry and dangers of war. The right to compensation for homes abandoned or destroyed during the war was granted to those who left the Chechen Republic in the period between December 12, 1994, and November 23, 1996. A large group of Chechens (officials of the former pro-Moscow government of Chechnya, officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement bodies of the republic) were provided employment in different regions of Russia. However, the problems related to obtaining registration in their new place of residence became the main obstacle to normal adaptation for the majority of Chechens in Russia. In spite of the fact that federal legislation requires only a notification procedure for the registration of Russian citizens, the authorities in many constituent territories of the federation enacted rules that limited the freedom of movement and freedom of choice with regards to place of residence. In these regions, an approval type of registration was implemented de-facto. The arriving Chechens were everywhere regarded as unwanted elements and only with great difficulty and bribes managed to slip through the sieve of the registration bodies. The absence of a residential permit created a host of problems, including de-facto deprivation of civil and socio-political rights. Along with other migrants from the Caucasus, they were also subjected to police harassment and extortion. In 1996–1999 the human rights organizations in Moscow registered a number of large-scale operations conducted by law enforcement authorities against Chechens and Ingushes. These operations included “check-ups,” detentions and searches, accompanied by beatings and humiliation. The following is one of the most striking examples. On December 29, 1997, at about 10 p.m., ten rooms in the dormitory of the Russian University of the Friendship of the Peoples, occupied mainly by the young Caucasian males, were stormed by composite teams of the Rapid Reaction Police Task Force (SOBR) and the Regional Department Against Organized Crime (RUBOP). Threatened with guns and clubs the students were forced to lie down on the floor. Then they were asked about their ethnic origin and beaten. Chechens were beaten especially severely. Almost all of the 20 young adults (Chechens, Ingushes and Cabardinians) were beaten and then were taken at gunpoint to the police station in the Obruchev district at Miklukho-Maklai Street. The victims of the police brutality testified that on that night the police station was filled to capacity with Caucasians. At the police station the beatings resumed. Again Chechens were beaten with exceptional cruelty and sophistication, their ethnic and religious dignity was purposefully offended and they were repeatedly told that this was “in retribution for Chechnya.” The beatings were conducted by the same officers of SOBR, while the local policemen remained absolutely indifferent and would not interfere. In the end, all the students were registered in the police journal again and their likenesses were captured on video. Their passports were taken away. Two hours later, the beaten-up students (eight Chechen youths were severely injured) were taken back to the dormitory. Some of them were returned their papers only five days later (2). Two invasions of Dagestan in August and September of 1999 (the Botlikhsky district in August and Novolokasky in September) conducted by the Chechen insurgent groups of Shamil Basayev and Hattab, the series of apartment building bombings in the cities of Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk that resulted in heavy casualties and according to the representatives of investigators, which were carried out by the graduates of Hattab’s Chechen sabotage training camps, brought about a general outburst of hatred towards Chechens. Many of them tried not to leave their homes, but were subjected to checks by law enforcement authorities even there. A special police operation dubbed “Whirlwind Anti-Terror” was conducted across Russia in the period between September 13 and October 6, 1999. Among other things, this operation was aimed at tightening up the system of residence registration. In many parts of the country including its capital, the local authorities tried, in defiance of the RF Constitution and federal legislation, to adopt additional extraordinary police measures. In most cases, such measures proved to be ineffective and only resulted in massive violations of human rights. In practice, they included arbitrary and unlawful denials of residence or temporary stay registration, large-scale police check-ups of registration papers accompanied by arbitrary detainment, beatings of the detainees, entry into living quarters and seizure of personal documents. Many Chechens were forced to give “voluntary” consent to fingerprinting. That period of time was rich in falsified criminal cases against Chechens. The widespread practice was to plant ammunition, arms or drugs on them. Sometimes they were even offered a selection of charges to be brought against them, and forced to choose. In many instances the initiative for conducting reprisals against Chechens was coming not from the local authorities, but from law enforcement officers. The frightened and vengeful Russian population was generally supportive of the police actions to the degree that they denounced their neighbors in hiding. CURRENT SITUATION The second military campaign in Chechnya, which began in October of 1999, was also accompanied by massive check-ups and detentions of Chechens all over the country, as well as beatings and other acts of unlawful violence committed by police officers. However, the instances of massive killing and the disappearances of people in Chechnya, “hard” and “soft” mop-up operations, assaults and robbery conducted by the federal troops compelled a significant number of Chechens to keep away from their home republic. Some of them settled in neighboring Ingushetia, others spread out all over the country. The head of the Federal Migration Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrei Chernenko, in his statement of June 13, 2002, made public the following interesting data. According to him, there are currently about 147 000 registered temporary migrants from Chechnya on the territory of Ingushetia, who are accommodated in tent-camps and private houses. In the last two months, only 2 500 of them have voluntarily returned to Chechnya. The number of those returning home from other parts of Russia is even less. The ongoing Russian-Chechen war and its inevitable casualties stir up blind anger not only among those who are directly involved in the conflict, i.e., servicemen, law enforcement officers and special services personnel. According to a rough estimate, over 350 000 Russian citizens have taken part in the first or second Chechen campaigns in the ranks of the Russian armed forces. Many of them have been poisoned with hatred towards Chechens and are capable of passing this hatred as a contagious disease to others. The fact that thousands of people, both federal servicemen as well as ethnic Chechens and residents of the republic of different ethnic origin, have died in the course of the two military conflicts in Chechnya, serves as a major factor constantly feeding the tension in the relationship between Chechens and the rest of Russia’s population. Moreover, in some regions the migrants from the Caucasus are subjected to pressure not only from the authorities, but from extremist nationalistic groups as well. The authorities prefer to turn a blind eye to these kinds of activities and, secretly sympathizing with the extremists, try to explain away the periodic incidents involving racial hatred by pointing to the wrong and sometimes even provocative conduct of the victims, who behave themselves differently and stand out against the general background. Thus, the monitoring findings in the Voronezh region for 2001 contain the results of a poll of Voronezh residents conducted by the “Quapitas” Public Opinion Research Institute. Asked, “which ethnic group do you find the most unpleasant?” 13.9% of the respondents named Chechens, 10.5% named “individuals of Caucasian origin,” and 3.2% named Jews. Only 56.7% of the respondents answered that there was no such ethnic group. 5.8% of the respondents chose not to answer the question. The authors of the report maintain that “Chechens” is one of the few ethnic groups that are most frequently mentioned by the local mass media in a negative context. The term “individuals of Caucasian origin” is mentioned in a negative sense three times more often than in a positive sense. Today, the persecution of Chechens by the authorities receives support from the majority of the Russian population. Some people simply believe law enforcement authorities when they call their actions normal measures of fighting against organized criminal groups, drugs trafficking, abduction of people, terrorism and other grave crimes, while the ethnic selectivity of their actions is justified by the current crime situation. It is easier to believe the authorities when the statements of law enforcement press services continue to emphasize the ethnic origin of non-Russian detainees and suspects. In the absence of a professional recruitment procedure, some law enforcement officers often act as active promoters of nationalistic ideology. An example demonstrating the nationalistic nature of persecution against Chechens is a raid conducted by the soldiers of the Tver Regional Department Against Organized Crime (RUBOP) on a cafeteria “Vstrecha” in the village of Krasny Kholm (Tver region). The head of Tver Chechen-Ingush Diaspora “Vainakh,” Alikhan Dabayev, is firmly convinced of the incident’s nationalist overtones: It is amazing that the people in the ski-masks did not even try to conceal that they were looking for Chechens. For example, they got hold of a dark-haired youth who was crying out that he was not a Chechen. They asked him for proof. He showed them his passport and when they saw that the youth was a Russian, they let him go. If someone turned out to be a Chechen, that person was immediately detained. The law enforcement authorities naturally denied any nationalist motivation in the detention of Chechens (3). It should be emphasized that the war had an impact on ethnic criminal communities, including Chechen gangs, only initially. In the first months following the start of the first Chechen campaign, law enforcement authorities did in fact increase pressure on Chechen organized criminal groups, but soon the representatives of the top layers of the Chechen criminal apparatus managed to distance themselves from their militant brethren and partially reestablish their rapport with law enforcement officers. Later on, Russian authorities and law enforcement repeatedly stated that Chechen criminal groups provided financial aid to armed separatist groups in Chechnya and reported major successes in curbing the activities of such groups. However, not a single case ever reached trial. Most likely, all of such statements were part of a propaganda campaign. This conclusion is indirectly corroborated by regular reports from the Federal Security Service claiming that they had detained, in various Russian cities, secret agents of the “Ichkeria” secret services, who had been recruited from among Russian soldiers taken prisoner in Chechnya. Indeed, it seems that if the Ichkerian intelligence service had reliable contacts with Chechen organized criminal groups, it would not have used such unreliable agents. VIOLATIONS OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF CHECHENS IN RUSSIA Freedom of Movement, Choice of a Place of Residence and Registration It is common knowledge that all human rights are interrelated and that violation of one of the basic rights inevitably leads to the violation of the other rights. The experience of the Chechens, who had to abandon their homes in Chechnya, shows that the violation of the right to freedom of movement and the right to select a residence inevitably leads to the infringement of a whole set of civil, political and socio-economic rights. The practice of denying the registration of residence or temporary stay, currently prevalent in Russia, turns many Chechens, who left Chechnya in recent years and who are citizens of the Russian Federation, into illegal immigrants in their own country. Although they possess all the regular papers, they can not exercise most of the rights granted to Russian citizens because the implementation of these rights is dependent on the availability of one or another type of registration. Regional and local statutes and orders effectuating such legislation turn the registration of residence or temporary stay (in defiance of the RF Constitution, Law “On the Right to Freedom of Movement” and the rulings of the RF Constitutional Court) from what was formerly a notification procedure into an obligatory approval procedure. Enforcement of the new procedure requires the police to conduct permanent “control over the observance of registration regulations.” All incoming individuals, lacking local registration, are subject to a violation of the right to freedom of movement and police arbitrariness. However, compared to other ethnic groups, Azeris, Chechens, Ingushes, Georgians and Tajiks become special targets of police persecution. It is hard to give an exact estimate of the number of refugees from the Chechen Republic, but it is quite obvious that only a few of them managed to obtain the legal status of forced migrants or at the very least, simple residence registration. According to the data provided by the Deputy Minister for Federation Affairs, Ethnic and Migration Policies of the Russian Federation, A. Blagovidov, in his letter to the Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for C.I.S. Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, V. Igrunov, “in the period between September 1999 and the start of 2001, the territorial authorities of the Federal Migration Service and the Ministry for Federation Affairs of the RF in the Chechen, Ingush, Dagestan, and North Ossetia-Alania Republics as well as the Stavropol territory have registered in accordance with form ¹7 (“registration of a family that has arrived at a new place in an emergency situation”) 568 449 persons, who had abandoned their place of permanent residence on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” (4) It is also well known that many of those who left Chechnya had to go, for various reasons, through the registration procedure several times and thus the real number of refugees has to be less than that given in the above letter. The letter further states that: After the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, in the period between October 1, 1999, and October 1, 2001, the territorial authorities of the Federal Migration Service and the Ministry for Federation Affairs registered as forced migrants 12 500 people, (or 6 000 families) who had been forced to leave the Chechen Republic. An absolute majority of them are representatives of non-titular ethnic groups or mixed families consisting both of individuals of titular and non-titular ethnic groups. The letter also mentions that in the nine months of 2001, only 1 331 people were registered as forced migrants out of the 2 903 who had applied for that status. It specifically points out that the rest of the citizens were “denied registration as forced migrants.” In comparison, in the period of 1991–1996, i.e., before and during the first war in Chechnya when the bulk of the migrants from Chechnya was composed of ethnic Russians, the status of forced migrants was granted to 150 000 people. According to the data provided by S. Gannushkina, head of the “Migration and Law” Network of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center: There is direct evidence that the migration authorities were advised not to grant forced migrants status to ethnic Chechens because they are not considered victims of discrimination based on ethnic, religious or political grounds. A number of regions make an exception for those few who can prove, with documents, their allegiance to the Russian government, direct cooperation with it in the period of D. Zavgayev or persecution from Muslim fundamentalists or bandits. As a rule, a favorable decision can be obtained only as a result of a legal action in the courts. The data provided by the “Migration and Law” Network shows that a number of migrant families were denied forced migrants status although in their applications they justified leaving Chechnya with such reasons as threats from Wahhabi guerrillas, unacceptability of the Wahhabit interpretation of Islam and regulation of everyday life, as well as coercion to provide assistance to bandits. Pyotr Aivenov, a lawyer for the “Migration and Law” Network in the city of Cheboksary, reports that in accordance with official letter ¹01/52 of December 19, 2000, received from the territorial branch of the Migration Service in the Chuvash Republic, the status of forced migrants is not to be granted to residents of the Chechen Republic who have arrived for a temporary stay without canceling their registration at the previous place of residence because “those individuals who have been registered temporarily by the migration service are not subject to the RF Law ‘On Forced Migrants.’” On some rare occasions it had been possible to obtain such a status through a court ruling. This was the case with the daughter and son-in-law of the former head of the administration of the Vedeno district, Amir Zagayev, who had been executed by the decision of a Sharia court. After the murder of the father, his daughter, Malika Zagayeva, with her husband, Iles Tukhashev, and two small children born in 1994 and 1995 respectively, had to leave Chechnya several days after the funeral because Iles Tukhashev, who was hiding with his friends, received a message saying that unless he joined a group of militants, he would share the fate of his father-in-law. With the assistance of their friends, Malika and Iles managed to escape with their small children to the city of Nazran (Ingushetia). But even there they were not left in peace. Iles Tukhashev was again made to understand that it was his duty to wash away with blood the betrayal of his father-in-law. The Migration Service sent the Tukhashev family to the city of Tambov, where they arrived on January 17, 2001, and applied for the status of forced migrants. The territorial body of the Migration Service in the Tambov region in a decision handed down on August 24, 2000, rejected their request. This decision was appealed to the Oktyabrsky district court of the city of Tambov. The appellate documents were lost twice in the court’s offices but finally, based on documents, newspaper clippings and testimony provided, the Tukhashevs’ won their appeal (5). Another example comes from a lawyer in the “Migration and Law” Network in the city of Voronezh, Vyacheslav Bitutsky. A family of ethnic Chechens (Russian citizens) T. Makayeva and K. Yasayev with their three small sons, escaped the bombardment of the city of Grozny in November of 1999 and arrived in Ingushetia. At the time, there were no vacancies in the refugee camps so the Migration Service of the Ingush Republic sent them to the Voronezh region. The family was given shelter in a center for temporary accommodation and filed an application for the status of forced migrants. Their request was rejected. Appeals to higher authority turned out to be fruitless. In November 2000, T. Makayeva filed an appeal with the Kominternovsky district court of the city of Voronezh. In support of her claim of real danger of persecution she brought up the descriptions of the shooting of peaceful Chechen civilians by federal troops during the storming of Grozny in October of 1999, the death of their neighbor, who was taken forcibly from his home, as well as the testimony of her mother, who stayed behind in Grozny and testified to the persecutions of Chechens on the basis of their ethnicity. One year later, in October 2001, the court took up the case and rejected the appeal. In February 2002, an appellate court reviewed the ruling and decided to leave the decision of the court of first instance unchanged. During court hearings it became known that the migration authorities of the Voronezh region referred to the letter of the Ministry for Federation Affairs ¹08-3757 of May 23, 2001, which reads as follows: Granting the status of a forced migrant to individuals driven from their homes by the danger of probable suffering as a result of anti-terrorist measures on the territory of the Chechen Republic, as well in relation to large-scale violations of public order is not allowed as it has not been provided for in the law. Besides, the conduct of anti-terrorist measures can not be viewed as a large-scale violation of public order because these measures are aimed at restoring the public order. Protocol ¹2 attached to T. Makayeva’s appeal shows that the status of forced migrants was denied only to refugees of Chechen origin. The following statement made in the courtroom during the trial by an official of the Migration Service of the Voronezh region is representative in this respect. She said that, “federal forces were sent to Chechnya by the President to restore peace and order there, not to persecute this particular family.” (6) S. Gannushkina, head of the “Migration and Law” Network of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center, maintains that “every instance of forced migrant status being granted through judicial decision is achieved after enormous effort by lawyers and human rights activists, imposes enormous strain on migrants, who have to spend hours waiting for the trial hearings, tolerate humiliation from the representatives of migration authorities and in some cases, even judges.” For instance, judge Makarova from the Meshchansky district court of the city of Moscow, in the course of the trial addressed those present calling them “individuals of Caucasian ethnicity” and claimed that she “could not stand more than four of them in the courtroom at one time.” Remarks such as “they have arrived in mass,” they “kill our sons in Chechnya, etc.,” are often directed at migrants from Chechnya. Not only are judicial appeals useless (in most cases) in obtaining forced migrant status, they are of little assistance in filing a motion to obtain such status. Nevertheless, there are also some positive examples. In the Kurgan region, appeals to the courts proved to be effective. In the period beginning in September of 1999 until the present time, the region has received 496 migrants from the Chechen Republic. The status of forced migrant was granted to 46 people and it was done exclusively through court rulings (7). Evaluation of this data requires one to remember that former residents of Chechnya, having failed to obtain the status of forced migrant, find themselves in a worse situation compared to that of migrants from other regions of Russia with respect to their prospects of obtaining residence registration in any region. Under the current regulations, they are asked first to cancel their previous residence registration in Chechnya, although return there under present conditions poses a danger to their lives. The last available, but most frequently used legal option in keeping with current rules is to obtain temporary stay registration (registration at the place of stay) while living with one’s relatives/friends or renting an apartment. Information coming in from various regions of Russia shows that even this option has special provisions exclusively for Chechens, which makes for maximum complication of the entire procedure. In Moscow, for example, local police officers, contrary to existing regulations, put their endorsements on registration application forms. Furthermore, after the apartment building bombings in Moscow on September 9 and 13, 1999, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov signed an executive order requiring obligatory reregistration within a three-day period for those who had been registered at a place of temporary stay. Collection of all the required documents and queuing for hours at the police station made this task practically impossible. Many of those eligible failed to reregister by the final deadline of September 21. According to official data, as of September 26, 1999, 105 000 people applied for reregistration and 20 000 of them had their requests rejected. Successful reregistration required submission of documents confirming one’s stay in Moscow (labor contract, a paper from hospital, etc.). But even some of those who submitted all the required documents were denied registration. In the end, everything hinged on the whim of officials. Reregistration for Chechens was out of the question. Police officers repeatedly stated that they had received unwritten orders not to register Chechens. In many cases law enforcement officials put pressure on landlords, who lent their apartments to Chechens and were willing to reregister them. On the one hand, law enforcement authorities hampered registration of residence or temporary stay and on the other they persecuted people for living without registration. During document checks and detentions, people distinguished by their appearance as being of a different ethnic origin from the rest of the population are subjected to humiliating treatment offensive to human and ethnic dignity. Moreover, document checks of Chechens have become a means for extortion by law enforcement authorities. For example, the Novye Izvestia newspaper (8) carried a story of the Chechen family of Lom-Ali and Malika Vatsayev, who left their destroyed house in Chechnya and went to live with their relatives in Moscow. The Vatsayevs rented an apartment and duly registered at their new place of residence. It was this registration that was the starting point of their troubles. Two weeks afterwards they were visited by two officers of the local Ivanovsky district police station Gargushin and Zhmalkov who demanded that the family vacate their apartment. Malika Vatsayev found out that the two officers did not receive any orders to conduct a passport control check and acted on their own initiative, most likely, to extract a bribe. She took this story to the editorial office of Novye Izvestia newspaper. The journalists called the chief of Ivanovsky district police station, Ivan Khonsky, who on the same day contacted Malika Vatsayev to apologize for the behavior of his subordinates and promised that the refugee family would not be disturbed again. However, the two disgruntled police officers summoned Lom-Ali, the head of Vatskhayev’s family, to their office and “inquired whether Chechens really wanted to live in peace, and if so, why did they complain to the newspaper. As grown-up people they should have realized that now they would not be left in peace in any case.” During checks of identification papers conducted in the streets and living quarters of the capital, police officers routinely detain and take to police stations migrants from the Caucasus. Some of the detainees are people who live in Moscow permanently and are duly registered at their place of residence, some of them are refugees from the Southern Caucasus countries or people who temporarily live and work in Moscow and have a registration of temporary stay. Police officers often seize and destroy the registration papers of the detainees. Sometimes (usually during raids on living quarters), detainees’ passports are taken away. Some of the detainees are kept in custody for more than three days and many of them are denied the opportunity to inform their relatives and friends about their whereabouts. According to the data collected by the “Memorial” Human Rights Center and that supplied by regional NGO-members of the human rights monitoring network coordinated by the Moscow Helsinki Group, campaigns against Chechens similar to the one conducted in Moscow were carried out in other regions of the country as well. Special attempts were made to fan the flames of suspicion towards the migrants from the Caucasus. For example, on September 14, 1999, the press-service of the regional police department of Syktykvar (Komi Republic) issued an appeal to the population that, among other things, contained the following recommendation: If your new neighbors are migrants from the Caucasus or if such individuals have caught your attention and their activities are of a questionable nature, report them to law enforcement officers. Be assured that the relevant authorities will do more than just merely check into the legal aspects of the their stay. Once in a while the situation becomes totally absurd. For example, an ethnic Chechen, A. Danisultanov, approached the editors of the Novaya Gazeta newspaper asking them to publish a statement to the effect that he was free of any wrongdoing before the law and he is not on the police most-wanted list. The Kolpinsky district court issued a ruling along similar lines. Still, the police detain him several times a week. Every time, A. Denisultanov shows them the court ruling but that does not help much (9). Detained citizens are not given the opportunity to call home to inform their relatives about their detention or to seek legal advice. All attempts to exercise one’s rights are being resolutely thwarted by police officers and can even incite the police to resort to violence. Therefore, detainees are strongly advised to comply whenever possible with the demands of police officers. Victims can raise the issue of unlawful detention and restoration of their legal rights only after they get released from police custody. There are numerous known instances of police officers forcing their way into the homes of citizens without a proper warrant and contrary to the will of the inhabitants. For example, the “Memorial” Human Rights Center has evidence that the homes of Chechens and Dagestanies in Moscow have been specifically targeted for such measures. In some cases, the inhabitants were taken into custody, were given orders to leave Moscow and their apartments were sealed. Sometimes those taken into custody during the raids were beaten at police stations. It is not uncommon that valuables and money would disappear in the course of “checks” conducted in homes and offices (10). Law-enforcement officers returning from Chechnya actively apply the experience acquired during mop-up operations there, while perpetrating seizures during unlawful searchers in the homes of Chechens. For example, such an operation took place in the Staritsky district of the Tver region. On the morning of May 29, a police convoy accompanied by traffic police vehicles entered a village. One hundred and fifty agents, headed by local investigating officer Kozlov, started the “operation.” The house of Nurda Shamastov in the village of Ildeikino was stormed by special task force troopers at 7:30 a.m., while the homeowner was absent. Sleeping women and children found in the house were rudely woken up (this Chechen family was sheltering their relatives, who had escaped from the city of Gudermes). According to the wife of Nurda Shamastov, the soldiers cursed incessantly, using obscene language, called the children jackals and wolves and verbally abused the women. One of the soldiers put his gun to the head of a 12-year boy and pretended to press the trigger. The soldiers threw one of Nurda’s sons on the floor of the corridor. His mother thought he was dead. She made an attempt to get to the boy but receiving a blow on the head, was thrown into a corner of the room. During her second attempt to get closer to the boy, the soldiers flew into a rage. They started beating the Chechen woman, trying to hit her in the head with their gun-butts (11). When the homeowner returned, they threw him into the mud without warning and put a gun to his head. A plain clothes officer said, “We killed you in Chechnya and we will kill you here.” After a wile N. Shamastov was taken inside. Then, he saw a Gazel mini-van filled with soldiers leaving the open gates of his brother’s garage. Then witnesses were invited and the “official” part of the search went on consistent with protocol and without beatings. The family of Nurda Shamastov was “lucky” after all. Ammunition or drugs were not planted on them and they “got away” with minimum damage: Nurda Shamastov’s brother, Nuradi, was taken to a forest 70 kilometers from his home and severely beaten, the rest of them escaped with only bruises and the loss of several sacks of grain and several packs of tiles. When the search was over, Nurda Shamastov’s wife threatened that she would take this matter to the prosecutor’s office. To this one of the soldiers replied: “If you file a complaint, we will stage a second Chechnya for you here!” But for the persistence of the head of “Vainakh” Chechen-Ingush Diaspora in the Tver region, Alikhan Dabayev, this incident would have gone unreported. He managed to convince his compatriots to file complaints with the prosecutor’s office demanding that an investigation of the incident be conducted. As it turned out, a search warrant had been issued by the prosecutor of the Staritsk district, Kadanev, allegedly following a complaint by one of the villagers that his wall-clock, ten meters of plastic cover and a sewing machine were stolen. The prosecutor personally visited the village to find out the details. Nurda Shamastov asked the prosecutor, “Why did you send them here, you know me, you know that I’ve lived here for twenty years?” The prosecutor did not answer. When he was asked by the local store watchman, why they had to shoot his dog, he replied, “You should forgive them.” Officially, the Staritsk district has 459 residents of Chechen origin. Most of them came to the Tver region in the 1970s and 1980s, when the government resettled the so called “surplus labor force” from the Caucasus republics, the rest are refugees. Getting residence registration is practically impossible even for those Chechens whose parents have been living in the region since Soviet times. Employees of passport offices cite a directive, prohibiting them from registering “individuals of Caucasian ethnicity,” especially if they arrived from Chechnya. However, this information was denied by the passport service of the Tver region police department. A more vivid illustration of a real “mopping-up” operation, but one conducted in the Moscow suburbs rather than in Chechnya, is given by a correspondent of Novye Izvestia, Marat Khairullin (12). His article was written in the aftermath of a special operation conducted in the dormitory of an experimental theater called Nakhi, (translated from Chechen it means “kindness, happiness, people”) which was created in Moscow by the State University of Culture. Twenty five Chechen students aged 16 to 22 studied in the studio. The special operation was carried out jointly by the Moscow Rapid Reaction Police Task Force (SOBR) that had just returned from their mission in Chechnya and the Department Against Organized Crime of the Khimki district: In the early morning hours of March 28 at around 6:00 a.m., the room of the supervisor of the special university course, distinguished artist of Checheno-Ingushetia and Cabardino-Balkaria, Associate Professor Magomet Didigov was stormed by armed individuals wearing ski-masks and crying ‘get up, black asses.’ Magomet was thrown face-down on the floor, hand-cuffed and then kicked and beaten with clubs to the accompaniment of a hail of obscenities. The same treatment was given to his son Timur, a sixth-year student of the Law Academy. ‘I only managed to plead that they should not beat my son and then lost consciousness,’ says Magomet. But the thugs in police uniforms paid no attention to his words. The same scene took place in other rooms: doors were smashed in, half-naked young men were beaten and had obscenities yelled at them while being dragged from their beds and thrown on the floor. Only the young women were spared beatings, but the doors to their rooms were smashed in as well. This all happened in the presence of 60-year old Professor Soltsayev who was simply thrown out onto a landing of a staircase. He was soon followed by the family of prominent Chechen journalist Ruslan Karayev, who is working as an assistant to the State Duma Deputy Aslakhanov. Ruslan Gaitukayev, a 20-year old youth, asked the heavily-built men in camouflage if he could put on his trousers and shirt. ‘Would you like some tea instead, monkey?’ asked one of the men armed with automatic rifle while opening wide the door to the balcony. This know-how was immediately adopted by others and all the balcony doors were opened, creating a strong draught on the floor. Photographs and videocassettes, personal and office records were confiscated. A stack of Derzhavnye Vedomosti newspapers published by the State Duma Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov, was also found in the room. This caused another outburst of anger — the agent grabbed the stack and started pummelling the head of the helpless Associate Professor with it screaming, ‘Are you into the distribution of anti-Russian propaganda materials, terrorist?’” Then the witnesses arrived and the officer put on a show of producing from under Didigov’s pillow a Walther pistol and from his coat pocket a silencer. The operation went on. While the officers were impounding the “evidence,” the gunmen belonging to one of SOBR units were stealing everything that caught their eye. Helping themselves to apples and oranges, which they got from the students’ refrigerators, the soldiers were roaming the rooms looking for anything that had any value. As a result of the ‘search,’ Timur Didigov lost his cellular phone. (Among the confiscated items were also socks, pens, and a perfume bottle belonging to the wife of the elder Didigov.) In the room next door, a masked officer spotted a set of boxing gloves and immediately put them into his sack. ‘We’ll use them in our training,’ he said contentedly. In the meantime, the police instructed the Chechens, saying, ‘We will not let you continue your studies anyway, so you’d better get lost.’ The students were called names, were told that Chechens had been herding sheep for ages and that they were being given an opportunity to return to the life of a herdsmen. The policemen also claimed that Chechens are by definition guilty of everything.<…> Having finished appropriating the valuables, the gunmen made themselves comfortable in the kitchen drinking tea and coffee and helping themselves to what was left in the refrigerators, while the agents continued the search. The investigative action was over by 10 a.m. The students were put in cars and taken to the police station. Then, all of the students’ testimonies were taken and they were released several hours later. Timur Didigov was being coerced into admitting to the ownership of the gun: ‘Tell us that it’s yours, or we will put your father in jail.’ Associate Professor Didigov was detained the longest and was released only in the evening, without any official charges brought against him. According to the data available to Novaya Gazeta, the operation was allegedly conducted in response to an anonymous phone call to the police about a probable cache of trotyl. The above story amply demonstrates that the law enforcement officers do not even make an effort to fabricate evidence. In the end the “impounded” gun could not be linked to anyone and the booty of the two units was confined to snack-food and a few valuables found in the dormitory. However, despite solemn promises from various high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office as well as the repeated calls of the State Duma Deputy Aslanbek Aslakhanov to find and punish those responsible for the operation, nothing has been done. One of the beaten students, Anzor Khadashev from Grozny, in his interview for Novaya Gazeta said the follwoing: We believe that they simply had to vent their anger on somebody. They felt like masters in Chechnya. Once they returned home, they wanted to be masters here as well. We are the perfect targets for this purpose. In all seriousness, I believe that they’re all mental cases. Why did they have to take away my family photos? Why on earth would they need them? Why did they take away one of my fellow students’ phone card? They also took the money we collected to buy food. You know, like the majority of students, we ante up to buy our food. I noticed that they were scared. When they got us up to take to the local police station and you looked even briefly into the eyes of one of them, they would immediately shout back, ‘Don’t stare at us! Want to remember our faces? Turn away!’ They were scared even with their ski-masks on. Do they really feel at home here? A similar story was given in the report on the “passport control operation” that was conducted in a dormitory of the Tver State Agricultural Academy (13). There is only one difference. Having beaten Chechens for half an hour, the special task force soldiers started to beat all the other students, including those of Russian origin. There is still another incident from Moscow involving former participants of the anti-terrorist operation on the territory of Chechnya. On the morning of July 2, 2001, two drunken non-commissioned officers (one of them worked as a driver at the central car pool of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and two servicemen severely beat a 40-year old former resident of Grozny who was passing by in front of house ¹2 in Novopodmoskovny Alley. The victim was later taken to a hospital with a head injury. The four hooligans were soon arrested. According to the investigation, both police officers had taken part in the anti-terrorist operation on the territory of Chechnya and their behavior was caused by the so-called “Chechen syndrome.” FABRICATION OF CRIMINAL CASES If the problems related to residence registration have primarily impacted the Chechens arriving from the Chechen Republic, the danger of being the victim of criminal case fabrication threatens all Chechens living in Russia. Fabrication of crimes against Chechens involve very simple and unsophisticated methods of the same kind being used in the fabrication of other types of criminal cases, regardless of the ethnicity of the victim. They mainly include planting drugs, ammunition, and sometimes guns or parts thereof. The “Memorial” Human Rights Center experts are of the opinion that it is quite indicative that none of the investigations in such cases has ever provided an answer to the question — what crimes had been committed or were being planned by Chechens using “their” ammunition and grenades. None of those arrested on charges of heroin possession was a drug addict; none of them had ever been charged with drug trafficking. The charges brought against them, as well as the circumstances of their arrest are “controversial.” In some instances, the drugs were “found” on individuals, who had been summoned to the police station or after the arrest in the course of a second or a third, rather than the first, body search. It is also noteworthy that some of the checks and arrests were accompanied by threats from police officers to plant drugs or weapons. According to estimates of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center and the “Civic Assistance” Committee, the activities of law enforcement in the city of Moscow became “especially rough and extensive” after the incursion of Chechen armed groups into the territory of the Dagestan Republic in August of 1999. Police officers would forcibly break into private apartments occupied by Chechens or representatives of other Caucasian ethnic groups without identifying themselves or asking for consent from the owners. Some such instances resulted in drugs (normally not exceeding several doses, nevertheless sufficient for a charge of possession with the intent to sell) and ammunition (several rounds or grenades) being “found.” According to the testimony of the detainees and witnesses, the drugs and ammunition were planted on them by police officers. Such statements are also corroborated by the following fact. Until August 1999, human rights organizations did not receive any large-scale complaints about plants of drugs and ammunition. One of the cases that was widely covered in the mass media was that of Timur Dakhkilgov. His case stands out of the pool of ordinary cases because the police had at least some formal, although false, grounds to suspect T. Dakhkilgov of involvement in terrorist acts. Nevertheless, this case is quite characteristic of the practices adopted by law enforcement. T. Dakhkilgov is an Ingush from the city of Grozny. When the house occupied by his family was destroyed during the assault on the city in 1995, his family moved to Moscow. He took a job as a dyer at the “Krasny Sukonshchik” factory, where his work involved the handling of chemical substances. When T. Dakhkilgov and his wife were going through the process of reregistration, they were photographed and fingerprinted. In addition to this, a wash to check for traces of chemicals on their palms was administered (still another humiliating procedure that was imposed on many Chechens and some other members of Caucasian ethnicities; it shows that they had been suspected of having committed crimes merely on the grounds of their ethnic origin). Four days later, he and his brother-in-law, Bekmars Sauntiyev (a Moscow resident for over 20 years) were detained by the police. T. Dakhkilgov was told that the tests run on the wash from his hands showed the presence of RDX or hexogen explosive. A search conducted in T. Dakhkilgov’s room did not reveal anything suspicious, aside from a half-empty sack of sugar, but the police “found” a pistol under B. Sauntiyev’s bathtub. The police released B. Sauntiyev but T. Dakhkilgov was taken to the police department of the city of Moscow, where his interrogation began. The police were trying to beat a confession out of him. Several days later, he was transferred to the Lefortovo prison. In the meantime, T. Dakhkilgov was shown on TV, where he was called a Chechen and the Minister of Internal Affairs, V. Rushailo, reported capturing a terrorist. In the end, it was established that the chemicals on his hands were not of hexogen but hexsun, a solvent used for washing wool and he was released without any apologies or compensation. (14) The director of the “Krasny Sukonshchik” factory told an Izvestia newspaper corespondent that FSB agents had taken washes from the hands of all dyers, working in the factory. “The results were the same. But they had arrested only one person, and that person was Dakhkilgov.” Another such “terrorist,” Suleiman-Said Mudayev, was detained on December 15, 2002, “on suspicion of terrorist acts” and taken for some reason to the Otradnoye district police station. His wife, Tabarik Mudayev, called the “Civic Assistance” Committee and told them that she would spend the night, together with her children, at the doors of the police station. A representative of “Civic Assistance” called the head of the Otradnoye police station to find out if the police had any real grounds to suspect S. Mudayev of terrorism. The local police chief replied, “Do you have any idea about the seriousness of the charges? Do you think it’s a joke?” Then, the representative of “Civic Assistance” pointed out that a person coming to Moscow for the purpose of performing a terrorist act would not bring along his wife and children. The police officer promised to figure it all out. On the next day, Suleiman Mudayev was released from custody. According to him, the police asked him to pay 2 000$ for not charging him with terrorism. However, on the morning following the telephone call from the “Civic Assistance” Committee, S. Mudayev was told that the policemen “took a pity on his children” and thus he had to pay only 200 roubles and then “get lost.” Suleiman Mudayev had already been arrested on a fabricated charge some time earlier, on September 24, 1999. At that time, he had come from the city of Rostov to visit his wife and was arrested in a car maintenance workshop where he was having his car repaired. The policemen first gave him a beating and then dropped a package with drugs into his pocket. Putting a gun to his temple, they made him pull the drugs out by threatening to plant some ammunition in his car instead. S. Mudayev was then taken to the police station ¹54 and afterwards to the pre-trial detention facility ¹2. On November 19, 1999, his criminal case under Article 229, Section 1 of the RF Criminal Code was sent to the Khoroshevsky inter-municipal court for consideration, in accordance with Article 218 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code. The order to keep him in custody was reversed and he was released on his own recognizance. An investigation was conducted as regards to the police officers, but no criminal charges were brought against them due to “insufficient evidence.” Even in serious cases when the order for arrest comes from officials in the upper echelons of the law enforcement apparatus, the mechanism for fabrication of criminal cases is as unsophisticated as usual. For example, after the head of the Representative Office of the Chechen Republic in Moscow, Mairabek Vachagayev, decided to terminate his office’s operations, the car in which he was riding with his employee, Musa Nugayev, was “coincidentally” stopped by a special group from the Senior Department Against Organized Crime and both Chechens were also “coincidentally” found to have been in possession of pistols. In spite of numerous inconsistencies brought up in the report of the observer from the “Memorial” Human Rights Center, the court ruled to validate the evidence and sentenced M. Vachagayev under Article 222, Section 1 of the RF Criminal Code to a three-year prison term, while M. Nugayev was sentenced under the same article to two and a half years of imprisonment. Then, the court decided to pardon them both. Experts of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center note that not a single fabricated criminal case has ended in an acquittal. On the one hand, judges follow an old Soviet-era rule — not to spoil the statistics for crimes solved by the police. On the other hand, they cover-up for fabricators whose crimes could have been revealed in the case of an acquittal. In the end, they are prisoners of their own xenophobic views. In any case, the judiciary does not play any role in ending the persecutions of Chechens and Caucasians in general. Moreover, it acts as a mechanism that exacerbates the discrimination. Many of the events of 1999–2000 are no longer perceived as unusual; some of them have become a part of everyday life. Having intimidated Chechens and other migrants from the Caucasus, law enforcement agencies no longer need those measures applied in the initial stages. It is a very complicated task to break the existing system of ethnic persecution enforced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other power structures. It is still being used by corrupt officials as an extra source of income. Nevertheless, given the present level of anti-Caucasian and anti-Chechen attitudes, any aggravation of the situation in the country would immediately increase the pressure on and persecution of Chechens. Attacks Against Chechens by Non-Governmental Paramilitary Groups Violations of Social and Economic Rights (1) See the Internet site of the “Memorial” Society www.memo.ru, web-pages “Human Rights Defense,” “North Caucasus.” (2) Discrimination on the Grounds of Place of Residence and Ethnicity in Moscow and the Moscow Region for the period of August 1999 — December 1999. Report prepared by the “Memorial” Human Rights Center and the “Civic Assistance” Committee (Moscow: 2000). (3) Afanasy Birzha (August 25–31, 2000). (4) Quoted from the attachment to the Report On the Status of the Residents of Chechnya, Who Have Been Forced to Abandon its Territory. The Report is based on the materials provided by the lawyers of the “Migration and Law” Network (Moscow: 2002). (5) On the Status of the Residents of Chechnya, Who Have Been Forced to Abandon its Territory. The Report is based on materials provided by the lawyers of the “Migration and Law” Network (Moscow: 2002). (6) Ibid. (7) Based on the materials provided by the lawyers of the “Migration and Law” Network. (8) Novye Izvestia (May 17, 2001). (9) A. Gorshkov, “He Is Not Being Looked for by the Police,” Novaya Gazeta (April 16–22, 2001, ¹27). (10) Discrimination on the Grounds of Place of Residence and Ethnicity in Moscow and the Moscow Region for the Period of August 1999 — December 2000. Joint Report of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center and the “Civic Assistance” Committee (Moscow: 2001). (11) I. Mandrik, “It’s Just a Pogrom,” Novye Izvestia (June 29, 2001). (12) Novye Izvestia (April 2, 2001, ¹56). (13) Novye Izvestia (October 23, 2001, ¹192). (14) Human Rights in Russian Regions — 1999 (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2000). Back |
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