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English Language Page And how do things look “from the other side?” In this very brief review, we will briefly comment on the xenophobia issue in Chechnya and make an attempt to explain why it has come to emerge in the first place. * * * The word that the Chechens use to describe the Russians is “gusski,” which stands for “alien,” “foe,” or “outcast.” (1) However, the use of that term should hardly be attributed to local Chechen xenophobia. The very structure of the word “xenophobia,” which includes the Grecian segments “xenos” (standing for “alien, strange, outlandish”) and “phobos” (meaning “fear” or “enmity”), requires that the two parts should be separately looked into. A good investigator would seek to track the evolution of “alien” and socio-cultural adoption of relevant phobias. Normally, the notion of “xenophobia” includes the following three integrated emotions: anger, revulsion and contempt. Whatever is taboo with regard to the “natives” is all right when applied to the “aliens.” The “alien” is normally perceived as a degraded person who is beneath the “native,” and he can be made a target for any and all destructive sentiments and passions, with a negative identity being shaped in the process. The socially pernicious xenophobic emotions in an archaic community inevitably spread to next-door and more distant neighbors. Specifically, the people who live in the mountainous regions are subject to the customary law (”adat”) honored by the local communities within a single valley, which is primarily applicable only to local residents (2). Within the family of Caucasian ethnic communities, the Chechens are special in that they were only liberated from the yoke of the Kabarda princes in the XVI-XVII centuries, with their original feudalistic hierarchical social pyramid heavily eroded. The internal free-for-all social relations in that distant period could be likened to the period of the “wild west” in the US. They also could be regarded as a replica of the ways maintained by the ancient Sparta-like military democracies, with the “taip” tribal structures playing a major role. Given these sorts of social arrangements, the level of loyalty or unity within a given “taip” or tribal community was increasingly assured through xenophobic feelings towards other communities. Clearly, this kind of legal conscience could hardly help build a nation, and at the beginning of the XIX century Imam Shamil tried to replace the “adat” practices by introducing Shari’a in order to propagate Islamic law and establish a new national identity, with “alien” values now having to be embraced. Notably, Imam Shamil’s defeat came not only from the Russian Empire’s strength, but also the local Islamic-origin modernization drive was doomed because Shamil’s lieutenants preferred to serve as functionaries within the Russian administration (3). While writing about the current Chechen community, many Russian scholars and analysts now and again refer to the writings of the XIX century when the old Caucasian war campaign was in progress. They somehow have overlooked the fact that over the past 150 years the conventional Chechen social structures — “taip,” religious, local, family or other communities — have grown to become more diversified and sophisticated. At least, the “friend-foe” divide line, which has been continuously crossed, has become more diluted and fragmented. From the XIX century, Russians have been “neighbors” with Chechens. At first glance, the story of Russian-Chechen relations has been nothing but a string of confrontations, including Caucasian wars of the XVIII–XIX centuries (with the Cossacks establishing their own communities in the region), deportation of whole communities (Ermolovskaya, Samashki, etc.) in 1920 in order to use the now vacated homes to accommodate the “poor highlenders,” numerous uprisings in the 1920s-1930s, and mopping up or combing operations that culminated in the 1944 deportation of Chechens. The Russians, that came to be settled in Chechnya after the original residents had been deported, explicitly viewed the former inhabitants of the “Grozny area” as foes (4). The Chechens, who had been cleared in 1957 to return to their homeland, settled closer to the hills (5) and north of the Terek-river in the Naoursky and Shelkovskoy districts, mostly populated by ethnic Russians (6). The Chechens then mainly lived in rural communities (7), with the city of Grozny largely being a Russian (non-Chechen) community. However, things changed incrementally, and by the 1970–1980s Grozny had become an inter-ethnic community. Industrial jobs were hard to land, with the region registering a huge labor surplus (8). High latent unemployment rates in the Chechen rural communities were made up for by subsistence activities, self-employment, or moon-lighting. Just to elaborate, it so happened that those teams of “moon-lighters,” formed from amongst different-age members of disparate “taips” or families, only served to further cement a single Chechen community. Secondly, that principle was later applied to establish collaborative partnerships and then… militant groups. During Soviet times, Chechen soldiers were valued rather highly. The Vainakh people held military careers in high esteem. In this regard, it would suffice to mention Generals D. Doudayev and R. Aushev. Notably, most of the Vainakh young people had been to different Russian regions to pursue their private economic tasks. To add, Chechens speak Russian like no other ethnic community in the Caucasus. Importantly, they currently maintain a diaspora spread across the Russian Federation. However, the past experiences indicate that no assimilation has occurred. The traditional societal structure and identity model (both within Chechnya and the diaspora) has been maintained. Now, how heavily did xenophobia manifest itself in Chechnya in the 1994–1996 period? Judging from personal experiences, Grozny residents (both Russians and Chechens) had equally suffered from Russian shellings and bombings, the circumstance producing no aggravation in the ethnic relations or escalation of xenophobic sentiments, strange though it may seem. In the years of the “first Chechen war,” the author of this overview could hear some Chechens (including militants more often than not) talking to Russians and suggesting that “it was, of course, the Jews, rather than Russians, that started the whole mess!” Further comments depended on the relevant interlocutor’s remarks (9). Oftentimes, no response would follow, and the listener would come to be convinced that the Chechens were mostly anti-Semites. Some “disrespectful” comment might very easily provoke a totally unexpected reaction. For example, the remark “I am fed up with your fascist talk! You’d better go to some federal military outfit and find your advocates there. However, the soldiers will tell you that it is the Jews and… Chechens who are to blame for everything bad in Russia!” would usually produce a situation when your companion would refrain from making any radical observations for some time. The use of the term “distant foe” has never been a manifestation of xenophobia. On the contrary, it appeared as some sublimation of the delicate phenomenon, and it was always handy in order to ease the tension while conversing with the “nearby alien.” Many of the “keynote texts” and pronouncements by the leaders of Ichkeria in those days described the ongoing conflict with the federal authorities as a Russian-Chechen religious and ethnic confrontation, with the realities, however, failing to be in line with that reading. There have been numerous examples of how humanely the prisoners and soldiers’ mothers (that traveled down South to look for their sons) had been treated during the first Chechen war (10). Notably, those attitudes could not be likened to anything witnessed in other post-Soviet armed conflicts in the Trans-Caucasus (Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Ossetia, Abkhasia) or even in the neighboring Prigorodny district of Northern Ossetia. Unlike conflicts in all of the said regions, the 1994–1996 Chechen war was not laced with xenophobic sentiments, with “anger, revulsion and contempt” still failing to prevail. One might conclude that any unexpected anti-Semitic remark could be some vestige from the Soviet past with its bombastic propaganda and government-backed anti-Semitism. Moreover, this kind of sentiment appeared to be a meaningful element in most of the ethic and social conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Whenever tens of thousands of jobless men spend months or years talking about current developments and the reasons for their calamities, while the chance of returning to their native homeland remains a mission impossible, so-called “public opinion” (popular version of history) gradually comes to be established (11). An effort to rationalize the contemporary events through application of holistic ideological designs or mythological schemes laced with xenophobic archetypes is nearly a ubiquitous affair. Those mythological patterns have usually been applied to the direct conflict makers, opponents and “the nearby foes.” Each time any given context would somehow hold the elements of collusion, the “international Jewish conspiracy” hazard is nearly always lurking in any analysis of this or that contingency (12). With Chechnya actually securing a sort of an independence following the Russian federal forces being routed in August 1996 and then pulled out of the republic, the challenge was to define a new identity and find the “foes” serving as a backdrop for that identity. Though the call to build an Islamic or even Sharia-based nation had not initially been doubted by the local Chechen elites; it could not be fully grasped or comprehended either (13). Notably, the crisis had not only been about ideology. The layman, as a matter of fact, no longer saw any authority outside, with the regular policemen being phased out by bearded militants wielding their “Kalashnikov” submachine guns. Right after the August victory, one could see crowds of “victors” or “August 25 fighters” filling out the city streets (14). The “politicians” battled for power, while refusing (or being unable) to counter and defeat rampant street crime. The “society” that had come out against the federal forces in Chechnya, likewise was unable to censure and restrain newly created (true or false) “resistance heroes.” Understandably, the scene could not but provoke the emergence of some new ideological visions. It was then that terror began to be used to target collaborators holding jobs with federal governing bodies (15). Criminal terror was primarily used to hit non-Vainakh communities (16). Importantly, those activities had not been ideologically charged: while maintaining no family-origin or other conventional links, those communities had just been more vulnerable. Of course, that coercive and terrorist policy required some ideological explanation. The militants desperately needed some justification for their action or inaction, which left numerous civilians without their property or homes. The general public was not equipped to counter the crime. The void was finally filled by the freshly concocted anti-Russian mythological ploys that had not been particularly effective in the days of the first Chechen war. The criminals operated under the guise of “fighters against the enemy’s agents and collaborators,” which, of course, could hardly be criticized by regular Chechens. Besides, this effort was fully in line with the government policy pursued to win independence in the war against Russia. Obviously, this was a case of simplistic negative identity drive. Then, the war-tested Chechen society failed to be adequately equipped to meet the pressing peacetime challenges. Concurrently, people began to be kidnapped for ransom money in Chechnya, with the so-called Wahhabitic Islam taking root in the region. These two ostensibly totally different phenomena had somehow had a very solid linkage. Particularly broadly covered by the Russian and international media were the kidnappings of local reporters and foreign nationals. However, it needs to be underscored that hundreds of persons were kidnapped for ransom money in such neighboring Russian regions as the Stavropol territory, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Northern Ossetia, with similar cases reaching into thousands in Chechnya per se. Understandably, these crimes against compatriots ran counter to the very spirit of either “adat” or Sharia law. Those despicable acts had to be either done away with or clearly explained. And the right ideological grounding was eventually found. The fact is that Arab volunteers had been few and far between (like Ukrainians) in the first Chechen war. Hattab and his ilk were rare individuals representing external support forces. The Chechen militants, talk about Sharia and jihad notwithstanding, had mostly professed Kadiri Sufi Tarikat — the conventional local variety of Sunni Islam. Following the completion of active military operations, some of the less conspicuous militant formations proclaimed themselves to be “truly Islamic warriors” or “Wahhabites.” It was exactly those elements that eventually became heavily engaged in the human trafficking business. The reasoning was rather simple: those professing the “wrong Islam” cannot be regarded as true Muslims, the family or “taip” links making little difference. Hence, one was free to kidnap either Russian speakers of non-Russian speakers, while committing no crime before Allah. Notably, “Wahhabit” formations had been led by such field commanders as Hamikhoroyev, Barayev and Akhmadov brothers — all confirmed kidnappers. Admittedly, there were many others who dealt in human trafficking without any ideological motivations. The “tug-of-war” between the moderate and radical champions of an “Islamic state” in the long run served to trigger the growth of xenophobic sentiments in Chechnya within 1996–1999. To Islamic radicals, that viewed themselves as part of the global jihad, the battle hymn in the 1999 march on Dagestan was made by the Jerusalem song (17), with the religious, rather than racial, affiliation being definitive. As a matter of fact, the “Kaffirs” could come from any race or tribe. To clarify, though the “peoples of the book” (Jews and Christians) are normally set apart by Islamic teachings, under the current circumstances in Chechnya nobody thought of suggesting the use of any “preferential treatment” with regard to those communities. The Jewish hostages (the “principal adversary”) used to be kept even in harsher conditions than other prisoners. They would be the first ones to be executed, according to the local Chechen wardens or jailors. While confronting the radical “Wahhabites” and “Mejlis-ul-Shurah,” (18) President A. Maskhadov could hardly proceed with moderate policy positions. He had to make use of rather an ingenious ploy and state that the “Wahhabites” operated as a global Zionist tool called upon to discredit Ichkeria before the world community of nations (19). A statement about this conspiracy was made by A. Maskhadov in the summer of 1998, with the “truth” being earlier unraveled by L. Kultygov (20) — head of the “national security service.” Notably, Chechnya’s residents had largely refused to align with the “Wahhabites” or back up their criminal activities. The general public perception then was that the “Wahhabites” had mostly included the scum of society, drug addicts, youngsters from bad families and other degraded elements. The “Wahhabites” would be driven out of the local rural communities with the following words: “You can practice your ways elsewhere, but not in our community!” To provide an example, B. Khaikhoroyev, one of the “Wahhabite” leaders and a noted field commander, was killed by his fellow-villagers in the summer of 1999 exactly for engaging in kidnapping operations (21). Then, one could witness disparate manifestations of the social adoption of xenophobic complexes, which might have served to keep the society stronger. However, the pace of change was too slow. One of the principal criticisms aimed at A. Maskhadov by the ordinary Chechens was that he failed to use force in the summer of 1998 to take out the local “Wahhabites,” with nearly the entire Chechen people being ready to back him up on that move. Overall, within those three years between the two war campaigns the xenophobic feelings had matured and led to a solid measure of bloodshed. One can hardly explicitly and unilaterally censure the Chechen terrorists, particularly given that the phantom of “Chechen terrorism” (just like some “black magic”) had been rather apathetically perceived by the Russian society. Generally, public and political developments in Russia and Chechnya within 1996–1999 had been proceeding in the direction of another armed conflict: the society could not (and it made no attempt to) to prevent this dangerous course of events. Bluntly, many politicians eventually craved for an armed conflict to break out (22). Now, one inevitably confronts a set of disturbing realities: while seeking to identify the reasons for and goals of the second Chechen war (pointlessly lasting now for nearly three years), the Chechens just could not but assume some xenophobic perceptions. Firstly, now one can clearly see Russians being made targets for negative sentiments. No distinction is being made between federal law enforcers and the general Russian population (23). While in the fall of 1999 the Chechens (tired from the “free-for-all” and A. Maskhadov who was unable to put in check the criminal gangs and extremists) hoped that some law and order would be introduced in their homeland with the “federals” coming back, the last two years of “combing operations” had their expectations wholly dissipated. Secondly, the contradictions between the advocates of “Wahhabism” and conventional Islamic teaching have come to be on the rise in Chechnya. Incidentally, inasmuch as “Wahhabite”-generated kidnappings and the Dagestan invasion (that produced a new presence of federal forces in Chechnya) have been attributed to Basayev and Barayev, principal “Wahhabites,” they have often been referred to as “agents of the federals,” thereby getting the xenophobic complex brought to the surface. (Notably, this latent confrontation on the grass roots level has now and again led to armed skirmishes between the “Maskhadov supporters” and “Wahhabites,” just like between the Krayowa Army and pro-Soviet guerillas in fascist-occupied Poland in the second world war). On the other hand, as long as the ongoing armed conflict keeps together the disparate local forces confronting the federals, the aforesaid contradictions could be kept on the back burner. Thirdly, just like in the past, one can see some shifts reflective of conspiracy-related xenophobia, with any and all opposing elements being attributed to the “global Jewish conspiracy.” Basically, this appears to be an “anti-Western complex,” which is far more tenacious and deeply rooted (not only in Chechnya but also in Russia) than it might seem to be at first glance (24). * * * Obviously, the last decade has turned out to be a catastrophe for Chechnya’s residents either on the domestic or public conscience level. Given the experiences relating to other ethnic and social conflicts, the Chechen people have weathered this test with much more presence than could be expected, no matter what sort of perspectives on this score have been promulgated by the official Russian propaganda. However, as it could only be expected, the xenophobic complexes in Chechnya have been allowed to grow, expand and diversify. (1) Without any doubt, this word seems to be more powerful than the antique “barbarian” (any person from external parts). (2) The more broadly known hospitality of the communities from the hills merely appears to be sort of a compensation for that exclusivity. (3) The task had been particularly challenging because it was rather recently that the Chechens adopted Islam. Until the XVI–XVII centuries they had been pagans. One can still visit the “sun burial grounds” located high in the mountains. (4) After 1944, isolated militant groups continued to fight in the forested hills, the last “rebel” allegedly being killed as late as 1973. (5) Many of the dwellers from highland communities failed to return home. The housing, that had been left unoccupied for nearly thirteen years, had fallen into disrepair, and the communities had shrunk by a factor of several times. (6) The communities, formally integrated with the Stavropol territory, in 1957 were made part of the newly established Chechen-Ingushi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). Apart from that, the Prigorodny district was left within the Northern Ossetia ASSR, The Ingushis, who had originally lived in that district, could not return home, the circumstance eventually producing an Ossetian-Ingushi conflict. (7) With the exception of local Cossack and Nogai communities in the rural areas. (8) Ironically, an effort to build a bio-complex and other industrial facilities at the close of the 1980s in order to alleviate the jobless problem had been taken by the Chechen community as “continuation of genocide of the Chechen people.” Notably, the national liberation movement was launched under the “green” colors. (9) Just as 1995 was beginning, State Duma Deputy A. Shabad sent the concerned Chechen over to State Duma Deputy V. Sheinis, who then was right there, in the basement of the presidential palace in Grozny. (10) Apart from unilateral releases of prisoners and the functional prisoner camp on the grounds of a Chiri-Yurt-based nursery school visited by soldiers’ mothers, there was also a security department-operated a dreadful “pretrial detention center” at Stary Achkhoi where dozens of prisoners and hostages were either killed or tortured to death. (11) The principle running as follows: “Any problem has at least one simple, clear, and incorrect solution.” (12) Of course, there was more to it. Mystics, fortune tellers, healers had become active like never before, with Nostradamus and his visions being repeated by all. (13) In reality, the “Sharia law” was meant to include: some “adat” customs, assorted local conventions, a few Soviet Criminal Code rules and selected current Islamic regulations. Notably, the whole mix was not supposed to be either streamlined or balanced out. (14) As such elements were called in France in 1944. (15) “Proscription lists,” that were used to run “combing operations” in Grozny at the end of August 1996, held hundreds of persons. (16) Including those who had been compelled to flee or just could not return home. Those people primarily included “Russian-only speakers,” the exact official statistics to that effect being unavailable. (17) Incidentally, they would sing that hymn in the Russian language. (18) Notably, the so-called “true Muslims” had been ignorant enough to name their supreme governing body using the term “Soviet” in both languages. (19) Understandably, that was not the brightest idea on their part. For example, the Northern Caucasus Cossacks had long since been seriously, though not publicly, talking about the global Zionist scheme to build an Islamic state from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea with the use of Armenians. (20) L. Khultygov was killed by the field commander S. Radouyev’s militants during a skirmish over the local television assets, rather than by some Zionists seeking to take revenge on him for releasing their treacherous schemes. (21) The hostages included some Georgian nationals, In an attempt to have them freed and during other skirmishes that followed, a few Bamout-origin residents were killed. Clearly, this is an example of the “alien” perception being translated from the tribal-related level to be applied under new circumstances. (22) The federal authorities needed to assure consistency of the rule in the nation, and for that goal to be achieved they found nothing better than a “small triumphant war.” Notably, it was only through provoking a new war that S. Basayev (leader of the “true Muslims” in Chechnya and a character that nearly totally marginalized and discredited himself) could re-enter the political “mainstream.” His gangs had launched a march on “Jerusalem,” and they are still fighting their battle, while V. Putin was elected second Russian president. As a consequence, all of the players had been “kept satisfied.” (23) Who can tell the difference? Public surveys certainly can help in this matter. Notably, the local anti-war movement is nearly non-existent. The Russian television programming carries a solid measure of “Special Forces,” “Man’s Work” and other examples of high-powered great-nation propaganda. (24) Ironically, at the close of 2001 one highly respected and “degreed” Chechen human rights activist and public figure, while being publicly charged by the local Chechens from the pro-Russian administration with advocating for A. Maskhadov and affiliating with “Wahhabites,” right before a delegation of high-level European Union officials, ardently responded by saying that he was not anti-Semitic. Clearly, the debaters were fully aware of the linkage between the two notions, with the others merely watching that “absurd theater” performance. Back |
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