|
English Language Page The problem of the Meskhetian Turks (1) in the Krasnodar territory is unique. In the first place, the Meskhetian Turks suffer organized discrimination, persecution and deprivation of their rights. They are identified by the state as a specific ethnic group rather than just as “migrants” or “persons of Caucasian nationality.” Secondly, local leaders are not persecuting the Turks independently. Regional and federal authorities implement an identical policy, using rhetoric similar — often identical — to that used by local leaders to justify their positions. Thirdly, a specific ideology has been elaborated and a powerful ideological campaign has been employed in order to justify open persecution of the Turks. The goal of this political movement has been made clear on many occasions — to do everything possible to make the Meskhetians, labeled as “an undesirable” group, leave the Krasnodar territory and, ideally, the country altogether. Russian authorities are practicing the same purposeful persecutions of the Chechens, although not so openly. Another difference between the Turks’ situation and that of the Chechens is that neither the Turks nor the Krasnodar territory itself are connected to an armed conflict. Fourthly, in the case of the Meskhetian Turks the administration has allied itself with extremist paramilitary nationalist groups known as Cossacks. Each of the above items, even taken alone, makes the situation look quite extraordinary. Nonetheless, one may conclude that the problem of the Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar territory is a clear indicator of a general process occurring within the administration and society as a whole. This problem, obviously in need of a solution, is legally, politically and even morally no more complex than problems routinely solved by forth graders in primary school. The fact that the authorities have been struggling with this issue for thirteen years precisely in this and not another manner is not accidental; it is an important indicator. The situation in Krasnodar may be viewed as a litmus-test, illustrative of what all the talk about the supremacy of law and “the promotion of tolerance” is really worth. GENERAL DATA AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (2) The majority of Meskhetians residing in the Krasnodar territory arrived there from Uzbekistan in 1989–1991 after the June 1989 Fergana events. By most conservative estimates, all in all, there are up to seventy thousand Turks currently residing in Russia. About ten thousand of those are Turks and their children who lived in Russia prior to 1989. The rest left Uzbekistan following the Fergana events. The Meskhetian Turks within the Russian Federation are spread over more than twenty regions; practically, all of them dwell in rural areas, and are not very well-to-do, especially those found in Central Russia. In almost all the regions the Turks’ standard of living is the same as that of the rest of the population. An exception to this is the Krasnodar territory, where the Meskhetian Turks are deprived of their rights; several hundred of the Meskhetians in Kabardino-Balkaria who fled there from Uzbekistan in the late 1980s — early 1990s are in a similar predicament. There is no accurate data as to the number of Turks currently residing within the Krasnodar territory; most probably, their numbers range between fifteen and eighteen thousand. They account for approximately 0.3% of the population (3) and are mainly concentrated in four rural areas in the west and southeast of the territory. In the Crimea region, which for some unknown reason is considered to be a “high density zone” of Turks, they actually account for about 6.5% of the population. There is not a single populated locality within the territory where the Turks constitute a majority of residents. The number of the Meskhetian Turks who are not registered at their place of residence (4) in the Krasnodar territory is between eleven and thirteen thousand. The territorial authorities arbitrarily refused them registration and continue to do so now. Consequently and contrary to pertinent legislation they are not recognized as Russian citizens although at the time of the USSR’s disintegration, they were permanently residing in the territory of the Russian Federation, were Soviet citizens and did not renounce their Russian citizenship. Persons lacking permanent residence registration (5) are virtually devoid of all rights. Their rights to housing and adjoining land, labor rights, rights to social security and medical service, to have their marriages registered, to record the fathers’ names in birth certificates of their children, to receive a passport or other personal documents, to continue education after finishing secondary school, etc., are non-existent. There are only a few exceptions to this rightless status: Meskhetian Turks may send their children to school; a few Meskhetians even manage to find temporary jobs; and in 1999, those of them that had temporarily stay registration were allowed to renew their driver’s licenses. Territorial and local authorities are actually practicing “a soft ethnic cleansing” to which they openly admit. The Meskhetians living conditions are made unbearable in order to force them to leave (6). The pressure exerted on them takes different forms: from “just” deprivation of fundamental rights to regular identification checks, open threats of eviction, hostile press campaigns, and Cossack raids resembling ordinary “gangster shakedowns.” Several times — in 1992 and 1996 — the Krasnodar territory adopted regulations (7) that introduced de facto special requirements for Turks staying in the region. As of June 1997, the Turks have been required to re-register at their place of residence every forty five days, each time paying 188 roubles per person. On the basis of the December 9, 1999 Resolution of the Head of Territorial Administration ¹877, the Turks were registered at their place of their residence for a period of eight months. Later on, in August 2000, by Resolution of the Head of Territorial Administration ¹573, the registration was extended for another five months. The registration expired on February 1, 2001, after which the police undertook massive identification checks among the Meskhetians, and fined the unregistered. On March 12, 2001, the Head of the Krasnodar territorial administration issued Resolution ¹173 “On the Meskhetian Turks Residing on the Krasnodar Territory.” The territorial Chief Police Directorate (GUVD) was instructed to register “persons of the Turkish-Meskhetian nationality residing within the Krasnodar territory” at their place of residence for a period of one year, to March 1, 2002. In February 20, 2002, the Legislative Assembly of the Krasnodar territory passed Resolution ¹1363-P “On Additional Measures to Ease Tensions in Interethnic Relations in Areas of Dense Concentrations of the Meskhetian Turks Temporarily Residing within the Krasnodar Territory,” (8) which reaffirmed the Turks’ special status. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS BEHIND THE POLICIES OF TERRITORIAL AUTHORITIES Since the end of the 1980s, migration and “national” policies pursued in the Krasnodar territory have been retained, despite contrary federal legislation. The maintenance of the requirements for authorized residence registration and for registration at a temporary place of residence, has the effect of restricting many rights; personal (and family), political, and social (property and labor) rights of persons lacking a locally registered residence are impinged. The aims of these policies have been to maintain a repressive system of control through the “observance of the passport regime,” and to maintain “an ethnic balance,” by limiting the residence registration of persons representing “non-Slavic nationalities.” For several years on end, the authorities themselves have been talking quite openly about their ethnic preferences, which are expressly stated in the Charter of the Krasnodar territory and a number of official acts. It is generally believed, though erroneously, that Nikolai Kondratenko was the initiator of the territorial politics pursued against migrants and national minorities. It is true that in 1989–1991, N. Kondratenko, as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Krasnodar territory, did a lot to steer the course of the territorial authorities precisely in that direction. However, the foundations of the ideological and statutory basis for the current policies were laid down somewhat later, in 1992–1993, under the so-called democratic Governor V. Dyakonov and the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Krasnodar territory A. Zhdanov. The official phraseology changed gradually. In 1989–1991, the territorial administration referred to migrants largely as a source of social problems; the ethnic theme received little attention. In 1992–1993 the so-called democratic leadership openly stated that it was afraid of destabilization and conflicts and, therefore, was forced to yield to the pressure of nationalistically minded Cossack groups and limit migration. At the same time, high-level officials started to talk about the ethnic “alienability” of migrants and the “objective” threat posed by ethnically-charged conflicts (9). In 1993–1996, N. Yegorov and Ye. Kharitonov, regional leaders loyal to Boris Yeltsin, gradually tightened the residence registration policy, using slogans to the effect that this was necessary to “prevent” ethnic conflicts. But at this time the regional heads no longer employed tactics of demonstrative concessions to the Cossacks and other aggressive elements as political cover. When in December of 1996 N. Kondratenko took over as Governor of the Krasnodar territory, the stage had already been set. He did not have to invent or institute anything drastically innovative. He only contributed to the nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric, having acquired notoriety for his anti-Semitic statements. It looks like A. Tkatchev, N. Kondaratenko’s successor in the gubernatorial office, has no anti-Semitic sentiments, but the level of xenophobia in official statements has remained the same and the policies of persecuting minorities and migrants have become tougher and still more sophisticated. Even against that background, the policies towards the Meskhetian Turks contain an independent element. In official statements, statutory acts, and everyday life the Turks are set apart as the objects of special policies, a distinct category, a quasi-estate. The territorial (and federal) authorities are putting forth several related arguments to explain and justify why the Turks are deprived of their basic rights and “are being forced” out of the territory. We shall quote these arguments and comment on each of them. 1) The territory is suffocating from an influx of migrants; therefore, the authorities are compelled to introduce restrictions on permanent residence registration to preserve social stability. The regulations are neutral, and their disparate impact on Turks is incidental. Comments Since 1992, the right of anyone legally domiciled in the RF to freedom of movement and choice of residence has been a constitutionally mandated principle. The federation’s constituent members have no right to enact contrary regulations. The Soviet-era statutory acts (mostly unpublished) authorizing the permissive character of permanent residence registration were invalidated by Resolution 26 (2-2) of the USSR Committee of Constitutional Supervision on October 11, 1991. It is surprising that nearly everyone readily believes allegations about “the influx” of migrants and the chimerical figures used to support this contention. The press regularly states that the number of migrants residing within the territory is one million or more (10). Only an ignoramus can be impressed by such statistics. Those figures come from data summaries from recent years collected by passport and visa services (dating back to 1993, 1991, 1989 or still earlier) regarding the number of people who have ever had their residence registered within the territory. Conveniently, no mention is made that these numbers also include those who have changed their place of residence within the territory (this accounts for more than one third of the migration turnover) and also the fact that, apart from an influx into the territory, there is also an exodus out of it. The total increase in the population, the most important indicator in assessing the actual situation, has been quite insignificant. In the early 1990s, this increase was not more than 1.3% a year; by 1996, it went down to 0.6%, i.e., the level of the 1970s-80s. Since 1989, there has actually been a net decrease of residents within the territory (11). The allegations about a large number of unregistered migrants are also unfounded. The Krasnodar territory is mainly a rural area where there is simply not enough space for hundreds of thousands of the so-called “illegal migrants” to “blend-in.” The lack of local registration of residence makes it absolutely impossible to lead anything like a normal life in the absence of the most basic rights and continuous “mop-up operations” and passport checks. The so-called unregistered migrants can hardly be counted as a source of problems for the local economy or a drain on the public budget as they are deprived of nearly all social rights. In any case, it is strange, to say the least, that people who arrived in the region twelve or thirteen years ago are categorized as migrants. 2) The Meskhetian Turks are not citizens of the Russian Federation; they should be treated as illegal migrants. As non-citizens, they are subject to certain restrictions, as illegal migrants — to penal sanctions. Comments The Meskhetian Turks, just as other Soviet citizens permanently residing on the territory of Russia since the date of Federal Law “On the Citizenship of the Russian Federation” (promulgated on November 28, 1991, in effect since February 6, 1992) who had not renounced their RF citizenship over the course of the following year, became Russian citizens in conformance with the procedure of recognition, on the basis of Section 1, Article 13 of the above Law. The Russian authorities at all levels, primarily the relevant bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, interpret the notion of “permanent residence” as having permanent residence registration. This interpretation is in opposition to the law on recognition of citizenship, which has already been affirmed many times in court cases dealing with the 1989–1991 return of settlers from Azerbaijan. There is not a single legal act of the USSR or the RF that would consider registration of residence (registration at the place of residence) synonymous with “permanent residence” as a matter of legal fact controlling individual rights. In early 1992, the notion of “the place of permanent residence” was used only in civil legislation (Article 17 of the RSFSR Civil Code of 1964) to denote a place where a citizen permanently or primarily lives. It must be used in a similar way in other cases as well. The term was introduced into administrative law only in 1993 by Federal Law “On the Right of RF Citizens to Freedom of Movement and Choice of Residence Within the Boundaries of the Russian Federation.” The wording used in that law is similar to that used in the Civil Code, except that “place” was replaced by “living quarters” where a citizen permanently or primarily lives. There is a notion of logical interpretation of a legal act according to the “the rule of contraries.” Let us assume that under the law on citizenship, that “permanent residence” in Russia implies nothing more than the availability of residence registration. In that case, hundreds of thousands, even millions of people who used to live in the RSFSR — those who left a certain place prior to February 6, 1992, and were registered thereafter, served a prison term or did military service, left to go overseas, resided under provisional (for instance, limited) registration, so-called vagabonds, etc., all must have become stateless persons. Nothing of the kind, however, happened. The statutory acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Order ¹210 of May 5, 1993, and Order ¹330 of June 30, 1993) envisage special procedures for documenting those categories of persons as citizens of the Russian Federation. The term “persons permanently residing in the RF” refers either to persons who have their residence registered on a certain date or those who have no other place of residence except on the territory of the Russian Federation. There is no third alternative, and the first having been ruled out as impracticable, leaves only the second. The Turks who had their residence registered in the Russian Federation as of February 6, 1992 (i.e., the overwhelming majority of them) were recognized as Russian citizens. The Turks residing in the Krasnodar territory were denied their residence registration as far back as in 1989–1990 and they were not recognized as citizens. Thus, legally, they are citizens of the Russian Federation while in reality their situation remains similar to that of stateless persons. In other words, government policies have rendered them de facto stateless persons. The notion of “illegal migrants” in the RF as applied to citizens of the former USSR (except citizens of the Baltic States; since 1998 — citizens of Turkmenistan; and since 2001 — citizens of Georgia) does not make any sense. In the 1990s, the Russian authorities did their best to water down this notion. The RF has no legislation on foreigners, although technically the USSR Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the USSR” of June 26, 1981 and Rules “On the Stay of Foreign Nationals in the USSR,” approved by Resolution ¹212 of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers of April 26, 1991 are still in effect. The USSR Law is not applied to former Soviet citizens (except citizens of the Baltic States) and Resolution ¹212 was ineffective until the end of 2000. Thus, the position taken by the Russian leadership towards former Soviet citizens (including citizens of the CIS states) did not allow them to make use of the procedures envisaged under the said acts (registration with the Visa and Registration Department, obtaining a residence permit). Instead, former Soviet citizens from the CIS states were (and still are, with a few exceptions) free to enter RF without requiring visas, not subject to any restrictions in the length of their stay, nor required to get approval of their purpose for coming. More importantly, they were subject to the same rules of registration at the place of their permanent and temporary residence as Russian citizens. That was confirmed both by the Resolution of the RF Government and acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, the foreigners’ registration requirement is a notifying rather than an authorizing procedure. It is noteworthy that the law imposes almost no restrictions on foreigners’ labor rights. Needless to say, upon their arrival in the RF, people are faced with the Russian passport system, with all its formal and informal restrictions. The bureaucracy ranges from regional rules of residence registration to the arbitrariness of official decisions. This chaos ensues from the incoherence and non-specificity of federal regulations. It goes without saying that the local migration legislation is unlawful, as are attempts to link rights (including labor and property rights) to the availability of residence registration. Meanwhile, many persons find it impossible to obtain permanent registration and are compelled to live under provisional (temporary stay) registration or without registration at all. The bottom line is that residence registration, or the absence thereof, is by no means a criterion of legality or illegality of migration. It is surprising that even sophisticated people tend to believe nonsense to the contrary. Even if we assume for a moment that the Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar territory are not citizens of the Russian Federation, this is not a basis for denying them registration and basic rights. 3) There was a time when the government of the USSR allocated areas for the Meskhetian Turks to settle in Russia’s Nechernozemye (Non-Black Earth Zone). They failed to take advantage of that opportunity and are, therefore, themselves to blame for their misfortunes. Comments The essence of the argument above is that a certain pale is established in the country for a certain ethnic group. Probably, the administration did seek such an outcome, although that can in no way be inferred from the 1989 governmental acts. Neither Resolution ¹503 of the government of the USSR of June 26 nor Resolution ¹220 of the government of the RSFSR of July 13, 1989 established any particular status for the Turks or mandated that they settle in specified places. The acts only provided for allocation of extra funds to those regions of Russia where the Turks from Uzbekistan were forcibly resettled, with the objective of assisting them with adaptation. Further developments fully confirmed that those who refused to rely on the state (or who, as most Turks, had no idea of the assistance offered) had taken the correct approach. The aid provided turned out to be meager and the living conditions — could not be called acceptable, to put it mildly. 4) The Meskhetian Turks are going to repatriate to Georgia from where they were exiled in 1944. Therefore, they should be treated as provisional migrants on the RF territory and it is not advisable to allow them become “entrenched.” Comments Here one issue is substituted for another. Many Meskhetians, possibly, even the majority of them, would like, in principle, to return to Southern Georgia. However, their prospective re-location is in no way connected with ensuring respect for their rights and freedoms in places where they currently reside. The desire to return to Georgia does not imply that they are obligated to do so. Clearly, the repatriation may take place only on a voluntary basis. Many fellow citizens would like to leave for some other country but this is not a reason to deprive them of their citizenship and their rights. Most Meskhetians in the RF are recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation, Turks of Kazakhstan — as Kazak citizens, Turks of the Ukraine — as Ukrainian citizens and so on. That does not prevent anyone from discussing an issue of prospective “repatriation” nor does it serve as an obstacle to it. Finally, Russian legislation is devoid of the notion of “provisional migrants.” There is also another side to this matter. LEGALLY, Georgia is not obligated to accept anyone. Upon joining the Council of Europe in April, 1999, Georgia assumed POLITICAL obligations to develop a legislative basis for the repatriation of the population exiled from Meskhetia in 1944 within two years, to start the repatriation within three years and to complete it within twelve years. The leaders of Georgia acted in a very predictable manner, as true “dust-pan Soviets,” i.e., in order to get what they wanted they made lots of promises and when the time came to fulfill them, they reneged, giving various excuses, knowing full well that they would go unpunished. A draft law on repatriation has been submitted to the Parliament of Georgia twice already. The proposed law treats repatriates as ordinary migrants, and establishes an authorized and very complicated procedure of resettlement, with resettlement itself guaranteeing no rights at all. The draft, if adopted, will make mass-scale resettlement of the Meskhetians essentially impossible. The leaders of the Georgian Parliament have already stated openly, several times, that the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks is not desirable and cannot not be carried out within the time-frame set by the Council of Europe. If one is to make a sober assessment of the situation, one should admit that the resettlement of a substantial part of the Meskhetians to Georgia is not a likely possibility. 5) The Turks are culturally incompatible with the neighboring population; their presence provokes conflicts and poses a threat of general destabilization. Comments There are two versions of the same argument: the administration is compelled to prevent interethnic conflicts and the administration is yielding to mass sentiments in order to prevent an outburst of popular discontent. One could comment extensively on this position, which amounts to a poorly disguised racist stand, but we will confine ourselves to only a few points. First, Turks live in dozens of regions of the RF and in other CIS states but reports of “conflicts” and “tension” are coming only from the Krasnodar territory, where the Meskhetian Turks are deprived of their rights and where a campaign of “forcing them out” has been launched. The local population keeps quiet about the Turks. It is the local officials, the so-called experts, Cossack activists, and media, i.e., non-impartial persons and organizations who are doing all the talk on behalf of the population. 6) The Turks as such are an undesirable and even harmful element. They are prone to crime and aggressiveness; they represent an alien culture; their presence implies an onset of “a demographic aggression;” and they are not loyal to Russia, since they are controlled by Islamic fundamentalists and Turkish intelligence services. Comments No comment. 2000–2002 Trends in the Policies of the Territorial Authorities In December of 2000, Alexander Tkatchev took over from Nikolai Kondratenko as the newly elected Governor of the territory. In a short while, he showed that he had no intention of easing the local migration policies and would stick to the same line with respect to the Meskhetian Turks. The Governor was supported by local law-makers. On December 6, 2000, the town of Maykop was the site of a joint meeting of the legislative assemblies of Adygeya and the Krasnodar territory. The meeting was devoted to “problems of migration.” (12) The legislators not only referred to migration as an absolute evil but openly indicated that they were primarily unhappy with the influx of “unsuitable” nationalities that “upset the ethnic balance.” The “unwelcome” ethnic groups were expressly identified as Meskhetian Turks (in the case of the Krasnodar territory) and the Kurds (in the case of Adygeya). There were quite unambiguous calls to remove them from the region. The deputies’ meeting approved a draft Federal Law “On Migration” and instructed the legislative assembly of the Krasnodar territory to submit it to the RF State Duma. In brief, the essence of the draft was to abolish the right to freedom of choice of residence in the RF; the draft was submitted to the State Duma. In 1998–2000, the RF Constitutional Court in several rulings (13) declared a number of articles of Territorial Law ¹90-KZ “On the Procedure of Registration of Arrival and Residence within the Krasnodar Territory” of June 23, 1995 and related regulations inconsistent with the RF Constitution and not subject to application. However, in practice, the application of the law and related regulations remain unaffected. During March-April of 2001, there was a re-registration of the Meskhetian Turks in accordance with Resolution ¹173 of the Head of Territorial Administration for a period of one year. The re-registration procedures involved gross abuses. Many Turks were denied re-registration for various far-fetched reasons: registration was refused to those who could not produce certificates of earlier registration, who had been permanently registered in other regions of Russia, and who rented and did not own their dwellings. As a result, one-year registration was granted to some three thousand persons (14). As soon as the provisional registration expired in March 1, 2002, the places where the Meskhetians lived were subjected to massive police and Cossack raids within the framework of so-called identification checks. Governor Tkatchev and his entourage, in public pronouncements, regularly attacked “migrants,” specifically the Turks, urging their listeners to drive them out. Bellow are excerpts from two of such speeches made by the Governor: By various estimates, the number of Meskhetian Turks currently residing within the territory ranges from fifteen to twenty thousand, which poses a serious problem. I want to remind them: do not forget, you are guests in our land. Sooner or later we will say good-bye to you. Today we are witnessing the genuine Russian Cossack population being ousted from domains which traditionally belonged to them, and some of the so-called guests earn their living by thievery and drug dealing. The majority of Meskhetian Turks do not wish to leave our land. I assure you that we will use all mechanisms both of pressure and persuasion so that the number of outgoing “guests” increases with each passing year. Besides, we also need to reduce the number of new-comers, not only the Turks but also the Azeris, Kurds and others. This process will, however, be a legal one (15). OR An international agreement has been reached to relocate the Meskhetian Turks into Georgia, their historical motherland. But they do not wish to return there. We intend to protect Kuban against all those who have forgotten that they are guests here and, therefore, should behave themselves accordingly, not to abuse the hospitality offered (16). As an aside, N. Kondratenko, former head of the region, also acted according to the same rhetoric. The following, however, is innovative. The Turks found themselves in a situation where they were totally denied access to justice. In the middle 1990s, several dozen Meskhetians managed to restore their rights judicially: through the courts, the people reinstated their rights of ownership to living quarters purchased by them and successfully appealed denials of registration at their place of residence (17). As of 1997, after N. Kondratenko took over, there has been an increase in pressure exerted by the administration on judicial bodies. Such was this pressure that courts started to pass judgments that did not conform with existing federal law by referring to territorial statutory acts. There have also come to light numerous instances where court judgments in favor of the Turks remained unexecuted by passport and visa services. Similar practices are still pervasive. Several dozen Meskhetian families are currently trying, with the help of the Krasnodar human rights organization “Good Deed” (Dobroye Delo), to resolve through the courts the following three problems: to confirm their rights of ownership to living quarters, to appeal denials of registration by passport and visa services, and to certify, through the use of special proceedings, the fact that they have been permanently residing within the Krasnodar territory since February 6, 1992 and thus consequently must be recognized as citizens. Since 2000, judges, by using various far-fetched legal ploys, have been doing everything possible not to allow suits to be considered on their merits or have been rendering patently illegal judgments (18). The Meskhetian Turks have also found themselves deprived of those few sources of income left to them. Almost all the Meskhetians who lacked local residence registration but were employed under labor contracts were dismissed in 1997–1999. To earn their living, just as before, they had to lease plots of land from private individuals and collective farms to grow vegetables, carry on petty wholesale and retail trade in market places and sell food stuffs grown on plots of land attached to their homes. Under pressure exerted by district administrations, in 1997–1998 there was a massive dissolution of lease agreements made with Turks who, for the most part, leased the land through front-men registered as local residents. In the winter of 2001–2002, all such agreements again in response to pressure from local authorities were cancelled. As of 1999, the Turks have been denied documents by the local government to certify that they are in possession of land attached to their homes. Without such papers one is not allowed to trade in the market places and may have to pay fines charged by tax inspectors. In addition, Turks have been exposed to possible fines for allegedly unauthorized seizure of land. Having earlier refused, for various outlandish reasons, to issue documents certifying the rights to land attached to Turkish homes and living quarters, the Crimean and Abinsk district administrations started to hold the Meskhetian Turks liable for the non-availability of these documents. A commission was set up under the Crimean Joint Committee of Land Resources and Land Use to control the use and protection of land. The rulings on administrative liability made by the commission read as follows: liability accrues if “use is made of a plot of land attached to a house acquired through a hand-written transaction (receipt) in the absence of duly executed documents confirming the right to land use.” That use of land is determined by the commission as a violation of Item 1.1. of Article 125 of the RSFSR Land Code — an arbitrary occupation of a land plot, subject to fines of up to 1 500 roubles and in the case of non-payment — up to 10 000 roubles.” (19) The Turks, as a rule, have no money to pay such fines, in which case administrative bodies initiate administrative proceedings and seize the defaulters’ property, such as food products, tableware, sheep and goats. In other words, the Turks are made to starve. In addition, the Crimea regional administration has promised to impose fines on holders of “illegally occupied” or “illegally erected” structures (i.e., dwellings which have not been registered, as is the case with the Turks) and also to tear them down. The pressure sharply increased in early 2002. Upon the expiration in February 28 of the one-year registration term, Cossacks and the police started massive identification checks in courtyards where Turks were known to live. The Meskhetians were again told to provisionally register for forty-five days and several persons were stripped of their passports. Resolution ¹1363-P “On Further Measures to Lessen Tension in Interethnic Relations in Areas of Dense Concentrations of the Meskhetian Turks Temporarily Residing within the Krasnodar Territory” of February 20, 2002, by the Legislative Assembly of the Krasnodar territory is a graphic example of a type of Soviet legal technique. It is based on understatements and euphemisms, when the meaning of documents is not expressly stated but implied. Formally, Resolution ¹1363-P requires that the administration, all services and local self-administrating bodies “take measures to reduce tensions in interethnic relations.” It also suggests that the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs resume talks with Georgia on resettlement of the Turks, and that the territorial administration prepare proposals on amending the agreement between that federal authorities and the territorial administration. Further, acceptance of applications to the territorial migration control commission for registration of stateless persons was suspended. Resolution ¹1363-P urges the Chief Police Directorate (GUVD) of the Krasnodar territory to be more active in identifying persons “who have illegally arrived in the territory.” It also urges the Committee for Land Resources and Land Use to “regularly perform verification of the legality of allocation and use of lands in places of dense concentrations of ethnic groups within the territory.” In actual fact, the implications of the document are quite different. The real meaning is that the Turks will be subject to special requirements, their registration within the territory will be prevented whenever possible. The policy of the government, just it was before, is to prevent Turks from using their own plots of land, and to put pressure on them through police checks. Thus, the territorial administration is challenging federal legislation by requiring particular conditions inconsistent with the law of the RF. On March 18, 2002, the town of Abinsk was the site of a meeting of territorial administrative activists dedicated to problems of migration. The Governor, speaking at the meeting, specifically said that “Kuban is Cossack land and everyone should be aware of this. In the near future we shall increase the amounts of fines for the absence of registration to six thousand rubles. That will hopefully make illegal migrants leave the territory of their own free will (20).” A. Tkatchev also proposed to set up filtration camps under district police departments (ROVD) where migrants would be brought, to be deported within three days. Other proposals made at the meeting included the following: to organize, using territorial budget funds, Krasnodar-Tashkent charter flights to deport the Meskhetians; to set obligatory targets for each district of a specified number of the Meskhetian Turks to be deported; to have the Legislative Assembly adopt a resolution “On the Deportation of Migrants.” ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE MESKHETIAN TURKS The Krasnodar territory is the site of operations for the Kuban Cossack Troopers’ Association (KVKO), which has been on the federal register since 1998. Still earlier, it acquired a semi-official status at the territorial level. The KVKO made a number of agreements with state agencies regarding Cossack governmental and other service and is enjoying the direct financial and material support of the territorial authorities. V. Gromov, the leader of KVKO, has, since 1996, been a member of the territorial administration. The paramilitary Cossack units are openly engaged in military training and are involved, either without formal permission or jointly with the police, in street patrolling, identification checks, etc. In its ideology, the KVKO is an extremist nationalist organization compared to which RNE (Russian National Unity) divisions and other Cossack groups look quite insignificant and are of little importance. The KVKO Taman division, operating in western areas of the territory where the Turks primarily live, is one of the most active and extremist-minded divisions of the KVKO. The Meskhetians proved to be convenient “whipping boys.” Cossack volunteer detachments regularly organize “raids” to run identification checks inside houses, in the street and in market places, which amounts to de facto harassment of the Meskhetians and other “persons of non-Slavic nationalities.” They also practice unauthorized detentions and beat the detainees. Cossack activists stage rallies and meetings urging the Turks’ expulsion and making public threats of violence against them. The Cossacks regularly interfere with various domestic conflicts as “protectors” of Russians. Sometimes, such activity develops into large-scale acts of violence (21). Thus, on the night of April 7, 2000, two intoxicated residents of Nizhnebakanskaya stanitsa, (a large Cossack village) of the Crimea region, broke into the yard of a Meskhetian Turk. The Turks turned out the unwelcome visitors and complained to the Cossacks. Several days later, the Cossacks gathered a mob, took the Turks allegedly guilty of that incident and beat them severely. As a result, one person with serious injuries was hospitalized. One year later, in April 26, 2001, the Cossacks of the town of Krymsk learned (which turned out to be untrue afterwards) that in the Novoukrainskaya village (next to the town) the Turks had allegedly beaten a teenager. A detachment of Cossack “volunteers” headed by I. Bezugly, a leader of the Taman division, carried out a raid on the Novoukrainskaya village during which several dozens families were stripped of their passports and car documents, several Turks were badly beaten and two persons were hospitalized. Not a single action staged by the Cossacks has been curbed by law-enforcement agencies, and almost no one has been held accountable or punished. As a result, organizations which pose as Cossack representatives have become totally detached from legal reality. Cossack organizations are disseminating the most absurd rumors about the Turks: for instance, that the Turks make their living by stealing cattle and vegetables from the fields, worship Wahhabism, are raping teenagers, have deliberately settled in the Crimea in order, in case of war, to take hold of strategic facilities and cut off the road to the city of Novorossiisk, etc. THE POSITION OF MOSCOW Over the last twelve years the federal authorities have been, in principle, pursuing the same strategy as their regional counterparts. The actions undertaken by territorial authorities not only grossly violate the RF Constitution and federal legislation but also, in some instances, fall under the RF Criminal Code. Not only has Moscow done nothing to put an end to this, but it has also never declared its disapproval, even in the mildest terms. Conceptually, the federal authorities share the attitudes of the territorial administration towards the Turks. One may hear representatives of federal departments say the same things as the leaders of the Krasnodar territory, e.g.: the Turks are residing in the territory illegally; a special pale for the Meskhetian Turks was established in Russia in 1989; the alleged limitations on residence registration instituted in Krasnodar during Soviet times are still valid; regional statutory acts should prevail over the Constitution and federal legislation, the Krasnodar territory is supposedly suffering from “excessive” migration; the Turks are an undesirables in both Krasnodar and Russia (22). At the same time, the federal authorities have so far taken no repressive measures against the Turks. The logic behind their politics, as that of the territorial leadership, is quite obvious — to not assume responsibility and to wait until things have somehow straightened themselves out (until, for instance, the Meskhetians have left for some place of their own free will). According to RF Government Resolution 1129-r of July 18, 1994, an Interdepartmental Commission was set up to solve the problems of the Meskhetian Turks residing on RF territory. Almost as soon as it was created the commission was clearly destined for “administrative death” and therefore, has done nothing concrete. It was twice resurrected, namely, by the RF Government Resolution ¹627-r of May 28, 1998, and by the RF Government Resolution 1280-r of September 14, 2000. The Interdepartmental Commission enjoys broad powers — its decisions are binding to be executed by the federal administrative apparatus and executive authorities of the federation’s constituent member states represented on the Commission. Judging by the brief episodes of its activity, the Interdepartmental Commission set itself the task not of protecting the Meskhetians in the RF but of creating conditions for them to resettle in Georgia or Turkey. Several times in recent years members of the Interdepartmental Commission have visited the Krasnodar territory, making public comments in support of the Krasnodar authorities. For instance, on May 28, 2001, N. Bugai, a member of the Interdepartmental Commission and head of the Department for Affairs of Nationalities of the RF Ministry for Federation Affairs took part in the regional conference, “Problems and Ways of Development of Interethnic Relations in the Krasnodar Territory,” during which he urged forcible deportation of “ethnic migrants” and adoption of a law on deportation (23). It is noteworthy that the initial membership of the Interdepartmental Commission included representatives of the RF Ministry of Social Protection and the Russian Red Cross; by the year 2000, membership did not include any “humanitarian” organizations. Their place was taken by V. Klinyshkov, deputy head of the Directorate to Fight Terrorism and Political Extremism of the Second Department of the RF Federal Security Service. The Ministry of Federation Affairs provided work for the Interdepartmental Commission and the Minister for Federation Affairs acted as its chairperson. Upon the liquidation of the Ministry for Federation Affairs on October 16, 2001, the Commission went into an administrative coma. It should be noted that in March 2001 — prior to the aforementioned most recent administrative coma — the Krasnodar territory was visited by A. Blokhin in his capacity as Minister for Federation Affairs and Chairman of the Commission on the Meskhetian Turks, to investigate the problem “on location.” Territorial and district officials together with Cossack activists assured the Minister that the territory was faced with an explosive situation, that the local population refused to have the Turks as their neighbors and were on the verge of rioting. They tried to convince the Moscow delegation that the federal government should find a way to evict the Meskhetians from the Krasnodar territory. During the delegation’s trip to the districts, the delegation was twice stopped by a hysterical crowd of Cossacks and RNE members. A. Blokhin had to explain his position at those improvised meetings, answering why Moscow was not evicting the Turks. As the visit drew to an end, A. Blokhin announced his decision to take a poll of all Meskhetian adults, asking what they are planning to do in the future and where they would like to go. The results of the poll were to determine further action by the federal administration, i.e., talks with Georgia, Turkey or other countries ready to accept the Meskhetians. The Minister made no mention of either granting citizenship or protecting the rights of the Meskhetians in the Krasnodar territory and other places within the Russian Federation where they are domiciled. A. Blokhin actually employed two techniques previously practiced by his predecessor to procrastinate and avoid tackling the problem. The first one was to substitute the issue of immigration for cessation of discrimination. The second one was to offer discourses of the type: “We are not in a position to decide anything until we have learned what they are going to do!” Besides, by raising the point of resettlement those in power in Moscow have, at least indirectly, admitted that they are not going to ensure the rights of the Meskhetians in the Krasnodar territory, thereby encouraging those who are “cleansing” the territory from “undesired settlers.” By way of example, here is the viewpoint of a representative of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs: Over the course of several years, the Meskhetian Turks have been granted, in compliance with territorial statutory acts, a long-standing temporary registration at the place of their actual residence with the availability of which they were able to solve virtually all their social and domestic problems (24) <…> The Meskhetian Turks residing within the Krasnodar territory with former USSR passports have fallen into the category of stateless persons. Today, they may acquire Russian citizenship only by filing a petition to that effect with the President of the Russian Federation five years after having received documentation of a residence permit. Such petitions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis (25) <…> Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, the administration and the Chief Police Directorate of the Krasnodar territory are concerned about the situation in places with dense concentrations of Meskhetian Turks which can be described as charged with conflict. Such conflict is often aggravated by the Turks committing crimes against the local population. The analysis of the crime situation over the last four years shows that the number of offences committed by the Meskhetian Turks in 1998 was thirty five, in 1999 — forty seven, in 2000 — thirty nine, over the eleven months of 2001 — thirty three (26). Some of these acts have evoked wide-spread public outcry among local residents <…> Furthermore, according to incomplete data for 2001… more than 4 200 persons of the Turkish-Meskhetian nationality within the Krasnodar territory were subject to civil administrative sanction (27). To compare, here is the viewpoint of a representative of the RF Prosecutor General’s Office: It has been established that the territorial bodies of legislative and executive authority repeatedly adopted acts aimed at restricting the rights of persons of that [Meshketian Turkish] ethnic group, as a result of which a considerable proportion of the Meskhetian Turks have not been granted Russian citizenship and have the status of persons temporarily residing within RF territory… The majority of the Meskhetian Turks lack right-granting documents for acquired housing, which makes their registration at their chosen place of residence difficult. In the absence of permanent registration the said persons have no right to be recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation according to the procedure in Article 13 of Federal Law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation.” The issue of acquiring Russian citizenship by the Meskhetians domiciled in dense concentrations within the Krasnodar territory should be solved on an individual basis in strict compliance with the said law. Analysis of media reports has identified no articles aimed at inciting national and religious enmity or disrespect for national dignity…(28) The Meskhetian association “Vatan” regularly appeals to various federal departments for aid only to receive pro forma replies, excerpts from which were given above, sent to keep up appearances. O. Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation and V. Zorin, a newly appointed Minister for Affairs of Nationalities have openly turned their backs on the Krasnodar problem. Since 2000, the position of the federal authorities has been changing for the worse, that is, against the Meskhetians. Support for policies intended to force them out is becoming increasingly obvious and active. Migration “problems” are actively tackled by the staff of the plenipotentiary representative of the RF President in the Southern federal district. Both staff officials and the representative himself take an unfriendly position towards migrants and minorities, to put it mildly. There are notorious “experts” on ethnic problems among officials, such as L. Khoperskaya, who acquired notoriety by calling ethnic discrimination a method of “optimizing the ethnic composition of the flow of migration.” (29) In the spring-summer of 2001, the staff of the plenipotentiary representative directly addressed the Meskhetians’ problem. In August 2001, the head office of the RF Ministry of Justice for the Krasnodar territory jointly with other departments conducted an inspection of activities of the Krasnodar branch of the “Vatan” Meskhetian Turks’ association. The chairman of the branch, S. Tedorov, received two notices of non-compliance with statutory provisions connected to the organization’s activity. There were basically two charges brought against “Vatan.” The first, a delay in submission of the year 2000 annual report to the registering authority; and the second, unauthorized activities conducted by “Vatan” "to promote the Turks’ settlement and entrenchment within the Krasnodar territory” in defiance of its Charter, which envisages that the Turks be provided with assistance in returning to their historic motherland. The liquidation of a branch of a public association through the courts is no simple matter and the territorial branch of the Ministry of Justice chose not to initiate it. It should be noted, that thus far, no inspections of the activities of Cossack organizations within the territory has been carried out. “Forcing out the Meskhetians” fits in nicely with the federal campaign of “cleansing” the country of former USSR citizens and citizens of CIS countries. In 2000, those citizens were equated with foreigners from “the far abroad:” the unpublished acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were applied to them, requiring documentation for residence permits and limiting by one month the term of residence registration at the place of domicile. In addition, the easy procedure for acquisition of Russian citizenship has been terminated; the effect of former USSR passports is coming to an end and a new law on citizenship is in the pipeline. Former Soviet citizens who live in the RF without registration of their residence or with USSR passports (i.e., the same as the Turks in Krasnodar) find themselves deprived of all rights and prospects. The objectives of those policies are obvious — to make all these people leave the country. The motives have also been proclaimed: to reduce the number of migrants who are perceived as a threat to state security and to get rid of “unsuitable” ethnic groups. That is quite consistent with the sentiments of the Krasnodar authorities. Speaking in the town of Abinsk on March 18, 2002, at the meeting of territorial activists, Governor Tkatchev declared as follows: “The President is in support of our aspirations, he has instructed me to take active steps without waiting for the adoption of federal legislation on this problem.” (30) Up to now, the federal administration has been eloquently silent. (1) Over the last 150 years, Muslims from Southern Georgia speaking the Turkish language, have been called and have called themselves different names. The terms “Turks from Meskhetia” and “Meskhetian Turks” originated and were used in the 1960s-70s within the movement for return of the Meshketians to Georgia and as of the late 1980s have been widely employed by mass media, special literature and among Meshketian Turkish activists themselves. For more information see: A. Osipov A. “The Movement of the Meskhetians for Repatriation (1956–1988)” Ethnographic Overview (1998, ¹5, pp. 95–107). (2) The predicament of the Meshketian Turks in the Krasnodar territory is described in detail in several books in the Russian and English languages. See: A. Osipov A., O. Cherepova Violation of the Rights of Forced Migrants and Ethnic Discrimination in the Krasnodar Territory: The Situation of the Meskhetian Turks (Moscow: Memorial, 1996); A. Osipov, Russian Experience of Ethnic Discrimination: the Meskhetians in the Krasnodar Territory, (Moscow: Zvenya, 2000). (3) The aggregate number of Krasnodar residents is about 5 050 000 people; Russians account for more than 85% of the population. (4) According to data from the RF Prosecutor General’s Office, as of the middle of 2001, the number of the Turks residing in the Krasnodar territory was 15 500, out of which number over 4 000 had been registered, 2 500 were recognized as Russian citizens. See: Letter ¹27/2-498-00 of June 29, 2001, signed by Yu. Titov, Deputy Head of the Directorate for Supervision of Federal Security Laws Implementation of the RF Prosecutor General’s Office addressed to Yu. Sarvarov, Chairman of the “Vatan” International Association of the Meskhetian Turks. (5) The status of the Turks’ who received RF citizenship in other regions of Russia or abroad but who lacked Krasnodar permanent residence registration is the same as that of the Turks not recognized as Russian citizens. (6) A situation similar to that of the Meskhetians is faced by about a thousand Khemshiles, Muslims speaking the Armenian language, who were forcibly resettled into the territory during 1990–1991 from Kirgizia where they lived after having been exiled from Adjaria in 1944. Kurds are also becoming a target of purposeful persecutions as a distinct ethnic group. (7) Resolution ¹ 97 of the Territorial Small Soviet “On Measures to Ease Tension in Interethnic Relations in the Crimea and Some Other Districts of the Krasnodar Territory” of February 12, 1992; Resolution ¹291-P of the Legislative Assembly of the Krasnodar territory “On Measures To Ease Tensions In Interethnic Relations Within the Specific Districts in Which the Meskhetian Turks Temporarily Reside Within the Krasnodar territory” of April 24, 1996. (8) Kubanskie Novosti (March 6, 2002). (9) The regional policy was essentially developed by a group of experts — M. Savva, V.Ostrozhny, V.Remmler — invited into administrative apparatus by the “democratic’ leadership in 1991. (10) See for instance: I. Karasev, “Every Fifth Resident of the Kuban Is a Migrant. The Creeping Ethnic Coup?” Kubanskie Novosti (May 31, 2001); V. Pavlov, “Economic Migration.” Volnaya Kuban (May 17, 2001). (11) Center for Investigation and Prevention of Conflicts of the Russia’s Academy of Science, Interethnic Relations and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States (Moscow: 2001, p. 209). (12) “Uncontrolled Migration As a Natural Disaster.” Kuban Segodnya (December 14, 2001). (13) Ruling ¹116-O of October 7, 1998, and Ruling ¹147-O of June 23, 2000. (14) Letter ¹41/12 of January 4, 2002, signed by N. Getman, First Deputy Head of the Public Security Service of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs addressed to S. Tedorov, Chairman of the Krasnodar territorial branch of the “Vatan” International Association of the Meskhetian Turks. (15) “Do not Forget You Are Guests!” Prizyv (September 8, 2001). (16) A. Tkatchev, “The Governor Must Not Be Kind to those who Are Killing Production,” Krayevye Novosti (September 13, 2001). (17) An accurate number of cases won is not known, according to the “Memorial” Society’s most conservative estimates, it may be as high as two hundred. It was a spontaneous process neither monitored nor stimulated by the “Vatan” Meskhetian Turks’ Association. (18) In 2001, with the help of the “Good Deed” organization, two complaints were lodged and accepted for consideration by the European Court of Human Rights in support of the interests of M. Eminov and Z. Eminova who had been denied by the Crimean district and Krasnodar territorial courts the right to judicially establish the fact of their residence on RF territory on the effective date of Federal Law “On Citizenship.” (19) According to the 2001 report made by V. Gaidash, deputy chairman of the “Good Deed” organization that gives assistance to the Meskhetians. (20) The territorial newspapers failed to carry a detailed account of the Abinsk meeting, therefore, the citation is taken from: “In the Kuban They Will Check Your Family Name Endings.” Inostranets (March 26, 2002). (21) The most notorious 1994–1997 incidents were described in: A. Osipov, O. Cherepova, Collected Articles; A. Osipov, Russian Experience of Ethnic Discrimination: the Meskhetians in the Krasnodar Territory, (Moscow: Zvenya, 2000). (22) For more information, see: A. Osipov, Russian Experience of Ethnic Discrimination: the Meskhetians in the Krasnodar Territory, (Moscow: Zvenya, (23) Popov A., “Problems and Ways of Development of Interethnic Relations,” Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Prevention of Conflicts Bulletin (May-June, 2001, p. 32). (24) That is an obvious lie. (25) This was made up by the author of the letter. On the date of the letter, the law was silent regarding the period of permanent residence required prior to applying for citizenship. (26) The annual number of crimes registered in the Krasnodar territory averages about 55 000. (27) Letter ¹41/12 of January 4, 2002, signed by N. Getman, First Deputy Head of the Public Security Service of RF Ministry of Internal Affairs addressed to S. Tedorov, Chairman of the Krasnodar Territorial Branch of the “Vatan” International Association of Meskhetian Turks. (28) Letter ¹41/12 of January 4, 2002, signed by N. Getman, First Deputy Head of the Public Security Service of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs addressed to S. Tedorov, Chairman of the Krasnodar territorial branch of the “Vatan” International Association of The Meskhetian Turks. (29) Forced Migrants in the North Caucasus (Moscow: 1997, p. 12); L. Khoperskaya Regulation of Migration Processes in the North Caucasus: Forced Migrants and the State (Moscow: 1998, pp. 125, 126). (30) “In the Kuban They Will Check Your Family Name Endings,” Inostranets (2000, March 26). Finishing of report |
Íàøà êíîïêà  |
|