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English Language Page At the same time it should be noted that the democratic procedures that guarantee the legality of the electoral process are, as yet, ineffective. The frequent violations that occur during election campaigns are largely the result of the immaturity of the legal mechanisms designed to protect rights, including the mechanisms that address manifestations of xenophobia. Lack of a continuous practice of rights enforcement also accounts for an approach to the initiation and investigation of criminal cases that is fraught with subjectivity. One of the obstacles to securing legal protection for one’s rights is that, in practice, existing legislation regulates relationships only between individuals. This means that criminal cases founded upon xenophobia targeted at a certain ethnic or any other type of group and not a concrete individual (i.e., a natural person) are for practical purposes not contemplated by the courts. Therefore, the nationalistic platforms of non-radical political organizations can be, from a legal standpoint, verbalized quite freely by the leaders and representatives of such organizations. Xenophobia is also a consequence of the fact that the application of sanctions provided for by current legislation is improbable in practice because the electoral commissions and prosecutorial authorities that control the electoral process very rarely register such violations and take effective measures to address them. In addition, manifestations of xenophobia that occur are not always perceived of as such. This is largely due to the low level of professional qualification present among electoral commission employees. Law-enforcement agencies and the courts are disadvantaged in this respect as much as in other spheres of socio-political life (1). In the course of the electoral process, xenophobia is predominantly encountered at the campaigning stage. Xenophobic views and expressions of such views are contained in speeches and declarations of electoral process participants or planks in the platforms of political parties and blocs. Printed campaign materials are also a popular medium for xenophobic statements and positions. One may distinguish between three primary sources of election-related xenophobia: first, from so-called patriotic organizations or their representatives running for deputy in legislative assemblies or for executive office; second, from politicians who unconsciously use xenophobic elements during their campaigns; and third, from electoral process participants for whom xenophobia is seen as the only means to conduct an effective election campaign. Politicians in the latter category include those who engage in legislatively prohibited methods of preparing and disseminating printed campaign materials. This section sets out data obtained in the course of monitoring manifestations of xenophobia as well as violations of legislation during the 1999 parliamentary campaign, since the majority of criminal cases initiated on the basis of Article 282 of the RF Criminal Code (incitement of ethnic, racial or religious hatred) were initiated specifically during that period. Of course, this report will not reflect all the manifestations of xenophobia recorded during the monitoring, but only those that best illustrate the report’s basic theses. At any rate, all the information obtained during the monitoring was taken into consideration when evaluating existing trends and was used as the foundation for this overview. NATIONALISTIC POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS The ideology reflected in the programme of nationalistic political organizations contains open xenophobia, which is the basis of their political platform. In this case, xenophobia is not just an element of a political ideology — it is the foundation for further theoretical construction of what are, in essence, nationalistic, racist conceptions. We note that here, xenophobia is not covert but is, on the contrary, overtly declared and has significance in and of itself. Leaders of nationalistic organizations publicly express their positions, disseminate books and brochures with xenophobic content, and are, as a rule, not prosecuted. Twenty-six political parties and associations of a nationalistic-patriotic bent took part in 1999 parliamentary elections (2). Participation of these parties and electoral associations in the campaign was accompanied by frank xenophobic statements. For example, in the Jewish autonomous region, a representative of the Russian Communities Congress (KRO) spoke on the radio of the realities of contemporary Russia, referring to the situation of Russians as compared to the situation of “non-indigenous” peoples. Having considered the statement, the district election commission evaluated it as exclusively polemic and therefore not in contradiction of the law. Marginal political parties such as “Laborers’ Russia” (“Trudovaya Rossiya”) and “Officers Union” (“Soyuz Ofitserov”) can be considered as only somewhat socialist, when it comes to the provisions of their programmes. The majority of their printed and public declarations are based on political anti-Semitism. In addition, the “exposure” of Zionist regimes at meetings is accompanied by dissemination of printed materials (bulletins, brochures, etc.) that contain not only imperialistic speculations but also those that are openly racist. For example, at the outset of the 1999 election campaign, a regional Congress of Patriotic Forces in Ryazan was held, which was attended by representatives of “Laborers’ Russia” and “Officers Union.” Such newspapers as Aryets [Aryan], RusskyNabat [Russian Tocsin], Russkoe Natsionalnoe Edinstvo [Russian National Unity], etc. were freely disseminated at the congress. The congress received positive coverage from the local press, which supports political leaders of the above-mentioned parties and disseminates their political statements. Sometimes, the declarations of candidates become objects of investigation conducted by prosecutorial authorities. For example, the radio address of A. Nedospasov, Chairman of the Tomsk regional organization “Historical Tomsk,” delivered during the election campaign, was acknowledged to have contained elements undermining the trust in and respect for certain ethnic groups. The regional prosecutorial authority served him with an official warning. The prosecutorial authority of the Vyborg district of St. Petersburg studied the campaign materials of a candidate for the State Duma, N. Bondarik, Chairman of the Russian Party, notorious for its nationalistic radicalism. For some reason, the examination was never completed and the election commission never responded to a petition to cancel N. Bondarik’s registration. The fliers that were distributed by the candidate’s staff contained calls to fight “God’s enemies, enemies of Russia and the Russian people” and to oust all non-Russians from Russia, as well as demands to nationalize the property of the “Jewish-Caucasian Mafia,” etc. In addition, N. Bondarik was twice given the opportunity to appear on St. Petersburg television programs in which he openly discussed the prospects for an ethnic cleansing of the city. The election campaign of I. Artyomov (Vladimir region), who represented the Russian All-National Union (ROS), was based on the racist planks of that organization’s political platform. Issues of the Rubezh newspaper that I. Artyomov disseminated as campaign materials on the eve of the election contained calls to liberate “Russian regions from individuals of the Caucasian nationality,” remarks about the purity of “Russian blood” and the unacceptability of mixed marriages, etc., which in the opinion of the candidate were a necessary pre-requisite for Russia’s prosperity. Political organizations that base their platforms on the premise that the Russian people are being exterminated in a genocide, also conditionally fall within this category. Justification of this thesis in the course of campaign meetings and in printed campaign materials leads to xenophobia that in substance does not differ from that frequently encountered in declarations of leaders and representatives of nationalistic and patriotic organizations. For example, the campaign materials and electoral program disseminated during a meeting with P. Ivanov, who ran for the RF State Duma from Nizhny Novgorod representing the “National Congress of the Russian Intelligentsia,” discussed the issue of “the genocide of the Russian people” and its causes. Ethnic xenophobia continues to be the dominant trend in the politics of the Krasnodar territory. Furthermore, almost any public pronouncement given by top territorial officials, either oral or written, forms and supports ethnic social stereotypes and justifies discriminatory measures undertaken against ethnic groups residing in the territory. Previously, the political rhetoric of local authorities combined relatively pragmatic xenophobic statements about concrete migrant groups and primitive geopolitical speculations of an anti-Semitic nature, the latter being most preferred under N. Kondratenko. When the territorial government was replaced and A. Tkachev became Governor, the emphasis shifted towards the struggle against forced and economic migrants. The anti-Semitic declarations pronounced by N. Kondratenko ceased to be the primary issue in the speeches of top territorial officials. During election campaigns, xenophobic rhetoric usually gains strength. In 1999, during public appearances before his constituents, Governor Kondratenko tied loyalty to the territorial administration and his political movement, “Fatherland” [Otechestvo] with loyalty to Russia’s national interests. He did this while casting the main political organizations and their candidates from single-mandate districts as enemies of the state, not the least reason for such a characterization being their “inappropriate” ethnic origin. NON-RADICAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR LEADERS Xenophobia is not the primary element of the platforms of moderate political organizations. Predominantly, xenophobic elements either veiled or overtly stated are contained in the rhetoric of political leaders as they meet with their constituents or interact with the mass media. It is necessary to note that such statements frequently are a consequence of a common misconception regarding the problem of xenophobia and its possible manifestations. This leads to statements containing elements of ethnic or religious xenophobia that are not perceived as unacceptable. In addition, many political leaders perceive such declarations as a normal part of public political speech because as a rule, the wide public does not condemn and even supports such pronouncements. In the Bryansk region, the local pro-gubernatorial mass media, as well as the campaign materials of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the National Bolshevik Party (NBP), and the Russian National Unity (RNE) are primarily focused on the ethnic origin of the candidates competing with incumbents during election campaigns. In 1999, one of the basic arguments against L. Narusova, who ran for the State Duma from the Bryansk region, was the claim that she was concealing her ethnicity. In the Kemerovo region, the pro-gubernatorial newspaper Levy Bereg, published an article that claimed to provide a balanced evaluation and objective analysis of the nation’s political elite, as well as the political situation in general. In essence, the article repeated well-known anti-Semitic arguments. The article’s authors considered it acceptable since the contents, in their opinion, corresponded to reality and were intended for the majority of citizens as reinforcement of existing views. Typically, anti-xenophobic criticism and accusations of xenophobia are not only misunderstood but also perceived as Russophobia. On the other hand, some political organizations deliberately include xenophobic elements in their political platforms in order to conform with the prevailing trend in internal politics and create and maintain an image of a patriotic organization that is not marginal. On the whole, aspirations to the status of being a patriotic organization result from the conditions prevailing in the political environment. The problem is that patriotism often has a defensive character, which leads to the exploitation (in one form or another) of xenophobic stereotypes by politicians and political organizations. XENOPHOBIA AS MEANS TO ENHANCE POLITICAL POPULARITY Xenophobia in political speeches and statements sometimes results from the literal interpretation of data obtained in the course of sociological surveys that are widely used during election campaigns. In striving to meet public expectations on a variety of issues, politicians include viewpoints that are most popular among their constituents in their election campaign speeches. In such cases, xenophobia has a strictly practical character, i.e., it is used as an instrument to enhance a politician’s political rating. For example, in the title of an election campaign article, “There Will Be No More Black Days in Russia” written by one of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) candidates running for the State Duma from the Saratov region, the words “we will have no more black” were typed with large, bold letters, whereas the last word in this sequence — “days” — was typed in a smaller font. This was probably an electoral move playing upon widespread stereotypes and xenophobic attitudes in the public consciousness. The poster of the “Unity” [Edinstvo] electoral bloc containing a portrait of B. Berezovsky and the text “Vote for my bear!” multiple copies of which were posted in Tula can be regarded as having taken advantage of xenophobic, in particular, anti-Semitic stereotypes to make a political campaign more effective. The authors of this poster apparently wanted to take advantage of anti-Semitic attitudes since B. Berezovsky’s ethnic (Jewish) origin was constantly used to discredit him or President Yeltsin and his associates. The high print quality of the poster and the impressive budget of the printing enterprise provide sufficient grounds to assume that the action had been thoroughly thought out and well planned. The importance of the printed mass media as an instrument of counter-campaigning grows significantly during election campaigns. Publications that take advantage of anti-Semitic, anti-Caucasian and more particularly, Chechenophobic stereotypes are not rare. As a rule, the subject matter of such publications have to do with accusing some participants in the electoral process of championing and protecting Jews, Caucasians, or Chechens. In such cases, whether or not newspaper editorial boards or article authors are really champions of xenophobic views is open to dispute. Probably, the most widespread ethnic and religious stereotypes in Russian society are used to enhance the popularity of certain candidates for elected offices. The heightened xenophobia against Chechens is skillfully used to discredit candidates for deputy, especially in Russian regions adjacent to the Chechen Republic. For example, in the Stavropol territory (1999) a local newspaper published an article about the connections of one of the candidates with leaders of terrorist groups in Chechnya, the accusations being substantiated by a 1997 photograph, in which the candidate was captured together with S. Raduyev and Sh. Basayev. The newspaper’s editorial board did not give the candidate a chance to refute the claim and, in fact, refutation would have been impossible since the article was published only two days prior to the actual start of voting. Anti-western attitudes are widespread. As a rule, anti-westernism manifests itself as anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. During the presidential election campaign the Kirovskaya Pravda newspaper (Kirov region) published a xenophobically-flavored article, “Who Are They, the Friends of People?” that contained false information about G. Yavlinsky, a participant in the presidential race. On the whole, G. Yavlinsky’s “Yabloko” is often criticized by nationalistic political organizations as a party that appreciates western values, which are allegedly alien to Russia. Illustrative of this, for example, is an article written by Deputy D. Usov, “One Can Never Stop Starving Eating ‘Apples’ Like These!” published in the Novii Petersburg newspaper. To quote, “many of them are not Russians ... the pro-American group chose a certain Azersky, and on German Yefimovich, just as it ought to be and not otherwise. The last name, the given name, and the patronymic, certainly speak for themselves ... consistent with a third rate Israeli actor in a “B” movie.” An anti-Semitic article dedicated to the elucidation of the ethnic origin of G. Yavlinsky was published in one of the local newspapers during the 2000 gubernatorial election campaign in St. Petersburg. Publication of an article supporting the sitting Governor was intended to decrease the rating of gubernatorial candidate I. Artemyev, leader of the city branch of the “Yabloko” party. PRINTED CAMPAIGN MATERIALS The most scandalous xenophobic statements are encountered in campaign materials such as fliers, brochures, posters, etc. The straightforwardness and aggressiveness of the contents largely depend on the severity of the penalty provided for by the law. But given that the majority of campaign materials contradict the norms contained in election legislation, they are anonymous, include no publication data, etc., therefore, as a rule, it is impossible to identify the producer, the individual placing the order to produce the materials, or the distributor of such materials. It is this impunity, specifically, that is the reason for the widespread distribution of xenophobic and frequently racist printed matter during election campaigns. According to observers, an outburst of anti-Semitism occurred during gubernatorial elections in the Novosibirsk region. A significant number of anonymous fliers with anti-Semitic content were prepared targeting the main rival of the regional Governor, V. Tolokonsky (the than Mayor of Novosibirsk, who eventually won the election and is Governor now). The same happened in 2000 in the Cheliabinsk region, during campaigning for the regional legislative assembly. The regional prosecutorial authorities apprehended distributors of anti-Semitic fliers and initiated a criminal case. The same scheme was used in Perm when campaign posters of one of the candidates, an ethnic Jew, were covered with graffiti reading, “Jew.” There is sufficient grounds to regard this as a planned action since the majority of the posters were hung in places where damaging them would not have been possible without special equipment (a ladder, for example). In Kalmykia, in connection with the 1999 parliamentary elections, a large number of anti-Semitic fliers targeting two candidates — V. Kolesnik from the “Yabloko” party and E. Baturina, wife of the Moscow Mayor and one of the leaders of the bloc “Motherland — the Entire Russia” [Otechestvo — Vsya Rossiya] Yu. Luzhkov — were distributed. In addition to accusations of Zionism and the danger of “Jews are longing for power,” the flier contained insinuations about the ethnic origin of Yu. Luzhkov. On the whole, one can say that the ethnic origin of candidates for elected offices often becomes the topic of anonymous xenophobic fliers, not necessarily with anti-Semitic content. As a rule, anti-Semitism is used to reinforce anti-western attitudes, which do not contradict the common and widely employed calls to support only ethnic Russians in elections. For example, anti-Chechen fliers targeted a City Duma candidate were disseminated in Chita on voting day. Petitions to the prosecutorial authorities and the regional election commission proved fruitless. An anonymous flier disseminated in Samara targeted candidate A. Amonariyev and took advantage of anti-Chechen attitudes. It read as follows: “Alexander Amonariyev, though a Chechen, is still our man — a dedicated Communist.” There are known cases where anti-Semitism is used as a means of reinforcing common xenophobia. For example, at the outset of the 1999 parliamentary race, fliers were disseminated in Tomsk on behalf of a Jewish committee (the existence of which could not be substantiated) calling upon “sons of Israel… to resort to a variety of means to encourage factionalism and infighting among Russians.” The fliers did not contain any information about any specific candidate. Apparently, the authors of this matter planned to take advantage of anti-Semitism specifically, later in the election campaign. Having disseminated fliers that were general in content, the authors most likely expected to raise the level of anti-Semitism, understanding that xenophobia within contemporary Russian society was primarily targeted against migrants from the Caucasus. The popularity of anonymous campaign materials as well as the overt operations of nationalist radical parties and organizations present the problem only from the standpoint of ineffective legal mechanisms. The continuous exercise of control by government authorities, the application of existing provisions of the Criminal Code in each case and raising the level of expertise and qualification of employees of the regulatory authorities — are all conditions necessary for a decrease in the public activity of political organizations and discrete individuals basing their actions on xenophobia. More complicated is the task of suppressing the activities of moderate political organizations whose political programmes and statements do not overtly express xenophobic views but covertly contribute to the maintenance of the overall atmosphere of intolerance in Russian political life. The constituents and the social base of marginal political organizations are known and the xenophobia of these parties mainly maintains already existing views and stereotypes among the members of their “target audience.” On the other hand, moderate political parties that enjoy significant support and the trust of voters broadcast xenophobia via their political operations onto larger social groups, thus popularizing essentially the same ideas as politically marginal entities. (1) V. Ailamazian, A. Osipov, R. Sapozhnikov, Legal Mechanisms for Counteracting Ethnic Discrimination and Incitement to Ethnic Hostility in Russia, Possibilities for their Application and Degree of Effectiveness. Report by the “Memorial” Human Righs Center (Ìoscow: 2002- www.memo.ru). (2) V. Pribylovsky, “National Patriots in Elections to III State Duma,” www.panorama.org. Back |
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