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English Language Page We have already mentioned that unlike “traditional religion,” the notion of “traditional organization” is required primarily to justify the fight against other organizations within the same religion. However, it is useful only for those, who can prove to the government and society its greater “traditionality.” The Moscow Patriarchate has used this argument against the secessionist Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church of Valentin Rusantsev (totally non-canonical from the theological point of view but quite legitimate from the legal viewpoint) or against the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (the parishes of which are quite “traditional” outside the boundaries of the former USSR and “non-traditional” inside them). This argument is most frequently employed, though, by the head of the Central Spiritual Department of Muslims, Talgat Tajutdin, who accused mufti Ravil Gainutdin and his followers of “Wahhabism.” By doing so, T. Tajutdin misused the meaning of the word as a synonym of extremism within Islam (although he personally knows its right meaning). The head of the Central Spiritual Department of Muslims also equated the followers of the Muftis’ Council with genuine Wahhabite preachers (primarily of Arab origin). At one time, Talgat Tajutdin made an attempt to directly scare the public, saying that “this extremist religious schism had already infiltrated into Moscow,” that one mosque had already been captured and “in spite of our protests they had already been given official ownership documents for the mosque (34).” In fact, he was talking about a mosque in the district of Zemlachka in Moscow that had been occupied by his main competitor Ravil Gainutdin’s followers about six months earlier in March of 2000. A specific situation has been unfolding in Dagestan where Wahhabism has a significant fellowship and is in opposition to the dominant Sufi schism of Islam (armed clashes between the two peaked in 1999). Sufi sheiks have practical control over the Spiritual Department of Dagestani Muslims (DUMD) and exercise significant influence over local political leaders. As a result, Dagestan has actually introduced religious censorship. In March of 2000, the Spiritual Department of Dagestani Muslims created an Expert Council that is responsible for monitoring all Islamic literature published in the republic as well as any audio- and video-material with religious contents, while any materials being sold without prior permission of the Expert Council are subject to confiscation and destruction by law-enforcers (35). (A similar council was established in the Urals in March of 2002, but its evaluations and conclusions only take the form of recommendations. Such a situation, in our opinion gives no grounds for concern.) Then the parliament of Dagestan passed a regional law banning Wahhabism and introduced a similar bill to the State Duma (see the article on legislation). Mufti Ravil Gainutdin expressed his righteous indignation over it and said that it was inadmissible to ban a whole faction of Islam. However, the alternative proposed by the mufti, i.e., to ban the “extremists,” does not sound any better: Those people who in the name of Islam are engaged in criminal activities cause harm to our religion. On this basis, we attempted to develop criteria that would allow us to differentiate between extremists and true believers. There are three major characteristics of extremism. I can name them all. They include the rejection of the fundamental traditions of Islam, a teaching of one’s own exclusiveness and pre-eminence that serves as a justification of the self-acquired right to call traditional believers non-Muslims, and finally proclamation of one’s right to abridge other people’s rights. In my opinion, these criteria must be taken into account while considering the issues related to Wahhabites (36). But obviously it is not only Orthodox Christians and Muslims who lapse into calling on the government to abridge the rights of their “competitors.” Following is a passage taken from the interview of the head of Central Spiritual Department of Buddhists of the Russian Federations, hambo-lama Damba Ayushev (37): — The law [Federal Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”] is actually limiting our opportunities. While giving freedom to new religious organizations, it imposes certain limitations on us. — What limitations are you referring to? — It is about the flock. Under this law it is permitted to create new Buddhist organizations called by people the “red-hats” (religious scientists also call them the same name and it is not a new schism in Buddhism — comment of A.V.). They are engaged in active propaganda and thus steal away our followers. Our influence on the believers is diminishing. That means that the law gives more advantages to new religions at the expense of the old ones. — What changes could be introduced into this law? — The changes should be as follows: the central concept of the law should be the tradition of a people and traditional religion of this people. The law should serve for better harmonization of the relationship between a religion and its followers. It must work for the people, for the preservation of the people. This is the direction I would recommend. This passage aptly demonstrates not only the desire to impose limitations on “competitors,” but also an emphasis on creating a rigid relationship between religion and ethnicity. And finally, xenophobia of this kind can also serve as an instrument in a dirty struggle. For example, in 2001 the Pentecostal bishop of the Samara region, Vasili Lyashevski, sent a letter addressed to the law-enforcement bodies of the city of Samara, the regional prosecutor’s office and the Federal Security Service demanding to ban a religious conference of his rivals among the Pentecostals. In particular, he wrote as follows: I believe that the groups “New Jerusalem” and “Open Sky” are extremist groups and try to stage a political show under the disguise of a religious conference. Their promotional materials say that the conference will be attended by a politician from Minsk, Yuri Karmanovich. I don’t know who this person is, but I’m afraid that the guise of missionaries can be misused by spies and all sorts of people, who have nothing in common with Christianity. I consider it an implementation of a directive of the West aimed at destroying the spiritual values of the Russian people. In his letter to the regional prosecutor of the Samara region, Vasili Lyashevski, spells out a lot of complaints against one of his competitors, Pentecostal bishop Sergei Ryakhovsky, including accusations of Masonry, heresy and instigation of inter-religious enmity (38). ANTI-WESTERN XENOPHOBIA, ANTI-ZIONISM AND ANTI-GLOBALIZATION The previous example was not the only example given in this report to highlight the theme of a confrontation with the West. In fact, such examples are very are numerous. There is nothing surprising in this, since many religious leaders in Russia, even those who do not share nationalist ideas, perceive their confrontation with other religious associations as part of an all-Russian confrontation with the ever-hostile West. Following is a passage from a statement of Metropolitan Kirill, the second man in the Russian Orthodox Church command and leader of the liberal-conservative wing of the Church. We believe that fighting against sectarianism by making the religious legislation more stringent would not bring the desired results … Because in the case of sectarianism we deal not with freedom of choice, but rather with the attempts of well-known forces to spiritually divide our society and to add religious differences upon the existing ethnic, property and political divisions (39). If we take into account that the absolute majority of those who are now called “sectarians” in Russia belong to religious associations that were brought to Russian ten or a hundred years ago from abroad, it will become clear that the “well-known forces” are also located somewhere abroad. If we add to this that the “sects” of western origin outnumber the “sects” of eastern origin, we can also conclude that the anti-sectarian rhetoric has an outright anti-Western character. The pronouncements of fundamentalist activists of the Russian Orthodox Church and their patrons among the bishops contain a lot of even harsher verbal outbursts to this effect. But the position taken by a moderate Metropolitan Kirill is more significant. The Patriarch’s position was stated in a Diocesan Assembly on December 15, 2000. He said the following: We must realize that there is a well-coordinated bloodless war being waged against our people, which is aimed at destroying us. A powerful industry of debauchery is at work in the Western countries, supplying to Russia incredible amounts of pornographic literature, manuals on so-called sex-education that promote lewdness of all kinds and de-facto organize everyday life in the pattern of Sodom and Gomorrah. In Russia today there is an immense market of alcohol, drugs, pornography, and contraceptives, which bring profits to foreign companies and mafias. The activities of the latter have resulted in an unprecedented demographic crisis in our country that brings about an incredibly rapid degeneration and extinction of our people (40). Muslim leaders also follow suite. On September 12, 2001, Talgat Tajutdin considered it necessary to state that “the USA have the same problem as the ancient pharaohs — haughtiness and pride, a desire to become a master of the world, while this position can be claimed only by the Almighty Creator (41).” However, the most vehement language is characteristic of Ravil Gainutdin’s deputy in the Muftis’ Council, mufti Nafigulla Ashirov. Commenting on the start of a military operation in Afghanistan, Nafigulla Ashirov stated that this action gives every Muslim the right to reciprocate in kind, though he also emphasized that his Spiritual Department will not call for any acts of violence (42). After the infamous pogrom in the street market at Tsaritsino on October 30, 2001, he commented that the views of the skinheads are quite appealing to him but the skinheads have chosen the wrong target — instead of beating Muslims, they should have beaten some Westerners (43). Speaking of Islamic leaders, we can not avoid the subject of their anti-Zionist attitude that is so militant (unlike, say, declarations of the Patriarchate in support of Yaser Arafat), that it can be characterized as a form of anti-Semitism. The same mufti Nafigulla Ashirov stated in the spring of 2001 as follows: Although there are many people who would disapprove of the methods of “Hezbulla,” they have proved their effectiveness. “Hezbulla” and its allies have achieved good practical results. The Israeli army has withdrawn from Southern Lebanon. <…> It is very important that for the first time the highest political elites have taken an armed popular struggle against the Israeli regime, which is fair, just and necessary. One could ask in this regard what sort of justification is necessary here? Who would in his right mind would attempt to question the lawfulness of the operations of Kovpak’s guerrillas? (44) Immediately after the tragedy of September 11, Nafigulla Ashirov and Vali-Azmed Niyazov, leaders of the Eurasian Party, who are very close to Ravil Gainutdin, gave a press conference and commented on those events as follows: “Who stands to benefit from all this? Who was the first to rip the benefits of this situation?” They emphasized that the first commentaries came “not from Americans or Russians, but from the same Scharansky and Liberman [ministers of the Israeli Cabinet], who seemed as if they had been waiting for this with the NTV cameras.” N. Ashirov also added the following: “We know which country has a well-developed network of secret services. These are Zionist secret services. Bin Laden does not have their capabilities. This was not done by Arabs or Muslims, but by those who had the necessary capabilities and who stood to benefit from it (45).” Anti-Western feelings in Russia have taken on, in recent years, a new form (ironically, borrowed from the West) — anti-Globalism. The Russian Orthodox Church leaders are offering to the government and the society their own strategic concept with regard to globalization, or more precisely with regard to Russia’s relations with the outside world, primarily with the West. We are talking about the concept that has been developed by Metropolitan Kirill, approved by the Patriarch and included in the “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” in the 2000 Hierarchs’ Council. Instead of quoting numerous articles and documents of the Council (46), we shall give a brief summary of them. The Church condemns liberal (Western) ideology as non-religious and individualistic, but acknowledges its right to exist in the modern sinful world. The Church maintains that the “traditional” ideologies — Islamic, Orthodox and others have an equal right to exist. The World Order should take account of all these ideologies in equal measure. The process of intermixture of civilizations is being assessed rather negatively, while the maintenance of religious, ethnic and civil identity is being viewed as its alternative. The Church maintains that the Russian people should identify itself within this paradigm as an Orthodox Christian people. This means a categorical rejection of liberalism, a demand to shift the balance towards traditional values and public mechanisms based on pre-revolutionary traditions. Metropolitan Kirill always expresses himself very diplomatically, but he also perceives the situation as critical and requiring urgent action: “The current ongoing global process of establishing liberal values as allegedly the pinnacle of the multi-century history of human civilization is today a bigger danger than was formerly presented by communistic atheism (47).” Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church offers Russia a policy that could be called civilizationary isolationism (it is worth comparing it to the above quotations from different concepts of state-religious relations) and that represents a defensive form of xenophobia. Radical anti-Globalism, if presented in a respectable manner, is not being rejected by the Church either. The St. Petersburg Theological Academy, headed by Bishop Constantine (Goryanov), held (in partnership with two secular institutes) a conference on May 3–4, 2001 on “The Spiritual and Social Problems of Globalization.” The conference adopted a final document (48) that is worth being quoted: The ideology of globalization is in opposition to Christian ideology and is incompatible with it; it is being introduced and promoted to the public and Church by the world elite and is representative of the latter’s interests. Globalization is becoming an embodiment of the utopian ideas of mondialism about the creation of a unitary supra-national rigidly-governed state on Earth… <…> The Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian State have become the main obstacles in the way to the world domination… This text displays certain parallels to the philosophy and propaganda of radical nationalists, but in general it repeats more clearly and resolutely the paraphrased ideas from the “Bases of the Social Concept.” Thus, it is not surprising that the Synod did not raise any objections against it, at least in public. Therefore, the fundamentalist anti-Globalism, although not in its extreme forms, has been actually legitimized within the Russian Orthodox Church. It has also led to a simultaneous legitimization (as well as promotion in the name of the Church) of anti-Western xenophobia. (34) RIA Novosti Agency (September 20, 2000). (35) Russian Regions Agency ( March 13, 2000). (36) A. Astakhova, “A Good Muslim is a Bad Wahhabite.” Segodnya (July 26, 2000). (37) A. Lampsi, “Law and Tradition.” NG — Religii (November 28, 2001). (38) A. Golik, “The Last Straw of Samara Pentecostals.” NG — Religii (September 12, 2001). (39) A. Korolev, “It Is Dangerous to Mix Religion with Politics.” Trud (March 14, 2001). (40) The OVTsS Communication of December 15, 2000. (41) Quoted from: “Supreme Mufti of Russia: Terrorist Attacks in the USA Are an Echo of Events in the “Hot Spots.” Mir Religii (September 12, 2001). (42) Russian Regions Agency. (October 8, 2001). (43) “Supreme Mufti Forecasts the Disintegration of Russia.” Prima Agency (November 6, 2001). (44) O. Karabaagi, “Intifada Goes International.” NG-Religii (May 16, 2001). (45) A. Sigida, “Muslims Have Found the Guilty Party — Those Are the Jews and Americans.” Kommersant (September 19, 2001). (46) Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexii II, “The World at the Cross-Roads.” NG-Religii (June 23, 1999); Metropolitan Kirill, “The Rule of Faith as a Rule of Life.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (February 16–17, 2000); “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church; Metropolitan Kirill’s Report at the VI International Russian People Council (December 14, 2001 — http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr112143.htm). (47) Metropolitan Kirill, “The Icon of the Mother of God of Filerm and Modern Challenges to Christianity” — the OVTsS Communication of December 17, 2001. (48) Document from the website of the movement “For the Right to Live Without an INN” at: http://infolab.spb.ru/anti-inn/info09.htm. Back |
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