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English Language Page Of late, Russia’s top-level government officials, starting with the President of the Russian Federation, with a certain regularity (now more often than in the 1990s) have made public pronouncements resolutely condemning any and all manifestations of nationalism and denouncing any move aimed at inciting ethnic or religious hatred. It is important to note that, those statements likewise have been released in connection with the military operations in Chechnya. Understandably, Russian officials across the board can hardly afford to make any public statements out of line with the presidential policy stance on that or any other issue. Hence, it can be concluded that xenophobia, either ethnic or religious, is not a part of official government policy in Russia. Of course, this hardly means that behind this presentable front one cannot come across discriminatory practices, but discrimination per se is not the focus of this book. We have also excluded xenophobic statements by minor government officials or members of the domestic law-enforcement authorities, limiting ourselves to the activities of the country’s political leadership. Regrettably, even at this high level, a good deal has happened that prevents one from concluding that xenophobia is totally absent from government policy. Since Soviet times, the bureaucratic apparatus has developed certain standards of behavior meant to preclude officials from being accused of nationalism. As far as the political nationalism of the 1990s is concerned, it is still present, in the beginning of this new decade, at the level of “big politics” (at least in the form of such political parties as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)), while it’s influence on governmental bodies is represented by a few separate, though quite distinct examples, which we will dwell on later in the text. Conversely, religious xenophobia was never taboo under the Soviet regime. Coupled with an almost profound ignorance (especially on the side of officials) of religious matters, the 1990s saw a sharp upsurge in xenophobic attitudes. These were counterbalanced to some extent only by the liberal rhetoric prevalent in the early 1990s among those who did not belong either to the opposition or to the “centrist” camps. However, the rapid growth of new religious movements and the accompanying wave of scandalous publications and misinformation (the totally absurd figure of three-five million converts to these movements is still being widely repeated) instigated and fostered xenophobia. As a result, religious xenophobia is noticeably more popular among politicians and government officials (which is equally true for outright forms of religious discrimination) than ethnic xenophobia. ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA Starting in the Soviet era, government officials have been nearly habitually rejecting any accusation of nationalism. As regards to political nationalism during the 1990s, it needs to be admitted that this phenomenon continued to be a feature of “big politics” (translated as including such political parties, as Ziuganov’s KPRF and Zhirinovsky’s LDPR), with the government merely including some rather conspicuous players that are the subject of this material. Though radical xenophobic pronouncements by federal-level government officials have been few and far between, one can not help pointing out the September 2000 print media article “Strategy for Russian Global Leadership” (1) released by A. Ignatov, General Director of the Informational Research Office, in the Presidential Property Management Administration. In his analysis, A. Ignatov presents his own version of the global Jewish conspiracy and calls upon Russia to make a preemptive move in order to secure control of some World Government, the reason being that “control of the World Government has been wrongfully established by a group of Hasidic and para-Masonic elements, and the existing situation needs to be urgently corrected.” To get the job done, the author suggests that measures ought to be taken to establish a state religion, set up a ministry of ideology and propaganda, etc. A. Ignatov’s piece, however, has been an exception to the general rule. First, one should highlight cases of Russian government agencies collaborating with explicitly nationalistic organizations, with radical and extremist organizations being on par with those. To be precise, we are talking about “collaboration,” rather than about domestic law-enforcement bodies being unusually tolerant of the activities of such groups (see the chapter on national-radicals). This sort of “collaboration” has been illustrated in a particularly striking manner in the south of Russia, where some Cossack groups now operate as quasi-governmental (“registered”) agents. Notably, all this transpires against the backdrop of certain Cossack elements being repeatedly involved in mounting organized attacks on local ethnic and religious minorities and distributing nationalistic propaganda materials. To emphasize, the nation’s southern provinces make up a rather distinct region of the Russian Federation (see more below). Importantly, there have been some cases of local authorities directly cooperating with Russian National Unity (RNE) — the country’s largest nationalist-radical organization (now split up). For example, in the spring of 2000, N. Trofimchuck from the Saratov regional RNE chapter was allowed to sit on a public advisory board with the Governor. In the summer of the same year, he was allowed to sit on a public advisory board in the regional legislative assembly(2) . The same lack of discrimination has even been practiced by presidential agents assigned to oversee the newly established federal districts of the Russian Federation. People in St. Petersburg, for one, were particularly outraged by V. Cherkesov (former head of the federal security service administration for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region and currently the presidential plenipotentiary representative in the North-Western federal district) releasing an article in the early 2001 issue of the Admiralteystvo magazine, whose editor-in-chief is M. Liubomudrov, a noted “patriotic author” and anti-Semite and whose other editors include Yu. Riverov, veteran of the St. Petersburg chapter of the nationalistic “Pamiat” organization. In principle, national-radicals can be used by the authorities to perform less seemly functions. To underscore, RNE is rumored to have been backed up by the country’s special services. But then, there is some very conspicuous evidence suggestive of this. According to Novaya Gazeta (3), A. Bespalikov, Deputy Governor of the Novosibirsk region, has been supporting and even maintaining the Workers’ Party of Russia led by A. Kubanov, a regional administration official (currently heading some kind of “specialized forecasting center”) and a former regional legislature’s deputy from Zhirinovsky’s LDPR party. Notably, some of the said party’s activists have recently been prosecuted for breaking into the grounds of the local bottling facility for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages in order “to protest against the Russian people being purposefully intoxicated out of existence.” Admittedly, government officials have explicitly condemned the use of violence with nationalistic motivations. However, it matters what modalities have been used in the process of condemnation. Following the largest ever October 30, 2001 pogrom at the marketplace near the Tsaritsino metro-station in Moscow, the Mayor of Moscow, Yu. Luzhkov, condemned the criminal attackers and pointed out that “ethnic intolerance appeared to be the only powder keg capable of blowing Russia to smithereens.” (4) Of course, it was good to hear Mayor Luzhkov say those words, especially given his earlier scandal-triggering pronouncement following the August 8, 2000 explosion in the Pushkinskaya metro underpass when he offhandedly indicated that “one should allow for the possibility of a Chechen connection in this matter.”(5) Then again, his comment about “ethnic intolerance” was wholly off point: the October 30 pogrom could hardly be passed off as a conflict between Russians and some other ethnic community. Firstly, even a large gang of teenagers can hardly be perceived as representative of the entire Russian ethnic community, and secondly, that pogrom’s targets comprised a disparate collection of persons, ethnic Russians included. It was precisely the “ethnic version” that Major-General Pronin, head of the Moscow City Police Department, had in mind when he sought to immediately meet with leaders of the local Caucasian communities in order to avert protests and ordered the police to run checks on Moscow-based Caucasians to see if they intended to take revenge. Recall that Moscow has had not a single retaliatory pogrom, with Azeris only staging a peaceful protest march following one of their compatriots being killed by skinheads in the Luzhniki marketplace. Though that sort of rhetoric, to say nothing of practical moves, is generally aimed at warding off any manifestation of extreme xenophobic violence, it somehow appears to be supportive of moderate forms of xenophobia. Those negative sentiments certainly were promoted by speedy calls to toughen the residence registration regime, which was primarily perceived by society as a measure against the “southern mafia” or “persons of the Caucasian nationality.”(6) Also, a totally inappropriate comment was made by O. Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, who pointed out that conflicts had usually been generated by poverty (7). That observation is not only untrue, (though it certainly can be debated) it had nothing to do with the situation in that particular pogrom. As a matter of fact, this attitude holds a concealed element of justification for xenophobia against migrants (particularly ethnic ones), the rationale being that the latter prosper while constraining opportunities of the “titular people.” This perception happened to be explicitly voiced by V. Iliukhin, State Duma Deputy from KPRF: “Why are the migrants of today so actively penetrating all of the institutions of government, of the economy and others? Why should a member of the titular community not get what migrants get? Should the balance struck in years past be upset, all of the traditions of co-habitation will be disturbed. Should that be the case, conflicts are inevitable.” (8) Just to emphasize, the important thing is not what has been said by a radical member of the political opposition. What matters most is that the RF Ombudsman actually shares that very view. Once out of their administrative centers, Russian regional leaders tend to be less constrained in their pronouncements. Particularly odious was a remark made by A. Mikhailov shortly after he was elected Governor of the Kursk region. This is what he had to say: You know who Rutskoy [the former Kursk Governor] is? He was backed up solidly by Berezovsky, and we defeated them. I think this development is quite indicative. In Russia we are beginning to incrementally get rid of all the scum accumulated over the past decade. In this we stand together with the President, rather than opposing him. Remember, Vladimir Vladimirovich is a Russian. So am I. To those who might not know, Rutskoy’s mother, Zinaida Iosifovna, is a Jew (9). Furthermore, A. Mikhalov’s remark was not some loose talk by some novice unaccustomed to public appearances on behalf of KPRF. First, he repeated the very same comment when he appeared on Kursk television (10), and second, within ten days (November 19) S. Maksachev, former Deputy Governor of the same region, happened to be beaten up right in the regional administration building, with anti-Semitic “battle cries” being shouted in the process (11). Importantly, neither the President nor his Administration (unlike even G. Ziuganov, leader of KPRF) released any statements regarding the incident. However, the Mikhailov incident just pales in comparison to what has been said by other top regional officials in the south of Russia. At the close of 2000, V. Volodatsky, Deputy Governor of the Rostov region and Chief of the Great Don Cossack Force, called on the President of the Russian Federation to have the Rostov region declared a special residence registration territory. The purpose of the appeal was to restrict the rights of “regular and involuntary migrants, no matter where they might come from” (either from other parts of Russia or foreign lands). The Cossacks demanded that migrants or outlanders (non-Cossacks) should be registered on a regular basis, have their stays in the region limited, be expelled even for minor transgressions, undergo tests for knowledge of local laws or language, and be barred from settling close to strategic facilities (like nuclear power plants, water basins, dams, military bases, federal borders or airports) (12). Leaders of the Krasnodar territory have been engaged in a protracted battle against the Meskhetian Turks (that were moved to the territory following the Ferghana valley pogroms in 1989 and authorized to stay there after the Georgian authorities refused to accept them) settled in the territory. Notably, the official policy position has been motivated by the Meskhetian Turk community being perceived as inherently criminalized. To provide an example of this, an excerpt from a report (“On the State of Migration Trends and Ethnic Relations in the Krasnodar Territory”) released by N. Kharchenko, Deputy Governor of the Krasnodar territory: The local Meskhetian Turks have for the most part been engaged in the business of unlawfully buying and reselling farm products at inflated prices. They deal particularly in trading meat that they acquire through shady arrangements. In compact settlements they have taken control of marketplaces, conducted themselves arrogantly, dictate their prices and insult members of the local communities. Drug use is common among them. Some of the Meskhetian Turks traffic in drugs, which only serves to boost the number of local drug addicts. People have been particularly outraged by their crimes which include murders, robberies, rapes, batteries, abusive behavior in public places and assorted thefts of private property. The Meskhetian Turks (just like all Central Asian residents) are inclined to believe that Slavic women are easy sexual prey, this perception drives younger Meskhetian Turks to behave accordingly. They have all sufficiently compromised themselves creating a persistent negative perception of their diaspora. Even worse, certain members of the Meskhetian Turk community have been voicing their claims to the Krasnodar territory, regarding it as part of traditional Muslim lands. Some of the more aggressive elements directly threaten the local Slavic communities, insisting that the latter will one day be driven out of the area or exterminated (13) Small wonder that N. Kharchenko’s words have been replicated by the heads of district administrations, among them, D. Tsymbal, head of the Krymsky district administration (14). To remind the reader, the trend had been set and continues to be fed by former Governor N. Kondratenko (1996–2000), who is now representing the new Governor, A. Tkachev (his protege) in the Federation Council in Moscow. Importantly, the country primarily knows N. Kondratenko as an active and consistent anti-Semite and a radical nationalist-patriot, rather than as a persecutor of the Meskhetian Turks. By way of example, here is a small excerpt from his remarks at a conference held by his regional “Fatherland” [Otechestvo] movement (not to be mixed with the organization of the same name set up by Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov): I have always been calling on the people to come out and rebel. However, the Russian people have chosen not to support me. As a consequence, it was not the “red” Ziuganov who was elected President of Russia but “Yeltsin’s” Putin. The papers refuse to carry what the Governor wants them to and nobody cares a fig! So, people decided to go to the polls. And look what happens: the Communists got 37% of the vote, while the kikes secured 60%! And now I can hear you begging me, “Nikolay Ignatovich, please save us!” … Just look at what is happening in Moscow. One can already see the outlines of a new Kazan-type Zionist state taking shape. You can hardly see any Russians in the upper echelons of government. Those offices are kept for agents of the Mossad, the CIA, NATO and other foreign elements! Importantly, during the 1990s Kondratenko would prefer to use the term “Zionism” to identify his primary adversary. In his remarks at that memorable conference he appeared to be more straightforward on that score: “Those who sell themselves out to the highest bidder know well that three kikes are more active than a hundred Russians…” He emphasized, “Let me tell you, if I had stolen as much as a cent, the kikes would have me destroyed.” And so on, and so forth (15). Notably though, the new Governor, A. Tkachev, tries to avoid making anti-Semitic remarks, he generally emulates N. Kondratenko in other respects however. Whenever he speaks on pressing regional issues, he inevitably refers to the “shady activities” pursued by the local Meskhetian Turks and Roma (16), while repeating the following outright racist slogans: “Kuban is for Kubanites! Though Kuban is a land with many ethnic communities, Russians make up the principal local community. Any person coming to settle here should adapt his ways to our ways, customs and traditions!” (17) When it comes to the supreme federal representative body — the Federation Council — it has been the venue for a slew of xenophobic pronouncements by isolated Russian parliamentarians. We are not going to focus on those. After all, those are only their personal perspectives or purely partisan views (18). We shall only refer to the national parliament, meaning the State Duma because the Federation Council has yet to develop an identity of its own. We should start by pointing out that A. Dougin (a noted Russian nationalist-radical) has, for more than a year now, been employed as advisor to G. Seleznev, Speaker of the State Duma. Though it is not easy to measure the degree of Dougin’s influence on Speaker Seleznev’s policy initiatives, it should be underscored that A. Dougin’s official position enabled him to hold the founding congress of his “Eurasia” movement in 2001 in the sumptuous interiors of the Moscow-based “President Hotel.” The State Duma (even the current one, in which Communists and nationalists have a good deal less influence than in the previous Duma) has persistently refused, not only to take any practical measures to counter increasingly aggressive nationalism but also to pass any policy declaration to that effect. Most indicative in this regard has been the fate of Deputy A. Fedoulov’s draft appeal to the Russian President, “On Censuring the Ongoing Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in Connection with Relevant Developments in the Kursk Region.” A. Fedulov wanted other members of the State Duma to endorse the document and forward in to the President as a response of the Duma to Kursk Governor Mikhailov’s statements and subsequent events in the region. To highlight, A. Fedoulov then was a member of the pro-presidential Duma faction. On November 29, 2000, the State Duma even declined to have the matter put on the legislative agenda, with the initiative being backed by only 73 deputies out of 450 (19). Importantly, the total number of votes, supporting the initiative, from the “Unity” faction was also insignificant. The Fedoulov draft appeal was apparently seen as excessively harsh: it held a latent threat of possible sanctions against KPRF — the political party that refrained from condemning the anti-Semitic statements made by KPRF members A. Mikhailov, N. Kondratenko and A. Makashov. April 26, 2001, the State Duma finally put the Fedoulov motion to a vote; it failed to pass. The initiative was supported by 129 deputies, with “Nay” votes totaling a mere 17: the remaining deputies chose to abstain rather than revealing their stand on the issue in question. To protest against his “Unity” faction colleagues being evasive on this sensitive matter, State Dume Deputy Fedoulov decided to leave the “Unity” faction ranks. Notably, the appeal not only held such universally accepted items as suggestions to censure anti-Semitism and improve verification of “human rights and civil freedoms compliance in the area of ethnic relations” but also carried the demand (unacceptable to most of the Duma members) to “accelerate passage by the State Duma of the federal law banning Nazism” or toughen liability under Article 282, the applicable provision of the RF Criminal Code (20) (see the chapter on evolution of Russian legislation). On May 17, 2001, the State Duma, once again failed (though by a narrow margin) to pass the Fedoulov appeal to the Russian President, 219 Deputies voted “Yay,” (the minimum number of votes necessary for passage is 226) just 73 deputies voted “Nay.” (21) Trying to maneuver his colleagues into passing his motion, A. Fedoulov chose to have a passage about the censure of “Russophobia” also included in his draft. This turned out to be an unfortunate move because the very term has been steadily associated not with xenophobia against Russians but with the anti-Russia conspiracy (mostly Jewish) theory (advanced by R. Shafarevich, one of the ideologues of the Russian nationalist-patriotic movement), rather than with xenophobia against ethnic Russians. On June 14, 2001, the Fedoulov motion even failed to win the support of many of the deputies on the moderate right, securing merely 163 votes (22). An even more expressive illustration of xenophobia in the State Duma occurred on April 19, 2001, when Deputy S. Ivanenko suggested that the deputies should all rise to honor the memory of Holocaust victims. One could see just half of the attending deputies sheepishly looking around and finally standing up as requested, with other parliamentarians never rising from their seats (23). RELIGIOUS XENOPHOBIA With regard to this section of the chapter, we think it necessary to repeat that our topic is xenophobia, in this case xenophobia based on religion, rather than discrimination in general. Although discriminatory practices in this area remain the same as they were in the 1990s, the main target of discrimination today, as in the past, are the so-called “totalitarian sects,” which for various politicians and government officials correspond to a vaguely defined circle of religious associations. The core of this circle is formed by the new religious movements, (further referred in the text as NRM) primarily the most widely known movements in Russia, movements like Scientology, the Unification Church (known in Russia as the Church of Moon), Krishnaism, etc. Xenophobia however, extends well beyond these. Politicians and government officials have been talking about two things — the criminal aspect of NRM activities and the danger they pose to the state in general. The criminal side of the problem has been more or less clarified. Following the heated debates of the 1990s, every government official now knows that they are not allowed to make frivolous charges of criminal involvement against a religious organization or a religion, and that is appropriate to talk only about specific crimes committed by specific groups. Some exceptions to this rule still occur, but in our opinion, they are not decisive in determining government policies in relation to public and religious organizations. In this sense, for example, they sometimes talk about the crimes committed by Satanist groups. It is not always clear, and for that matter not that important, whether those crimes were motivated by Satanic religions or were just committed by some individual members of a Satanist group (most frequently by teenagers) for no special reason whatsoever. It should also be noted that any talk about Satanists is full of exaggerations, but it should also be granted that the enmity towards them is not totally unfounded. A number of the accusations made against the NRM are shared by the vast majority of our (and not only our) population. So officials repeatedly state that their claims merely voice the prevailing general opinion. The NRM are accused of extorting money, psychological subjugation of their followers, (or, to use a common expression, “turning them into zombies”) and promoting the “abandonment of society.” Undoubtedly, such things do happen. The question remains whether these accusations should be addressed exclusively to the NRM, since similar things also happen inside established, “traditional” religious associations. It can be maintained that what we are dealing with here is a case of xenophobia based on the unusual social behavior of people because of their religion. Such xenophobic attitudes are held by a significant number of people and are not specifically sponsored by the government. However, there is no need for any special support. These issues have been thoroughly covered (24) already and we would like now to consider in greater detail those types of religious xenophobia, which are backed up one way or another by the government. There is a view very common among politicians and, correspondingly, among government officials that some religions or religious organizations present, through their preaching, a clear danger to national security. It is worth quoting here a statement of Viktor Zorkaltsev, head of the State Duma Committee on Public Associations and Religious Organizations, made at a press conference on the relationship between the government and various religions on January 25, 2002: Our Committee has been developing a statutory act aimed at ensuring the spiritual security of Russia. <…> Spiritual security is a key factor in the system of national security. It is a shield against the “fifth column,” the major defense of our multi-ethnic culture, our multi-century civilization, and the keystone for sustaining its identity. <…> Finding a legislative solution to the problem of spiritual security means erecting a barrier not only against religious extremism, but also against the flood of base and shallow drivel that has engulfed our mass media. <…> All mass media outlets addressing an audience of multiple millions have to set up public oversight boards, which would have the capability of influencing the informational policies of the print, television and radio mass media companies …. This is not censorship, it is a governmental information policy (25). One could certainly argue that being a member of KPRF faction in the State Duma, Viktor Zorkaltsev speaks only for his party, which has been advocating the above outlined views on statehood, freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. But another speaker at the same conference, presidential plenipotentiaty representative in the Central federal district, Georgy Poltavchenko seemed to be in full accord with Zorkaltsev, saying that “our major task today is to bring together those forces, for which the issue of spiritual integrity of Russia is the highest priority (26).” The same standpoint is also shared and actively promoted by the department of religious studies of the Russian Academy of Civil Service (RAGS), in particular in its draft concept of the state-religion relationship (see the article on religious associations) (27). The same position can be expressed in a more radical way. For example, Vladimir Zbankov, deputy head of the Chief Department of the Ministry of Justice for Moscow (temporarily suspended in January 2002), who became known for having denied re-registration to the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army, stated in the same press conference that “non-traditional religions” are penetrating Russia “primarily from the USA,” and that the West in general is trying to “purposefully undermine our … spiritual foundations.” (28) Bringing in ideology can serve as a basis for specific discriminatory measures and xenophobic actions, taken by federal and local authorities. For example, the Ministry of Education recently sent a letter to all educational institutions that reads as follows. Missionary organizations in Russia have been consistently trying to develop the necessary conditions and create a mechanism for the implementation of the idea of “substitution of the social-psychological code” of the population of our country, which would automatically lead to the removal of the more than one thousand-year history of Russian statehood from the memory of our people, revision of such notions as self-identification of the nation, Motherland, patriotism and cultural heritage (29). Jehovah's Witnesses, which are very active in preaching their views, are the most commonly employed example of such “subversive” activities. They were selected as a model, for example, in the city of Krasnoyarsk by the Public Relations department of the mayor’s office, which organized a series of meetings with the representatives of educational, cultural and medical institutions on the topic of “The Spiritual Aggression of Religious Sects.”(30) The only official federal publication, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, often publishes articles on “totalitarian sects.” In particular the Jehovah’s Witnesses were the subject of an article, where the author not only accused the Jehovah’s Witnesses of presenting a threat to national security, but also alleged that they were practicing ritual killings (31). The administration of the city of Nizhnii Novgorod published a list of religious organizations, for which the cooperation of municipal services, educational and cultural institutions was not recommended. Besides the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the list included all known NRMs, but for some reason also referred to “truly-orthodox” religious communities (32). The “anti-sectarian” rigor of local authorities can sometimes attain a larger scope. Thus, for example, a conference titled “Mordovia on the Threshold of the Millenium: the Problem of Totalitarian Sectarianism” was held in the city of Saransk, the capital of the Mordovia Republic. It was organized by the local diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church with the assistance of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Organizations under the head of the Mordovia Republic and the Mordovia State Pedagogical University. The conference dealt with the methods of countering the activities of NRMs, and also the activities of Baptists, Evangelists and Pentecostals (33). The above example shows that the Russian Orthodox Church can and often does play the role of official expert for the authorities, which by itself can be regarded as discrimination against other religious associations. Thus, a purely religious rejection of Protestantism as a form of heresy, quite natural for an Orthodox bishop, is translated through government bodies into specific policies, gaining a purely secular character and transforming itself into outright religious xenophobia. Public figures, actively involved in the campaign against “totalitarian sects,” serve as intermediaries of a sort between the Russian Orthodox Church and government officials. They are organized around the Center of Jeriney of Lion, headed by Alexander Dvorykin. Without going into the details of their “anti-cultist” activities, we shall note here that A. Dvorykin is closely linked with the Moscow Patriarchate, is heading a department at the St. Tikhon Orthodox Theological Institute and his assessment of NRM is of an outright theological nature. Nevertheless, government officials are eager to quote the texts prepared by A. Dvorykin and his associates as expert opinions. The chairwoman of the human rights commission under the Governor of the Chelyabinsk region, Ekaterina Gorina, for example, turned to the Prosecutor General’s office for information about the unlawful activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses, while preparing for a court hearing following a ban on the meeting of a Jehovah's Witnesses local chapter. Deputy Prosecutor General Evgeny Chuganov replied that although his office did not have any such data, he could recommend a book by Alexander Dvorykin, Introduction to Sectology (it is, in fact, a transcript of the course of lectures read at the St. Tikhon Orthodox Theological Institute) or the handbook New Religious Organizations of a Destructive and Occult Character in Russia, prepared by the Missionary Department of the Moscow Patriarchate (experts in the field have raised a lot of objections against this handbook) (34). References of this kind can hardly be called the exception. Dvorykin’s associates in the anti-cult struggle also include public officials, like the head of expert department of the V.P Serbsky State Research Center for Social and Forensic Psychiatry, Fedor Kondratyev. The professional arguments (we shall not attempt here to make any judgments of their quality) of the latter are constantly combined with ideological passages of the following kind: “Each of the parishioners [Jehovah Witnesses] has a supervisor. The word of the supervisor is the word of God. As a result, fifty-thousand Russian passport holders are Russian citizens by law, but in fact are getting their orders from Americans, with the strings pulled from New-York, from Brooklyn.” (35) The growing role of radical Islamic fundamentalism (“Wahhabism”) within the Chechen separatist movement, the emergence of Wahhabite groups in other parts of the Northern Caucasus, primarily in Dagestan, is a matter of serious concern to the government. This concern is partially an exaggeration, as is the importance of the religious factor in the Chechen war. Nevertheless, the government is facing a real problem of security here, unlike the chimerical threat posed by the new religious movements of Western origin, which we touched upon earlier. Although government officials and politicians realize the fact that the government is not fighting against Muslims in general, but against a relatively small group of Muslims, they find it naturally hard to draw the line between the two. This fact gives rise to elements of anti-Islamic xenophobia. It also seems that at least partially this attitude contributes to the “legalization” of the widespread ethnic xenophobia against the migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. For example, in a special meeting held in the city of Yekaterinburg on September 12, 2001, representatives of the local government bodies called for more stringent policies towards migrant-workers from Islamic regions because they were perceived as the most criminalized group. Governor Eduard Rossel consented to this proposal ordering control measures stepped up and to preparation of corresponding amendments to regional legislation (36). (No amendments, however, were introduced following that meeting). About the same time, Governor of the Khanty-Mansiisky autonomous district, Alexander Philippenko, and Governor of the Yamalo-Nenetsky autonomous district, Yuri Neyelov (37), also made public statements against the arrival of Muslims. Even the deputy chairman of the Commission on the Affairs of Religious Associations under the Russian Cabinet, Andrei Sebentsov, who has a reputation of being a generally liberally minded official, supported the initiative of the State Council of Dagestan that suggested banning Wahhabism as a form of extremism (38). In fact, Wahhabism by itself is a fundamentalist religious teaching (dominant, for example, in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia) that does not necessarily imply political violence. More often than not though “anti-Wahhabite” statements lead to a new round of “anti-sectarian” rhetoric in general. Thus, in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, Governor of the Saratov region, Dmitry Ayatskov, for example, spoke against peaceful coexistence in his region with “Islamists, Krishnaites, and other sects.” (39) The theme of “Wahhabism,” treated as a form of political extremism on Islamic soil, has naturally led to the situation where the problems (real or imagined) related to the new religious movements are being mixed with the theme of extremism and are generalized, in our opinion, in the totally ridiculous notion of “religious extremism.” The following illustration of this point is a passage from the above quoted speech of the presidential penipotentiary representative in the Central federal district, Georgy Poltavchenko: The events of September 11 have brought to the fore the need to counter extremism, political as well as religious. Our country had to face this horrible evil several years earlier. Sometimes, it originates in foreign religious organizations that aim their activities at undermining the spiritual security of our country. We must stop by all available means any religious extremism and consciously distinguish it from good-minded followers of traditional religions. The activities of a number of new religious movements cannot be qualified as anything but extremist. We must hinder the spread of destructive pseudo-religious organizations, which impose their views and values on people against their will, call on them to abandon their duties as citizens and leave their families. Stepping up the measures for countering religious extremism is one of the highest priorities in the area of relations between the government and the churches. The fight against religious extremism requires a further development of the legislative foundation, improvement of the work of law-enforcement and executive bodies. The spiritual security of the state can be based only on an unwavering opposition against any manifestation of religious or political extremism. The omnibus measures of countering extremism must include, along with the legislative and law-enforcement measures, certain steps in the area of education, scientific research, promotional activities, aimed at the development and communication of an ideological and theoretical alternative to the views and concepts of the extremists. At the same time it is equally important to contribute to the dialogue and cooperation between different religions. We are holding this conference together with the Inter-Religious Council of Russia. I can see here representatives of many religious communities. I’m sure that the traditional religions in our country can and must formulate a common answer to the challenges of our time, they can and must act together in finding the solutions to existing social problems (40). G. Poltavchenko then makes a smooth transition from the international Islamic terrorists to the Russian “Wahhabites” in the above mentioned sense of the word, and after that to all “destructive” new religious movements (given that there is no generally acceptable classification of NRMs by their “destructiveness,” regardless of the true meaning of the term). Finally, he dwells on the need to create, as an alternative, a new state ideology on the basis of the alliance between the government and a number of “traditional religious organizations,” members of the Inter-Religious Council of Russia. This new ideology has already been implemented in the Ministry of Justice bill “On Countering Extremist Activities” that was made public on January 10, 2002 (41). Without going into an analysis of the bill, we shall only note that its religious component (expressed in amendments to the law on the freedom of conscience) is overtly aimed against Islamic radicalism and the new religious movements. For example, “coercing to commit suicide or denying medical assistance to people due to religious motives under circumstances posing a danger to their life or health” shall be banned as “religious extremism” (we cannot write this ridiculous term without quotation marks). This clause immediately makes one recall the Jehovah's Witnesses, who prohibit blood transfusions, including for their children. Besides, some Orthodox priests sometimes compel their parishioners to give up the intake of prescribed drugs. Those priests could also be charged with some form of “religious extremism” as “coercion to destroy the family” (since the clergy can apply “coercion” only through their own authority). The remedy against extremism offered in the bill is rather simple. “If it is established that a public (religious) association, or equally its sub-structures, leaders and (or) members at the request of or with the knowledge of at least one of its leading bodies have been involved in extremist activities, it shall be recognized by a court’s decision an extremist organization and thus banned.” In the meantime, a justice department or a prosecutor can also suspend the activities of such an association. Since it would be rather easy to prove that the Patriarch, members of Synod and bishops have been aware of the above mentioned “extremist” activities committed by a number of priests, this can serve as the main ground for suspending or even terminating the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church or some of its various dioceses and institutions. The same applies to many other religious associations. Obviously, such a fate will not befall the Russian Orthodox Church, and no one intends to ban all organizations summarily, but the current Ministry of Justice would simply like to have compromising materials against them in order to make their manipulation easier. These materials could be used primarily against those religious associations that have already become the target of xenophobic pronouncements of government officials. The bill developed by the Ministry of Justice has, of course, a long way to go. It is being actively opposed both by the chairman of the “relevant” State Duma Committee, Viktor Zorkaltsev (he authored an alternative bill (42), less stringent in nature, but more absurd in essence) and the Russian cabinet official overseeing religious issues, Andrei Sebentsov. Nevertheless, the emergence of such odious bills is an indication of a certain shift in the attitudes within the Russian government (43). While the fear of Wahhabism is quite real, though exaggerated, and while the concerns about the new religious movements are somewhat relevant to the real problems of individual citizens, who have been affected by those active religious associations (conflicts within families, medical, property and other problems resulting from the pursuit of the rules of a chosen religion), the anti-Catholic campaign that was staged in February-March of 2002 was, to the contrary, of a purely ideological nature. An upsurge of xenophobic emotions was caused by the Pope’s decision to transform, as of September 11, 2002, the temporary Catholic structures in Russia (Apostolic administrations) into regular dioceses. Though it is possible to understand (but difficult to share) the indignation about this decision on the side of the Russian Orthodox Church, it is totally unclear why this administrative reform within the Roman Catholic Church should have evoked any reaction from the Russian government. And the reaction, for that matter, was quite strong. On February 12, 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Vatican (44), stating that after the official notification from the Vatican received on February 4, the Ministry, though not questioning the right of the Catholic Church to organize itself according to canonical rules, but considering the fact that this issue primarily affected relations with the Orthodox Church and could lead to their serious deterioration, recommended that the Pope should presently suspend the transformation of Apostolic administrations into dioceses and settle this issue first with the Russian Orthodox Church. By doing so, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to interfere with the internal organizational matters of a religious association, which not only runs contrary to corresponding Russian law, but also to the international commitments of the Russian Federation. Then, on February 15, the State Duma approved a motion of Vladimir Zhirinovsky to recommend that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should “deny visas to Vatican representatives in view of the deterioration of the situation and their unilateral actions aimed at changing the status of Catholic dioceses.”(45) The President, though, refrained from making any statements on this issue. Following his meeting with the first deputy head of the Chief Department of Foreign Affairs of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Abramov, the head of Russian Catholics, Metropolitan (formerly archbishop) Tadeush Kondrusevich, stated that S. Abramov did not question the right of Roman Catholics to organize themselves according to their canonical order (46). Individual politicians also commented on this issue. On February 14, the above quoted Governor of the Saratov region, Dmitri Ayatskov, said as follows: “I am concerned that the Orthodox Church of the Russian state is losing its position. I am especially concerned with the opening of a Catholic diocese in the city of Saratov. The Russian Orthodox Church should be more active in this regard. We are loosing the Orthodox religion. Whenever there is a gap, a niche, other religions will eagerly step in.” (47) The upper chamber of the Parliament did not stay out of the debate. The first deputy chairman of the Federation Council, Valery Goreglyad, not only made sharp comments against the creation of Catholic dioceses on the territory of Russia, but also spoke against Catholicism itself: “We should ask ourselves principally what could Catholicism bring to Russia compared to the Orthodox religion? What has it given to the ‘traditional catholic countries’ besides the dogma of Papal infallibility, the ineffective social doctrine of the II Vatican Council and an incessant debate over abortion?” V. Goreglyad made a very typical assessment of the situation, which amounts to the following: the “expansion” of Catholicism means an expansion of the West (to quote, “the plans of the West have not changed at all, only the methods have changed. Once the sects have failed, now it’s the Pope’s turn”) and that presents a clear “danger to our national identity.” The following comment of V. Goreglyad is quite amusing though: “If the two churches are indeed like two sisters, then why doesn’t the more stable, financially sound Church give a helping hand to its sister-church that experiences financial difficulties?” He finished his statement with an appeal that is easy to understand: “When there is a danger to particular industries, it is time to resort to protectionist customs tariffs. When the national identity is in danger, it is time for cultural protectionism.” (48) Xenophobic attitudes toward alien NRMs, of Catholics, and even Russian Protestants, who were made legal in Russia as early as 1905, naturally lead to a desire to somehow attach a special, privileged status to the “main” or, as they are more often called, “traditional” religions. This desire often surfaces in various concepts of the relationship between state and religion, like the bill “On Traditional Religious Organizations,” and a number of declarations (see more on this subject in the article on religious organizations). But it has not been incorporated yet into government policies and still remains at the activity level of individual political leaders. The President, who is firmly in charge of the government today, despite his personal sympathy towards the Russian Orthodox Church, has not allowed himself to make any xenophobic or discriminatory remarks about other religions. At the most, Putin very vaguely stated that Russia has other religions beside “traditional religions,” but the “traditional ones can firmly rely on the government’s support (49).” Neither the Presidential Administration, nor the Cabinet give any solid support to the idea of granting a special status to the Russian Orthodox Church and several other religious organizations friendly to it (primarily, the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia and the European CIS countries, headed by Talgat Tadjutdin). It should be noted, though, that in 2001, for a period of several months, Gleb Pavlovsky’s Foundation for Effective Policies (FEP), which is reputedly close to the Presidential Administration, provided direct support not only to the Russian Orthodox Church, but also to its fundamentalist wing, associated with the name of Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov). At that time FEP’s Internet site “Strana.Ru,” which serves as a mouthpiece of the government on the web, maintained a religious page, the editors of which openly identified themselves with Archimandrite Thkhon. In late August of 2001, the page as well as access to its articles archive were closed. The current situation in the State Duma is more complex. The Duma does not have a consolidated opinion on the issue, while religious and social themes remain only marginally important to the parliament (which is only natural for a predominantly non-religious society). Therefore the activities of a small group of deputies, lobbying for the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church, assume a special importance. It is due to the proactive position of this group that materials and declarations are being generated, which become de-facto associated in the eyes of the public with the position of the whole Duma. Among other things, these materials include the bill sponsored by Alexander Chuyev, “On Traditional Religious Organizations,” as well as recommendations prepared for the parliamentary hearings with a characteristic title “The Legislative Problems of the Relationship between State and Religion in the Light of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.” In full accordance with the title, hearings held on July 6, 2002, recommended modifying the current legislation in favor of the “traditional religious organizations” and against “religious extremism.” This same group of deputies came out in support of the Yekaterinburng diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was involved in a criminal case for instigating national and religious enmity in its publications (for a detailed account, see the chapter on anti-Semitism) . The intervention was quite successful as the case was dropped. It is important to note that what fails at the federal level often takes place at the regional level. As we have seen in the above example of Nizhnii Novgorod, expert councils working for the local authorities recommend prohibitive actions against “totalitarian sects.” Ludmila Stebenkova, a Moscow City Duma member, recently suggested setting up a similar council in Moscow, involving the representatives of the “traditional religious organizations (50).” Several regions have enacted local statutes limiting missionary activities despite the fact that such limitations violate the RF Constitution, which requires that only federal legislation can regulate human rights matters (including freedom of conscience). The general political trends are also a cause of some concern. If we summarize and somewhat oversimplify the prevailing political commentaries, we can say that there is a continuous struggle for influence in the presidential retinue between the old Kremlin elite and those who were brought into power by V. Putin from various security agencies (primarily from the special services). The latter group is more willing and inclined to communicate with the representatives of the “traditional religious organizations” and especially the Moscow Patriarchate. They are more outspoken about the need to involve these organizations in laying down the ideological groundwork of the state. This group is allegedly linked to a business tycoon and current Federation Council member, Sergei Pugachev, who is famous for his relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and especially with its most conservative and even fundamentalist circles (e.g., Archimandrite Tikhon). S. Pugachev’s businesses control the only openly xenophobic program on national television called “Russian House.” There is no doubt that if this group gets the upper hand in the Kremlin power struggle, there will be a further shift towards a more ideological state, which, in turn, will result in an upsurge of government-sponsored religious xenophobia. (1) A. Ignatov, “Strategy for Russian Global Leadership,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (September 7, 2000). (2) Ì. Shirokova, “RNE Sharing Power in Saratov.” Kommersant (July 11, 2000). (3) P. Voloshin, “Deputy Governor’s Tamed Storm Troops.” Novaya Gazeta (August 6, 2001). (4) Quote from “Government Efforts to No Avail.” Moskovskie Novosti (November 6, 2001). (5) Lenta.Ru (August 8, 2000). (6) V. Yakov, “Racism Represented by Government Officials.” Noviye Izvestiya (November 2, 2001). (7) “Government Efforts Remain Ineffective.” Moskovskie Novosti (November 6, 2001). (8) S. Aleksandrov, “The Friendlies in Town.” Profil ( 2001, ¹42). (9) E. Kondratyeva, “Kursk Governor’s First Moves.” Kommersant (November 9, 2000). (10) “Mikhailov is Unlikely to be Prosecuted for his Anti-Semitic Pronouncements.” NTV.Ru (December 6, 2000). (11) Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in the Russian Federation Bulletin ( 2000, ¹9). (12) A. Yuzhny, “Cossacks Introducing Special Regime in Rostov Region.” Segodnya (January 5, 2000). (13) Quote from Human Rights in Russian Regions — 1999 (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2000). (14) Ibid. (15) Quote from Human Rights in Russian Regions — 1999 (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2000). (16) “Krasnodar Governor Fans out Nationalistic Passions.” Kolokol.Ru (December 20, 2001) . (17) Quote from Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000 (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2001). (18) For analysis of such presentations made in both Federal Assembly houses within 1994–1997 see E. Mikhailovskaya, “Federal Assembly. Russian Parliament as Model of Public Conscience” in A. Verkhovsky, E. Mikhailovskaya, V. Pribylovsky, “Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Society.” (Moscow, 1998). As a matter of fact, few things have changed since then. (19) “The State Duma Refused to Condemn Anti-Semitism and Outlaw KPRF.” Lenta.Ru. (November 29, 2000). (20) “Duma Deputies Chose Not to Tell Putin About the Rising Anti-Semitism in the Country.” Lenta.Ru (April 26, 2001). (21) “The State Duma Again Refused to Condemn Anti-Semitism.” Lenta.Ru (May 17, 2001). (22) L. Levinson, The State Duma Legislation Process Bulletin (2001, ¹30). (23) O. Volkov, M. Nikiforova, “Failing to Rise.” Vremya Novostey (April 20, 2001). (24) See, for example: A. Barker, New Religious Movements (St. Petersburg: 1997); Lev Levinson, “Notes on Faith and Insanity.” Dia-Logos: Religion and Society 1998–1999 (Moscow: 1999). (25) V. Zorkaltsev, “Specificity of the Current Relationship Between the State and Religions in Russia and the Prospects of its Further Evolution” (http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr201253htm). (26) G. Poltavchenko. No title (http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/ nr202075.htm). (27) For the text of the RAGS concept, see: http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/ run.cgi?action=show&obj=1269. (28) Quoted from the author’s notes taken at the conference. (29) I. Suprunova, “And the False Prophets Would Arise.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta (October 9, 2001). (30) “The public relations department of the Krasnoyarsk city administration is organizing a series of meetings with the representatives of educational, cultural and medical institutions on the topic ‘Spiritual Aggression of Religious Sects.’” See: Radio-Church (March 23, 2001). (31) I. Lopatin, “Why Did Jehovah Choose Them as his ‘Witnesses’?” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (February 2, 2001). (32) “The ‘Black List’ of Religious Organizations in Nizhny Novgorod.” NG — Religions (June 14, 2001). (33) “Will There Be an Oppression of Evangelical Christians in Mordovia?” Kestone News Service (February 27, 2001). (34) S Ivanenko, “Liberation of Chelyabinsk against Non-Orthodox Believers.” Moskovskie Novosti (February 6, 2001). (35) Quoted from: V. Velichko, “Road to an Alien Shrine.” Vremya MN (July 6, 2001). (36) V Belimov, “Take your Turban and Head for Home: A Surge of a Phobia Against Muslims in Yekaterinburg.” Vremya Novostey (September 14, 2001). (37) Leader of Khanty-Mansiisky “Yabloko” organization, Dami Khabibulin, sent a letter to V. Putin, asking the President to restrain the governors instigating inter-ethnic enmity. See: Provintsialnoye Agenstvo Novostey (October 4, 2001). (38) “Deputy Chairman of the Commission on the Affairs of Religious Associations under the Russian Cabinet of Ministers, A. Sebentsov, Answering the Questions of the Chief Editor of the Orthodox Information Agency ‘Russian Line,’ S. Grigoryev,” Russian Line (January 31, 2002). (39) S. Kazovski, “To the Country, to the Auntie” Novye Izvestia (September 19, 2001). (40) G. Poltavchenko. See: http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/nr202075.htm (41) Letter of the Minister of Justice Yuri Chaika of January 10, 2002, with the bill and all the attachments was made public on January 22, 2002, at the site of “State-Religion Relationship” (http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action =show&obj=1356). (42) See: http://www.state-religion.ru/cgi/run.cgi?action=show&obj=1360 (43) Comments of the editor: This chapter was written prior to the passage of Federal Law “On Countering Extremists.” Only a few months ago, it seemed impossible that the said law would come to be passed so soon, and the majority of experts hoped that many “odious” provisions would be stricken from the bill in the course of its subsequent readings. However, today we know that those hopes have failed. The new law can be effectively used againt any and all religious associations. And the “shift in the attitudes within the Russian Government,” to which the author of this chapter refers, is now quite evident. (44) Vatican News Service (February 13, 2002). (45) Polit.Ru (February 15, 2002). (46) “Presidential Administration Has no Objections Against Catholic Dioceses in Russia.” NTV.RU (March 1, 2002). (47) “D. Ayatskov Disapproves of the Idea of Opening a Catholic Diocese in Saratov.” NTV.RU (February 15, 2002). (48) V. Goreglyad, “Russia — a Roman Province?” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (March 19, 2002). (49) “Vladimir Putin Receives the Islamic Leaders of Russia at the Kremlin.” NTV.RU (December 17, 2001). (50) I. Sukhov, “A Cult Show.” Vremya Novostey (June 4, 2001). |
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