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English Language Page Starting from the fall of 1998, MHG joined forces with regional human rights organizations across the Russian Federation in order to carry out local human rights monitoring on a systemic basis. Admittedly, in the past, Russian human rights activists had been aware of the monitoring tool. Throughout the three-decade-plus-long history of the local human rights effort, a tremendous body of knowledge and experience has been compiled. However, not a single non-governmental organization could run a monitoring survey, while being aware of the relevant state of affairs in all 89 Russian provinces that at times have been known to be even more different from each other than some European countries. So, a Russia-wide program of systemic monitoring has come to be introduced through the application of a model developed by MHG experts. Underpinning the model was the idea to create a Russia-wide network of human rights organizations embracing any and all local regions and territories, with MHG operating as the facilitator of local activities, developer of a single database of monitoring tools and compiler of annual human rights reports on the basis of knowledge secured from the regions. Regional partners of MHG are generally committed to run local monitoring surveys and submit relevant reports on tasks completed. Over the past four years, the established Russia-wide human rights monitoring network has proved to be a highly sustainable and effective undertaking in terms of the indicators of monitoring quality. Also, the expertise and skills developed over years of systematic work eventually allowed member-organizations to change over to supporting a more sophisticated level of activity related to running specialized monitoring tasks looking into the most pressing human rights issues across the Russian Federation (the specialized (thematic) monitoring efforts, understandably, being an extension of a baseline monitoring effort normally executed and which first identified the most pressing problems). Of course, it is essential that the results of specialized monitoring should not only be covered in widely released publications but also be translated into focused public actions concurrently staged throughout Russia and aimed at making a difference in a given human rights area. Within 2002-2004, four specialized human rights monitoring surveys are expected to be published with the financial assistance of the European Commission that chose to back the monitoring activities of the Russia-wide network of human rights organizations (1). The topic for the first specialized monitoring effort (just completed) was "nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance". To clarify, when making plans for specialized monitoring activities, we researched the reports of systemic human rights monitoring efforts in Russia and chose to focus on human rights conditions in "closed" institutions (i.e., prisons, mental hospitals, detention centers, etc.) and in the judicial system; basic human rights are generally impacted by the behavior of local law-enforcement and the level of access to a court of law. However, the events of 2001 made us depart from the initial plan. On October 30, 2001, one of the Moscow street marketplaces became a scene of a pogrom staged by about 300 skinheads that produced a large number of casualties. Notably, the attack was aimed against members of ethnic minorities, primarily those from the Caucasus. For quite a few years local human rights activists have been continuously pointing to the risk from growing nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments in the Russian Federation. Attacks and pogroms against members of ethnic minorities have recently become an almost regular affair in the life of communities in major Russian cities. Circumstances notwithstanding, the authorities have stubbornly refused to recognize the growth of violent crimes committed based on racial or ethnic motivations. For the most part, the criminals have escaped punishment, with Russian prosecutors or judges just refusing to see the racial component of the felonies committed. (For example, the relevant authorities have continually refrained from applying existing law, particularly, Article 282 (provoking ethnic enmity) or Article 212 (massive public disturbances) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). As a consequence, the perpetrators of pogroms enjoy an environment of utter impunity. "It was precisely through previous inaction on the part of law- enforcement agencies that such a large-scale racially-charged disturbance of the peace [the October 30, 2001 pogrom in Moscow] was made possible", according to experts from the Russian human rights community (2). Notably, in the spring of 2002 (with the UN Human Rights Commission considering at its 58th Session the results of the August 31 - September 8, 2001 Third World Conference against Racism held in Durban, South Africa) the Russian delegation indicated that the questions of combating extremism, xenophobia and intolerance had been treated as priority issues by the President of the Russian Federation, the government and law-enforcement agencies, with perpetrators of hate crimes being duly brought to account. Then, the Russian delegates underscored that different ethnic and cultural communities live and work in the Russian Federation in an atmosphere of mutual accord and peace. (For example, the Russian delegation referred to President Putin who said at the March 19, 2001 meeting with leaders of the local Jewish community that Judaism, Christianity and Islam have been peacefully and harmoniously coexisting within Russia for centuries). While explaining to the forum that Russia has effectively handled the problems of intolerance and race-based crimes and that it is free from discriminatory practices, the Russian delegates gradually went over to attacking other nations, particularly, some European Union countries. The Russian delegates emphasized that it is in the European Union - and not in Russia! - that tensions between ethnic communities have been on the rise, nationalistic sentiments have been erupting and discriminatory practices against members of ethnic minorities have been sustained. It is there that race-based crimes are investigated for years, with criminals going unpunished. Thus, Russian authorities actually refuse to recognize the growing problem of nationalism and xenophobia in the country. Rising societal tensions have continued to be primarily attributed to social problems, in particular, migration flows. What is more, rather than reign in on some of the particularly aggressive radical groups, the authorities preferred to counter potential responses from local ethnic minorities. With this in mind, the Moscow city authorities decided to introduce a tighter policing regime following the aforementioned October 30, 2001 pogrom. This was publicized in the mass media by law-enforcement representatives and understandably, played a meaningful role in the rise in the number of individual attacks on members of ethnic minorities during the weeks after the pogrom. Before the close of 2001, we deemed it sensible to have our counter-xenophobia effort limited to isolated projects (3) and initiatives mainly aimed at either research or enhanced public awareness. However, an abrupt rise in the number of racially-charged violent crimes taking the form of massive actions producing large numbers of casualties and the continued application of wholly inadequate and irresponsible policies on the part of the authorities served to make the problems of nationalism and xenophobia one of our top priorities. This change has made it absolutely incumbent on the Russian human rights community, particularly, the All-Russian human rights monitoring network coordinated by MHG, to be actively and fully engaged in the battle against persistent nationalism and xenophobia by creating a body of knowledge on the matter, boosting the level of public debate and running targeted public campaigns. In order to reinforce the results and impact of the several aforementioned projects already running in different regions and put in place a basis for running large-scale well-rounded operations of this nature, we decided to make "nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance" the topic for our first Russia-wide specialized monitoring and subsequent public actions. * * * Compared to the bloody ethnic conflicts in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s, the spread of racism and xenophobia across the Russian Federation initially seemed unworthy of special alarm (4). Rather, it was political anti-Semitism that represented the major problem confronting the country’s liberals. Notably, the presence of a large number of political parties and groups, which viewed anti-Semitism as part of their ideology, was inconsistent with prevailing public sentiment (5). Basically, anti-Semitism in Russia for the most part remained a component of an anti-Western attitudes, and even then it rarely reached beyond the political tug-of-war between the "democrats" and the "conservatives". Even that face-off was indicative of the dismissive manner in which the authorities treated the problems of nationalism and xenophobia in the Russian Federation. As a matter of fact, the nationalistic and xenophobic propaganda drives have never been stopped. By way of example, the Den (Day) daily, one of the principal mouthpieces of the "patriotic opposition", was shut down only after the October 1993 events in Moscow. However, it speedily reemerged under a new name - Zavtra (Tomorrow). To emphasize, the activity of the Russian National Unity (RNE), whose members had taken up arms to confront the government during the October 1993 siege of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, has never been put in check. Most of the "ethnic enmity" suits have been either terminated before reaching a court of law or concluded with excessively lenient sentences handed down by courts. The rise of xenophobia in Russian society, a persisting trend throughout the 1990s, had initially been left unnoticed by the domestic democratic community. It was only in the mid-1990s that analysts started to talk about so-called Caucasophobia. Admittedly, the sentiments relating to members of Caucasian ethnic communities had been more or less in evidence since the 1970s. Understandably, reforms in Russia produced social shifts that have made those feelings more conspicuous. What is more, the escalating migration flows have compounded revolutionary societal changes. With the government actually dodging the challenge of regulating migration flows and governing social transformations, the more mobile migrants desperately struggle to survive by filling niches and jobs in accessible commercial undertakings and criminal enterprises. The easily recognizable members of Caucasian or Central Asian ethnic communities incrementally began to be perceived by titular communities as the source of social injustice and rising crime rates (6). Of course, that perception produced a solid measure of xenophobia. Notably, the targeted ethnic groups would inevitably be regarded as aggressors. Asked which ethnic communities work to incite ethnic enmity, 57% of the respondents named the Chechens, 38% other ethnic communities from the Northern Caucasus, and 24% pointed to the Azeris, according to the 1997 VTsIOM (All Russian Center for Public Opinion Research) public survey (7). Rather than resolutely counter ongoing xenophobic sentiments and pass measures to ease escalating social tensions (a natural phenomenon in times of economic hardship), the authorities (particularly the regional ones) moved to place constraints on the continuing flow of migrants, through the application of such administrative policies as: domestic passport checks, residence registration requirements, and accompanying compliance verification tactics. In reality, all of these policies have produced an excessive amount of arbitrariness by relevant officials and law enforcement officers that would resort to ethnic profiling while dealing with recognizable members of non-Russian ethnic communities. Providing the most obvious examples of such profiling are the Krasnodar territory and Moscow, although such policies are present to some degree all over Russia. At this point, governmental xenophobia is being fed by societal xenophobia, and vice versa: official action, often made to win popular support for these or other policies, have served to legitimize unacceptable public attitudes. Correspondingly, a reorientation has taken place among the national-radical parties and groups; one after another they have followed the popular sentiment and basically "exchanged" Jews for Caucasians as "the primary enemy of the Russian people". ("The Jewish-Masonic conspiracy" has been relegated to being just one of the remote and latent evils instrumental in producing "all the misfortune befalling Russia".) Clearly, the Chechen crisis has been a principal factor contributing to the institutionalization of ethnic xenophobia (as an inherent component of the activities pursued by Russian law enforcement) and demonization of members of Caucasian ethnic communities. The Caucasophobia has developed along the following two paths. The first Chechen war triggered the trend to incrementally synthesize the notions of "person of Caucasian nationality", "Chechen" and "bandit". Through the ranking Russian officials have repeatedly underscored that the military operation in the Chechen Republic was against bandits, rather than Chechens. Nonetheless, those pronouncements have been speedily disavowed by the actions undertaken by members of federal law enforcement agencies deployed in Chechnya. Widespread cruelty against local non-combatant Chechens, practiced from the start of the first Chechen war, have most graphically shown that the federal military has made no distinction between peaceful local residents and the "notorious" bandits. To emphasize, the entire affair has been steadily perceived as the Russian-Chechen conflict. This phenomenon has been allowed to spread to other Russian regions. The appropriate phenotype provided sufficient grounds for suspicion and persecution by law-enforcement. Notably, the key role as regards to this has been played by regional special police units that participated in the "operation to restore constitutional order in Chechnya". As they were assigned to Chechnya on a rotational basis, those law-enforcement officers would return to their home communities with psychological baggage from their experiences. Among Chechnya-based law-enforcement officers the prevailing stereotype is that "all Chechens are bandits", while for the residents of other Russian regions that sentiment has expanded to embrace "all individuals of Caucasian nationality". On the other hand, regional and local governments have taken advantage of the Chechen armed conflict in order to justify policies designed to place constraints on migrants, particularly Caucasians (with Chechens being the primary target). Things in ths area have been drastically compounded by the Sh. Basayev terrorist raid on Budennovsk, Stavropol territory, and S. Raduyev’s attack on Kizliar, Dagestan, to say nothing of a number of other destructive attacks, which have been committed by individuals close to the active Chechen field commanders, according to the evidence provided by investigators and confirmed at relevant court hearings. It is worth noting that during the short lull between the two Chechen wars the intensity of negative attitudes towards Chechens in particular, and Caucasians in general, had not let up at all. The authorities had passed no measures to help phase out Caucasophobia and terminate discriminatory practices with regard to Caucasians, that had at that point become common in law-enforcement circles. To underscore, the corruption (inevitably produced by discriminatory practices) in law-enforcement agencies has become intertwined with Caucasophobia, producing a certain modus operandi. Given these conditions, following a series of unprecedented terrorist acts across Russia in the fall of 1999, Caucasophobia had reached the level of veritable paranoia for a short period. It would suffice to recall an online interactive public poll run by a national television network’s prime-time popular news program, the query being about retaliatory measures having to be taken in light of the recent residential building explosions in Moscow. Revealingly, the following measures were listed as possible responses: drive all Caucasians/all Chechens/all bandits out of Moscow. The overwhelming majority of respondents felt that the capital city should be cleared of all Caucasians, with the "bandit eviction" option getting the smallest number of votes. The launch of the second Chechen military campaign has gone hand in hand with a massive anti-Chechen propaganda drive. High-ranking government officials were heard and seen making pro forma pronouncements about the Chechens being different from terrorists. As for the delicate distinction between the war against international terrorism and the war against the Chechen people, that distinction could barely be seen in the official rhetoric and soon evaporated completely from mass media reports. The largest national television network, ORT, has repeatedly called for carpet-bombing Chechnya or having it "flattened by a road roller (8)". As a consequence, during 2000 the level of xenophobia in Russia shot up especially high, according to disparate public polls. For example, 70% of Moscow-based respondents displayed negative sentiments with regard to Chechens (9). Following the August 2000 Pushkinskaya Square underpass explosion in Moscow, 65% of local respondents supported the idea of evicting all Caucasians from Moscow, with 57% of respondents favoring the idea of "using all available weapons" to launch a strike at terrorist territory (meaning the Chechen Republic as a whole). Notably, pronouncements by government officials hardly served to defuse heated public feelings. Mayor of Moscow Yu. Luzhkov, for one, explicitly stated that the Pushkinskaya Square explosion "clearly had a Chechen connection". Recall that those words were uttered only several hours after the actual explosion, with investigators lacking sufficient evidence to arrive at any preliminary conclusions. Certain politicians openly made use of those tragic events in order to fan hatred. For example, V. Zhirinovsky, the leader of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) faction in the State Duma, arranged a rally under the slogan "Good Chechik - dead Chechik"(10). Of course, that sort of pronouncement would only be heard from the most radical of politicians. Interestingly enough, these politically incorrect words failed to generate any official response. By the way, the last example is most indicative in that the lack of sustained practices maintained to prosecute unlawful utterances has been a major factor contributing to the growth of xenophobia across Russia. The anti-Chechen and anti-Caucasian sentiments could not have poisoned the Russian public on such a large scale had it not been for the inaction of the relevant government agencies or even indirect official support for the transgressors, all transpiring against the backdrop of a general surge of nationalism. Additionally mention should be made of the rather frequent manifestations of ideological and political anti-Semitism, at odds with grassroots xenophobia vis-a-vis Jews, which is very nearly negligible. Pointedly this sort of rhetoric has repeatedly come from a number of high-ranking government officials. The best example regarding this is Kursk regional Governor, A. Mikhailov, who won his election and rushed to indicate that in the person of his rival, A. Rutskoy, he beat the entire "Russia-wide Jewish Congress". Then he added that his victory would launch an effort to "liberate Russia from all that foulness". A Mikhalov also argued, "This is where the President and I are allies, rather than adversaries (11)". Notably, V. Putin did not deem it necessary to personally speak out and refute A. Mikhailov’s remark. Of course, we do not suspect the current Russian President of holding similar views. Recall that V. Putin has on a number of occasions came out against any and all manifestations of anti-Semitism, nationalism and other forms of intolerance in Russia. However, all those pronouncements have been rather declaratory in nature, with specific incidents being left uncommented upon. A. Mikhailov was not the first Russian official with links to the Communist party to have uttered anti-Semitic pronouncements. Achieving a great deal of similar public notoriety were A. Makashov and V. Ilyukhin, deputies in the 1995-1999 State Duma. To underscore, during hearings on the issue of impeaching President Yeltsin, V. Ilyukhin, who then chaired the State Duma Committee on Security, pointed out that the presence of Jews in the Russian Government was one of the reasons for Yeltsin¡¯s anti-populist policies (12). Admittedly, while comparing all Russian high-ranking government officials of 1990s-vintage in order to identify the better nationalist, first place for uncovering the "Zionist conspiracy" most certainly should go to N. Kondratenko, former Governor of the Krasnodar territory under whom the region was transformed into a bulwark of militant nationalism ¡ª basically, the official ideology of the regional government. A. Tkachev (N. Kondratenko’s successor) has made the following pronouncements on the issue of regional policies: "Kuban is for Kubanites. Indeed, Kuban is a multi-ethnic community, but ethnic Russians make up the principal segment of Kuban’s population. Everyone coming to settle here ought to adapt their ways to our ways, our customs and our traditions". Unlike N. Kondratenko, A. Tkachev has been almost dismissive about the Jewish question. He has spent his entire reserve of patriotic passions in the battle against migrants, particularly, the Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, Armenians and others. Here is one example to illustrate his policy stand on the migration question, which receives extensive coverage in the local media: The ethnic question has reached the boiling point. We ought to stand up for our Homeland, we ought to defend our land and the titular people. Of course, we are concerned about the thousands of Kurds and Meskhetian Turks settled in the lands of Krymsky, Abinsky and other districts. If our residence constraints were lifted, a wholly new ethnographic environment might emerge in the region within just a decade¡ Mind you, this is the Cossack land, and nobody should forget that, the new settlers included. This is where we hold on to our traditions, develop our culture, set the rules of the game and the rules of our lives. This fact shall not be ignored by anyone (13). Members of local migrant ethnic minorities have been made the targets of rabid xenophobic pronouncements by local officials, with N. Kondratenko actually launching a campaign of persecution against unwanted newcomers. But it was A. Tkachev that made the life of local migrants truly intolerable. Notably, Governor Tkachev maintains that his regional ethnic policies have been backed up by the federal authorities and the Russian President himself. These words have never been refuted by any federal official (14). Given the circumstances, it is small wonder that other Russian regions seek to replicate the lessons of Krasnodar. For example, according to the Kurgan regional monitors, V. Ufimtsev (ethnic policy advisor to the Kurgan Governor) said the following stating the official position on the proposed ethnic policy, "While recognizing the equality of all peoples, we should confirm the fact that ethnic Russians have assured and will continue to determine the spiritual, social and economic well-being of our multi-ethnic community". While some authorities remain dismissive and others are under the influence of xenophobia and nationalism, fertile ground is being created for nationalist-radical parties and groups to grow and thrive. Over past decades, some of those have extended their reach Russia-wide. By way of example, the Russian National Unity (RNE) "the largest and most visible movement in that category (despite a major setback generated by an intraparty schism)" continues to feature some elements from fascist ideology. By 1998 RNE chapters had been established in dozens of Russian regions, with many of those maintaining paramilitary formations. Alarmingly, in a number of Russian provinces local RNE chapters enjoy covert backing from the regional authorities, with RNE elements even being used to help maintain law and order on city streets by way of running patrols. Also, mention should be made of assorted Cossack units that in certain regions (Krasnodar territory, Rostov region, etc.) have been particularly known for their aggressive and nationalistic attitudes. Just like RNE members, Cossacks have now and again been used by regional and local authorities to run law enforcement patrols, such measures often lead to members of local ethnic minorities being unlawfully persecuted on a systemic basis (with Krasnodar territory providing one such example). Starting from the mid-1990s, one could increasingly see isolated actions staged by the largely loosely organized but extremely aggressive juvenile movement of skinheads whose victims have by now included Caucasians, Asians and Africans across Russia. The number of skinhead attacks, just like the ranks of these young racists, have been increasingly on the rise. For instance in the course of 2000, Moscow alone had as many as 30-40 monthly incidents of black foreigners being assaulted by local skinheads. Throughout the 1990s the Russian authorities have passed almost no measures to counter domestic national-radicals. Eventually, (1998-1999) RNE was targeted by the law-enforcement, the actions of the authorities largely being generated by the unfolding election campaign. To provide an example in this regard, Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov had the local RNE chapter outlawed and its newspaper shut down, with the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (TsIK) ruling to deregister the "Spas" electoral bloc that included RNE movement. Obviously, those measures (just like any other rulings dealing with Russia’s national-radicals) had been passed on purely legalistic grounds and had nothing to do with a wider effort to stamp out any activities seeking to fan ethnic discord. Overall, cases of public associations, mass media outlets or individuals being prosecuted for racist pursuits have been extremely few and far between. The number of those cases reaching a court of law is even smaller; some cases get re-categorized, with the "racist activity" component being dropped. What is more, judges generally pass soft sentences in such cases, with the convicted usually getting amnestied (persons convicted of racist crimes have been amnestied nearly every year). All this can be explained, in part, by law-enforcement being either incompetent or indifferent, or by some officials being supportive of nationalistic ideas and, of course, by the difficulty (combined with the unwillingness) to see the difference between freedom of expression and incitement of ethnic hatred, between socially hazardous and non-hazardous actions. Surely, this trend could be reversed were there the political will to do so. Alas, this has yet to happen. The lack of consistency in the actions of Russian authorities became apparent in 2001 when law enforcers and other government officials were surprised by the aforementioned pogrom at a Moscow marketplace. What is more, the authorities were likewise surprised by the June 2002 massive riots triggered by Moscow skinheads. Violent manifestions of ethnic xenophia are, of the course, the most dangerous, but Russia also has other sorts of xenophobia to deal with. For example, the rise of religious xenophobia (the topic being covered by a special chapter in this book) has been transpiring (the specifics being different, of course) concurrently with similar trends in the area of ethnic relations. The late 1980s - early 1990s, with the Soviet government shedding the policy of state atheism, marked a surge in the activity of religious groups and interests among broad segments of the population. To clarify, Russian society at that time lacked major negative religious stereotypes. Those were times when government officials from different agencies would readily communicate or cooperate with the most outlandish religious associations, the latter being enabled to practice comfortably in the Russian Federation. The natural result of the religious liberalization drive in Russia was the emergence of numerous and disparate religious groups including ones pushing exotic teachings. Given that the Russian people had for the most part been raised in the conditions of a Soviet atheistic culture, emerging religious practices were perceived by society with a large degree of suspicion. Concurrently, the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy) came to realize that the new religious renaissance could hardly lead to the Russian Orthodox Church (RPTs) automatically being restored to the role it used to play before the Russian revolution of 1917. Notably, the issue here was not Orthodoxy’s status as the state religion as at the time of the Russian Empire, but of the majority of the population belonging to the Church (in a formal sense, at least). Apart from that, RPTs has been increasingly coming under the sway of its conservative wing, which continues to close ranks with the country’s right-wing political groups. Church-supported mass media outlets have launched a campaign to counter the efforts of other Christian religions. Notably, the Orthodox press has been backed up by local nationalistic and patriotic publications, as well as by a multitude of reporters from a variety of media sources (including some "democratic" outlets), which have come to be intolerant of unconventional tenets and practices pursued by holders of other religious beliefs. To emphasize, it was merely in the late 1990s that Russia came to fully confront the problems related to religious pluralism i.e., the emergence of socially hazardous religious groups (like "Aum-Shinrikye" or satanic groups seeking no official registration or public visibility) and the need to draft its own policy on the more radical practices maintained by some religious organizations (like the "Jehovah Witnesses" banning the practice of blood transfusions). Most of the Russian people’s (primarily government officials) lack of knowledge about ongoing religious activities would now and again lead to the demonization of a whole range of religious groups and to comprehensive xenophobia vis-a-vis the so-called "non-traditional religions". Members of non-Orthodox Christian religions have been accused of proselytizing, using harmful psychological methods, collaborating with foreign special services and seeking to change the "established cultural identity" of the Russian people, to say nothing of other "sins". As a consequence, the battle against "foreign religious expansion" has been effectively turned into yet another driver of growing nationalistic sentiment, with dominant Orthodoxy being viewed as a basic component of Russian statehood. In many Russian regions (15) the local RPTs hierarchy has already secured a high degree of clout with the authorities, resulting in discriminatory practices maintained against members of religious minorities (not only including those whose activities could be considered harmful to the health or security of Russian citizens). The very fact that non-Orthodox religious groups are active throughout the country has been regarded as a threat to Russian society and the state. On the federal level, rising nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment in the religious sphere corresponded with the passage, by the State Duma, of the 1997 Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience", whose preamble carries a provision on the special role played by the Russian Orthodox Church, with new religious associations operating in Russia for less than 15 years having their rights meaningfully curtailed (16). In addition, the 2000 §³oncept for National Security reads that one of the national security objectives shall be to "counter the cultural and religious expansion of other countries seeking to penetrate Russia (17)". Also, the nationalistic character of religious xenophobia is evident when one considers members of "ethnic" religions (Jews or Lutheran-Germans) encountering no major problems in their religious pursuits. Such pursuits are limited to members of the given ethnic community (i.e., they do not proselytize and thus, are not perceived as expansionist). Xenophobia in relation to Muslims (the sentiment being generally manifested through RPTs and local communities protesting against the erection of Islamic mosques) is basically a reflection of more deeply rooted ethnic hatred. The protesters would normally demand that the inflow of Muslims to traditionally Russian regions should be constrained and that other ethnic minorities should not be allowed to extend their diaspora to mono-ethnic Russian communities. Another dimension of xenophobia in Russia, which is discussed in several chapters of this book, is so-called anti-Westernism. This term is generally used to imply a whole set of attitudes ranging from mistrust and suspicion of the more industrialized Western democracies to disparate perceptions based on the idea of a global conspiracy against Russia. Propagation amidst the political elite and general Russian public of various concocted conspiracies (stretching from the conventional "Jewish-Masonic" conspiracy to relatively fresh geopolitical schemes) appears to be rather dangerous because it would contribute to the growth of nationalistic feelings and expansion of ideological anti-Semitism. As can be deduced from developments in Russia during the NATO-led military operation in Yugoslavia, those sorts of perceptions could be easily translated into aggressive hysteria through the use of focused propaganda. Over the past decade the level of xenophobia has been rising to dangerous levels. Contributing to the expansion of nationalistic and xenophobic sentiments has been the ongoing armed conflict in Chechnya along with discriminatory practices vis-a-vis migrants across the Russian Federation. While refusing to recognize the problem’s growing relevance and pass effective measures to counter the escalation of intolerance in Russian society, the authorities have allowed racially motivated violence to grow to proportions such that the government may not be capable of handling. Admittedly, over a lengthy period of time Russian law enforcement agencies had been stubbornly explaining their inability to tackle the said problems by a lack of relevant legislation. In the second half of the 1990s it was recognized that the country needed a special law to counter extremism. However, given the absence of minimal political accord on which activities should be targeted as extremist and what measures could be taken in that regard, no legislation on that matter had been passed at that time. With the pro-Putin majority in the State Duma established, the need for any political accord between parliamentary factions had disappeared. Eventually, the President proposed a counter-extremism law that was passed by the State Duma against the backdrop of unending appeals by law enforcers and multiplying attacks by Russian skinheads. The law’s drafters apparently proceeded from the need to have domestic law enforcers best empowered to perform their functions, though it was evident that even the authority conferred under prior legislation had not been fully applied to handle the more glaring cases of extremism. Interestingly enough, following the June 9, 2002 pogrom triggered by skinheads and other football fans in downtown Moscow, the mass media carried numerous reports on the urgent need to pass counter-extremism legislation. It is clear, however, that the police required no special powers to restore law and order right then and there, and the events of June 9 represent an objective case of law enforcers simply failing to perform the task at hand. Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activities" features the following two basic deficiencies: its definition of extremist activities is all-inclusive and the repressive provisions are unreasonably harsh (with law enforcers being authorized to rule extra-judicially on suspending the operations of targeted public organizations, to say nothing of other measures). As a consequence, the problem of inadequately defined legal provisions to counter racism persists and has even been compounded, with the law thereby failing to provide more effective tools to fight racist activities. What is more, the new law evidently opens up new opportunities for law enforcers to persecute non-racist public organizations, religious associations, mass media organizations and even commercial enterprises. Hence, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the given law could be applied to implement selective politically charged repression and promote corruption. When making plans for this specialized monitoring effort, we realized from the very start that the job of covering the manifestations of xenophobia and discrimination in a single survey would be too challenging a task. So, we had to make a choice. We were influenced by the fact that ethnic discrimination practices in the more critical Russian regions (Krasnodar territory, Moscow) had already been covered by a series of dedicated studies completed by the "Memorial" Human Rights Center. On the other hand, we thought that the issue of discrimination in Russia reached far beyond discriminatory practices in relation to ethnic and religious minorities. To emphasize, discrimination against migrants appears to be a pressing problem not only for members of ethnic minorities but also for displaced Russians. Hence, it was quite purposefully that we defined the topic for our specialized monitoring effort as "nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance" and chose to have the comprehensive issue of discrimination left out of this survey. Clearly, the questions of xenophobia and nationalism, on the one hand, and discrimination, on the other hand, come to be closely intertwined and interdependent. Application of discriminatory measures by government officials would more often than not be reflective of prevailing xenophobic attitudes, which explains why the examples of xenophobia contained in the book are often based on discriminatory practices. To underscore, it has never been easy to keep track of "off-the-record" remarks by government officials, especially given that their formal pronouncements are normally free of any xenophobia. The specialized monitoring effort’s findings are expected to be used by Russia’s regional human rights organizations to mount assorted public actions including: round-tables with members of local governments to address the problems of xenophobia and intolerance, meetings with members of the local mass media to discuss the most appropriate way to cover ethnic and religious topics, pickets and marches conducted against xenophobic and nationalistic practices, "clean city" public actions (with local teenagers being attracted to remove publicly displayed fascistic symbols and logos on the walls of buildings), presentations of regional reports on the issues of nationalism and xenophobia, workshops on the problem of tolerance in high schools and higher educational institutions, etc. Finally, a brief comment should be made on the structure of the book compiled to hold the findings of the recently completed specialized monitoring effort. The concluding report has been put together to be reflective of the dimensions of the contemporary Russian environment, where one could come across manifestations of xenophobia and see the authorities either taking or failing to take appropriate remedial measures. The book includes a section on Russian legislation aimed at counteracting nationalism and xenophobia, a section on xenophobia in government agencies, and a section on nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance in public and political life. The fourth section of the book "that on particularly vulnerable groups" was an integral part of the concluding overview. Then, in order to run a comparison between Russian regions in terms of pressing nationalist and xenophobia-related problems, we selected local reports from the Altai territory, St. Petersburg and the Chechen Republic - regions that appear to be radically different from each other as to their geographic, demographic, economic, political and other particulars. To point out, the Introduction’s second part is dedicated to describing the overall situation with xenophobia, nationalism and intolerance in the provinces. (1) The project titled "Human Rights Monitoring Network" is implemented by the Moscow Helsinki Group in cooperation with the International Helsinki Federation, the Netherlands Helsinki Committee and the Polish Helsinki Foundation. (2) See the statement "On the October 30, 2001 Pogroms in Moscow" by participants of the second Russia-wide Conference of NGOs Against Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance. St. Petersburg, December 16, 2001. (3) "Monitoring of Manifestations of Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russia" funded by the Henry M. Jackson Foundation; "Racism and Xenophobia in Russian Media" funded by the Open Society Institute; "Defense of the Roma Rights in the Russian Federation" funded by the Open Society Institute; "Anti-semitism and Xenophobia in Russian Regions" funded by the United States Embassy (Moscow). In addition to other data, materials gathered for these projects have been used for the compilation of the given book. (4) The year 1992 saw an armed conflict breaking out between the Ingushis and Ossetians for the Prigorodny district, in the Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania, which until the deportation of the Ingushis and Chechens engineered by Stalin had been part of the Chechen-Ingushi Autonomous Republic. The ethnically motivated armed clashes notwithstanding (the task of returning things to normal required the deployment of federal forces that continue to be based in the region to the present day), the conflict failed to have any impact on the overwhelming majority of the country’s population and left the perceptions of those two ethnic communities largely unmodified. (5) The findings of the 1997 VTsIOM (All Russian Center for Public Opinion Research) public survey may be indicative of the domestic perception of Jews. For example, asked "How would you take it if your sister/daughter married a Jew?" 55% of respondents said they would have nothing against that development. Clearly, given the query’s wording, the response appears to be indicative of a fair amount of tolerance to the given ethnic group. (6) Giving form to the stereotype of Caucasian criminality was the appearance of the generalized notion of "an individual of Caucasian nationality" in criminal reports from law-enforcement agencies and which with the help of the mass media quickly came into use. (7) T. Lokshina, "Hate Speech in Russia: Overview of the Problem and Means for Counteraction" in the Collection of Essays Xenophobia in Post-Soviet States (Lubljana: Peace Institute, 2002). (8) Quote from the "Odnako" television news analysis program anchored by M. Leontyev. (9) Human Rights in Russian Regions - 2000 (Moscow: MHG, 2001, p.135). (10) A demeaning nickname for Chechens. (11) Human Rights in Russian Regions - 2000 (Moscow: MHG, 2001, p.137). (12) S. Lukashevsky, "Banning the War, Discrimination and Violence Propaganda" in Human Rights in Russian Regions - 1999 (Moscow: MHG, 2000, p.99). (13) See the regional report by the Krasnodar human rights center. (14) See the April 9, 2002 Statement released by "Memorial" Society in connection with the continued persecution of Meskhetian Turks and other ethnic minorities in the Krasnodar territory (www.memo.ru). (15) In "ethnic" republics, where the so-called "titular" ethnic communities have historically practiced Islam or Buddhism, things appear to be different from the situation in most subjects of the Russian Federation. (16) As a consequence, given the relevant rulings by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, all religious associations which had received their registrations prior to the said law being passed managed to get their rights fully respected. Hence, the law’s regulatory provisions, as a matter of fact, do not support any discriminatory practices today. Understandably, the religious associations that are being formed now or expected to emerge in the years ahead, would certainly have fewer rights for at least 15 years following their first official registrations. Admittedly, both regional and local administrations are known to have used discriminatory practices against members of "non-traditional" religions, without resorting the said law. They have just been operating in line with the in-house administrative directives. (17) Human Rights in Russian Regions - 2000 (Moscow: Moscow Helsinki Group, 2001, p.101). |
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