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English Language Page Over the past few years, the much-publicized cruelty displayed by Russian law enforcement bodies has been causing a good deal of public alarm. On the one hand, the old Soviet-era perception that “my militia is always there to protect me” has become obviously at odds with the daily realities of life in post-Soviet Russia. On the other hand, government censorship has been lifted and human rights activists and journalists are seeking to expose social ills, drawing public attention to innumerable cases of police torture, beating and humiliation. In the meantime, it would be foolhardy to count on the public at large to exercise meaningful pressure on authorities in this particular regard. The heart of the matter is that Russians appear to have always believed that unlawful violence and arbitrary practices by the authorities are inevitable and that available non-governmental resources are completely insufficient to rectify the situation. As a consequence, torture and cruelty have been increasingly indicative of the true image of Russian law enforcers, while inhuman or degrading treatment continues to be perceived as inevitable features of life in Russia. During Soviet times, beatings and other types of organized cruel treatment had eventually been outlawed by official decrees and directives, and long-practiced techniques of torture were largely abandoned, with specialized practitioners themselves eliminated in the course of massive repression. The last of the aforementioned documents was passed shortly after Stalin’s death in 1953. In April 1953, the then-Minister of Internal Affairs issued an order to withdraw and destroy all technical implements designed to administer torture. Soon after that order was put into effect to eliminate all evidence of officially authorized torture practices, the chiefs of police and investigation authorities were tried and sentenced to varied terms of imprisonment, with some of the former officials (including the very same Minister of Internal Affairs and his close aids) executed by firing squad. Notably, one of the arguments underpinning the severity of that punishment was the “socialist laws” being breached on a massive scale in the course of investigative efforts. Although police and presecutors made an effort to avoid application of qualified torture practices following that disciplining act, outright violence continues to be the principal strategy applied to investigate circumstances surrounding criminal cases in Russia. This unlawful approach is either implemented in a relatively “soft” version (with a detainee being kept in a pretrial detention facility where the living conditions are below any and all standards) or a “hard” one (with a detainee being either beaten up, thrown into a “pressure-hut,” suspended to the ceiling, stretched, electrocuted, stifled, threatened with rape, or taken through an out-of-court execution sequence). To point out, “torture with the use of physical force has normally been applied by police in combination with psychological pressures, including rude remarks, insults, threats addressed to a detainee or his/her immediate-family members,” according to O. Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation (1). Clearly, the armed conflicts that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the two Chechen campaigns served to reintroduce torture practices into Russian society. To clarify, the army “fast-track” interrogation techniques (2) first started to be used to handle the adversarial elements in armed conflicts, the procedure being quickly replicated to unlawfully “investigate” the “unwelcome” better-off individuals. Today, many Russian law enforcers who have been in Chechnya on short-term assignments are once again fully aware of the specifics of qualified torture practices. Because of their participation in arbitrary killings, robberies and marauding raids, nearly all MVD and FSB SWAT-type elements have been effectively corrupted; cover-up attitudes reign supreme. What is more, the “Chechen experience” has now been regarded as principal leverage for a law enforcer to quickly climb up the career ladder. Notably, the specific “Chechen” style of investigative work has now been turned into sort of a model for those police officers and prosecutors that have not yet been to Chechnya and taken part in war crimes. However, with the level of legal culture in Russian society being rather low, cruel treatment of detainees and prisoners for the most part continues to be perceived as either an inevitable evil or some sort of involuntary behavior on the part of officers employed by domestic coercive structures. To emphasize, verbal accounts of the victims of police torture, beating or cruel treatment serve to confirm the functioning of the established system of “beating-out” the needed evidence. Normally, cruel treatment is applied during detentions, transits or when detainees are in a remand prison or temporary detention ward. Admittedly, the victims or witnesses of cruelties by police have largely flatly declined to be identified or to stand up for their rights in a legal fashion. More often than not, the individuals who have been made targets of torture by police just refuse (for fear of worse to come) to call in a doctor in order to confirm the evidence of physical damage caused by the law enforcers. Notably, whenever the victims try to sue law enforcers for the application of unlawful investigative techniques, prosecutors generally seek to have the abusers acquitted of any criminal charges. Detainees in Russia are not allowed to make telephone calls to their homes to tell their family members of their being taken into custody or ask for legal aid, which certainly amounts to a severe breach of the law. Any attempt to use established rights are normally sharply put in check by the attending police officers, who are ready to apply physical force “as necessary.” Given the scene, the detainees are usually advised to meet all requirements set by the local law enforcers. It is only following his/her release from a given police precinct that an individual is free to raise an issue of his/her illegal detention or have his/her statutory rights restored. The ongoing MVD structural reform, aimed at having special law enforcement forces less dependent on regional-level authorities, has been proceeding without any noticeable changes. Notably, an effort is underway to create a criminal police service in place of the federal criminal police committee, which had been originally intended but never established. To point out, the problem of evaluating the performance of law enforcement bodies in Russia appears to be most pressing. The moves to officially reject the crime clearance rate as the principal indicator of efficiency of police authorities across the country and introduce a policy to draw up totals of all reported misdemeanors and offenses are believed by the professionals themselves as inadequate measures, capable of further compounding the uneasy situation. The new approach might serve to reduce the totals for reported and registered offenses, particularly the aggregates for crimes that are especially difficult to clear. To underscore, the rush for improved statistics has already resulted in Moscow reporting an apartment-theft crime clearance rate of 40–50% and a car-theft clearance indicator balancing between 5–6%. This obvious disparity is explained by the fact that any individual whose car has been stolen cannot easily be dissuaded from making an official statement to the police. What is more, one can see direct competition between two neighboring police forces. Should the police catch an apartment thief within the confines of their precinct and secure an admission of apartment thefts committed in an adjoining area, they keep the “intelligence” to themselves, so as not to help the competitors improve their crime clearance rate (3). With B. Gryzlov (a political appointee, rather than an MVD or FSB senior career officer) becoming Minister of Internal Affairs, unfortunately no impetus has been provided either to expedite the MVD structural reform or improve the state of law enforcement in the country. Notably, the gloomy outlook for the reform’s future comes primarily from yet another attempt to step up the performance of law enforcement bodies merely through structural reshuffles. Lack of optimism about a change for the better is rooted in the currently unmanageable problem of inadmissibly low cultural levels displayed by most of the MVD personnel, ranging from junior ranks all the way through senior and general officers. As a matter of fact, for several decades now police continue to be staffed from the same social pool that provides candidates for organized crime gangs. For example, prosecutors (not infrequently coming from the families of Russian and Soviet intellectuals), that used to be conspicuous because of their superior general knowledge and excellent training, have now been rapidly losing that lofty social station. The low social standing of current law enforcement agents, their inadequate compensation packages, high rates of corruption, continuous shortage of qualified personnel and the never-ending outflow of better minds to fill jobs in the private sector clearly indicate that the situation might go from bad to worse. The law enforcement structures are continuing to be further criminalized. To provide another example, from January through November 2001, nearly 10 thousand policemen had been brought to justice, 2 000 of which were charged with committing corruption-related crimes, according to E. Solovyev, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Many active-duty and retired policemen in Russia strongly maintain that adequate crime clearance rates cannot be achieved unless unlawful investigative strategies continue to be employed. Often, by just monitoring a detainee’s reaction to the application of “strong-arm” techniques, policemen claim they can quickly conclude if the individual in question has actually committed a crime or not. In addition, many policemen and investigators are tempted to resort to unlawful investigative approaches because of a large number of objective hardships. Police, normally overburdened with excessive volumes of disparate tasks, just lack the time to quietly and thoroughly investigate reported crimes. They lack the requisite technical assets, to say nothing of the fact that certain limitations have been placed on the use of costly crime scene examination procedures. Also, the generally acknowledged thoroughness of enquirers and investigators (actually performing some of the court’s functions) in Western countries cannot be achieved under local conditions. This particular aspect has been covered by numerous regional reports that carry various examples of Russian law enforcement officers continuing to be corrupted into committing assorted legal offenses. In 1998, the Russian Federation joined the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Article 3 of the Convention contains a provision banning the use of torture and cruel treatment: “No person shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or denigrating treatment or punishment.” Pursuant to the relevant interpretation made by the European Court of Human Rights, Article 3 of the Convention not only carries an explicit and absolute ban on the use of torture but also commits the signatory-states to launch an effective investigation into any case of a person substantively claiming to be either tortured or humiliated by a government official (4). To underscore, this provision of Article 3 is supported by Article 13 of the Convention, which bounds all signatory-countries to providing effective protection for persons whose rights or freedoms defended in the Convention have been breached by a government official. To explain, this provision of Article 13 provides for an immediate and impartial action to be launched into the circumstances of the substantively reported use of torture or humiliation, according to the European Court of Human Rights. As compared to 1998, torture practices have somewhat changed for the better, according to V. Abramkin, Director of the Center for Promoting a Reform of Criminal Justice: The more critical challenges have moved from the Chief Department of Penalty Implementation (GUIN) to the local police precincts and their temporary detention wards, generally known in Russia as KPZ cells. The statistics for torture inflicted at pretrial detention facilities and penal colonies are reported to have meaningfully decreased. Lower numbers of incoming appeals and torture-related criminal cases are reflective of this trend. Admittedly, the removal of GUIN from under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and assignment to a different law enforcement agency has produced this positive shift. Now, we see the wardens of pretrial detention facilities refusing to accept detainees with obvious marks of beatings from the police. There have been some situations when prison attendants themselves have approached prosecutors with a request to look into the origins of physical injuries sustained by the detainees and bring a legal action against a possible suspect should the available evidence be sufficient. B. Fedotov, former warden of the Pskov-based pretrial detention facility, even paid his own money to buy a video camera to tape evidence of bodily injuries. He actually says that every third prisoner needs to filmed. Remand prisons per se are no different from torture chambers because inmates suffer from the “lack of sleep, fresh air and, simply, space.” To emphasize, this admission has been made by Yu. Kalinin, Deputy Minister of Justice and Russia’s “Chief Warden,” who has spent over 30 years of his life building up his career within the country’s criminal penalty implementation system (5). Unfortunately, measures undertaken by the Prosecutor General’s office, MVD and FSB in-house security services to look into the appeals and grievances reported by individual torture victims have been extremely ineffective; only a small number of such complaints end up considered by a court of law. To add, less than one quarter of criminal cases involving abuse of power by police and penalty execution system personnel, have been initiated because of evidence collected by the in-house security services. The remaining portion of the cases has been initiated by complaints filed by individual persons. For example, a quarter of all complaints lodged with the Krasnoyarsk Regional Ombudsman against actions by local law enforcement officials have been related to the police using violence, breaching formal law procedures while pursuing investigative efforts or even coercing the suspected persons into providing the desired evidence. Despite the fact that such complaints in large numbers also have been forwarded to the regional prosecutor’s office, in the overwhelming number of cases, the local prosecutors have ruled to ignore the individual complaints. Whenever a criminal case was launched, it was normally closed within a short time. Of course, one can hardly rule out the possibility of a number of complaints being filed just to avoid criminal responsibility. Sometimes it is, indeed, nearly impossible to determine whether a reported incident of torture has actually been the work of police, especially when relevant statements are made after some time has passed (for example, in the course of a trial by a court of law). However, focused observations have led to the conclusion that the key reason for accused torturers escaping legal punishment lies elsewhere. Individual statements and complaints are generally examined and considered only superficially, with the accused policemen usually denying any use of unauthorized violent tactics. Importantly, no exhaustive efforts are made to secure unbiased knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the case in question. To provide another example, the given crime scene is almost never thoroughly examined in order to uncover traces of torture or any implements used for that purpose. The overall impression is that prosecutors do not so much seek to arrive at the truth, as they attempt to protect police from any criminal liability. They are often successful in achieving the latter, even when reported materials contain sufficient evidence (for example, timely secured and properly certified medical statements of sustained bodily injuries) of the police torture or other rough methods of investigation. Clearly, one of the reasons for the poor state of affairs in the area of exposing unlawful investigative strategies used by Russian law enforcement agents lies in the fact that local prosecutors and police have primarily been tasked to counter crime, with their principal indicator of performance continuing to be crime clearance rates. Obviously, a number of objective (police being inadequately equipped with technical facilities to investigate and uncover crimes) and subjective (low training standards, inability to effectively take advantage of criminal investigation-related provisions in applicable laws, etc.) factors stand in the way of an effort to improve that performance indicator. As a result, the main proof of a suspect’s guilt is more often than not his admission of guilt, which has in most cases been secured through the use of unlawful investigative methods. Admittedly, any impartial prosecutorial supervision has been largely prevented by the fact that Russian prosecutors are usually engaged backing up the prosecution in criminal cases. This “obviously results in prosecutors being least interested in uncovering the use of any rough methods applied to the detainees or defendants. Should it be revealed that unlawful investigative strategies had been used to build up a body of evidence for a given trial, such evidence would seriously undermine the prosecution-backed position in a court of law (6).” Revealingly, Russian prosecutors usually join forces with police to battle against crime, and they largely operate as a single unit. Given the circumstance, Russian prosecutors are tasked to perform two incompatible functions — investigating the reported crimes, on the one hand, and checking to see if the police investigators operate in compliance with the established law, on the other hand. Notably, because the former function reigns supreme, prosecutors pay little attention to the issue of use of torture during an investigation. Just as in previous years, Russian courts of law have been inclined to turn down complaints filed by detainees who alleged that they had either been tortured or humiliated in the course of police detention. In such cases, judges would normally question one of the available investigators on the matter or make an inquiry with the local prosecutors. The invariable response would be that no unlawful methods had been applied. In addition, judges would never demand that prosecutors submit the materials of relevant inspections, and they would never check to see if those prosecutor-conducted inspections had been thorough and fair. If the defendant had not filed any complaints to that end during the investigation, or if such statements had not been appropriately registered, judges for the most part would just ignore any declarations made to that effect by the defendants. Generally, statements made by defendants, and sometimes by witnesses, in the course of investigative efforts outweigh those made during a court trial. Exceptions to the rule have been rather rare. Unfortunately, those have included the cases of judges being unlawfully swayed by the defendants’ well-connected friends or relatives. Should the trial be by jury, it needs to be underscored that, whenever a defendant makes statement to the effect that he had been made a target of torture or humiliation by police during an investigation, the judge would normally order the jurors out of the courtroom and singly consider the defendant’s statement. Then the presiding judge would have the jurors return to the courtroom and tell them that the defendant’s complaint had been unjustified and that the jurors could proceed from the evidence secured during the pretrial investigation. So, the Russian system of investigation and justice (primarily built on verbal evidence) remains largely on the medieval level, where the defendant basically has a choice of either admitting his guilt or dying from torture. In too many cases, Russian law enforcement officers have failed to look for other types of evidence. As was emphasized by V. Abramkin of the Center for Promoting a Reform of Criminal Justice: No true statistics on how widespread the use of torture is in Russia have been made available. Criminal cases of detainees being beaten by police have largely been lost in the multitude of abuse-of-office cases. Today, it is nearly impossible to find out how many Russian policemen have been brought to justice for torturing detainees. The thing is that, once they have been found guilty of committing criminal offenses, the uniformed sadists would normally be first expelled from the ranks of the police force and then prosecuted as regular civilians (7). Overall, “the cases where the party guilty of either torturing or mistreating of detainees have been effectively prosecuted and put behind bars appear to be isolated exceptions, rather than the rule,” observed O. Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation (8). However, the lack of court sentences or exact statistics for police brutality do not result in the general public’s entertaining illusions about the real state of affairs of law enforcement in Russia. Clearly, Russians for the most part seem to be distrustful of the domestic police authorities. This conclusion has been indirectly confirmed by the findings of the September 10 — October 4, 2001 inspection carried out by MVD in the Smolensk region. Specifically, a public survey conducted by the regional police authority revealed that only 21% of respondents regard local law enforcement officers in a positive light. Nearly one third of those queried stated that “they were not ready to assist the police because they saw no point in it.” Crime victims in the St. Petersburg area gave the same types of responses. Just one third of those surveyed said they had readily contacted the police to report what had happened to them, with 38% of respondents explaining their reluctance to call for police help by saying, “the police would not budge to help anyway (9).” The reasons for such attitudes on the part of the public toward those who are supposed to safeguard public law and order are quite clear from the reports submitted by Russian regional human rights activists. Cruel and Degrading Practices Used to Deter Crime, Detain Suspects, Impose Administrative Penalties and Terminate Unauthorized Public Events Recent Russian experiences have graphically shown that the use of disproportionate physical force to deter crime or detain suspects has become routine. In many cases, the police authorities have resorted to unwarranted use of emergency resources, including special or SWAT-type elements from MVD, FSB, Ministry of Justice and Tax Police. Obviously, the purpose of such forceful interventions is not only to rule out any possible resistance from the suspected party but also to intimidate the targeted individuals, publicly humiliate them and prevent them from resorting to legal methods in standing up for their rights. Clearly, persons detained following such terribly harassing police raids usually fall despondent and become easy prey for dishonest inquirers or investigators. Sometimes, traces of beatings sustained by detainees while either transited to a local police station or kept in a detention ward are attributed to the suspects’ stubborn resistance while being apprehended. The unwarranted employment of special coercive police elements, which has nearly become standard practice in dealing with conflict-of-interest situations (it would suffice to refer to the early 2001 “Most-Media” holding escapade widely covered at the time by Russian press), directly compromises domestic authorities. The so-called “masked performers (10)” have become the usual actors on most Russian television news programs. Not a week passes without local television anchors reporting that investigators from some of the numerous coercive structures (including the prosecutor authorities) were accompanied by armed police elements to pay a visit to a commercial bank or private company office. On January 12, 2001, during a meeting of Russian prosecutors in the Kremlin, the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, felt compelled to publicly target the Prosecutor General’s Office for the notorious “masked performer” shows. It was only two weeks later (January 30, 2001) that V. Ustinov, Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, responded to the presidential criticism and issued an order “to improve prosecutor supervision over the police activities undertaken to carry out searches or expropriations.” The document read as follows: It has been determined that the strategy of providing power backing for investigators has often been used to exert psychological pressure on suspected parties. This approach frequently leads to crude violations of constitutional civil rights and excessive disruptions of established business cycles maintained by private businesses… Prosecutors of all levels are supposed to resolutely put in check any attempt to employ special police elements for the purpose of exercising psychological pressure on targeted individuals. However, it was only on February 19, 2001, that this document was released by Russian mass media. Notably, the delay in the release of the order was explained by L. Troshin, public relations officer for the Prosecutor General, who referred to a special inspection (launched before the aforementioned presidential criticism came to pass) that needed time to be properly finalized. The inspection revealed that the power-backing strategy indeed had been applied under certain conditions for deterrence purposes. L. Troshin admitted that an example of implementation of such a strategy was when the police-backed investigators undertook a search raid of the Moscow-based ORT television head office at the close of 2000 (11). Pursuant to the aforementioned Prosecutor General’s order, special police elements (normally coming from MVD, FSB or Tax Police) “should only be involved to support investigative activities under exceptional conditions. Such situations, for example, might emerge when there is a high risk of the targeted individuals offering active (or armed) resistance or insubordination to investigators performing their lawful functions.” Then, the document goes on to read as follows: “the cases of prosecutor-unauthorized searches under non-extreme conditions shall be viewed as gross violations of the applicable law.” Notably, those extreme conditions imply the presence of “circumstances reflective of the targeted individual taking steps to eliminate incriminating evidence.” Prosecutors received even the belated response to President Putin’s critical remarks with ambiguity. In his interview for the Rossiya daily, G. Bespalikhin from the public relations department of the Prosecutor General’s Office, as a matter of fact, tried to disavow V. Ustinov’s order as he suggested that it was just another internal document, written to cover situations when search and expropriation actions are performed by investigators from prosecutor offices. The order allegedly could not be applied to other Russian law enforcement bodies. Whenever MVD or FSB officials approach the relevant prosecutor office to secure a search warrant, they do not seem to be committed to report on how they intend to carry out their plans and whether they want to engage an armed police element to back up the operation. However, even a non-premeditated show of force by law enforcement officers and their preparedness to apply no-holds-barred tactics in order to achieve their objectives on the premises of company offices is a problem with which that the Russian public has become increasingly concerned. To add, the chapter of this Collection of Reports on the predicament of ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation most graphically describes the bizarre strategies applied by MVD elements to pursue their operations against this country’s ordinary people. Whenever targets for those actions are those from the Caucasian or Central Asian ethnic communities, or by Roma or Meskhetian Turks, the tactics employed by MVD personnel are increasingly reminiscent of the infamous “mop-up operations” in Chechnya. A pointed example of that sort of law enforcement practice in Moscow was made by the March 27–28, 2001 nighttime “mop-up operation” on the premises of the Chechen “Nakhi” studio-theater’s dormitory at the State University of Culture. A Moscow-based special police unit (just back from a Chechen assignment) undertook unlawful action there, together with the Moscow region-based Khimki district police department against organized crime. Importantly, even an average person can hardly feel secure against the arbitrary rule of the police. An example of an excessively cruel police performance in apprehending a suspect has been provided by the Khabarovsk regional report. On the night of November 10–11, 2001, in the city of Khabarovsk, V. Voropaev, a popular television anchor and editor-in-chief of the Panorama news program on the Dalnevostochnaya Radio and Television Network, left his office and headed home on foot. He walked along Lenin St. (one of the city’s three central thoroughfares), which was quiet and empty at that late hour. As he approached the block on which the high school ¹12 is located, V. Voropaev suddenly saw a police patrol car approach him and make an abrupt halt. Almost immediately, he was assaulted and savagely beaten by several policemen from the patrol car. Just as V. Voropaev realized there must have been some mistake, he had enough time to cry out his name before he passed out. When he came to, the policemen admitted it was a case of mistaken identity, displayed their credentials and let the journalist proceed home. It so happened that shortly before that unfortunate incident, the local police precinct was contacted by a woman who reported that her purse had just been stolen by some street hoodlum. The woman was asked to get into a police patrol car and help scout the neighborhood in order to catch the criminal. As she spotted the journalist leisurely walking home, the woman allegedly recognized her assaulter. By the time everything was sorted out, V. Voropaev had his scull fractured, nose broken and face badly bruised. Regrettably, neither the patrol car in question nor the woman, who might have helped the journalist (who launched his own investigation) to throw more light on the whole matter, could be found. The Khabarovsk police have flatly denied that such an incident transpired on that night (12). In order to have the entrepreneur, A. Pavlov, from the town of Lebedian of the Lipetsk region, unlawfully taken into custody, the police used excessive physical force by binding his hands and feet in a crosswise fashion. When A. Pavlov was carried out of his home to a police vehicle, his head repeatedly hit the cement floor and the vehicle’s door (that was “mistakenly” left shut). Following this rough treatment, A. Pavlov sustained a serious brain concussion. Notably, even the temporary detention facility’s warden refused to accept the brutally beaten detainee delivered by the police (13). In a different case, V. Artemyev (charged with committing a triple manslaughter) said he had been shipped from Kovrov (Vladimir region) over to Moscow in a car trunk with his arms and legs shackled in the so-called “envelope” fashion. When in Moscow, V. Artemyev was suspended by his shackles and made wear a gas mask with the air pipe temporarily plugged (the technique known as the “elephant” procedure). He also had a heavy concrete slab dropped on his chest several times and was repeatedly hit on his head and heels with a water-filled plastic bottle. He was tortured so that he would provide proper evidence and admit his guilt in the crimes attributed to him (14). Torture and Other Unlawful Investigation Strategies Frequent beatings and unlawful use of physical force during detainment or prisoner transit notwithstanding, the principal complaints against the application of torture and other unlawful investigative techniques have mostly been made about preliminary enquiry efforts conducted by either regular or special police elements at local police stations. It is precisely there that experts in the use of unlawful investigation strategies are practicing torture. Over the past decade, the field-phone-set-based electrocuting torture techniques have been applied on a wide scale at Russian police stations (15). Given the large numbers of reports, this strategy appears to have become the most frequently used technology-based torture. Admittedly, though this procedure has become standard in terms of specifics, some local “talents” seeking to upgrade the strategy can always be found. For example, to augment their performance indicators, criminal investigators from the Volgograd-based Tsentralny district police department chose to resort to a magneto-type generator to produce powerful AC pulses. They used it on detainees to secure badly needed confession of guilt. This particular case is currently being considered by the local prosecutor’s office, pursuant to the provisions of Part 3 (“inflicting physical injuries”), Article 286 of the RF Criminal Code. The three policemen involved in the use of that unlawful interrogation technique have been put behind bars pending their trial (16). Members of the regional prosecutor’s office have uncovered an exceptional case in the Republic of Tatarstan, where local torture “specialists” never stopped honing their “strong-arm” investigation skills. In November 2000, Sergeant K. Khramov, junior investigator from the Kazan-based Sovetsky district police department, shot a 17-year-old detainee to death during an interrogation. As the case was broadly publicized, the local police department issued its own carefully crafted story of the events. According to the Sovetsky district police officials, when the detainee was escorted to the local temporary detention ward, he attacked Sergeant Khramov with a pair of scissors, the latter being compelled to use his firearm in self-defense. However, the prosecutor’s office of Tatarstan shortly afterwards determined that events had proceeded in a wholly different way. It was eventually revealed that Sergeant Khramov and Sergeant Artemyev performed as some sort of in-house torturers at the local police station, both of them usually knocking the desired evidence out of the detainees. Members of this Kazan-based district police force, the best crime-solvers in the city for the year 2000, could not be easily prosecuted because the local police bosses would variously and most resourcefully stand up for their “friends.” Revealingly, most of Khramov’s and Artemyev’s colleagues claimed they had seen or recalled nothing of the kind. The few policemen who were initially resolved to reveal the torture practices then thought otherwise; they claimed that in their first deposition they had been intimidated by investigators from the regional prosecutor’s office into providing “convenient” evidence. Notwithstanding the circumstance, official investigators secured sufficient evidence to have Sergeant Khramov and Sergeant Artemyev appropriately prosecuted and indicted. Pursuant to the investigation materials of the given case, in September 2000, Sergeant Khramov and Sergeant Artemyev were assigned to handle the suspect E. Antonov, who had already admitted to committing five thefts. The local police department, though, had a few more non-attributed thefts reported and registered in the Sovetsky district. E. Antonov was supposed to assume those “remaining” offenses, thereby “assisting” the police. It took quite a while for the local expert investigators to talk the suspect into providing the right evidence. First, Khramov and Artemyev spent three days ruining the detainee’s kidneys. When that did not work, Sergeant Khramov pulled a plastic bag over E. Antonov’s head and had it tightened on the neck of the suspect with a string. (The victim still wears a dark-red scar from that cruel torture.) Eventually, E. Antonov confirmed whatever was demanded of him, but at the trial he once again refused to take those “add-on” thefts imposed on him. To emphasize, the judges concurred with the defendant on that particular point. Apart from physical torture, the two sergeants were known to have used psychological pressure on their victims as well. K. Khramov, for one, enjoyed breaking into parts and putting together again his standard-issue Makarov pistol in the course of interrogation sessions. While suggesting that a detainee might get killed when attempting to make a break, he would normally press the trigger. However, this methodology did not prove to be universally effective. Cruel beatings and torture had to be frequently applied to achieve the desired objectives. To provide another example, A. Rokhlov, who had been handled by the two sergeants, admitted to committing 27 thefts in a single night. Then, the suspect was shown around the crime scenes where the police officers explained to him what he had lifted and under which circumstances. Actually, A. Rokhlov had been illegally dealing in non-ferrous metals, but he was caught while committing a minor misdemeanor. Once delivered to the Sovetsky district police station, he was given a solid beating. However, during the trial, the sergeants claimed they had not touched the given detainee. Allegedly, the latter had a drug abstinence-related seizure, and the sergeants took pity on him. They brought him over to their room for a heart-to-heart talk. “We were just having a cup of coffee and talking about life in general,” argued Sergeant Khramov and Sergeant Artemyev. But somehow, the detainee left that room with a ruptured eardrum. The regional prosecutors provided their own story of how that “small talk” transpired. For starters, K. Khramov trained his unloaded gun at the victim’s face and pulled the trigger. Then he loaded the gun, sent a bullet into the chamber and said there would be no more jokes. Also, K. Khramov pointed out that A. Rokhlov was not registered on the list of detainees and nobody would think of coming to this particular police department to look for him. Once they learnt that the detainee had been chemically treated for alcoholism, the two detectives had his hands manacled and made him drink vodka. Then, they threatened to rape him unless he agreed to submit a statement of confession. Admittedly, A. Rokhlov assumed a few thefts, but that did not leave the sergeants fully satisfied. They took the detainee to a local dump yard, put a gun muzzle in his mouth and said, “Now, say a prayer, bugger, before you die.” At that point, A. Rokhlov agreed to write and sign whatever was demanded of him. Then, he was taken to a local compound of summer cottages where he was asked to show the scenes of his crimes. To add, the sergeants beat the suspect two more times during the course of the investigative effort. The principal episode, which was actually used by the prosecution to kick off an effort to look into the methods used by members of the Sovetsky district police department, was the killing of the 17-year-old P. Yashkov. K. Khramov described the relevant circumstances as follows: During an interrogation session, I remembered that I had to check in my gun. As I turned to my safe-deposit box to retrieve the gun, I felt the detainee assaulting me from behind. He grabbed me by the sweater that I wore on that day. In a scuffle that followed, Yashkov seized a pair of scissors from my desk and attempted to stab me. As I tried to fire a warning shot, I inadvertently got him in the head. However, the prosecutor uncovered an inconsistency in the story presented by K. Khramov. On that particular day, the Sovetsky district police department was put on a “heightened alert,” and the policemen were not required to check in their weapons at all. Also, there were other irregularities. Sergeant Khramov was much stouter and stronger than the frail-looking suspect. Given his tremendous operative experience, he could easily defeat an assaulter of that caliber. Finally, the scissors did not bear the victim’s fingerprints. Under the circumstances, the investigators and then the judges concluded that the sergeant threatened to use his gun unless the suspect provided the right evidence. Evidently, he pressed the trigger just habitually because he was either carried away with his threats or simply forgot that the gun had been loaded in the first place. As a result, K. Khramov was found guilty of committing involuntary manslaughter, though he could not but be fully aware of the applicable firearm regulations, and he could also foresee the potential effects of his rash actions. Also, Sergeant Khramov and Sergeant Artemyev were ruled guilty of abusing their status and torturing detainees. However, the sentence appeared to be rather soft: while Khramov got six years in jail, Artemyev, who merely “learned” from his senior and more experienced colleague,” received a suspended sentence of three years, with two years on probation (17). The task of providing concrete examples of torture is rather complicated because of the fact that one cannot fully trust the submitted complaints. What is more, the prosecutor’s brief responses to the effect that either no legal action could be taken on the matter in question or the relevant case has been terminated usually carry little substance. These responses also make it nearly impossible to conclude that the requested review or investigation had been diligently completed or that the denial of a full-fledged legal intervention had been soundly substantiated. To add, the pertinent materials cannot always be accessed for review. It has been rather common that applicants who had made statements on the use of torture by investigators then show little interest in the results of relevant probes. Of course, the reasons for such an attitude are varied, with police coercive pressures being one of them. As a consequence, numerous testimonials on the use of “strong-arm” tactics by the police in Russia continue to be largely disregarded. However, there is one category of cases when the media especially quickly gets wise to the use of unlawful investigative techniques and torture by the police. Those incidents for the most part have to do with genuinely innocent individuals getting apprehended by mistake. To provide an example, on January 4, 2001, A. Vinogradov was summoned by V. Kulkov (prosecutor) to the Oktiabrsky district police department to be interrogated as a witness, according to the Vladimir regional report. As A. Vinogradov was brought to the local police station, he was almost immediately assaulted by three policemen, who started to beat him with their fists, rubber batons and booted feet. Shortly afterwards, they suggested that A. Vinogradov might try to make a break by jumping out the window from the second floor. Then, they threatened to shoot and kill him should he try to do that. Notably, beatings (aimed to secure a confession pertaining to the case of a policeman found dead in December 2000) went on until an investigator arrived and stated that the detainee most positively was not the man he wanted to see, even though that man’s last name was also Vinogradov. Then, A. Vinogradov was questioned and let go. On his way home A. Vinogradov paid a visit to the nearby clinic to be examined by a doctor, who confirmed that he sustained a broken rib and multiple serious injuries in the back, chest and arms. Another similar accident has been reported by the regional monitors from Krasnoyarsk. In June 2001, a few local policemen detained a person named V., brought him to their police station and stated that they suspected V. of having shot and wounded their colleague a few days ago. Inasmuch as V. would refuse to cooperate, they set out to beat him. At that very moment, some of V.’s friends (students from the local law school and sympathizers of the regional human rights organization) came to the police station to find out why their friend had been detained. They saw their friend being convoyed along the main corridor of the police building, his face heavily bruised. Then, they heard V. cry out from heavy blows he was apparently receiving. The following day, V. was released. He immediately visited the local clinic to have the injuries appropriately recorded. Then V. went to the local prosecutor’s office to lodge claim for the guilty party to be properly prosecuted. Notably, apart from the beatings, the policemen in question could be charged with committing other offenses as well. In particular, V.’s detention for nearly one day failed to be adequately documented. The police tried to conceal this circumstance by filling out a report to the effect that V. was apprehended for minor hooliganism. The relevant materials (variously corrected) were then dispatched to the court. However, given that the witnesses confirmed V.’s alibi, the judge just closed the case without finding any grounds for having V. tried on the given charges. Clearly, the policemen in this case could be held fully responsible for torturing V., keeping him in detention without any grounds and committing fraud while officially charging him with minor hooliganism. A few days later, the police eventually apprehended the individual that had killed the aforementioned policeman, with V.’s innocence in that matter thereby being made obvious. Given the circumstances underlying the sequence of the transgressions, a criminal action was appropriately instituted against the police. A never-ending paper shuffling followed. For months on end, V. would urge the investigator to energize their effort. However, the latter would always respond by saying that the investigation deadline had been missed. Meantime, members of the local police station held a few meetings with V. to let him know that they had reached an understanding with the local prosecutor’s office on terminating the case under the proviso that V. would not appeal against such a decision. Within six months, the case was eventually closed. The validity of the submitted reports on police torture and beatings also have been corroborated by a limited number of court sentences passed to punish the law enforcers who abused their job status. Below is a typical example reflecting the level of police arbitrariness and the severity of the relevant punishment. Here is an excerpt from a sentence passed by the Tuimazinsky district court of the Republic of Bashkortostan: August 7, 2001, between the hours of 13.30 and 15.30, police officer I. Kamaletdinov requested I. Shaimukhametov to come into his office and started asking him if he knew anything about the current whereabouts of Morozov, his wife’s brother. Shaimukhametov responded negatively. Then, Kamaletdinov began to threaten Shaimukhametov and hit him in the face with a fist, thereby badly injuring the latter’s right cheekbone. Also, Kamaletdinov forcefully and simultaneously slapped his hands on Shaimukhametov’s ears, and went on hitting the latter in the chest and abdomen. What is more, in a room being visited by R. Karimov (member of the local police force), Kamaletdinov made Shaimukhametov do 40 push-ups and 100 sit-ups, counting out loud. After that, Kamaletdinov ordered that Shaimukhametov should squat on his feet, stretch his arms forward and keep that posture for 30 minutes. Then, Karimov hit Shaimukhametov in the chest with his knee several times, while threatening that he would break his ribcage unless Shaimukhametov revealed where Morozov was. Shaimukhametov continued to deny any knowledge of Morozov’s whereabouts. Then, Karimov several times hit Shaimukhametov in the back and legs with his feet. What is more, Karimov proceeded to have Shaimukhametov’s arms immobilized behind his back and have the latter’s pants unbuckled and pushed down. Following that humiliation, Kamaletdinov pointed to an upended chair with one of the legs wearing a condom and said that now Shaimukhametov would be put astride and turned into a woman. At that point, Shaimukhametov could stand the torture no longer and promised to find out where Morozov was. Then, he was let go, with Kamaletdinov signing a summons for Shaimukhametov to come to the police station at 09.00 the following morning. Notably, he warned that Shaimukhametov should refrain from telling anyone about the beatings that he had sustained. Pursuant to the relevant medical statement, Shaimukhametov received rather severe injuries in the areas of his right cheekbone, abdomen, right knee and ear drums. To point out, the sentence provides a description of just a part of the torture applied by the police to the victim. In particular, the judges somehow failed to check if three unidentified plain clothes policemen were involved in the interrogation session, as was claimed by the detainee. Allegedly, one of those individuals had Shaimukhametov thrown over his shoulder down on the floor. Then, the policemen would repeatedly grab him by his hands and feet and toss him upwards for a subsequent freefall. To underscore, they replayed the procedure while he was handcuffed. The aforementioned circumstances notwithstanding, the court sentence reads: “While determining the type and degree of punishment for Kamaletdinov and Karimov, the court takes into account good references from the workplace, local residential community and schools, and the fact that this is a first conviction. The court believes that the officers could rectify their attitudes without being isolated from the society.” As a result, the court passed a suspended sentence of three years for I. Kamaletdinov and R. Karimov, with the latter also obligated to pay 2 649 roubles to I. Shaimukhametov as compensation for physical injuries and 50 000 roubles as compensation for moral damages. However, I. Shaimukhametov refused to accept the court ruling and appealed for the “suspended” sentence to be reviewed. Currently, the case is pending consideration by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Bashkortostan. Apart from torturing and beating the detainees, the police also might chose to take the detainees’ loved ones into custody. For example, in November 2001, during an investigative effort run by the Amur Regional Court, the defendant S. Shmatko argued that he had been unlawfully placed behind bars by the police. While he initially refused to provide the desired evidence, the police also arrested his wife, thereby leaving uncared for their two little daughters (nine and four years of age). After S. Shmatko had been repeatedly beaten in his temporary detention ward, he signed the statement of “evidence” incriminating himself and other innocent people. It was only then that his wife was eventually released. Pursuant to the relevant investigation materials, S. Shmatko’s wife had never been interrogated as a suspect while she was kept in custody. The court determined that under the given criminal case, as many as four persons had been kept behind bars without any grounds. Particularly alarming are the cases when habitual torture or beatings of detainees have been reflective of certain racial motivations. In November 2001, the Nikulinsky district court had two former policemen (Major Evdokimov and his driver, Sergeant Adaniaev) sentenced for abusing their job functions to six months of correctional labor (with 10% of their wages being withdrawn for the government) and six months behind bars respectively. Both sentences were, however, suspended. On October 29, 2001, R. Guseynov, a 29-year-old Azeri with an expired Moscow residence registration, was apprehended. The detainee was brought to a police station, taken into a briefing room and ordered to face the wall. Sergeant Adaniaev then started to work on him. He hit at his kidneys, liver and legs, while seeking to leave no traces. Meantime, Major Evdokimov was just looking on. Then, the policemen filled out a detention record, which stated that R. Guseynov had offered stubborn resistance to the police authorities. The detainee was lucky to have been allowed to make a telephone call to a reporter-friend of his. When the latter arrived, he threatened to kick up a major scandal unless his friend was released. The two police officers apparently became scared and let R. Guseynov go in peace. To restore justice, R. Guseynov headed directly for the Nikulinsky prosecutor’s office and did whatever was needed to launch an investigation into the matter. Major Evdokimov turned out to be connected with the local neo-Nazis. While the court hearings lasted, hundreds of black-bereted and uniform-jacketed skinheads would gather in front of the courthouse, attend the court sessions and even shout their slogans “Hail Hitler!” or “Glory to Russia!” As the sentence was read out, they chose to boo the judge. The police authorities had the two cop-criminals punished separately. While Major Evdokimov was “retired” with a pension, his driver Adaniaev was allowed to leave the ranks of his own free will. (1) M. Deutsch, “Burden.” Moskovsky Komsomolets (November 5, 2001, ¹248). (2) For more details, see the chapter on torture in Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000. (3) L. Stoliarenko, “How I Lost My Police.” Novaya Gazeta (June 6, 2001, ¹46). (4) See, for example, the following jurisprudence of the European Court: Aksoy v. Turkey or Assenov v. Bulgaria. (5) V. Abramkin, “Executioner Needs Some Counseling.” Izvestia (November 23, 2001). (6) See the special report by O. Mironov, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation “On Violations of Human Rights by Members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and Members of the Criminal Penalty Implementation System of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation” (Released October 10, 2000). (7) M. Glikin, “Goblins are Coming.” Obshchaya Gazeta (February 8, 2002, ¹6). (8) M. Deutsh, “Burden.” Moskovsky Komsomolets (November 5, 2001, ¹248). (9) V. Kostiukovsky, “My Police is There to…” Novye Izvestia (June 23, 2001). (10) Mask-wearing members of special police units. (11) A. Kornya, “Prosecutor General Under His Own Orders.” Vremya MN (February 20, 2002, ¹30); G. Punanov, “Prosecutor General Terminates Masked-Performers Shows.” Izvestia (February 20, 2002, ¹30). (12) Khabarovskiye Vesti (November 13, 2001). (13) For more details, see the Lipetsk regional report on the human rights situation in 2001 at www.mhg.ru (available in Russian only). (14) E. Rubtsova, “Pathfinders.” Novye Izvestia (August 11, 2001, ¹141). (15) To learn of the technique’s origins, see the chapter on torture in the Collection of Reports Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000. (16) “Volgograd Criminal Investigators Use Electrocuting Techniques to Interrogate Detainees.” Versty (March 22, 2001, ¹31). (17) S. Idiatullin, A. Sheptitsky, “Perfect Image for Police Force Practicing Torture.” Kommersant (July 16, 2001, ¹123). Finishing of the report Back |
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