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English Language Page Freedom of speech and access to information The process of transferring ownership of media sources (NTV and others), which had been part of the Media-Most holding controlled by the Gazprom company (37% of whose shares belong to the state), was completed in 2001. The non-economic nature of the “argument between the two managers (1),” the political confrontation between V. Gusinsky, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the holding, and federal power, became apparent upon publication of the so-called Secret Protocol ¹6. M. Lesin, Russian Federation Minister of Press, had signed this protocol, among others. According to the protocol, Gazprom had promised to ensure closure of a criminal case initiated against V. Gusinsky in exchange for ownership of shares in the Media-Most holding. Indeed, the criminal case soon was dropped on the grounds of a “lack of corpus delicti.” When V. Gusinsky, already living abroad, refused to finalize the deal and made Protocol ¹6 public, the Prosecutor General’s Office initiated a new criminal case against him. However, the Spanish court, and later Interpol (2), stated that the prosecution of V. Gusinksy was political, thus allowing Gusinsky to avoid extradition (3). In early 2001, the Moscow Arbitration Court, in support of the agreements previously reached between Gazprom-Media and Media-Most and in an attempt to settle their financial disputes, ruled that 19% of NTV shares be seized. On January 25, the High Bailiff’s Office arrested the shares, forbidding their sale and transfer, and deprived holders of voting privileges. Of note is the fact that the implementation of the court ruling took place at a time when Media-Most’s representatives were negotiating with foreign investors. The seizure of these shares reduced the number of shares in free circulation and thus negatively affected the possibility for Media-Most to sell a portion of shares to foreign investors. In addition, this same fact limited the ability of Media-Most toinfluence any decisions made by shareholders at an April 3 shareholders’ meeting where new management of the company was elected. Former NTV managers and journalists disagreed with the decisions of the shareholders’ meeting on the basis that the process of decision-making, in their view, had been violated due to a lack of a quorum (4). Keeping these details in mind, it is worth mentioning some peculiarities of the court decisions regarding legal actions taken by both parties. Court decisions made in favor of NTV, as a rule, were either successfully protested by representatives of the Gazprom-Media or reversed by decisions of other courts. A case in point was the ruling regarding the legality of the shareholders’ meetings. The decision of the Preobrazhensky district court of Moscow, which banned the NTV shareholders’ meeting of April 3, 2001, was overruled by the same court on the day of the planned meeting. Simultaneously, the Cheryomushkinsky district court ruled on April 2 in favor of a lawsuit filed by a Gazprom-Media daughter-company, which occurred on the same day the “old” NTV Board of Directors met, approved the charter of NTV as an electronic mass medium and decided on the proper order for election of the editor-in-chief. The court ruling declared that the April 2 meeting of NTV shareholders, held by the team of journalists led by E. Kiselyov, Director of NTV, was illegal. On April 14, the new management of the company, accompanied by its own security service, occupied the corporate offices, justifying their actions by the fact that decisions made at the shareholder’s meeting had entered into force. Some of the NTV employees who did not want to cooperate with the new director general and editor-in chief joined other television channels: TNT and TV-6. April 14 can be seen as the day when de-facto control over NTV was taken away from Media-Most and given to Gazprom-Media. On November 27, 2001, Gazprom-Media’s right of ownership of former Media-Most assets was legally implemented (5). Official representatives of Gazprom announced their intention to sell shares of media companies, including those of NTV, as they viewed them as non-profile assets (6). However, despite the fact that during 2001, representatives of Gazprom-Media conducted negotiations with potential foreign investors on selling shares of the television company, to date Gazprom-Media retains ownership of the Media-Most shares, including those of NTV. Soon after control of NTV was transferred to Gazprom, an “argument of managers” emerged over the last private Moscow television channel broadcasting in meter frequency range, TV-6 Moscow (ZAO Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation (MNVK)). Seventy-five percent of MNVK shares are controlled by B. Berezovsky, who has been in opposition to President V. Putin since the summer of 2000. In 2000, B. Berezovsky, claiming he was pressured by the state, gave 49% of shares of the main Russian television channel, Russian Public Television (ORT), to the state (7). The following coincidence is interesting. The conflict between MNVK shareholders was initiated by the private pension fund, Lukoil-Garant, which owns 15% of the shares of the television company, soon after the majority of former NTV journalists led by the former Chairman of the board and editor-in-chief, E. Kiselyov, had joined TV-6. President V. Putin expressed his attitude towards B. Berezovsky and freedom of speech clearly enough when he said that: It often happens that a man who has drunk too much vodka and smashed in his neighbor’s face gets five years in prison for hooliganism… Those, however, who have stolen or illegally come into fortunes of dozens and hundreds of millions of dollars are viewed as political figures. These people have nothing to do with democracy. By exerting their control over the media, they do not protect freedom of speech, but protect their own commercial interests… [it is imperative that] journalists should be able to fulfill their professional duties in a totally independent fashion (8). It was by owning a controlling interest that B. Berezovsky was able to actively influence editorial policies of the channel, using it as an informational and political resource to achieve his own political aim, of which he spoke openly in an interview given to the “Echo of Moscow” Radio (9). The replacement of the so called oligarchs, who used the media to realize their personal political and commercial aspirations with large corporations controlled by, or simply loyal to, the federal power is a dubious means of protecting freedom of speech in the media. Representatives of the Lukoil-Garant pension fund, the company that initiated the conflict between shareholders, justified their effort to liquidate the television channel by quoting the Russian Federation Civil Code (Clause 4, Article 99) and Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies” (Clause 4, Clause 5, Article 35). These laws allow for liquidation of a joint-stock company if its liquid assets remain smaller than capital assets for two years in a row. On September 27, 2001, the Moscow Arbitration Court ruled in favor of Lukoil-Garant, calling for the liquidation of ZAO MNVK. This decision was appealed by TV-6, but on November 26, the appeal was declined. The Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow district ruled on December 29, 2001, in favor of TV-6, thus overruling the two previous decisions of the Moscow Arbitration Court. However, on January 4, 2002, the decision of the district arbitration court was appealed by E. Renov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Arbitration Court. As a result, on January 11, the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court ruled that TV-6 was to be liquidated. On January 22, TV-6 stopped broadcasting by order of the Russian Federation Ministry of Press. Court procedures pertaining to consideration of such lawsuits is almost non-existent. There are only two such precedents: suits against the Media-Most holding and ZAO MNVK. At the same time, Article 35 of Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies” is absent in the new version of the said law, which comes into force in 2002, allowing one to consider this article as inactive. In general, application of the above mentioned law does not look legally faultless, since Federal Law “On Mass Media,” the application of which should have been a priority, was never taken into account. Existing controversies in the legal norms allowed courts to examine the case by relying exclusively on the Civil Code and Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Companies.” They ignored the specific fact that the MNVK joint-stock company was a source of mass information. Specifically applicable is Clause 1 of Article 16 of Federal Law “On Mass Media,” which states that the right to initiate lawsuits targeted at termination of broadcasting rests only with the registration authority and the Russian Federation Ministry of Press. The TV-6 television company, consisting of a team of journalists led by E. Kiselyov, was officially registered on January 24, 2002. It has submitted its application to participate in a competition, scheduled for March 27, 2002, for the right to broadcast on the frequency of the former TV-6. At present, there are no private federal channels broadcasting in the meter frequency range except for NTV, which is controlled by Gazprom (10), which is in turn controlled by the state. Thus, political activity of the executive power in the sphere of mass media has been focused on media holdings. While private media structures were disintegrating, a state media holding (11) composed of a large number of regional and federal companies broadcasting television and radio signals, including those operating in the private media sector, was being consolidated with the active participation of President Putin and the Russian Federation Government. It took over a year to develop a project targeted at the establishment of a state holding uniting all television and radio stations under one joint-stock company, with the state owning the controlling interest. On August 13, 2001, the President signed a decree “On the Establishment of a Single Federal Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network” (RTRS), which was composed of the Chief Center of Television and Radio Broadcasting (GTsRT), the Chief Center of Management of Radio Broadcasting Network and Arterial Radio Communication (GTsURS), and the All-Russian Television and Radio Company (VGTRK). Initially, the project implied establishment of a public corporation, but this aspect was not implemented. According to the unitary form mandated by the presidential decree, the state is to be the sole proprietor of the newly consolidated 88 regional broadcasting centers. The right of managerial appointment of the new media structure rests with the President. It can be assumed that the state-owned holding, controlling an enormous portion of informational infrastructure of the country, has been established to promote presidential politics and support the 2004 presidential election campaign. At the same time, during the past year, the State Duma initiated the discussion of a number of draft laws whose potential adoption may limit the freedom of speech and rights of the media. The desire to meet the requirements put forth in the Concept of Informational Security, adopted in 2000, is the basis for action for some of the legislators, and from time to time this Concept assumes the form of urgent legislation. Provisions of the new Concept are frequently understood to mandate a limit on exchange of information and require stricter control over information flows. For example, amendments to Federal Law “On Mass Media” that pertain to foreign participation in company’s stock, forbidding foreign nationals and individuals with dual citizenship to own 50% or more of a company’s shares, were quickly adopted in April of 2001. Adoption of these amendments coincided with the battle against the Media-Most holding whose main shareholder was V. Gusinsky, an individual with dual citizenship. The impression is that the hasty adoption of these amendments was the capping of the political war waged at changing the proprietor of NTV. Legislation regulating the informational field has undergone a number of changes. State officials have repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that central Russian newspapers publish interviews with representatives of the opposing side in the Chechen conflict (12). Moreover, after Nezavisimaya Gazeta had published an interview with A. Maskhadov, presidential aid S. Yastrzhembsky pointed to the existing imperfection in Russian legislation related to the regulation of freedom of speech and suggested that the State Duma “should pay attention to that (13).” The State Duma adopted amendments to Federal Law “On Mass Media” that prohibit the advocacy and justification of terrorism, which may be viewed positively. But at the same time, the law forbids the dissemination “via media or otherwise … statements of terrorists, extremists, and other individuals impeding the conduct of anti-terrorist operations in any form (14).” This innovation may, in fact, result in the media’s inability to publicize the viewpoint of the opposition, but also to cover events in Chechnya more or less analytically. A broad interpretation of these amendments may possibly lead to abuses on the part of controlling structures. At the same time, introduction of the above-mentioned limitations corresponds to the current political state of affairs. One possible result may be a limiting of pluralism in opinions about the situation in Chechnya, pushing public discussion of this problem further into the background and increasingly distracting the public’s attention from military operations. The federal government has undertaken a number of measures targeted at increasing possibilities to regulate the media and strengthen control over independent publications. Alterations in tax legislation, in particular, introduction of a 10% VAT on mass media (15), is in fact a fiscal instrument that serves to regulate the number of media outlets and volume of circulation. Introduction of the tax may lead to liquidation of a number of publications, especially at the regional and local levels, and as a result, a general reduction in the number of publications. Politico-analytical publications will be the first to face difficulties once prices go up, as they tend to be less in profitable. The demand for books and periodicals will also decrease in response to higher prices. But the most important aspect affecting freedom of speech is that by abolishing state support for mass media (prolongation of benefits), regional powers acquire additional opportunities to subsidize local publications selectively. And ultimately, the replacement of media supported by the state by beneficial taxation and subsidies will result in the growth of local press’ dependence on regional powers. Russian legislation regulating issues related to professional activities of journalists in the Chechen Republic is undergoing significant changes, resulting in a strengthening of control over reporters. In addition, due to the Russian Federation Presidential Aid Department, journalists are required to register with the press-center of the United Group of Forces (OVG). The rules governing accreditation procedures with the Russian Federation Presidential Aid Department of S. Yastrzhembsky (16) do not directly refer to a mandatory registration with the United Group of Forces press-center, although Paragraph 12 does require journalists to “observe the United Group of Forces internal house rules” during their stay “in the zone of military operation or inside troops’ quarters.” The order regulating journalists’ work established by the United Group of Forces, an internal circular whose text has never been made available to media editorial boards (17), allows preventing a journalist from conducting professional activities on the territory of Chechnya should this journalist not be registered. At the very least, this order gives federal troops the right to create obstacles for journalists who have been actively working in the conflict zone without registration, including the right to apprehend journalists for as long as it takes to go through all formalities. Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist of Novaya Gazeta, was apprehended on February 20, 2001. This was possible because she had not complied with the United Group of Forces press-center registration rules, although she had properly registered with the Russian Federation Presidential Aid Department. Additionally, one of the OVG rules specifies that journalists may travel within the republic only under escort of the military, a rule A. Politkovskaya ignored. A. Politkovskaya, a well-known journalist, has dedicated her professional life to informing the public on issues regarding the civilian population of Chechnya and to securing assistance to those who have suffered during the military operation. This trip to Chechnya was her nineteenth and she never before had encountered such resistance. The journalist was kept inside the quarters of a marine regiment for three days, with no opportunity to move about independently. Journalists’ non-compliance with the regulations established by the High Command cannot be grounds for the military to extert psychological pressure and harassment on those (18) who criticize the actions of the federal troops in Chechnya. Officials attempting to deny the apprehension explained the three-day stay of A. Politkovskaya in military quarters as simply the inability to provide the journalist with an opportunity to fly to Khankala, where the primary press-center was located, because of “bad weather conditions (19).” Journalists’ opportunities for independent work in the Chechen Republic are also limited by new travel regulations, adopted on July 26, which imply that a press-service officer must accompany each journalist when outside of the Khankala military base (20). In a territory where distribution of information is, in fact, forbidden, each new regulation increasingly impedes access to and dissemination of information. Coverage of events occurring during anti-terrorist operations is allowed only within the limits established by the military command and federal authorities. In 2001, one of the main tasks of the Russian Federation government was to organize the informational network of Chechnya. This implied restoring television and radio broadcasting in the territory of the republic and making arrangements for the publication of local periodicals. The population of Chechnya has access to a limited number of sources of information. These are confined to informal, state, and a small number of private media outlets that constantly experience difficulties. In February and March, residents of a part of the republic’s territory began to receive transmissions of the official federal television channels, RTR and ORT, as well as Radio of Russia, “Free Chechnya” Radio, and some municipal and district newspapers. In light of this, Radio Liberty decided to start broadcasting its programs in a number of languages of North Caucasus peoples, including the Chechen language, in order to provide an alternative source of information to residents of the republic. The reaction of the federal authorities was visibly negative, based on the conviction that the station’s editorial politics, with respect to actions of the federal troops in Chechnya, was “partial and biased.” Director of Promotion of Russian Federation FSB Programs, A. Zdanovich, expressed the fear that the radio station might aid in “intensifying the ideological war against Russia (21).” This overtly expressed dissatisfaction with the radio station’s decision to start broadcasting in the Chechen language supports the characterization of Chechen informational space as being closed and strictly controlled by the authorities. Legislative activities of representative and executive authorities in the regions often contradict federal legislation and limit or directly violate the freedom of the media. In many ways, the legislative activity of regional and local authorities aimed at tightening control over the media is associated with limiting access to and attempting to interfere with the process of gathering information. In the Voronezh region and the Republic of North Osetia-Alania, the administrations have created structures authorized to control informational contents. Justifying its actions by citing the existence of “threats to regional informational space,” the administration of the Voronezh region has formed a “Council for the Protection of Information (22).” The President and government of Osetia, showing care for the moral well-being of minors, are striving to establish public councils that are to implement “measures to clean up the informational field” and constructively facilitate the formation of a system of moral values (23). Moreover, the legality of these measures is based solely on their popularity with the public. The very establishment of public councils is not something that directly violates norms of Federal Law “On Mass Media,” but the troubling fact is that the legislative innovation preceded an election campaign, in which the role of the media is vitally important. The accreditation procedure is becoming more convoluted in regional regulations. For instance, the Nizhny Novgorod tax authority has developed a law establishing the order of priority for accrediting journalists and for regulating the number of journalists and photographers. Depending on the level of priority, a maximum number of journalists and photographers who have the right to apply for accreditation must be identified. The highest priority is granted to publications of the regional level, whereas federal and district media may accredit only one journalist (24), correspondent, or photographer each. In addition, the newly adopted “Provision on Accreditation of Representatives of Mass Media” by the Nizhny Novgorod Regional Department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Taxes implies obligatory completion of a questionnaire containing questions of a personal nature. Adoption of this provision limits access to information for a range of media sources and forms a privileged group of regional publications and television companies. Limitations of access to information through accreditation mechanisms also exist in the Republic of Kalmykia. The decree of the republican government of March 26, 2001, states that a journalist can be deprived of accreditation through a court of law, should he or she distort the activities of the republican government (25). There are reasons to assume that any assessment made by a journalist with respect to activities of the republican government, which he or she is entitled to do in accordance with Federal Law “On Mass Media,” can be classified as distorting the truth. Media representatives find themselves in a situation where it is easier to avoid lawsuits by disseminating the official, governmental point of view. Moreover, this decree contains a provision that allows a press secretary of the government to review materials prior to their being published or aired, which can be regarded as imposing an element of censorship. Currently, this decree is being examined in a court of law in connection with a civil lawsuit dealing with rights of journalists inside the republic. The government of the Saratov region limited access to information for local journalists through a simple decision: sessions of the Presidium of the regional government have become private, regardless of the subject under discussion (26). This was put into effect by a notice signed by the Minister of Press of the Saratov region, Yu. Sanberg, and distributed in advance by e-mail to media sources, not by governmental decree. In addition to violating the legislation on mass media, the legality of the above-mentioned document is doubtful, since on January 4, 2002, the actions of Yu. Sanberg were judged illegal in a court of law (27). Amendments to the “Provision on Accreditation of Journalists,” developed by the City Council of Achinsk (Krasnoyarsk territory), introduced a number of limitations on gathering of information. In particular, the amendments specified mandatory topics to be covered by the local press (28) and set forth specifications according to which journalists are now required to assess activities of the City Council in an unbiased and multifaceted manner. In this case, the legal right of journalists to freely select topics and freely assess events is ignored and directly violated. The impression is that municipal authorities are trying to economize on publications of the City Council, whose duty it is to timely cover and appraise decisions and actions of the Council. In some regions, accreditation requirements are not based on any relevant federal law. For example, the accreditation procedure at the Legislative Assembly of the Vladimir region is made more difficult by requiring three years of prior experience in journalism. Additionally, an accredited journalist must not have participated in any capacity in court cases initiated by the Legislative Assembly that had to do with protection of honor, dignity or business reputation. Not only does the regional provision on accreditation contradict federal legislation, which is devoid of any requirements of prior professional experience, but it also reflects an erroneous understanding of civil law. In fact, lawsuits about protection of honor and dignity pertain only to violations with respect to physical entities, not to a legislative assembly, which is a legal entity (29). The frequently convoluted accreditation procedures, which are also in violation of federal legislation, may result in the formation of a privileged group for which access to information is not impeded. Based on the opinion of V. Dorkin, Dzerzhinsk city head, the private publication Nash Listok was denied the right to obtain information about the activities of the City Council. Dorkin, in his conversation with a correspondent of Nash Listok, informed the journalist that he was not allowed access to sessions of the City Council because he violated not only constitutional and federal laws, but also the City Charter (30). Local officials denied Nasha Zvezda access to information based on the fact that the municipal administration was working with a different publication (31). Results of monitoring conducted by the Glasnost Defense Foundation indicate that there is a tendency to form “black” and “white” lists of journalists representing various publications. Officials of the Omsk regional administration have legitimized “lists of individuals and publications eligible to attend official events,” which can be regarded as a direct violation of Federal Law “On Mass Media (32).” According to the central newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, an analogous system is in place in the Russian Federation State Duma. The only difference is that while in Omsk “blacklisted” journalists are not allowed to enter the administration building, journalists “disagreeable” to the State Duma are allowed to gather information and enter the Duma building if escorted by the aid of the parliamentarian whom the journalist has come to interview. A Moskovsky Komsomolets journalist, Ekaterina Deyeva, found herself subjected to the above constraints after having published a series of articles negatively depicting certain State Duma Deputies (33). Passing measures forbidding certain activities often coincides with election campaign periods. For example, the Kirov Regional Duma forbade filming videotapes, a violation of the principle of freedom in gathering of information. According to the press secretary of the Kirov Regional Duma, the ban was necessary in order to prevent the dissemination among voters of “non-constructive presentations of deputies,” many of whom were running in local elections (34). In addition to violating federal legislation regarding media, citizens’ electoral rights to obtain direct information on legislative activities of a candidate were also violated. Open discussion regarding the budget was also forbidden, although previously was openly discussed. To maintain their popularity, deputies who initiated the prohibition abused their authority by thus impeding the formation of voters’ electoral decisions. Journalists of some central publications were denied the right to cover the inauguration ceremony of the re-elected Governor of the Irkutsk region, B. Govorin, because they had supported other candidates during the election campaign (35). On the whole, the ability of the media to form and maintain public opinion renders them a very effective instrument in the rotation of the political elite. Therefore, during election campaigns relations between the power elite and media become more antagonistic. During all phases of an election campaign, both those in power and those running for office make every effort to check the smallest criticism capable of discrediting their actions. During monitoring conducted by the Glasnost Defense Foundation and the Center of Extreme Journalism, a number of infringements on the media’s freedom were registered. As a rule, those who actively participated in the political process at the local, regional, and federal levels were pressured. General social and economic dissatisfaction within the country served only to enhance the status of the media, as it tended to criticize political decisions and actions of the ruling bodies. For example, events unfolding around the private television company TVK in Lipetsk initially began outside of a legal framework. On the eve of regional elections, interest in TVK increased because the channel was one of the most popular in the city and thus potentially an effective instrument of influence during the election campaign. The disputing parties were shareholders in the company. Some of them were affiliated with the regional administration and others, with the Novolipetsk Metallurgic Factory (36). AO Energy, owners of 35% of shares of the company, conducted a meeting and approved new management, with the aim of gaining control over the television channel. This company was close to the regional government and wanted to provide informational support for the election campaign. The old management, supported by a team of journalists, disputes the legality of the new Director General’s election. The Kuntsevsky municipal court of Moscow and the Sovetsky district court of Lipetsk banned a shareholders’ meeting called by AO Energy. But despite the court rulings, the meeting was held and a new Director General was elected. In implementing this decision, the new management occupied the offices of the television company and hired new security guards (37). Access to the building where the company’s offices were located was denied to journalists and, in fact, a forced seizure of the company took place. The journalist team protested against the decisions of the new management and on August 31, the Sovetsky district court of Lipetsk ruled that the newly-elected Director General was forbidden to either manage the company or impede the professional activities of journalists and former head of the company (38). But on the same day, when the high bailiffs presented the new management with the verdict and the new security guards allowed the journalists into the building, the chief bailiff withdrew the writ without explanation. As a result, the journalists barricaded themselves inside the company’s offices, while the security firm that had been hired by the newly-appointed management made another attempt to seize the company’s offices. The Russian Federation Ministry of Press disconnected the transmitter of the Lipetsk telecommunications company, “to ensure that the dispute be handled in the legal arena,” and subsequently suspended its broadcasting license, on the basis of complaints filed by journalists who had not acknowledged the new management (39). The trial of the Belgorod journalist, O. Kitova, falls within this same category of political conflict. The regional prosecutor’s office accused O. Kitova of five counts of criminal behavior: “insulting” (Article 130 of the RF Criminal Code); “slander” (Article 129 of the RF Criminal Code); “impeding the administering justice and conduction of a preliminary investigation” (Article 294 of the RF Criminal Code); “use of violence against a representative of the authorities” (Clause 1, Article 318, of the RF Criminal Code); and “insulting a representative of authorities” (Article 319 of the RF Criminal Code). As a result, O. Kitova was given a two and a half years suspended sentence, 20 000 roubles in fines, and was deprived of the right to be elected for a three-year period. As a deputy of the City Council and head of a profile committee of the Belgorod Regional Duma, O. Kitova had direct access to city financial and commercial information. Conducting successful independent investigations, O. Kitova exposed and prevented large, legally-dubious financial deals involving the regional government. O. Kitova publicized the results of her investigations in Belgorodskaya Pravda, the most popular regional newspaper, of which she was a permanent author. Exposure of facts demonstrating corruption within the local power structures on the eve of elections is undesirable, to say the least, for those seeking reelection: the Governor and other officials. It is not incidental that the regional prosecutor’s office ignored Regional Law “On the Immunity Status of the Deputy of the Belgorod Regional Duma,” which provides for broader guarantees of immunity for a deputy if a lawsuit is filed against him or her. In particular, the Regional Duma is obliged to consent to the arrest of a deputy against whom a lawsuit is filed charging him or her with a crime against a person. This is not accounted for by federal legislation. Many Russian and foreign observers assess judicial events involving journalists and political figures as expressing a political bias rather than strictly legal values. Additionally, these observers speak of unprecedented physical and psychological pressure being exerted against journalists (40). These observations are based on many examples of legal aberrations. Examples include unfounded accusations (41), faulty investigation methods, including subpoenas accompanied by inadequate application of force, investigators turning a blind eye to local legislation about deputy status, which forbids interrogation of a deputy without consent of the Regional Duma, and the denial of timely provision of medical care. The lawsuits against journalist and deputy O. Kitova is based on Federal Law “On the General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Russian Federation,” which guarantees immunity for deputies, but also places limits on their immunity. In cases where a deputy’s actions are associated with a crime against a human being, instigation of criminal proceedings against this deputy, as well as his or her arrest, becomes legitimate without the consent of the legislative assembly. The criminal case against O. Kitova on the count of slander was the first of the five to be instigated on the basis of a complaint filed with the prosecutor’s office by the mother of a young man, who claimed he was the victim of a gang rape. Having conducted an independent investigation, O. Kitova managed to prove that those under investigation had been framed and the case had been concocted. She described her findings in a series of articles published in Belgorodskaya Pravda and Obschaya Gazeta. The mother of the victim did not agree with results of the investigation and filed a complaint with the regional prosecutor’s office. In the course of their investigation, O. Kitova was forcefully brought to the prosecutor’s office twice and was subsequently arrested several times, which contradicts the regional legislation on guarantees of deputy immunity, which, as previously mentioned, provides more protection than the Federal legislation. To see yet another example, the real reason Elvira Mazhennaya, editor-in-chief of the television company City Channel (Yaroslavl region), was accused of slander was that she was just doing her job. E. Mazhennaya prepared some material on the establishment of federal districts in Russia. In support of the possible effectiveness of this measure, she used an example of mutual settlement of accounts between the Governor of the region, A. Lisitsyn, and head of the Financial Control Department (KRU) of the Yaroslavl region, N. Ryzhkova. In her television report, E. Mazhennaya mentioned the destruction of the regional administration’s financial audit documentation in exchange for establishment of a Chief Controller’s fund. Head of the department, N. Ryzhkova, and her associates used this fund to extract bonuses. When the police were investigating the allegation of slander, a number of violations were committed. In particular, a federal search warrant was issued against E. Mazhennaya; however, she did not show up for interrogations because she was away on vacation. In addition, inappropriate investigation methods were used, including the illegal seizure of property, which indicates that pressure was exerted against the journalist. Ultimately, at the end of the court proceedings, E. Mazhennaya was acquitted based on the lack of corpus delicti. However, this ruling was made possible not because journalists of the television channel and E. Mazhennaya presented the court with documentation proving their conclusions, but because it is legally inadmissible to consider a case of protection of honor and dignity of an organization (Financial Control Department of the Yaroslavl region in this case) (42). At the same time, the court did acknowledge that a portion of the material had affected the honor and dignity of the regional Governor and director of the Financial Control Department (43). Although the court had acquitted the journalist, a formality was found to deny a criminal case, apparently in order to avoid harming the reputation of regional officials and the Governor. On the whole, criminal cases dealing with protection of honor, dignity and business reputation remain one of the basic methods of exerting pressure and influence upon media by representatives of regional and local power. The Civil and Criminal Codes provide for fines and monetary compensation for moral damages, in addition to official refutation in relevant media. Frequently, amounts claimed by victims may lead to bankruptcy of the media source. Courts, understanding this consequence, often reduce awarded claims by a substantial amount. The Mayor of Kuznetsk (Penza region) filed a lawsuit against the publisher of Lyubimaya Gazeta, O. Kochkin, citing damage to his honor and dignity. However, while demanding compensation for moral damages allegedly inflicted upon him, he did not provide the slightest proof. The legally unsubstantiated claim, containing no description of the very event when slander was committed, was accepted and subsequently upheld by the court. The defendant was sentenced to pay one million roubles in fines for compensation of moral damages inflicted upon the plaintiff. Initially, the plaintiff, Mayor of the city, estimated the amount of compensation to equal three million roubles (44). Head of the city administration of Donetsk (Rostov region), Yu. Tarasenkov, filed a lawsuit against the local newspaper Nashe Zerkalo for having assaulted his “honor and dignity.” He accused the publication of defaming him, and of publishing untrue information that discredited him. He estimated the amount of compensation for moral damages to equal 150 thousand roubles (45). For a local newspaper, this amount is enormous. It is necessary to note that the content and meaning of Clause 2, Article 129 of the RF Criminal Code was interpreted in a legally illiterate manner. Thus, in the claim filed by the Donetsk Mayor, the newspaper is accused of using “metaphoric expressions,” “probable judgements,” “euphemisms,” “polysemantic notions,” “hints,” etc., that create a negative image in the minds of voters. But Clause 2, Article 129 of the RF Criminal Code implies that the law can address only disseminated information and facts, not assessments, metaphors, and assumptions (46). An analogous situation occurred in the Kemerovo region when the title of an article, which appeared in the newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti, became subject of an investigation conducted by the Mezhdurechensk city court. The claim was filed against the title and subtitle of the article “Privatization of Power. This is What Happens Behind the Broad Back of a Patriot and Father of Kemerovo Residents, Aman Tuleyev.” This title, not the facts of corruption among regional top officials, allegedly stung the honor and dignity of the Kemerovo Governor, A. Tuleyev (47). The favorable decision of the court refuted not the facts presented in the article, but the interpretation of the title. The court arrived at the following conclusion: “Literal interpretation of the title implies that the power in Kuzbass is being sold to private entities and the unlawfulness that is reigning is akin to that of the Stalin’s rule (48).” The Mezhdurechensk city court (Kemerovo region) considered the case initiated against Moskovskiye Novosti on the basis of Tuleyev’s claim because one of the local newspapers reprinted the article. Presumably, any other court that was not controlled by the local governor simply would not have accepted such an absurd case. In addition to questioning journalists’ pronouncements and opinions in court, erroneous understanding of law is also widespread. As it has been noted before, claims on protection of honor and dignity can be filed against a physical, but not a legal entity. Physical entities can only be accused of damaging someone’s business reputation. Monitoring conducted by the Center of Extreme Journalism has registered cases when local power exerted pressure against private media with the purpose of gaining subsequent control over them. As a rule, such pressure is exerted by indirect administrative methods. For example, an independent television company, Shans, which had been founded by a team of journalists on the basis of the former television company, Mir, that belonged to the local administration and the joint-stock company Rostovugol, was disconnected from electric power supply on the basis of company’s “lack of documents necessary for television broadcasting.” The new Mayor of Shakhty, Yu. Zagorulko, questioned the legal propriety of rental agreements signed by the previous administration and the Shans television company. As a result, the city head ruled that the company was to vacate its office, which was located inside a municipal building (49). On the whole, manipulations related to rental contracts remain one of the most effective methods of exerting pressure against media that are not loyal to those in power. (1) The Gazprom company was a large shareholder and at the same time creditor of the holding and its member-companies. Inability to pay off a multimillion debt served for the Gazprom as legal grounds for claiming the controlling interest and the right to manage the holding’s mass media. (2) Interpol officially declared that it viewed demands of the Russian party politically motivated and refused to apprehend him. See New Summary of the Center of Extreme Journalism at www.cjes.ru; www.ntvru.com (October 24, 2001). (3) See the chapter “Freedom of Conscience” in the Collection of Reports Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000. (4) “Vladimir Gusinsky Obtains Opportunity to Regain Control Over NTV.” Glasnost Defense Foundation Digest (May 28, 2001, ¹41); “Picket and Police at NTV Studio.” Prima (April 4, 2001, ¹288). (5) “OAO “Gazprom-Media” Completes Legal Procedure of Acquisition of Ownership Rights to Its Media Assets.” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (November 28, 2001). (6) A. Etres, “Playing Poker for Mass Media: “Gazprom” Tries to Trap Turner, Merdoc and Kirch.” Financial Times Deutschland — http://www. inopressa.ru/details.html?id=6132 (7) See the chapter “Freedom of Speech and Access to Information” in the Collection of Reports Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000. (8) “Putin Let the TV-6 Situation Take Its Course,” http://lenta.ru (January 15, 2002). (9) Interview of B. Berezovsky to the “Echo of Moscow” Radio. Federal News Service (January 11, 2002). (10) As it has been noted before, by late January 2002 the plans to sell shares of the television company announced by representatives of the Gazprom-Media remained unexecuted. (11) “President Signs Decree Establishing Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network.” NTV — www.ntvru.com (August 13, 2001). (12) On January 31, P. Kovalenko, member of the RF State Duma Committee on Informational Politics, declared that providing Chechen troops and their leaders with opportunities to express their views in Russian newspapers was inexcusable and identified it with “those targeted at support of the Chechen troops.” What caused some Deputies to apply to the Minister of Press, M. Lesin, was an interview with A. Maskhadov published by Kommersant daily and Internet-based Grani.ru. In late February, Nezavisimaya Gazeta also published an interview with A. Maskhadov which caused the negative reaction of presidential aid, S. Yastrzhembsky and on March 2 the RF Ministry of Press gave an official warning to the newspaper. On August 31, S. Yastrzhembsky made a presentation in which suggested that amendments be made to the existing legislation which would prevent mass media from disseminating information originating from Chechen troops. This was caused by another interview with A. Maskhadov published by Kommersant daily. On October 31, he made a more concrete statement implying “self-limitation from informational pantophagy” and raising the issue of boundaries of the freedom of speech in the circumstances of the anti-terrorist operation. For more information, see “Monitoring of Violation of Rights of Journalists and the Press and Conflicts Associated with Coverage of Events on the Territory of the Chechen Republic.” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (2001). (13) For more information, see “Monitoring of Violation of Rights of Journalists and the Press and Conflicts Associated with Coverage of Events on the Territory of the Chechen Republic.” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (2001). (14) “Duma Adopts Amendments to Law “On Mass Media.” Kolokol.Ru — http://www.kolokol.ru/R/P/1318 (December 21, 2001). (15) Initially, it was presumed that all tax benefits for mass media would be abolished and a 20% VAT tax would be introduced just like with all other commercial entities. Therefore, the 10% VAT tax is viewed as a tax benefit. But in fact, what we have been dealing with since January 2002 is not a beneficial 10% instead of a 20% VAT tax rate, but rather introduction of taxation for mass media. (16) See: “Rules of Accreditation of Representatives of Mass Media with the RF Presidential Aid S. V. Yastrzhembsky” at www.ntvru.com/. (17) The RF Union of Journalists states that the text of rules established by the military command “…has never been supplied to any of the newspapers which send their employees to the North Caucasus. See: “Explanation of Colleagues: Game without Rules” at www.ntvru.com/. (18) “Anna Politkovskaya Requests that Lawsuit Be Initiated on the Fact of Her Apprehension.” Lenta.ru (February 22, 2001). “Russian Marine Wanted to Shoot a Journalist of Novaya Gazeta” Using the “Grad” Artillery Mount.” Russian News Bureau (February 22, 2001). (19) Chairman of the Chechen Government, S. Ilyasov, Justified Actions of the Federal Troops by A. Politkovskaya’s “Simply Having Problems with Transportation and Communication.” See: “Monitoring of Violation of Rights of Journalists and the Press and Conflicts Associated with Coverage of Events on the Territory of the Chechen Republic — www.gdf.ru (2001). (20) “Monitoring of Violation of Rights of Journalists and the Press and Conflicts Associated with Coverage of Events on the Territory of the Chechen Republic” — www.gdf.ru (2001). (21) Ibid. (22) “Monitoring of the Glasnost Defense Foundation” — www.gdf.ru (Spring 2001). (23) Ibid. (January 2001). (24) “Tax Authorities Accumulating Dossiers on Journalists Pending Accreditation” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (November 26, 2001). (25) “Rights of Kalmykia Journalists to Be Revised. Based on the Decision of the RF Supreme Court, They Will be Taken Care of by the Highest Judicial Instance of the Republic.” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (November 30, 2001). (26) “Oh, but This Is a Very Piquant Government!” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (November 2, 2001). (27) “Journalists and the Ministry of Press Clear the Air in the Court of Law” Saratovskiye Novosti Information Agency (January 4, 2002). (28) Amendments require that the journalist is to “operatively and truthfully cover activities of the city Council” and “inform the population of the city on decisions made by the city Council.” See: “Glasnost Defense Foundation Thinks that Achinsk is the Most Disputable City in the Territory” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (October 19, 2001). (29) Rossiysakaya Gazeta (July 12, 2001). (30) The conversation between the correspondent and the city head and administration officials was confined to the following: “We will not let you in here, please do not attempt to get into the building!” — quoting V. Vorobyov, “Code Red.” Nash Listok — http://www.nps.monnet.ru (2001). (31) Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (August 7, 2001). (32) “Federal Law “On Mass Media” Was Not Written for Omsk Authorities. Officials of the Regional Administration Fighting Freedom of Speech.” Glasnost Defense Foundation Digest (February 26, 2001, ¹28). (33) Moskovsky Komsomolets (June 30, 2001). (34) “Deputies of the Regional Duma Forbade Videofilming of Their Sessions” Glasnost Defense Foundation Digest (February 2,2001). (35) Based on materials of RTR (September 7, 2001). (36) G. Putanov, “Five Meters to Air.” Izvestia (September 4, 2001, ¹161). (37) Ibid. (38) D. Gevorgian, “Extra-Departmental Security Protecting Freedom of Speech” Kommersant (September 4, 2001, ¹161). (39) “Court Instances Preoccupied with Search of “TVK” Owner” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (November 5, 2001). (40) See: “Letter of the OECD Representative on Freedom of the Mass Media to the RF Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (May 25, 2001). (41) Two criminal cases were supplemented with the previous three and deal with “exerting violence against police representatives.” Note, that “the suggestion to come over and provide explanations” to the prosecutor was made by a group force of 10 police officers.” See: I. Naidyonov, “To Beat the Journalist — To Love the Motherland.” Obschaya Gazeta (March 29, 2001, ¹13). (42) As it has been noted before, claims on protection of honor and dignity can be filed against a physical, not a legal entity. Physical entities can only be accused of damaging someone’s business reputation. (43) N. Vladimirova, “Television Journalist Admitted to Not Being a Criminal.” Kommersant (March 23, 2001, ¹51); “Court Admits Criminal Charges Against Journalist E. Mazhennaya “Ungrounded and Illegal” Glasnost Defense Foundation Digest (March 26, 2001, ¹32). (44) Novaya Gazeta (September 25, 2001, ¹69). (45) Glasnost Defense Foundation Monitoring — www.gdf.ru (February, 2001). (46) See: RF Criminal Code, Article 152, Clause 1: “A citizen has the right to demand in a court of law that any information damaging to his or her honor, dignity or business reputation be refuted should the one who has disseminated such information fail to prove that it is true.” Quoting: RF Criminal Code — Part 1 (Moscow: 1995). (47) “How Mezhdurechensk Court Serviced Kemerovo Governor.” Moskovskiye Novosti (November 20, 2001). (48) Ibid. (49) “Does “Shans” Have a Chance?” Center of Extreme Journalism — www.cjes.ru (August 1, 2001). Back |
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