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English Language Page In early 2001, a decision was passed to revoke the provision of Federal Law “On Citizenship,” which allowed the possibility to secure Russian citizenship through a simplified sequence. Following the repeal of that provision, refugees from former Soviet republics, who had fled from ethnic conflicts of more than a decade ago, came to be viewed as foreigners “temporarily residing” in the Russian Federation. The notion of the “near-abroad” ceased to provide any legal basis for preferential treatment of certain refugees. Those from the “near-abroad” are now required to obtain new passports either by going to the consulate representing the former Soviet republics from which they fled or by returning to their original homeland to receive a domestic passport there. Understandably, either option is problematic. Most migrants do not have the financial resources needed to either travel back to their original homeland or to go to the appropriate consulate in Moscow in order to obtain a travel passport (2). As a result of the revocation of the former Federal Law “On Citizenship,” the number of illegal migrants has grown rapidly. The new Federal Law “On Citizenship,” whose draft, as of February 20, 2002, has been through two readings, has yet to enter into force. The absence of Federal Law “On Migration Policies of the Russian Federation,” which would regulate the continuing influx of immigrants, has not been replaced by any regulatory act, according to O. Mironov, Human Rights Ombudsman of the Russian Federation. This circumstance only serves to create conditions that exacerbate illegal immigration into Russia (3). President Putin (during his visits to Rostov-on-Don, Novosibirsk and Kazakhstan) and top officials from the Russian legislative and executive branches of government have repeatedly stated that Russia’s policy is to attract ethnic Russians from other CIS countries (4). Russia’s willingness to receive large numbers of ethnic Russians from the former Soviet republics simply reflects the need to achieve an effective solution to the pressing problem of the country’s aging and diminishing population, as well as a desire to prevent a possible economic decline resulting from a decreased workforce. Out of the three options available to resolve Russia’s demographic problem-increasing birth rates, reducing death rates, or attracting migrants the latter appears to be the most realistic since it can be implemented readily (given the low budgetary commitments), efficiently and rapidly. Legalizing a simplified mechanism to secure Russian citizenship or to receive the status of refugee or involuntary migrant and assurance of a measure of financial support for new Russian citizens would be the most sensible way for the government to implement its demographic policies. However, visible efforts on the part of the government to provide needed legal and financial support for migration-management activities hardly allow one to conclude that these presidential goals are about to be achieved. The refusal to release funding for the 2001–2004 Federal Migration Program seems to indicate that Russian authorities attach little significance to these issues (5). An official migration policy program, which had been drafted a while ago, failed to be passed in 2001 by the RF legislature in spite of the fact that on July 19, 2001, the government of the Russian Federation approved the policy. Although that document did not have any formal status, it did provide an impetus for structural reform of the executive body of government. The November 14, 2001 decision to eliminate the Ministry for Federation Affairs, Ethnic Community and Migration Policies (Minfederatsii), a highly ineffective government agency that had suffered from ten years of continual restructuring, is an example of the above stated reform. The functions of this agency were redistributed among three other federal ministries, with long-term effects of this restructuring yet to be fully measured (6). One can only suspect the likelihood of insufficient coordination between the three government bodies as they proceed to handle the questions of domestic and cross-border migrations without the availability of either sufficient prior experience or trained personnel. Specifically, the responsibilities of the disbanded Ministry for Federation Affairs have been given over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Ministry for Economic Development. The idea behind this fragmentation was to facilitate achievement of the federal goal of rational izing economic development of the country. The aim is to employ migrants and optimize the territorial distribution of the population by filtering migration flows to select employable persons who are motivated to fill government-defined jobs in specified regions of the Russian Federation. The nation’s migration policy broadly stated by the President and defined by the executive branch was confirmed by members of the State Duma. On October 24, 2001, Ruling “On Measures to Counter Illegal Migration and Streamline Migration Trends” was passed. It recommends tightening the rules for non-visa entries into Russia by nationals of other CIS countries, expediting ratification of the 1998 CIS-wide agreement on cooperative efforts in preventing illegal migrations, and drawing up a set of legislative provisions for willing migrants to be settled in Russian regions specified by the authorities (7). The closure of the Ministry for Federation Affairs and transfer of part of its migration-related responsibilities to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was motivated by the government’s concern over the risk of terrorists entering Russia under the guise of refugees or migrants, according to D. Gorke, deputy regional officer for Russia, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (8). In discussing the relevance of this issue in the light of the ongoing struggle against international terrorism, V. Rushailo, head of the RF Security Council, emphasized the lack of effective supervision over the continuous flow of immigration. He emphasized the pressing problem inherent in the availability of large numbers of unlawful migrants who might be recruited for terrorist gangs (9). At the end of the October 24, 2001 session of the RF Security Council, V. Rushailo explicitly stated that “an effort to battle against illegal migrants should be made part of the ongoing anti-terrorist campaign (10).” There is reason to believe that the transfer of responsibility for immigration policies (primarily supervisory) to the Ministry of Internal Affairs may result in a situation where the agency’s priority would be to perform supervisory functions in order to decrease unlawful immigration into the Russian Federation. Before the Ministry for Federation Affairs was disbanded, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation handled issues related to unlawful migrants, and the decision to again share migration-related responsibilities to a certain extent confirmed the actual state of affaires. However, providing social support for involuntary migrants and refugees has become a rather unconventional job for the police. Additionally, given that the Ministry of Internal Affairs has always been an overburdened governmental agency, the chances for the structure to become an efficient performer in this line of activity are rather slim. There is one critical question that remains to be answered. Will the former Federal Migration Service (disbanded in 2000), which was responsible for providing social guarantees to involuntary migrants and refugees, become autonomous and self-contained within the Ministry or will it become just another bureaucratic office? The effort to screen immigrants is likely to favor ethnic Russians, particularly given that the authorities have emphasized this objective as a top-priority goal. Importantly, a simplified procedure for receiving Russian citizenship (contained in the draft of federal law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation”) can create conditions especially favorable for Russian-speaking migrants (11). Notably, as was already indicated, the decision to provide no funding for the Federal Migration Program and the lack of functional federal migration policies are not likely to contribute to achievement of the aforementioned goals (12). Although a good policy to attract Russian-speaking migrants is important and the state needs to effectively tackle this question, the government’s commitment to support forced migrants and refugees already living in the Russian Federation ought to take first priority. This is particularly important for the state because many of these persons are fully employable solvent resources. The three principal categories of forced migrants and refugees (13) in the Russian Federation are the following: foreign nationals seeking asylum in Russia; citizens of the former Soviet republics compelled to leave their communities because of the ethnic conflicts of the late 1980s — early 1990s; domestic migrants compelled to flee from their areas of permanent residence, primarily from Chechnya, which became a theater for military operations. Pursuant to the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, ratified by Russia, and Federal Law “On Refugees,” the government of the Russian Federation passed Ruling “On Granting Interim Asylum within the Russian Federation.” The said ruling provides a framework for the relevant government agency (the disbanded Ministry for Federation Affairs was originally responsible for these matters) to tackle questions of interim asylum when considering individual applications. As a reminder, registration, deportation and storage of information on the persons granted interim asylum by the Russian government were previously handled by the Ministry for Federation Affairs and then given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for implementation. Inasmuch as all of the migration-related responsibilities have now been transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is most likely that MVD will decide on asylum requests, extensions of authorizations, and deportations. Numerous foreign nationals (mostly from African countries and Afghanistan) seeking to secure either refugee status or Russian citizenship continue to remain in the Russian Federation illegally, primarily because of their inability to receive any legal status at all. Notably, out of nearly 700 000 refugees only 595 succeeded in obtaining refugee status since 1993 (14). In addition, this limbo suffered by many migrants from the former Soviet republics is compounded by a lack of appropriate registration, which largely depends on the availability of either provisional or permanent housing. These people usually are the victims of regulatory policies pursued by the local authorities. For example, immigrants from Kyrghyzstan who for some years now have been living on the grounds of a former children’s summer camp in the Istra district, Moscow region, cannot secure the housing registration because the camp premises which they occupy were not intended to be housing facilities. These temporary dwellers do, however, pay utility costs (15). Inasmuch as the lack of either provisional or permanent housing is often one of the more pressing problems confronting Russia-based refugees and involuntary migrants, many are unable to secure required registration. Given this unwelcome state of affairs, these people have little chance of properly settling in Russia. Granting requested housing, providing funds for this purpose, and making available home-building loans are part of the obligations of the state to refugees or forced migrants holding proper status documents. However, the housing issue is yet to be properly resolved. In the early 1990s, when there was a large influx of refugees, Russian authorities put people into hotels and rest homes across the Russian Federation. For example, many Baku refugees that fled from Azerbaijan following the local ethnic conflicts in the early 1990s continue to live in hotel rooms. In 2001, the situation became progressively worse because new owners of those hotels do not want their properties used as provisional housing. On June 29, 2001, a decision was made (no court ruling or statement from local authorities is available) to have S. Mkrtumian and four of her children evicted from the Zarya Hotel with the help of local police (Marfino district, Moscow). Her personal belongings were confiscated. This was done despite the fact that the government had not fulfilled its commitments to provide alternative housing for refugees and the Mayor’s Department for External Relations had paid Mkrtumian’s hotel expenses through November 1, 2001 (16). Similar action (documentation authorizing the action was again unavailable) to evict the Androsenko family (Vladimir region) from their provisional housing and to confiscate their personal belongings was undertaken by the local bailiff. This family of refugees had come to Russia in 1992 and was waiting for housing promised by the Dudenovsky farming enterprise (17). The Androsenko family proceeded to challenge the legality of the local bailiff’s actions. Regional reports contain many accounts of problems related to securing appropriate legal status, the unavailability of which underlies many of the problems experienced by migrants. There have also been numerous testimonies on the hardships related to receiving requested housing and otherwise getting settled. The actual living conditions of involuntary migrants and refugees continue to be rather poor. The situation of the Chechen forced migrants, who left their communities during the start of the second military campaign and settled in makeshift camps, temporary settlements, and private homes in the contiguous subjects of the Russian Federation, has been rapidly changing for the worse. In 1999, the regional offices of the old Ministry for Federation Affairs ceased to grant registrations to newly arrived migrants from Chechnya. Certificates under Form ¹7, which is needed to receive social benefits, have not been issued since April 13, 2001 (18). This lack of documented confirmation of a desperate situation gives the authorities a legal basis to deny financial aid to people who are essentially refugees. But since the state has labeled these people “persons who involuntarily left their communities in the Chechen Republic,” it is obliged to provide compensation and needed supplies. However, the refugees that fled to Ingushetia in 2001 have not been able to secure even the documents needed to receive free meals or food supplies (19). Given the absence of an ongoing government effort to provide for minimal support of refugees and migrants in makeshift camps (20) and the persisting federal debt of about 100 million roubles (21) owed to the migration-management authorities and the Ministry for Emergencies of Ingushetia, one can hardly expect Russian government to seek to improve the lot of Chechen refugees. As it continues to refrain from granting forced migrant status to current Chechen migrants, the federal government cannot claim to be effective in this area of its activity. Admittedly, international humanitarian operations and charity organizations have been compensated in part for the insufficient and irregular federal funding. In addition, the state’s current policy can also be explained by the fact that the repatriation strategy has been perceived as the only feasible solution to the outstanding refugee problem. The effort to launch a process of incremental repatriation of migrants in Ingushetia-based camps back to Chechnya and then to urge other persons (who had left the Chechen Republic for different Russian regions in the previous years) to return to their original communities was viewed as a top-priority political task for the federal government and the Chechen administration. However, the measures drafted by the central government to achieve this goal (providing social guarantees and compensations for lost housing or property) became secondary to the requirement for assuring safety of their lives. The latter has been the principal demand made by the refugees and the only precondition for their return to their homeland (22). The federal authorities and the Chechen administration have given a variety of reasons for the desired elimination of the makeshift camps. Some of the stronger arguments that have been put forth are the following: many of the Chechen refugees’ homes are allegedly intact and ready for occupancy; the refugees are only interested in living off the humanitarian handouts (23); there is the likelihood that the camps could be used for political purposes by the adversarial side in the Chechen conflict (24). There have been reports that the Chechen administration and the federal authorities had been implementing a series of dubious and ultimatum-type measures designed to coerce the Chechen refugees back to their communities. An armored vehicle in the town of Urus-Martan tore down the Gazuyev family’s house. One week before that event, the Gazuyevs had received a coercive suggestion to return home or face the consequences (25). In order to speed up the repatriation of Chechen refugees from the Ingushetia-based camps, the federal government has undertaken a number of measures aimed at promoting the return home and phasing out opportunities for the refugees to stay in the camps. The following measures have been implemented: the responsibility for financing the Chechen refugees based in Ingushetia has been transferred to the Chechen government; (26) the Chechen administration has started to make social payments exclusively on the territory of Chechnya as of December 1, 2001; all relevant humanitarian aid activities have begun to take place only within the confines of the Chechen Republic (27); the single-family home owners and legal entities that provided shelter for Chechen refugees have ceased to be eligible for exemptions or breaks on the payment of utilities or rent (28). Despite the get-tough policy, during 2001, out of nearly 30 000 refugees known to be living in makeshift camps in Ingushetia, only 168 persons returned to Chechnya (29). Not all of the refugees from the first military campaign in Chechnya managed to settle successfully outside Chechnya. Many of them continue to live in provisional lodgings: hotels, rest homes, etc. Understandably, they have been pressured to leave the premises. Some Chechen families living at the Elbrus rest home in Kabarino-Balkaria are supposed to vacate their premises on the orders from the local management. Given the rouble devaluation in Russia, the government compensation packages have become inadequate for the refugees to acquire any housing (30). In a recent example of the consequences of the stricter registration policy, the head of the Nalchik city public education department issued a directive barring the children of undocumented refugees from attending local schools. As a result, about 100 children were not allowed to attend classes at the school ¹8 in the city of Nalchik. Though the deputy head of the city public education department denied that such an order had been issued, the shameful experience had not been the only one in that city (31). The revocation of one part of the April 30, 1997 Government Ruling (¹510) “On the Procedures for Compensations Payable to the Citizens Who Lost their Housing and/or Properties in the Campaign to Resolve the Crisis in the Chechen Republic and Who Left Chechnya Permanently” by the Review Panel of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is an example of one positive accomplishment secured by a number of human rights organizations (primarily the “Civil Assistance” Committee) in 2001. In the original wording of the ruling, the payment of compensations was made conditional on the dates when a person was registered and compelled to leave his/her community. As a consequence, many of the refugees from the first Chechen military campaign fell outside of the said ruling and were denied the right to compensation (32). This segment of the ruling was judged as unlawful by the Review Panel of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and was repealed (1) See interview N. Coussidis, deputy regional officer of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with E. Chubarov, staff correspondent of Izvestia newspaper: “We are Not Locals.” Izvestia (February 19, 2001, ¹29). Providing relevant legal status to all Russia-based migrants appears to be a sound strategy to tackle numerous social and economic problems, both for the refugees and involuntary migrants, as well as questions of migration supervision, according to T. Ivanova, sociologist from the Migration Laboratory, Institute for the National Economy Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences. Understandably, legal status comes to be the requisite condition for migrants to secure the relevant registration and become settled otherwise. See G. Sokolova, “We Produce Illegals.” Moskovskaya Pravda (February 12, 2001, ¹6); A. Korobov, “Receiving Russian Citizenship Gets More Difficult.” Vremya-MN (August 11, 2001, ¹141). (2) One can hardly receive any official documents without bribing the right officials in the first place, according to Tatiana Kotlyar, head of an Obninsk-based regional human rights group. (3) I. Sukhov, “Positive Discrimination.” Vremya Novostey (March 15, 2001, ¹45). (4) As he appeared before the forum of representatives from migrant organizations, A. Blokhin, former head of the Ministry for Federation Affairs (now eliminated), had this to say about in thrust of the country’s migration policy laid down by the President: “We want to ask our compatriots to return to Russia. However, we would primarily welcome those who come equipped to settle unassisted. Of course, we will help them to get land, move personal effects and secure employment.” See: “Shall be Viewed as Aliens.” Obshchaya Gazeta (May 31, 2001, ¹22). Also, V. Nikitin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Affairs of Ethnic Communities, released an article in the Vremya MN newspaper saying that there are some options for assuring regulation of the migration flows and defusing tensions produced by excessive numbers of migrants in some Russian regions. V. Nikitin suggests: “We intend to push the relevant legislation to assure settlement of migrants in certain regions of the Russian Federation where the local migration management services would be authorized to resolve all migration-related matters within a short order.” V. Nikitin “Where Shall the Migrant Run?” Vremya MN (October 26, 2001, ¹195). (5) By way of example, the decision to strike the federal migration program from the list of the government-funded programs and activities stands to mean that as many as 200 000 involuntary migrants have lost their housing guarantees, with 40 000 families being denied the relevant home building loans. See: by V. Kadzhaya, “Accidental People.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (July 4, 2001, ¹19). (6) Before it was disbanded in October 2001, the Ministry, established in 1991–1992, had gone through 11 complex and uneasy structural and personnel reshuffles. In 1991–1992, a decision was passed to set up the State Committee for the Affairs of Nationalities that came to be headed by V. Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology, Russian Academy of Sciences. In December 1992, the State Committee began to be headed by G. Shakhray who led the agency through its first major reshuffle in 1994 when the State Committee was renamed to pose as Ministry for the Affairs of Nationalities and Regional Policies. Following its first large-scale restructuring, the Ministry was headed by N. Egorov, former Governor of the Krasnodar territory. It was already in 1995 that coming to lead the Ministry was V. Mikhailov, former Deputy Minister in the same agency. In 1996, the Ministry was renamed to be known as Ministry for the Affairs of Nationalities and Federative Relations. In May 1998, coming to head the Ministry was E. Sapiro, former speaker of the Perm regional parliament. In September 1998, following yet another structural reshuffle, the Ministry for Nationalities was broken into the following two government agencies: the Ministry for Ethnic Policies headed by R. Abdulatipov and Ministry for Regional Policies headed by V. Kirpichnikov. However, in 1999, the two agencies came to be brought together again to form the Ministry for Regional and Ethnic Policies headed by V. Mikhailov. In January 2000, V. Mikhailov was replaced by A. Blokhin. In July 2000, the Federal Migration Service was made part of the Ministry for Regional and Ethnic Policies that was quickly renamed to operate as Ministry for Federation Affairs, Ethnic Community and Migration Policies. (See:N. Gorodetskaya, “Abandoned Ethnic Challenges.” Vremya Novostey (October 18, 2001, ¹192). (7) Yu. Chernega, “Illegal Migrants are Passed as Terrorists.” Kommersant (October 25, 2001, ¹196). (8) I. Semenova, “UN Accepts Militia in Mufty.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (November 1, 2001, ¹214-215). (9) À. Kornya, “Transplanting Human Organs.” Vremya MN (October 26, 2001, ¹195). (10) Yu. Chernega, “Illegal Migrants are Passed as Terrorists.” Kommersant (October 25, 2001, ¹196). (11) Under the provisions of Article 30 of the draft of federal law “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation,” the authority to handle the matters related to a simplified procedure for granting Russian citizenship is expected to be turned over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the right to invoke that provision primarily being enjoyed by the persons “that were born within the Russian Federation or held the USSR citizenship in the past,” as well as “those who have or had at least one parent holding citizenship of the Russian Federation.” If the given person used to hold the USSR citizenship but was not born within the Russian Federation, he/she shall not be eligible to invoke the expected simplified citizenship granting procedure. See the text of draft law at: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/086205GD.SHTM. (12) This stands to mean that the federal budget would no longer contain a separate line-item holding all allocations authorized to handle a whole array of the pressing migration-related matters. (13) Including the persons that continue to be illegal and still seek to secure the relevant status. (14) “Getting Refugee Status in Russia is Mission Impossible.” Prima (March 14, 2001, ¹213). (15) Î. Vandysheva, “Opting to Settle in Russia.” Komsomolskaya Pravda (October 4, 2001, ¹182). (16) “Baku-Origin Refugees to be Evicted from Moscow Hotels.” Agency for Social News (July 16, 2001). “Prosecutor General’s Office Stands Up for Refugees.” Prima (July 16, 2001, ¹298). (17) Å. Êîrotkova, “Embraced by the Cold.” Literaturnaya Gazets (October 24, 2001, ¹43). (18) “Federal Authorities Keep Pushing Chechen Refugees Back Into Chechnya.” Agency for Social News (June 6, 2001). (19) With the start of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, all forced migrants arriving in Ingushetia have been documented through the use of Form ¹7. Availability of the certificate allowed the holder to be registered for temporary residence, as well as provided with free meals or food supplies, free provisional shelter and medications. Basically, that ID paper was merely of local applicability. Should the certificate be lost, it would not be restored. All certificates issued so far continue to be valid ID papers. Importantly, this type of certificate has not been issued since the start of 2000, according to A. Cherkasov from the “Memorial” Human Rights Center. (20) “On March 23, the “Bart” refugee camp at Karabulak had its hot meal deliveries discontinued, and on March 31 all bread deliveries were halted. On April 2, the town of Nazran stopped its bread supplies to the local refugee camps. What is more, that very day also marked the termination of bread deliveries to refugee camps near the town of Sleptsovskaya, with hot meal deliveries there halted a week before that. On March 21, the Yandar-based refugee camp (Nazranovsky district) had its hot meal deliveries terminated, and on April 3 the refugees stopped getting their bread supplies. There are reports of the same sort of things transpiring at the refugees camps near Malgobek, Ali-Yurt, Nesterovskaya and Voznesenskaya.” See: ”Chechen Refugees in Ingushetiya Get No More Bread.” Prima (April 24, 2001, ¹228). (21) “Chechen Refugees Get No Statutory Registration.” Prima (October 15, 2001, ¹343). (22) M. Muradov, “Chechnya Draws Refugees,” Kommersant (May 29, 2001, ¹91). N. Konovalova, “Dangers of Being at Home. Welcome to Hell.” Novye Izvestia (25 May, 2001, ¹87); N. Gorodetskaya, “Leaky Tents Forever.” Vremya Novostey (July 24, 2001, ¹130); A. Uglanov, V. Tsepliayev “Refugees to be Buldozed Out.” Argumenty I Fakty (June 6, 2001, ¹23); at: Kolokol.Ru: Publications from the Civil Liberties Foundation — www.kolokol.ru/R/P/947. (23) “Elagin Will Have 50 Thousand Refugees Returned to Chechnya from Ingushetiya.” See the website: www.ntvru.com (July 25, 2001); I. Sukhov, “Chechen Refugees Could be Back in Ingushetia.” Vremya Novostey, (July 9, 2001, ¹119); “The Russian Security Council Will Address the Problems of Chechen Refugees” — www.ntvru.com (28 August, 2001). (24) “All Refugees Will Be Back in Chechnya by the Winter” — www. ntvru. com (July 20, 2001); V. Yanchenkov. “Involuntary Nomads.” Trud (September 5, 2001, ¹162). (25) “Refugees Continue to be Pushed Out into Chechnya.” Agency for Social News (June 20, 2001). (26) “News Report: March 3, 2001 Government Ruling (¹163) Provides for Financing of the Provisional Accommodation Facilities Exclusively Based Within the Chechen Republic.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta (August 2, 2001, ¹142). Also see: “Federal Authorities Continue to Push Chechen Refugees into Chechnya.” Agency for Social News (June 6, 2001). (27) N. Gorodetskaya, “Winter Without Meals or Roubles.” Vremya Novostey (October 10, 2001, ¹186). (28) N. Konovalova, “Being at Home is Dangerous.” Novye Izvestia (May 25, 2001, ¹87). (29) “Chechen Refugees Denied Registration on Verbal Orders from Government.” Prima (October 15, 2001, ¹343). (30) V. Rechkalov, “Faces from the Caucasus.” Obshchaya Gazeta (September 27, 2001, ¹39). (31) Ibid. (32) “Court Lifts Limits on Compensations for Chechen Refugees.” Prima News Agency (March 20, 2001, ¹217). Back |
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