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English Language Page On the whole, Russian citizens have an opportunity to implement their electoral rights, but a number of factors result in violations due to which implementation of the right to periodical change of power through elections is in fact seriously limited. Illegal interference of authorities of various levels in the electoral process results in a significant number of cases where elections in Russia assume a quasi-competitive character and voters are offered to choose from among candidates one of whom is in fact “destined” to win the elections. Frequently, such a situation may lead to remonstrative electoral behavior of voters. For example, during gubernatorial elections in the Primorsky territory, 33.7% of the voters voted “against all candidates”(1) in the second round of the elections. The aim of Federal Law “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum” is to guarantee electoral rights, both active (the right to be elected in the bodies of power) and passive (the right to vote). Sometimes, the desire to conduct elections within a certain period of time leads to violations of active electoral rights. An indicative example was seen in the second round of gubernatorial elections in the Tula region. The candidate who ranked second in the first round of elections refused to participate in the second round and withdrew his candidacy. But the other candidate who was supposed to run in the second round also refused to participate further in the elections. Nevertheless, against his will, the latter was included on the ballot by the regional election commission, which wanted to avoid a non-alternative election and thus directly violated the active electoral right of the candidate. The Tula Regional Court that considered the complaint submitted by this candidate was unable to independently solve the problem and forwarded the case to the RF Constitutional Court (2). It appears that the situation of a non-alternative election could have been resolved within the framework of existing legislation by appointing the date for registration of new candidates to conduct repeat elections. Exertion of administrative pressure against candidates may indirectly lead to violations of the active electoral right. An staff-member of a law enforcement agency who had announced his intention to take part in gubernatorial elections in the Penza region received a contract-termination notice from his employer despite the fact that his labor agreement had been concluded for a period ending in May 2004. There are cases when indirect pressure exerted against a candidate running for a public office is accompanied by criminal actions with respect to his or her authorized representatives and members of election headquarters. The leader of election headquarters of one of the candidates running for governor of the Penza region was assaulted in his own apartment. An authorized representative of one of the candidates running for the Samara Regional Duma experienced pressure constantly exerted by criminal structures, which included illegal solicitation of information about her family members. The influence of bodies of power can be tentatively divided into two principal constituents: interference of the federal center during the course of a regional election campaign and active utilization of “administrative resource” by the acting regional authorities whose representatives participate in elections. The fact that the federal center is interested in a certain outcome of regional elections is politically legitimate and does not represents a violation of electoral legislation in itself. But non-observance of campaigning rules, as well as promotion of certain candidates during the election campaign violate the legal principle of equality of candidates. Gubernatorial elections in the Primorsky territory, one of whose participants was G. Apanasenko, deputy representative of the RF President in the region, may serve as an example of interference on the part of the federal center (3). Third in the first round of elections, G. Apanasenko was to quit the race but the removal of V. Cherepkov for violation of campaigning rules, as he had illegally obtained free air time on TV, automatically enabled G. Apanasenko to take part in the second round of elections. At the same time, S. Darkin, who completed the first round with the best result and was granted free air time on the same grounds with V. Cherepkov, had no claims brought against him that could result in his removal from the race. This example allows one to assume that there is a double-standard used with respect to candidates, which in this case was applied to ensure G. Apanasenko’s participation in the second round of elections. Most likely it is the financial attractiveness of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) that made the federal center pay such close attention to presidential elections in this region. This republic is one of the few Russian regions whose economic situation is secure, which in this case is based on tax payments made by a large Yakutian company, Alrosa, dealing in extraction and processing of diamonds. V. Shtyrov, president of Alrosa prior to elections, was the only real candidate on the list of those who ran for the presidency of Yakutia. Apparently, he agreed to reorganize the diamond extraction company and turn it from regional into a federal one, which means that the majority of its taxes is to be paid to the federal budget instead of the regional. The political process, within the framework of which neither of the principal candidates (then-President of the republic, M. Nikolayev, Deputy Prosecutor General of the RF, V. Kolmogorov, and V. Shtyrov) could obtain the conclusive majority, was developing alongside the election process. As a result, the voting ballot was undergoing constant alterations. Court examinations with respect to two of the three principal candidates — M. Nikolayev and V. Shtyrov — and the federal center’s change of priorities with respect to candidates running for presidency (at the initial stage of elections, it was V. Kolmogorov who had the support of the federal center, which is proved by direct campaigning on his behalf by P. Borodin, Secretary of State of the Russia-Belarus allied state) resulted in the fact that the early voting on December 8 was conducted with ballots that included the names of V. Kolmogorov and V. Nikolayev, who withdrew their candidacies at the end of the election campaign. M. Nikolayev, who had counted on an opportunity to be re-elected for the third consecutive term, used his possibilities to influence the republican judicial authorities. The Parliament of Yakutia did not want M. Nikolayev to be re-elected and, therefore, refused to void from the Constitution of Yakutia the provisions that prevented President of Yakutia from serving longer than two terms in office. This led to a contradiction between the regional legislation and the amendment to Federal Law “On General Principles of Organization of Bodies of Executive and Legislative Power of RF Subjects” passed by the State Duma in 2000. The amendment allowed regional heads who had been elected prior to October 1999 to be re-elected for the third consecutive term. M. Nikolayev pressured the Supreme Court of Yakutia, forcing it to satisfy his request to ignore the Parlament and the voters’ complaints against his illegal registration (4). Upon the whole, the election campaign in Yakutia was accompanied by tough and not always legal measures undertaken as a rule by the election headquarters of V. Kolmogorov toward competitors and representatives of their election headquarters. Apprehension and subsequent incarceration of members of election headquarters of other candidates without an indictment, maximal utilization of resources of the republican prosecutor’s office to fight competitors (5), etc. were among the tactics encountered. Essentially the campaign could not be characterized as a competition for electors’ votes. It is the utilization of administrative resources in this campaign that prevents one from speaking of observation of democratic mechanisms of power rotation by means of effective campaigning. As a rule, participation of acting regional heads in gubernatorial election campaigns is associated with the practice of accumulating various possibilities to use state organizations and structures — the above-mentioned “administrative resource” — for election campaign purposes. In 2001, this problem was one of the issues actively discussed by representatives of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and one of the reasons why CEC came forth with a project to establish “Free Elections” Fund (6). It was the issue of equal participation of candidates in the election process and observation of electoral legislation (during the election for head of the Irkutsk region) to which the RF Ombudsman, O. Mironov, dedicated his address. This address was based on the petitions submitted to O. Mironov by deputies of the legislative assembly of the Irkutsk region. O. Mironov discussed instances when power structures were used to exert pressure against citizens supporting candidates in opposition to the then-Governor, as well as against citizens who provided financial assistance to the opposition (7). “The excesses and extremes to which the then-Governor went in utilizing administrative resource” was the primary characteristics of the assessment of the pre-election situation in the Irkutsk region made by A. Veshniakov, CEC Chairman (8). At the same time, the civil case that had to do with the refusal of the Irkutsk Regional Court to satisfy a collective petition of four candidates to disfranchise the current Governor for violation of campaign rules was removed from the agenda of the RF Supreme Court (9). Violating campaign regulations by campaigning in favor of a certain candidate on the part of a public servant is one of the most widespread violations. This violation rarely brings about cancellation or revision of election results. Many regional reports contain information about campaigning conducted by regional heads in favor of certain candidates. For example, the Governor of the Kirov region campaigned in favor of a specific candidate running for Kirov’s mayoral office as he met with voters. The regional election commission only pointed out to the Governor that it was necessary to strictly abide by the election legislation. During the election for the Astrakhan Regional Duma, representatives of precinct election commissions, who by law were to supervise over the course of the election campaign, acted against certain candidates. Publication and dissemination of illegal campaign materials in the form of newspapers and fliers with information on the publisher either omitted of faked is a general feature of elections at all levels of power. As has been noted before, participation of a current regional head in an election campaign is often accompanied by his taking advantage of his official position. On the voting day of gubernatorial elections in the Irkutsk region, a newspaper containing materials in favor of the candidacy of the then-Governor, B. Govorin, was disseminated in the city of Irkutsk. Although law enforcement authorities were informed of the election law violation, no sanctions followed. Moreover, facts were registered indicating that public officials pressured their subordinates, coercing them to vote for B. Govorin and threatening to deprive them of bonuses should they vote otherwise. The current legislation presents potential candidates with two possibilities to become registered and take part in an election campaign: they must either collect a certain number of signatures of voters supporting them or make a monetary deposit (10). The majority of candidates resort to the first method not only due to financial considerations but also due to the fact that collection of signatures in fact contains elements of campaigning, as information about the candidate is presented to those whose signatures are solicited. Forgery of signatures, and solicitation of signatures by deceit or coercion are the most widespread violations encountered at this stage of the election campaign. Sometimes, voters are offered bribes in exchange for their signatures in support of a certain candidate. The election commission of the Nizhny Novgorod region refused to register a candidate running for governor in light of the fact that the signatures he provided had been collected by heads of municipal enterprises among their subordinates, using coercion. The decision of the regional election commission was based on explanatory notes of employees of municipal enterprises obtained during the course of an inspection conducted by the Chief Police Directorate (GUVD) of the region. Although the election commission was not presented with evidence proving that coercion had indeed taken place, the candidate was nevertheless denied registration. Taking into account the fact that the candidate who was denied registration was the acting Mayor of the regional center and might have presented a real challenge to the Governor who was running for re-election, it is legitimate to assume that the actions of regional election commission were motivated by political considerations, rather than by an unbiased examination of the signature lists (11). It appears that the regional power has opportunities to influence decisions and actions of regional election commissions regardless of whether or not the current head of the region participates in elections. For example, the Central Election Commission of the Komi Republic did not thoroughly examine a grievance regarding violations of election legislation committed by the election headquarters of the acting Governor during solicitation of signatures. The commission limited its response to summoning members of the headquarters and hearing their assurances that they had acted legally. Documented evidence of signature solicitation among municipal employees in their workplace did not result in an alteration of the commission’s decision in favor of the Governor’s election headquarters (12). Instructions of the Central Election Commission of the Adyg Republic containing hard-to-fulfill requirements with respect to documentation necessary for registration eventually led to derangement of the signature solicitation campaign. For example, according to these instructions, a candidate is to submit two 6x9 cm photographs, a format that does not correspond to the standards generally available at photography studios. Should a candidate fail to provide such photographs, his or her registration documents would not be accepted. Another widely encountered violation of the election law is campaigning that starts prior to the candidate’s receipt of registration certificate. During the elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2001, instances were registered in several precincts indicating that campaigning was directly or obliquely underway while solicitation of signatures was still in process. For example, in the election precinct ¹14 the principal competitors began their campaigning in district newspapers prior to the beginning of the official campaign period. Many of the candidates who were at the time deputies of the previous convocation disseminated illustrated reports about their accomplishments during their respective terms, which can be viewed as indirect campaigning and abuse of power, as other candidates did not have such opportunities. Political parties actively joined the election campaign to the Moscow City Duma having nominated their candidates in all of the Moscow’s 35 election precincts. Given the tremendous influence of Yu. Luzhkov, Moscow Mayor, on the capital’s political processes, as well as given the merger of the “Fatherland — All Russia” (“Otechestvo — Vsya Rossiya”) political movement (one of whose leaders Yu. Luzhkov also was) and the pro-presidential “Unity” (“Edinstvo”) party, which won the 1999 parliamentary elections, the ability of other parties to have their nominees elected was limited, to say the least. To overcome this situation, an agreement was reached between the “Fatherland” and “Unity,” on one side, and the political parties “Yabloko” and SPS, on the other, to nominate mutually agreed-upon candidates from the four political parties simultaneously in all the election precincts of Moscow. Thus, in practically all precincts, the elections to the Moscow City Duma were made into a formal attribute implementing political decisions made on the parity basis. Creation of an electoral situation in which political differences between the parties were reduced to nothing accounted for a low turnout of voters since the primary participants of the elections failed to take their political preferences into account (13). Many of the violations registered during the campaign period had to do with the pressure exerted against mass media and organizations selling advertisement facilities. These actions lead to the inability of opposition candidates to conduct an effective election campaign targeted at a broad range of voters. Vladivostok TV, regional branch of the State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company (GVTRK) in the Primorsky territory, whose broadcasting covers the entire region, forwarded a petition addressed to A. Veshniakov, Chair of the RF Central Election Commission, S. Knyazev, Chair of the Primorsky Regional Election Commission, O. Dobrodeyev, Chair of the State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company (GVTRK), M. Lesin, Minister of Press, and K. Pulikovsky, Representative of the RF President in the region, in which they accused G. Apanasenko, candidate for governor, of exerting an unprecedented amount of pressure against the company, forcing it to limit the airing of candidates’ campaign materials exclusively to his personal videos and “anonymous” programs from his election headquarters. Staff of the television company expressed their concern with respect to the possibility of their being charged with violation of the election law since practically the entire campaign air time was filled with materials of G. Apanasenko’s election headquarters, which contradicts the rules regulating the conduct of an election campaign (14). During presidential elections in the Republic of Tatarstan, observers noticed an absence of any political advertisement of candidates running for presidency against the acting President, M. Shaimiyev. Observers also noticed that candidates could not address the electorate and have their video materials aired on local television. Formally, presidential elections in Tatarstan on the whole can be considered to have been in compliance with the democratic procedure. But in reality, the very institution of the electoral process was discredited by the absence of any real competition in the campaign, as well as by the nominal nature of voting. During voting, observers from the oppositionary candidates’ election headquarters registered cases of vote coercion under the threat of sanctions and in violation of the secret ballot principle. For example, laborers of the “Elekon” and “Tatenergo” enterprises under the threat of dismissal were forced by their supervisors of having voted in favor of the acting President of the republic. Also, directors of state farms actually voted instead of farm workers. According to the election headquarters of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) candidate, inadequately sealed bulletin boxes, and boxes that were not sealed at all represented the most widespread violations in this election (15). Among other violations practiced by candidates is bribery of voters. For example, an inspection group was formed to verify the allegations provided by residents of the Surinday settlement (Evenkia). This group consisted of representatives of law enforcement agencies, the regional election commission, and the prosecutor’s office. They identified facts indicating that settlement voters had been bribed by members of the group supporting a candidate for governor of the Evenk autonomous district who was running against a candidate that represented the interests of a large oil company. Each settlement resident received an assortment of groceries, while the local school and public club each received a set of expensive equipment. Based on the information confirmed by the inspection team, the regional election commission canceled the candidate’s registration (16). Sometimes, violations of election law that occur in connection with vote counting and results publication become objects for legal action taken by prosecutors. The prosecutor’s office of the Samara region, which received a complaint of one of the candidates claiming that voting results had been falsified, initiated an investigation. All the voters whose data were provided in the election registration documents of the precinct in question were individually questioned. During the course of the examination, facts of violations were identified and legal action was taken. Later, the prosecutor’s office initiated another criminal case based on facts of falsification of voting results in the Zheleznodorozhny election precinct of Samara (17). Analogous violations were registered during vote counting and publication of election results for the City Duma of Armavir (Krasnodar territory). One of the candidates initiated verification of voting results. As a result, the court and the passport and registration service identified facts of falsification of general results at one of the election precincts. The final reports were found to contain non-existent voters, which resulted in an inflated voter turnout and alteration of general voting results. The precinct election commission was also found to have been formed in violation of the law, because its members were all employees of one organization presided over by the organization’s boss (18). The Adygeisk city court (Adyg Republic) found that the vote count conducted by one of the election commissions of the city had been illegal. At the same time, violations committed by the precinct election commission (election precinct ¹39) in the election of deputies to the Perm regional Legislature Assembly were the reason why the court found the election results invalid. In addition to falsification of voting results, cases of direct and indirect bribery of voters right at polling stations have been registered, as well as cases of violations of the secret ballot principle. Elections for the Leningrad regional legislature were rendered invalid in one of the election precincts because of confirmed information indicating massive bribery of voters, also involving children through whom attempts had been made to influence their parents. Facts of voter bribery were registered during the early election to the Tula regional legislature when each of the voters who voted early was presented with 20 roubles in cash and a bag of flour. The regional law of the Stavropol territory on election that does not account for issuance of absentee certificates (necessary to vote outside one’s election precinct). This in itself can be regarded as a limitation of the passive electoral right. This results in the fact that hospitalized citizens, out-of-town students, individuals in pretrial detention facilities, as well as civil and military personnel who find themselves traveling on voting day, are deprived of the right to vote. Violations of the legally prescribed procedure that regulates voting outside polling stations may lead to subsequent falsification of general voting results for an election precinct. During the elections for the Khabarovsk regional legislation, voting violations were registered on the territory of a military unit, which was provided with ballots based on the request that contained a list of voters who were temporarily hospitalized. An inspection verified that only 10% of the hospital patients had the right to vote in the district in question. The rest of them did not belong to the unit at this location and were in this district only temporarily to receive treatment. Therefore, they should have been voting for deputies from other election precincts. Given that no preliminary verification of lists of voters who were to vote outside their polling stations was conducted as prescribed by the law, one of the candidates, whose winning the election largely depended on voting results from this precinct, filed a complaint. The court that examined the case did not uphold the grievance. Sometimes, poorly thought-through actions of election commissions lead to violations of the passive and active electoral right. Registration of one of the candidates at municipal elections in the Rostov region was canceled but later, on the very day of the voting, reinstated again. Nevertheless, the election was conducted using ballots that omitted the name of the reinstated candidate. The municipal election commission of Zverevo (Rostov region) declared all ballots invalid and thus indirectly made amends to the candidate for the violation, hoever, the voting of four thousand voters who had come to participate in the municipal elections was annulled. In some cases, violations committed by members of election commissions lead to their disbandment and reinstatement of the winner-candidate based on the re-count of votes. For example, falsifications committed by the city election commission during elections to the city legislature of Voronezh during vote counting in the election precinct ¹10 were confirmed by decisions of the district and regional courts. Initially, the city election commission declared that most of votes had been cast “against all candidates,” but a re-count showed that the majority of the ballots cast “against all candidates” were invalid. The district court ruled that one of the candidates had been elected deputy. This ruling was upheld by the decision of the regional court when it reviewed an appeal submitted by the city election commission. Later, based on the decision of the regional court, the city election commission was disbanded. Rights of observers, who theoretically are to prevent violations during the course of voting and vote counting, are frequently violated. For example, during gubernatorial elections, as well as elections for representative bodies of power and heads of district administrations in the Tyumen region, the vote count procedure was closed to observers. Analogous violations were identified during elections in the Adyg Republic, in the Irkutsk region, etc. Confrontation between regional and municipal powers (Governor versus Mayor) is typical for certain subjects of the Russian Federation. It can influence the election process and the conduct of elections. Indicative is the conflict between the territorial and regional election commissions that occurred in the second round of municipal elections in Balakovo (Saratov region). The Balakovo city court canceled registration of one of the mayoral candidates because he gave incorrect information regarding ownership of property. This caused a protest of local residents that wished to see on the ballot the name of this candidate, who at that moment was acting Mayor and in opposition to the Governor. The city election commission ignored the court decision, having included the candidate’s name in the second round ballot and having thus exceeded its authority. As a result, voting was conducted using two different kinds of ballots. One of them was prepared by the city election commission and contained the name of the aforementioned candidate. The other was prepared by the regional election commission and did not contain this candidate’s name. The regional election commission did not take any adequate measures with respect to the actions of the city election commission, which fell under Article 315 of the RF Criminal Code (failure to execute court decision), and created a situation in which voters in fact were unable to implement their electoral rights. It appears that operative intervention of the regional election commission targeted at liquidation of ballots issued by the city election commission would have allowed voters to express their electoral preferences in a more intelligible fashion, as they at least might have resorted to the “against all candidates” option. As a result, the elections were rendered invalid and the Mayor was appointed by the City Council on the initiative of the Governor. This was done on the basis of a new City Charter precipitously adopted by the City Council, which is a violation of the federal law provision pertaining to direct mayoral election. In addition, having thus altered the City Charter, the deputies disregarded the opinion of citizens who in the city referendum of 1996 voted for selection of a mayor by election (19). As it has been noted in our previous reports on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation, no local elections are conducted in the Republic of Bashkortostan. This issue was examined by the courts of Bashkortostan and the RF Supreme Court. The plaintiff, deputy of the Beloretsk City Council (Bashkortostan) I. Isyangulov, demanded in his suit that provisions of the Constitution of Bashkortostan be brought in compliance with the RF Constitution, including the provisions that have to do with appointment of heads of local administrations by election. The courts of Bashkortostan refused to uphold the suit, as did the RF Supreme Court, having referred to the federal agreement on separation of authorities between federal and republican powers. Having exhausted all venues available to protect his rights within his own country, the plaintiff submitted a petition to the European Court of Human Rights (20). Election legislation of the Republic of Tatarstan not only allows the President to appoint heads of local administrations, but it also permits working for the executive bodies and serving legislative authorities simultaneously. For example, among deputies of the Tatarstan State Council there are the following republican officials: Chairman of the Central Bank, Prime Minister, Chief of the Presidential Administration, and appointed heads of municipalities (a total of 56 individuals) (21). This grossly violates the principle of separation and independence of the three branches of power and contradicts the RF Constitution (Article 10). On January 23, 2001, the RF Supreme Court ruled that the election legislation of the republic was not applicable regarding a deputy holding an executive office. This, however, did not result in any measures being undertaken by the Tatarstan Central Election Commission to rectify the aberrant situation. The process of cancellation of registration of the deputies-state officials elected on December 19, 1999, should have been initiated and repeat elections should have been called in the relevant districts. Inaction of the Tatarstan Central Election Commission was unsuccessfully challenged in the Tatarstan Supreme Court and later in the RF Supreme Court, which decided not to review the appeal (22). (1) À. Chernyshov, “ S. Darkin Was Found Governor.” Kommersant (June 22, 2001, ¹107). (2) “Constitutional Court to Review Tula Election Scandal.” Vremya Novostey (May 25, 2001, ¹90). (3) Campaigning of the RF President’s Representative in favor of G. Apanasenko does not allow one to speak of the federal center’s simply being interested in the outcome of gubernatorial elections in the Primorsky territory. O. Konstantinov, D. Guseva, “The Primorye Knot is Getting Tighter.” Vremya MN (June 15, 2001, ¹100). (4) N. Gorodetskaya, “People’s Favorite,” Vremya Novostey (November 1, 2001, ¹202); “People Versus Law.” (October 25, 2001, ¹197). (5) I. Mikhailov, “Truth from Yakutia.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (November 29, 2001, ¹223); À. Sokolnikov, “Magician of the Emerald City.” Novye Izvestia (December 1, 2001, ¹219); Ì. Govorov, “Yakutia Syndrom.” Novye Izvetiya (December 11, 2001, ¹225). (6) I. Mikhailov, “Truth from Yakutia.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (November 29, 2001, ¹223). (7) V. Eliseyenko, “Ombudsman is Authorized to Declare.” Vremya MN (July 27, 2001, ¹130). (8) I. Sokolova, “Governor Caught Red-Handed.” Novaya Gazeta (July 26, 2001, ¹52). (9) “Supreme Court Has No Claims to Govorin.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (September 12, 2001, ¹169). (10) Monetary deposit as a means of registration of a candidate was introduced at the elections to the State Duma in 1999. (11) E. Alekseyeva, “Nizhny Novgorod Mayor Will Not Become Governor.” Kommersant (May 31, 2001, ¹93); S. Anisimov, “Nizhny Novgorod Mayor Barred From Elections.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (June 2, 2001, ¹98). (12) S. Sorokin, “Komi Republican Election Commission Gives Place to Woman.” Kommersant (November 9, 2001, ¹205). (13)Yu. Luzhkov, B. Nemtsov, S. Shoigu, G. Yavlinsky, “City Duma Needs Honest and Sensible People.” Moskovskaya Pravda (November 9, 2001, ¹207); R. Falyakhov, “Four-Timed “Hooray!” Novye Izvestia (November 9, 2001, ¹203); M. Nikiforova, L.Petrov, “Election Season.” Vremya Novostey (June 21, 2001, ¹107); Luzhkov, Nemtsov, Shoigu, and Yavlinsky, “To Sign Agreement on Moscow City Duma Election.” Izvestia (November 5, 2001, ¹205). (14) À. Chernyshov, “Journalists Revolt Against Candidate for Governor.” Kommersant (May 17, 2001, ¹83). (15) Å. Tregubova, “Tatars — They Are So Persistent …” Kommersant (March 26, 2001, ¹52/P). (16) À. Makarov, “Evenkian Torments.” Vremya Novostey (March 27, 2001, ¹53). (17) Ò. Fyodorova, À. Fyodorov, “Samara Prosecutors Go Voting.” Kommersant (December 14, 2001, ¹228). (18) I. Zverev, “Secret of Polling Station ¹0450.” Obschaya Gazeta (November 22, 2001, ¹47). (19) S. Oganezova, “Who’s Against Mayor.” Izvestia (January 10, 2001, ¹1); “City Divided in Two.” Izvestia (January 16, 2001, ¹5); Ì. Shirokova, “State Duma Did Not Fancy Elections Saratov Style.” Kommersant (January 19, 2001, ¹8); “Former Mayor Turned Prisoner of Conscience.” Kommersant (May 29, 2001, ¹91); Ì. Shirokova, À. Fyodorov, “Balakovo Moves Away From Saratov Region.” Kommersant (January 23, 2001, ¹10); “Moral Slap On Governor’s Face.” Prima (January 31, 2001, ¹184-1). (20) Ì. Khairullin, A. Rakhimov, “To Be Held Liable in European Court?” Novye Izvestia (February 12, 2001, ¹24). (21) Ì. Glikin, “Tatar Deputies Have Been Shown the Door.” Obschaya Gazeta (April 12, 2001, ¹15). (22) Å. Komarov, “Tatar “Moonlighters” Are Beyond the Law.” Novye Izvestia (March 28, 2001, ¹53). Back |
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