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The Ban on Propaganda of War and the Instigation of Discrimination and Violence

The activities of informal youth neo-nazi movements (skinheads, etc.) that had been latent before April 2001 rose to qualitatively new levels after two pogroms that took place in the city of Moscow. Until then, the haphazard and infrequent incidents of street violence motivated by racial or ethnic hostility had been essentially of a non-organized nature (1).

The first massive organized action of extremist neo-nazi groups, pogrom of a street market near Yasenevo metro station, was staged on April 21, 2001 (Adolph Hitler’s birthday) by a gang of 150 people. The timing is in itself an indirect indication of the fact that neo-nazi groups profess the same ideas as those promoted by political fascism. A. Semiletnikov, deputy editor-in-chief of the nationalistic magazine Russki Khozyain, was indicted on charges of organizing mass-scale street riots and involving under-age youth in criminal activities. Four under-age youths were charged with participation in street riots and hooliganism. The formal charges conceal the apparent xenophobic nature of the skinheads’ organized attack against members of ethnic minorities that resulted in the destruction of a portion of the street kiosks (2).

The pogrom of a street market near Tsaritsino metro station, followed by mass-scale attacks against ethnic minorities near Kashirskaya metro station and in the vicinity of the Sevastopol Hotel (Kakhovskaya and Sevastopolskaya metro stations), was the second mass-scale action of skinheads. This was an organized and coordinated effort (3). About 300 rioters, all of them residents of Moscow and Moscow region, gathered at a previously agreed upon hour in a forested area near the upper Tsaritsino ponds, adjacent to the street market, and received metal rods from their leaders (4). As a result, two people were killed and one more, Karam Dzhanmamedov, died in the hospital, not two mention over 20 persons that were wounded. The law enforcement agencies failed to prevent the tragic deaths of three people because they were largely unprepared for an attack of this nature and lacked experience in dealing with street riots staged by under-age youths. According to the opinion of V. Shansev, Moscow Deputy Mayor, the law enforcement agencies simply failed to anticipate the pogroms (5).

Out of the 25 pogrom participants arrested by the police, all were released some time after, with the exception of two suspects in the actual killings (6). Two of the pogrom participants, S. Polyakov and V. Trubin, have been charged with murder. All others arrested in connection with the pogrom in the southern area of Moscow have been charged with hooliganism. The inefficiency (to put it very mildly) of the Moscow police is reflected by the fact that the Tsaritsino pogrom was not prevented, and incidents of ethnically motivated violence and killings are continuing to occur in the city of Moscow.

The majority of those taking part in the Tsaritsino pogrom evaded the police and took refuge in the metro, where they went on beating people of “non-Russian” appearance. Skinheads attacked several Azeris in the passageway at Kashirskaya metro station (7). Large groups of pogrom participants gradually converged at the Sevastopol Hotel, frequented by members of the Moscow Afghan community, and staged a pogrom near the Kakhovskaya metro station, in the vicinity of the hotel. As a result one person, a Hindu national, was killed. A seven-year old girl received a cerebral concussion.

The events that took place after the street market pogrom at Tsaritsino metro station showed that the police do not have any contingency plans for preventing this sort of neo-nazi attacks, and that their actions are sporadic, ill-coordinated and largely ineffective. The fact that the rioters’ actions were labeled as hooliganism indicates that law enforcement agencies are reluctant to properly assess the situation, which might be explained by the prevalence of significant intolerance towards specific ethnic minorities among police officers.

The police confirmed that many of the suspects in the Tsaritsino case belonged to one pro-fascist group of skinheads. Representatives of law enforcement agencies make a point of emphasizing the informal nature of such pro-fascist youth associations (8). On the other hand, lack of registration of youth movements professing racist and chauvinistic views and promoting violence reduces the ability of law enforcement structures to exercise control over their activities. The underestimation of skinheads’ level of organization has a direct impact on the effectiveness of police counter efforts. (9)

The events that have occurred to date have had a pre-planned character and their participants were apparently well informed about the nature and goals of the attacks. The riot participants displayed a certain level of ideological preparedness for action (10). But, in addition to the pre-planned and organized events, there have also been registered incidents of haphazard violence, characterized by a high degree of unmotivated and unprovoked brutality. In late November of 2001, three teenagers aged 15, 16 and 17, calling themselves “skinheads” and “keepers of the city,” beat to death a homeless acquaintance of theirs. (11) Once arrested, the teenagers could not explain why they had committed this crime.

On August 23, 2001, a group of skinheads beat up a 34-year old Angolan, Paul Massa Mayoni, near the UN Refugee Center. Three weeks later, he died in a hospital due to the head injuries he received during that attack (12). According to law enforcement agencies, the culprit is a 16 year-old Moscow college student, who identifies himself with the skinhead movement. The investigation into the death of the Angolan citizen was given a new impetus after the tragic events in Tsaritsino, which brought to light the activities of skinheads and increased public awareness of this issue.

Growing public awareness of the threat coming from skinheads and the feeling of defenselessness against fascist young men represented the most likely reason for the death of L. Milyavskaya. She and her son were in the yard of her house when they were approached by a group of skinheads who threatened to kill her son (13). The woman collapsed from fear.

Incidents of sudden and unprovoked violence against various socially-unprotected groups in Russian society have been largely the result of a sense of impunity for this type of behavior, as well as the growth of social and ethnic xenophobia (14).

It should be noted that the ongoing war in the Chechen Republic, accompanied by violence on both sides, can only contribute to the growth of the aforementioned trends within Russian society. The number of violent incidents is growing from year to year.

The following racially motivated offences committed by skinheads have been registered in Moscow in spring and summer of 2001 (15). Two Mongolian citizens were beaten in January at Prospect Mira metro station. Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Esi Yamadu, was beaten in January. On March 11, a large-scale fight was staged near the Armenian school, with one of the students being eventually hospitalized. When the police arrived at the scene, they simply dispersed the crowd without making any arrests (16). On March 17, an Iranian citizen was beaten at Akademicheskaya metro station. On March 24, at the Kiyevskaya metro station, a citizen of Nepal was beaten and subsequently hospitalized. On April 21, as a result of the aforementioned pogrom of the street market in the area of Yasenevo, dozens of people were beaten and 29 kiosks were destroyed. On April 22, on Manezh Square in downtown Moscow, an 18-year-old Chechen was killed by skinheads in a fight. On May 15, at Sokolniki metro station, a Zimbabwean citizen was beaten. On May 27, three Tadjiks were severely beaten and had to be hospitalized. On May 29, an elderly Moscow resident of Syrian descent was beaten in the metro. On June 11, a Senegalese citizen was beaten in the metro between the Kitay-Gorod and Tretyakovskaya metro stations. On June 15, a Chinese citizen took a beating in the metro. On July 8, a Cameroonian citizen was beaten in the metro between Dobryninskaya and Paveletskaya metro stations. On June 22, a Dagestani resident was beaten in the town of Zelenograd (Moscow region). On August 23, a refugee from Angola was beaten and later died in the hospital (as described above).

The growing number of acts of unprovoked violence committed by young people over the last several years is clearly reflective of a high level of asocial behavior. This seems to be one of the results of the degradation family’s social functions and ineffectiveness of other social institutions meant to integrate young people into society. Otherwise, the negative impact of xenophobic views and social background in general would not have beenso influential on the attitudes of this segment of youths.

The events near Tsaritsino metro station have been adequately assessed and resolutely condemned by many politicians. At the same time, the programs and measures being developed to prevent large-scale incidents of racism and xenophobia are, in fact, primarily aimed not at prevention of such attitudes in society and educating the youth, but at the enforcement of more stringent regulations of staying in Moscow. The head of the Moscow Chief Police Directorate, Major-General Pronin, publicly called for giving Moscow a special status and quickly introducing special rules for entry and registration of incoming migrants (17). The government is trying to find a comprehensive answer to the growing xenophobic attitudes within society by driving incoming people and ethnic minorities into a kind of a social “ghetto.” The available information indicates that the proposed policies emphasize the introduction of more stringent registration controls, while absolutely no attention is given to propagating tolerance as part of the programs.


Activities of Neo-Nazi Groups in the Regions and Territories of Russia
The activities of neo-nazi youth groups are on the rise throughout the regions of the Russian Federation. Foreign students of institutions of higher education and people from of the southern parts of Russia and the CIS are usual targets of beatings and other forms of violence.

At the beginning of this year, African Unity (civic organization of Africans in St. Petersburg) appealed to the human rights organizations and the city administration asking for protection, but their letter did not lead to any practical measures in connection with providing security to foreign students. In early October of 2001, a gang of skinheads attacked several students of the St. Petersburg State Technological University, nationals of China, Zimbabwe and Cote D’Ivoire, near their dormitories. In the presence of a continuous threat of skinheads terrorizing foreign students and after almost complete inaction on the part of law enforcement agencies and government officials, the foreign students organized themselves into self-defense groups. In order to prevent demonstrations by Africans and large-scale clashes with skinheads, the police increased patrols in the corresponding areas of the city (18). It is apparent that the measures taken by law enforcement agencies are insufficient, and that there is a need for the implementation of comprehensive citywide measures to put an end to racist activities.

Ongoing violent actions of skinheads against Chinese students studying in higher education institutions of Voronezh compelled the students and college administrations to take their own security measures. On April 21, the local skinheads staged up a symbolic incineration of a cross in front of a dormitory occupied predominantly by foreign students. Incidents of attacks and beatings became even more aggravating following this event. A group of 70 students, together with their tutor, were relaxing in the city park, when they were attacked by skinheads. As a result, two girls had to be hospitalized (19). The local law enforcement agencies maintained that the attacks against the Chinese did not have any nationalist or racial underpinning. Only after a meeting organized by the regional administration at the request of the Voronezh University Dean, the law enforcement agencies agreed to enhance patrols of the streets and the area where the foreign students are concentrated and permit the organization of student self-defense groups. Similar to the situation in St. Petersburg, cooperation between the police and student self-defense groups is the only way of countering the skinhead threat. Following the heightening of racist sentiments in Voronezh, an attempt was made to set up an anti-fascist center that would coordinate the activities of law enforcement agencies, administrations of colleges and representatives of foreign students (20).

In the city of Oryol (Oryol region), Chinese students have also become the major targets for skinheads, members of the Russian National Unity and their sympathizers (21). Following several instances of violence (on July 30, a Chinese student had his head broken by a stone near his dormitory; on July 31, a Chinese female-student was attacked in a city park; on August 7, two students were whipped with belts) (22), the Chinese students now move around the city only accompanied by police officers. The police do not have any other means of ensuring the students’ safety. Stringent post controls were introduced in foreign students’ dormitories as an additional safety measure. As a result, many students discontinue their studies and return home, which has a negative impact on the city revenues. It is doubtful that the above measures, which effectively have resulted in a wall between the Chinese and the local community, are the most efficient solution for preventing racist attacks from violent youth.

Regular attacks against foreign students at the Tver State Technological University and Tver Medical Academy, including beatings, killings and the pogrom of the students’ dormitory by local high school students on the night of May 9, forced the Vietnamese, Hindu, and African students to address an open petition to the regional and local authorities (23). College administrators attribute the inability of local law enforcement agencies to ensure the safety of foreign students to the fact that police forces are largely understaffed. Many colleges and universities do not have enough funds to hire their own security personnel that would be more capable of effectively dealing with racist issues (24). Following the attacks against foreign students in Tver, 25 criminal cases were opened, a special working group was set up to coordinate the investigations and study case materials, the Mayor of the city pledged to keep an eye on the investigation, and plain-clothed policemen started patrolling the area near the dormitory (25). The police view all offences against foreigners as mere hooliganism, which predetermines the direction such investigations take. The law enforcers do search for the actual perpetrators and attempt to ensure the safety of students in the area of their dormitory, but no preventive measures against racially motivated violence are being taken.

Given the increase in 2001 of the number of incidents when foreign dark-skinned students were beaten but not with the purpose of robbery, the administration of the Kursk State Medical University chose to appeal to the city special task police unit to ensure the safety of their students (26).

The activities of skinheads against migrants from the Caucasus sometimes bring about spontaneous protests by relatives of the victims. On February 10, 2001, in St. Petersburg, three Azeris were heavily beaten by skinheads and one of them had to be hospitalized in severe condition. After this incident, the relatives and friends of the victims (around 200 people) staged a protest against the inactivity of the law enforcement agencies, who failed to arrive at the site of the crime in time. It was only owing to the efforts of Gudsi Osmanov, Honorary Consul of Azerbaijan in St. Petersburg, that the conflict between the Azeris and police was finally settled (27).

In addition to foreign students, another major target of hatred and attacks for skinheads are the Roma. In early August, a group of skinheads (13 to 18 years of age) beat to death two Roma, whom they incidentally met near the Tsaritsa river (Volgograd region). The prosecutor’s office of the Volgograd region opened an investigation in connection with this murder case but could prosecute only part of the gang, because many of the group members are not yet of legal age for criminal prosecution (28).

Political rivals of skinheads, i. e., antifascists, liberals and communists, are also known targets of neo-nazi hatred and violence. A civic antifascist foundation called “School of Peace,” located in the city of Novosibirsk, has become a permanent object for skinheads’ aggression (29). In the course of 2001, teenage skinheads would repeatedly paint swastikas and Anti-Semitic slogans on the walls and fence of the foundation’s building and brake their windows. The local authorities chose to take no notice of these pro-fascist activities. On February 12, a group of skinheads in St. Petersburg savagely beat four Germans, volunteers of the “Memorial” Society, who came to Russia to take care of elderly residents of the city as a way of “atonement for the sins of German nazism against other peoples in the world.” In this particular instance, the police was quick to react and arrested a group of 23 suspects (30).

The common feature of all the criminal cases opened within the framework of investigation into the offences committed by neo-nazi youth groups is that the main charge brought against the persons under investigation is “hooliganism” (or variations thereof such as “deliberate hooliganism,” “hooliganism with the use of weapons or instruments”). One of the officials of the Prosecutor General’s Office explained the nature of their work as follows: “We are not into politics. If you intend to charge somebody with rioting, you must prove that the person trashed not just any street vendor, but street vendors from the Caucasus in particular. And that is politics. Who is going to collect this kind of evidence? It is much easier to charge the teens with hooliganism. And it’s also much easier to prove hooliganism in court. (31)”

The federal bill “On Countering Political Extremism,” once enacted, might make it more difficult to conceal the nationalistic and political nature of this problem (32).

Although this bill has not yet been approved, the absence of adequate legal basis for the fight against extremism should not be taken as a justification of the utter inefficiency of law enforcement and administrative measures. That is especially so, given that while this draft law is being developed, there exists a special Presidential Standing Commission for Countering Political Extremism, headed by the Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation, Yu. Chaika (33).

One of the most common types of xenophobia among fascist youth groups is Anti-Semitism, which very often takes the form of desecration of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues. On September 23, the building of the Moscow Choral Synagogue was desecrated (34). According to V. Likhachev, working for the Information and Research Center “Panorama,” an outburst of Anti-Semitism was observed at the end of the summer. This conclusion is supported by many incidents of vandalism at Jewish cemeteries (Arsamas in the Nizhnii Novgorod region; city of Perm; Velikiye Looki in the Pskov region; city of Krasnoyarsk; city of Saratov) and setting fire to synagogues (cities of Kostroma and Ryazan) (35).

Publication of Anti-Semitic materials and offensive materials against people of African descent have become an issue in a suit filed by the Jewish civic organization “Shalom XXI Century” against the newspaper Novoye Vremya in the Omsk city court. A linguistic expertise requested by the court did not find any evidence of offensive language towards Jews and people of African descent in the publications under consideration (36), resulting in the court’s decision to dismiss the action. We believe that a court tasked to determine whether or not a publication is of a disparaging or slanderous nature in relation to a specific nationality should assess the overall impact of such publications, rather than the literary value of specific words in the text.

Publications of Anti-Semitic and more generally xenophobic spirit are openly sold in many regions of Russia. A presentation of the book Time to Raise the Sword by V. Sosnin, which is in fact a compilation of the well-known Anti-Semitic concoctions like Catechism of the Soviet Jew and Protocols of the Elders of Zion, was held in the city of Saratov. V. Sosnin also took part in a meeting marking the anniversary of the Kulikov Battle, where calls were made to make short work of the Jews. A criminal investigation was opened into the instigation of inter-ethnic hatred (37).

In 2001, a new magazine called Admiralteistvo came out in St. Petersburg. Although the magazine positions itself as a periodical targeting a broad audience and offering various materials on national politics, it is in fact just another xenophobic magazine distributed in the region. In early October, legislators of St. Petersburg found in their mailboxes an issue of the Nashe Obozrenye newspaper, where Y. Belyayev, notorious in St. Petersburg for his pro-fascist views, calls to “beat the blood-sucking invaders from the Caucasus.” From the point of view of the Northwest department of the Ministry of Press, these calls instigate ethnic hatred and are liable to persecution. Nevertheless, on November 9, the prosecutor’s office of the Central district of the city ruled against pressing charges against Y. Belyayev in “the absence of guilt.”

The Volgograd city court ruled to cancel the license of the Slavyanin newspaper, which openly disseminated pro-fascist ideas. In early 2001, journalists of the magazine Premier appealed to the prosecutor’s office to indict Slavyanin’s editor, V. Popov, on charges of instigation of inter-ethnic hatred. As a result of the investigation initiated by the prosecutor’s office, the charges were fully supported. However, V. Popov escaped prosecution because he was found mentally incompetent. The Ministry of Press also filed a suit against the newspaper, but V. Popov did not agree with the court’s decision and filed an appeal.

The local authorities and law enforcement agencies in the Samara region do not take any steps against mass media outlets that resort to Anti-Semitic invectives. No action has been taken against the editors of the Alex-Inform regional newspaper, which regularly makes derogatory remarks against Jews. Moreover, this newspaper is sold through the official “Rospechat” (“Russian Press”) distribution network.

Mass media in the Astrakhan region publish articles promoting discrimination against migrants. Migrants are compared to “trashcans that one can find at every corner.” Such publications call for cancellation of temporary residential registration for migrants and immediate deportation of foreigners and refugees from the Caucasus and the Central Asia. They also suggest taking specific measures against migrants. For example, to deny them employment, rent or purchase of houses, to boycott any goods sold by migrants from the Caucasus, to limit entry to the region for migrants from Central Asia, Caucasus and Afghanistan. In the Bryansk region, similar issues are also regularly brought up in the Bryanski Rabochi periodical. The newspaper blames migrants for taking control of the markets and imposing higher prices and criticizes the local authorities for non-interference with migration.

Many regional print media carry direct calls for action against ethnic and religious minorities, which in itself constitutes a criminal offence. Nevertheless, neither the law enforcement agencies, nor the prosecutor’s office take any practical steps to stop such publications (38).

The situation is particularly dramatic in the Krasnodar territory, whose administrative authorities are deeply involved in regional internal issues related to migration and allow themselves public statements that directly promote discriminatory measures against foreigners. Local media, in particular the Kuban Segodnya newspaper, duly publish such statements made by the Governor and various public officials and politicians. One of the issues of the newspaper carried a statement of the Governor that culminated as follows: “Kuban is for its residents! Kuban is a multi-ethnic region but the core ethnic group of Kuban is the Russian people. Those who come here to settle have to adjust themselves to the dominant ethnic group, its customs and traditions.”

Public activities of various national and patriotic organizations in the regions continued to be of a marginal nature. One of the few noteworthy features of 2001 was the activity of the Saratov branch of the Russian National Unity (RNE), which claimed to have its representatives in the power agencies of the city of Saratov. Members of this organization participate primarily in the work of consultative agencies to the local authorities (Public Council of the Saratov Regional Duma, Public Consultative Council to the Mayor of Saratov), although they openly state their claims for more active involvement in legal and political processes in the future (39). At the national level, the activities of RNE have been negligible due to the ongoing split within the leadership of the party and active opposition of the Moscow authorities (40).

Litigation over the registration of the National-Bolshevik Party (NBP), initiated by the Moscow regional department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation had a positive outcome for the party. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ministry of Justice could not deny registration to the party, on the grounds that its leader, Eduard Limonov (Savenko) is confined to a pre-trial detention facility (41). One can get an impression that the fight against extremism, which has been widely proclaimed by the authorities, is selective in nature and largely ineffective, since the informal neo-nazi organizations, that present a real danger to society, are not actively opposed by law enforcement agencies.


(1) See: Human Rights in Russian Regions — 2000.
(2) The law enforcement agencies received a tip in advance, but when they arrived at the street market they did not find any groups of skinheads. This was so because the skinheads used the opposite entrance to the market and did not move around in large groups. Had the law enforcement agencies been more serious about this issue, their actions would not have been so superficial. See also: A. Selivanova, “The Yasenevo Street Market Was Destroyed in 20 Minutes.” Komsomolskaya Pravda (April 24, 2000, ¹74).
(3) The prosecutor’s office brought charges of organizing the pogrom against M. Volkov.
(4) S. Topol, Y. Senatorov, “Pogrom Organized by Fascists.” Kommersant (November 2, 2001, ¹202). According to unconfirmed information, the investigation determined that the rods were bought at one of the construction materials markets and brought to the meeting point in a car.
(5) A. Anisimov, “The Scapegoats.” Moskovsky Komsomolets (November 9, 2001, ¹250).
(6) S. Topol, Y. Senatorov, “Pogrom Organized by Fascists.” Kommersant (November 2, 2001, ¹202).
(7) Ì. Telegin, “Police is trying to make a deal with the Caucuses Diaspora.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (November 2, 2001, ¹206).
(8) The prosecutor of the Southern administrative district of Moscow, A. Shtukaturov, stated, that the pogroms were organized by “various informal chauvinistic youth organizations.” See: S. Topol, Y. Senatorov, “Pogrom Organized by Fascists.” Kommersant (November 2, 2001, ¹202).
(9) One of the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated in an interview given to the correspondent of the Itogi magazine, S. Krivoshein: “If we admit the presence of nazi groups in the city, we will have to admit that they are well organized. That would mean that half of our bosses have to be fired because we have an organized crime group in Moscow that has never been mentioned in operational or annual reports. On the other hand, we cannot deal with the skinheads as a political force, because the police are not involved in politics. Thus, we have to treat them as hooligans.” Quoted from S. Alexandrov, “Nazis in the City.” Profile (November 1, 2001, ¹42).
(10) À. Bogomolov, “Tsaritsino Pogrom Was Not the Last One.” Novye Izvestia. (November 13, 2002, ¹205). In answering the correspondent’s questions, the leader of a large skinheads’ group, who initiated the interview but chose to remain anonymous, spoke about the organized character of the Tsaritsino’s pogrom and its anticipated consequences. He stressed that the participation in the action was strictly voluntary.
(11) “Skinheads Took Care of a Homeless.” Vechernaya Moskva (November 22, 2001, ¹229).
(12) Ibid.
(13) À. Bogomolov, “Tsaritsino Pogrom Was Not the Last One.” Novye Izvestia (November 13, 2002, ¹205).
(14) “Racism and Xenophobia are Thriving in Russia.” Inostranets (November 20, 2002, ¹43).
(15) It should be noted that crimes against foreigners, especially those who work for foreign embassies in Moscow, are reported more frequently than any other attacks by skinheads.
(16) I. Rokotova, “The Schoolchildren Were Beaten with Metal Chains.” Moskovskaya Pravda (March 19, 2001, ¹50).
(17) Vyakov, “Racism with Statehood.” Novye Izvestia (November 2, 2001, ¹200).
(18) N. Donskoi, “Division “Shaven Head.” Novaya Gazeta (October 18, 2001, ¹76).
(19) V. Novokhatski, “Skinheads on the Rampage.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta (June 5, 2001, ¹101).
(20) “Resistance Is Uniting.” Versty (May 29, 2001, ¹58).
(21) À. Naibov, “Russian and Chinese are Brothers Forever.” Tribuna (September 20, 2001, ¹169).
(22) L. Mukhamedyarova, “They Attack in Packs.” Obshchaya Gazeta (September 6, 2001, ¹36).
(23) I. Mandrik, “Genuine Aryans from Tver.” Novye Izvestia (May 24, 2001, ¹84).
(24) Y. Vasilyev, “Bloody Session.” Moskovskiye Novosti (May 29, 2001, ¹22).
(25) I. Mandrik, “Descendents of Afanasi Nikitin Give Beatings to Guests from India.” Novye Izvestia (January 19, 2001, ¹8).
(26) “The Dark-Skinned in Need of OMON Special Police Task Force.” Versty (September 4, 2001, ¹100).
(27) À. Mikhailov, “Beating of Migrants from the Caucasus in St Petersburg.” Vremya Novostei (February 13, 2001, ¹25).
(28) I. Shevchenko, “Under-Age Skinheads Beat Two Gypsies to Death.” Vremya Novostei (August 13, 2001, ¹144).
(29) I. Petrov, “From Words to Deeds.” Inostranets (August 21, 2001, ¹30).
(30) V. Nesvizhski, “Pogrom Weekend in the Northern Capital.” Segodnya (February 13, 2001, ¹33).
(31) H. Rubtsova, “Pogrom or Hooliganism.” Novye Izvestia (November 24, 2001, ¹214).
(32) Here, we shall not analyze this draft law and its various draw-backs.
(33) Speech by the RF President on November 10 (Police Day) underscored the importance of the fight against national extremism by the law enforcement agencies. In his previous comments on the Tsaritsino pogrom, V. Putin characterized the authorities’ actions as ineffective. For excerpts from the speech, see: “Efforts of the Authorities Sometimes Prove to be Ineffective.” Moskovskiye Novosti (November 6, 2001, ¹45).
(34) Novye Izvestia (September 25, 2001, ¹172).
(35) V. Likhachev, “Anti-Semites Are on the Rise.” Vremya MN (September 6, 2001, ¹159).
(36) “The Court Liked the Jokes.” Versty (August 30, 2001, ¹98).
(37) N. Andreyeva, “When Xenophobia Turns into Internationalism.” Obshchaya Gazeta (November 29, 2001, ¹48).
(38) V. Nesvizhski, “Everyone to the Fight Against Foreigners.” Segodnya (March 5, 2001, ¹49).
(39) V. Vyzhutovich, “Okhotnoryadtsy.” Vremya MN (April 25, 2001, ¹73).
(40) V. Likhachev, “Extremists Start and Lose. What Are the Right Radical Groups Today and How Close Are They to the Powers that Be.” Obshchaya Gazeta (June 14, 2001, ¹24).
(41) I. Mager, “Limonov’s Party Is Now Legal.” Vremya Novostei (November 20, 2001, ¹213).


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