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English Language Page As a response to criticism by the media and non-governmental organizations, the military accuses journalists and human rights activists of discrediting the RF Armed Forces and undermining the defense capabilities of the country. Even statistics on the number of criminal cases related to abuse of power and code of behavior in the Armed Forces became classified, which was reported by the prosecutor’s office of the Moscow military district (2). At the same time, at the parliamentary hearings on crimes in the military, held on September 21, 2001, the Chairman of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, General N. Petukhov, publicized statistics about crimes committed by servicemen during a six month period in 2001. He reported that the number of crimes in the military increased with every year (3). The scope of “common” crimes is becoming broader (theft of weaponry, property theft, inflicting injuries, military service evasion etc.), and “new” crimes (drug sales and drug use, mass killings of guard shifts, homosexual rapes and the likes (4)) are becoming more frequent. But even civilian officials of the Ministry of Defense reject the idea of total civilian control over the Armed Forces. Such is the position of L. Kudelina, Deputy Minister of Defense on Finances and Economic Activities, who explicitly stated, “There are authorities in Russia who can supervise the Armed Forces, which are regularly inspected by the Accounting Chamber, Prosecutor General’s Office, and the courts. Besides, the Armed Forces have their own inspection authorities. What do we need some other inspectors for? Inspectors are numerous, but the situation is not getting any better (5).” As always, military bureaucrats refer primarily to the “low quality of recruits” as a key reason for the poor situation in the Armed Forces and suggest that this situation be improved by calling up students who have deferred their service until the completion of their university studies. The General Staff submitted to the State Duma amendments to Federal Law “On Military Duty and Military Service.” One amendment allows deferment only for the students studying for the professions listed in a “state order.” The General Staff is opposed to the contract-based manning of the Armed Forces. According to the Yezhenedelny Zhurnal magazine, military economists do all they can to exaggerate cost estimates for the contract scenario in order to prove that there is not enough money now, nor can there ever be, to implement a contract-based military (60. This line of argument is the primary one used by the military to paralyze the government in opposing the reform. But calculations by independent economists from “Yabloko” and SPS factions in the State Duma, for instance, unambiguously show that the financial situation in the country is not an obstacle to modernizing at least the recruiting system, given of course, minimization of losses to the defense budget due to theft, which are becoming more aggravating from year to year. In 2000 alone, losses from economic crimes in the Armed Forces were as large as 3.2 billion roubles — 16 times as high as in 1999 (7). According to the Accounting Chamber, the military districts suffering most from theft are the North Caucasus, Siberian and Far-Eastern. In Chechnya and the adjoining areas, more than 34.1 million roubles worth of goods have “gotten lost” during the past two years; in Siberia — 16.1 million; in Primorsky territory — 11.5 million roubles. In the Transcaucasian area, officers of the single large unit of the Russian forces located there, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Aivazyan and Captain S. Krukov, stole more than 19 million roubles worth of foodstuff (8). As of the spring of 2001, the defense budget lost 14 219 995 000 roubles (9). The military prosecutor’s office reported that, “the situation is aggravated by the fact that the military officials whose duty is to secure materials became thieves (10).” The leadership of the country has tried to take some steps to rectify the situation. Eighty criminal cases were initiated. Court proceedings that began on March 12, 2002, promise to have great public repercussions, having to do with alleged infliction of material damage to the state in the amount of 327 million U. S. dollars. The defendant is former head of the Main Military Budget and Defense Ministry Finance Directorate, Colonel-General G. Oleinik. L. Kudelina, Ministry of Finance, has since taken over from him. The defense budget becomes less transparent with each year. Information about how money is spent is well hidden from taxpayers. In 2001, information ceased to be published about levels of fulfillment of defense orders by the military-industrial complex (11). There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this: the professional military (primarily senior officers and generals) are not prepared to accept a professional army. They fear it in the same way they fear civic control. The year 2001 brought a number of scandals related to massive abandonment of military units by servicemen. According to the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committees, annually up to 40 000 men escape from their units (12). In 2001, the escape of 74 soldiers from one unit of the guards regiment ¹589located in the Roshinsky settlement not far from Samara made front page news. These soldiers protested against humiliating treatment they received from servicemen from the North Caucasus. It should be noted that among those who escaped there were no fresh conscripts — all the soldiers had served between 8 to 18 months. The unit commander had ignored their complaints, and they decided to go to the army headquarters located in Samara, hoping to find help there. They left their unit without permission. This caused such a commotion that on September 4, 2001, Chief of the General Staff, A. Kvashnin, had to go to there personally and in December, the unit was visited by S. Ivanov, Minister of Defence. Thirteen servicemen were convicted “for violating regulations that stipulate behavior between servicemen in the Armed Forces.” And though Colonel A. Nurgaliev acting prosecutor of the Samara military garrison, denies the nationalistic nature of this situation, the growth of tensions between different ethnic groups is obvious, especially secondary to the events in the North Caucasus. Commonly, servicemen of Caucasian extraction mistreat soldiers of other ethnic background, and nationalistic hatred sometimes culminates in soldiers from the Caucasus being lynched. In the Far Eastern military district alone, which is supervised by the prosecutor’s office of the Bikinsky garrison (Khabarovsk territory) three murders were committed. Ten soldiers acted together in killing Private Vyachedov. This Dagestani man was tied to a tree and beaten to death. In the 5th Belogorod garrison, five ethnic Russian servicemen organized a public execution of Private Akhilgov, an Avar by nationality. Using the opportunity that one of them was on duty, they opened the rifle storage room, took two automatic rifles with ammunition, grabbed the victim and shot him. The heavily wounded Avar was then finished off with an axe. In the third case, 18 Russian soldiers armed with sticks and chains organized a cruel “farewell party” for a Dagestani soldier. During a fight at the train station the Dagestani man was killed. All those involved in the killings have been detained and sentences to various prison terms, from 3 to 10 years. But there is little hope that incidents such as these will not be repeated (13). Another unprecedented escape from a military unit occurred in May of 2001. Private Sergei Strochikhin, who served in the Vyborg boarder guard detachment of the North-West Administration of the Federal Boarder Guard Service of the Russian Federation, left his sector of responsibility during the night of May 24–25 and crossed into Finland on a cargo train. He was armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle and two magazines of ammunition. He managed to hijack a car. Having driven 30 kilometers, he lost control of the car and landed in a ditch. He then abandoned the car and rushed into the woods. Finnish policemen and boarder guards began a chase, which turned into an exchange of fire, and ended with Sergei Strochikhin killing himself. In the breast pocket of his jacket, a letter was found, which he had written before his escape. It became clear that this “green” soldier decided to commit suicide because he was tormented by “old hands” whom he specifically named in his letter. Finnish policemen explained his escape to Finland by his desire to reliably convey the truth about what was happening in the unit. After Russian officials received the letter, the soldiers who had tormented Sergei Strochikhin were arrested (14). During the first seven months of 2001, more than 700 soldiers turned to the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committee after they had illegally left their units. The most common reason for leaving their units is extortion practices on the part of “older” soldiers and sergeants, who force newly drafted conscripts to get money for them. They fix a deadline and then switch on “a counter”: the soldier’s debt grows with each passing day. The initial amount demanded in provincial areas may be about 100 to 200 roubles, but in Moscow and the Moscow region it can be as high as 2 000 roubles (15). That is how “old hands” make “green” soldiers beg. You can see begging soldiers near the Begovaya metro station, very close to the military prosecutor’s office of the Moscow military district. One soldier said: In our company, several “old hands” are about to be demobilized. Each of them has one or several “ghosts” — younger soldiers. The “ghost” must put a hundred roubles under the pillow of his ‘old man” every day — a kind of a “demob” gift.” How and where you get the money is your own headache. If you fail to bring the money you may be beaten up and sent out to beg at night. They won’t let you sleep unless you bring in the required amount (16). One of the toughest locations for soldiers is the town of Sputnik, not far from Vladikavkaz, where officers and praporshiks (warrant officers), despite numerous complaints from human rights activists, continue in quite a matter-of-fact way to sell their soldiers to the local population as slaves. Soldiers are seen begging everywhere, even coming directly to people’s homes asking for money, apparently for “older” soldiers. Servicemen who fought in Chechnya have to wait about six months to get their “combat” pay, if they promise a bribe of 3 000–5 000 roubles to the financial department people. Otherwise they may wait for a year. Often, the lucky ones who have received their money run into racketeers at the gates of their unit and are immediately robbed of the money (17). According to the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, M. Kislitzin, during the first six months of 2001 alone, “dedovshchina” (mistreatment of younger servicemen by “old hands”) in the North Caucasian military district doubled in comparison to the same period of the previous year. On the whole, the number of occurrences of improper behavior, violating military regulations increased in the RF Armed Forces by 29%. Another typical story involved Private Rychkov who escaped from unit 66431 based in the Sputnik settlement. He was drafted from the Perm region in the fall of 2000. His mother and elder brother decided to visit the unit after they had stopped receiving letters from him. When they arrived to the unit, it took them a while to find out that neither the battalion nor the company commander knew how and where Private Rychkov had disappeared. They learned during the course of their search that he had spent some time in hospital with a broken jaw. After two days of useless attempts to find him in nearby villages, the Rychkovs had to go home. And then, an Izvestia newspaper journalist found Private Rychkov. The events developed as follows. On March 19, 2001, two weeks prior to the visit of his relatives, Rychkov and another soldier was taken by a lieutenant-colonel in a “UAZ” jeep to the village of Oktyabrskoye. The colonel was building a house there, so he needed free labor. Some days later, Rychkov escaped to Vladikavkaz. He spent over a month in workers’ hostel. Everybody in the vicinity knew about the escaped soldier, but it did not occur to anyone to report him. There are scores of soldiers and even three officers currently at large, after they escaped from the unit ¹66431 (18). The escape history of the RF Armed Forces was complemented by an incident, the likes of which had not occurred since 1917. On May 2, 2001, two deserters, 20-year old K. Terekhov and 18-year old P. Mozgunov, lethally injured Senior Lieutenant Belov and then killed Major-General Baev, Commander of the district training center of the siberian military district ¹212. The criminals were arrested on the same day in the city of Chita, at their female friend’s place. Despite the fact that investigators did not detect any connection between the desertion and “dedovshchina,” the episode deserves special attention. The current situation, where commanders fail to control improper behavior among conscripts and even promote dedovshchina, humiliate and degrade their subordinates physically and morally, and where access to arms is easy, puts their own lives, those of their subordinates and even those of outsiders at great risk. The past summer alone saw seven shootings, resulting in more than twenty people dead (19). But the Command of the RF Armed Forces has drawn amazing conclusions from the tragic events in the Siberian military district. At the news conference of September 14, Chief of the Main Directorate of Educational Work in the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Azarov, first made routine references to manageability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. He then discussed a forthcoming experiment to “legalize ‘informal leaders’ among soldiers, with the help of whom we will be able to improve the dedovshchina-dominated situation.” But these informal leaders could only be the same notorious “old men” who become leaders not with their brains but with their fists. To rely on informal leaders actually means to legalize “dedovshchina (20).” So, having recognized the impossibility of eradicating this negative phenomenon, the military leadership is trying to channel it into some positive direction. But the way we see it, the attempt is doomed to failure because dominance of dedovshchina indicates that professional servicemen themselves are morally and psychologically degrading, including the immediate commanders of soldiers and sailors. All too often, they perceive conscription servicemen simply as free labor. Soldiers are used in this way over the whole territory of the Russian Federation. Only the most scandalous cases become publicly known. For instance, a commander of one airforce unit in the Ivanovo region sent four soldiers to work at his summer cottage. One of the walls of the house suddenly collapsed, seriously injuring one of the soldiers. Also, in the Khabarovsk garrison, conscripts were actually sold to a local businessman by their unit commander. They worked for four months without pay at a ravioli producing shop. But, according to official records, they spent this time-period in hospital (21). We cannot but conclude by saying that the information that becomes public is only the very tip of the iceberg. However, even this little data is quite sufficient for prospective draftees to perceive military service as a punishment and do their utmost to avoid it, resorting to all available legal and illegal means. This avoidance in itself is, in a sense, Russian conscripts’ vote for a professional army, or at least in support of a radical change of the system, which is almost completely closed to civilian scrutiny. No amount of “patriotic education” could influence this perception, regardless of how strongly Russian military leaders would like to think it might. Every year, it becomes more difficult for the military to meet their recruiting targets. That is why they have openly resorted to force, stepping over legal boundaries. The Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs signed Order ¹118/218, dated March 4, 2000, which endorsed Interdepartmental Instruction “On Organizational Cooperation of Military Commissariats and Internal Affairs Bodies in the Work of Ensuring Fulfillment by Citizens of Their Military Duty.” Remaining basically within the limits of legality, this document, nevertheless, instigated a hunt for potential draftees. Namely, police may detain all people of conscription age and bring them to military commissariats where they are closely “examined.” Some of them (very few) may be released, others (the majority) undergo prompt medical examination and are immediately dispatched to an assembly point, and then on to a military unit. The glaring unlawfulness of such measures is not only a demonstration of the organizers’ confidence in their impunity but also their own recognition of their helplessness in the face of the growing reluctance of young people to fulfill their constitutional duty. In big cities, evasion of the military draft is massive. And it is the populations of Moscow and St. Petersburg that experience the most aggressive hunts for draftees. During each recruiting campaign, Moscow authorities admit to a problem and promise to resolve it. But each year, this topic becomes more aggravating for human rights defenders. The fall of 2001 witnessed the most scandalous recruiting campaign ever. Many people attribute it to the appointment of Colonel Krasnogorsky as Moscow Military Commissar as well as to the increase in the recruiting target from 5 500–6 000 to 6 700 in Moscow. In spite of numerous facts provided by the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committees, the newly appointed Commissar assured the public that there were no special “hunting” operations in Moscow aimed at catching draftees to meet recruiting targets for the fall. He critiqued the data provided by the Soldiers’ Mothers as “full of ill will and packed with lies.” It was only after A. Barannikov, State Duma Deputy from the SPS fraction spent four hours at the Kuntzevo military commissariat on December 20, 2001, and saw first-hand what was happening there, that the Moscow authorities voiced their position on the matter. A. Barannikov witnessed at least 50 young men being brought to the military commissariat by police. They were given call-up papers without any medical examination and told to come back to the commissariat with their belongings ready to leave for a military unit. The Chairperson of the Moscow Drafting Commission, L. Shevtsova, at a specially convened press conference on December 25, expressed “extreme dissatisfaction with the unauthorized hunt for young people of conscription age (22).” However, on December 28, armed OMON (Special Task Police Unit) staff showed up at the hostel of the Russian University of Chemical Technology of Mendeleev. When students opened their doors after a false fire alarm, the police took their IDs, put them in buses and, without explaining anything, brought them to the Tushino military commissariat. There they got their passports back in exchange for call-up notices. Among those detained were there full-time day students and post-graduate students who legally enjoy deferment from military service (23). To summarize, the observance of the rights of conscripts is impossible unless human rights in general become a priority issue in the state’s domestic policy. (1) D. Safonov, “Putin’s Army: Defense Reform Is Losing Momentum,” Izvestia (2001, ¹191). (2) Outgoing number 35/6-127 dated February 9, 2001. (3) V. Baluev, “You’d Better Not Surrender!” Vremya MN (2001, ¹171). (4) V. Popov, S. Evsenko, “Portrate of Today’s Evader,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (2001, ¹10). (5) V. Mukhin, “Democracy Is Counter-Indication For the Armed Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2001, ¹228). (6) A. Goltz, “Your General Staff Has Gotten Loose.” Yezhenedelny Zhurnal (2002, ¹6). (7) A. Shchelokov, “Under Armed Escort or Voluntarily?” Nesavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie (2001, ¹12). (8) V. Sivkova, “Who Feeds the Armed Forces with Garbage?” Argumenty i Fakty (2001, ¹27). (9) R. Tolkun, “In Vein.” Versty (2001, ¹27). (10) V. Sivkova, “Who Feeds the Armed Forces with Garbage?” Agrumenty i Fakty (2001, ¹27). (11) V. Soloviev, “The Government Proposes 30 % Increase of Defense Budget.” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (2001, ¹33). (12) A. Nikolaev, “Man with a Gun.” Rossiya (2001, ¹191). According to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, at least 20 000 people try to evade military service every year. (A. Shchelokov, “Under Armed Escort or Voluntarily?” Nesavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie (2001, ¹12)). (13) M. Gladky, “Chechnya of a Garrison Scale.” Vremya Novostei (2001, ¹19). (14) A. Smirnov, “He Escaped to Finland Because He Wanted Russia to Learn the Truth.” Novyye Izvestia (2001, ¹91); V. Sokirko, “Ghost of “Dedovshchina,” Moskovsky Komsomolets (2001, ¹155). (15) A. Tavobov, “Mother, Do Not Write to My Commander Any More.” Vechernyaya Moskva (2001, ¹128). (16) A. Babchenko, “District of Military Beggers,” Moskovsky Komsomolets (2001, ¹221). (17) A. Nikitin, “Slaves Wearing Sholder Loops,” Izvestia (2001, ¹128). (18) Ibid. (19) M. Khairulin, “Seven Years Behind the Stove Is Equal to Amnesty.” Novyye Izvestia (2001, ¹180). (20) G. Anisimov, “Dedovshchina Will Be Legalized.” Izvestia (2001, ¹170). (21) E. Batuyeva, “Slaves Wearing Shoulder Loops.” Tribuna (2001, ¹187). (22) A. Malakhova, “Halt! Who Is There?” Vechernyaya Moskva (2001, ¹242). (23) http://www.svoboda.org/archive/hr/1201/ll.121301-1.asp. Back |
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