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English Language Page This “hereditary imperfection” in legislation and law enforcement practices needs to be understood. Slavery and the use of forced labor in Russia have traditionally been linked with the government, particularly in the forced use of prison labor (2). Other coercive structures, especially the military, have also been mentioned in this regard. Given that the utilization of forced labor had been a rule in the “Soviet legal arena,” it is only natural that this lamentable practice has been continued in the new Russia, to the extent that the new Russian government has replicated the ways of the former Soviet Union. Over the past decade, a host of reports has been released that tell of the uses of forced or slave labor by organized crime groups and ethnic communities. This phenomenon is not surprising since the government has slackened control and created conditions favorable for the surge in criminal activities and the introduction of an archaic “communal law.” From the findings of the monitoring effort, on can see that the types of forced or slave labor have not significantly changed. Numerous facts have been collected to confirm that enforced slave and bondage labor has been used to support “domestic,” “household,” construction and handicraft tasks. Yet, another aspect to this problem is the so-called “trafficking in women” and prostitution (also of minors). “Closed government” structures in Russia, including the penitentiary system and armed forces, have traditionally used forced labor. The old “Soviet” ways are being maintained in certain regions of the Russian Far East, where logging operations are still under way pursuant to a Russian–North Korean agreement. As a matter of fact, these logging camps are some sort of ex-territorial GULAG enclaves, with foreign loggers toiling under terrible conditions and North-Korean special services openly enforcing their own regulations (3). E. Gontmakher, head of the Department for Social Policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, released a rather odd pronouncement on the legal aspects of North Koreans working in the Russian Federation. In particular, he insisted that Russia had nothing to do with maintaining foreign loggers because North Korea administered these logging camps. A somewhat more balanced statement on the matter came from the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One paragraph in particular reads as follows: “North Korean organizations and nationals within the Russian Federation enjoy the same legal safeguards as Russian organizations or citizens.” Admittedly, over the past few years, forced labor has been used less and less by the Russian penitentiary system secondary to the overall economic slump and inefficiency of forced labor. Importantly, administrations of many penitentiary facilities have been unable to have most of their “charges” employed. In the last few years, prisoners (and even military draftees) have been employed to perform many different labor tasks. More often than not, this work beyond the prison or barracks walls brings neither a “gulp of freedom” nor an opportunity to make a few extra roubles. The report based on monitoring findings for the Komi-Permyatsky autonomous district, in an illustration of the above, reads as follows: The Kudymkarsk-based pretrial detention center (SIZO) ¹4 makes use of prisoner labor only if the inmates detainees give their consent. People are normally assigned to logging, saw-bench, or loading-unloading operations. In the summer, they usually tend the in-house vegetable garden. When interviewed individually, they inevitably admit they are happy to have a job. Though many want to be useful in some way, the SIZO facility does not have enough jobs for all. Given the circumstance, the right to work becomes a reward for exemplary conduct. However, the unlawful character of those activities nearly always goes hand in hand with a lack of basic safety measures. For example, on August 17, 2001, the Ustiuzhensk district court (Vologda region) eventually brought to a close a half-year-long trial of MVD Colonel Sobanin, former head of the local general security penal colony. The defendant was found guilty of the death of convict V. Pankratov, who was part of a prisoner team involved in constructing a country cottage for the penal colony chief. As the groundwork was being prepared, a deep trench collapsed and V. Pankratov was badly injured. He soon passed away in a local hospital. Colonel Sobanin received a three-year prison sentence for having abused his office and generated fraudulent gains. Russian penitentiary facilities are reported to have nearly no labor protection regulations. For example, the division ¹7 of the notorious ZhKh-385 (4) penal colony in the Republic of Mordovia had prisoners working 20-hour shifts with no days off (fourteen convicts worked at a local dairy farm from 06.30 through 19.00 hours, and three others — from 03.00 to 22.00 hours). The Amur regional administration officials are reported to have engaged local prisoners to produce souvenirs (including those occasionally presented to visiting government officials), repair car parts, fix gardening tools and build apartment doors and window frames. The work was compensated by commuting sentences or making leisure time available. Exploiting military labor has become the order of the day in the Russian Federation. In December 2001, in the Samara region, a small-scale anonymous poll was conducted of 23 active duty draftees. Eight responded that they had been engaged to perform labor tasks beyond their duty assignments. Another nine soldiers stated that they were aware of draftees being employed to do non-military tasks (doing odd jobs at construction sites or driving vehicles). The Novosibirsk regional report, which is yet to be properly substantiated, reads that draftees have been employed to construct summer cottages for commanding officers and that some military chiefs have leased conscript soldiers to private-sector developers and operations. In the Amur region, the local farming organizations are known to have concluded informal arrangements with military bases to have the military labor made available for a certain period of time. In the fall, one can see uniformed soldiers digging up potatoes and harvesting cabbages in the fields of the Tambovsky, Mikhailovsky, Belogorsky and Arkharinsky districts. When referring to the use of slaves or forced labor “in the non-legal arena,” one normally has in mind the Chechen Republic. In 2001, the numbers of reports on hostage takings, demands for ransom payments and use of slave labor within the Chechen Republic have been on the wane. This shift is primarily the result of the fact that it is rather risky to maintain “house slaves” under conditions of never-ending “mop-up operations.” Most of the aforementioned communications are about individuals being taken hostage and turned into slaves during the past decade. To provide another example, on August 8, 2001, liberated from Chechen captivity was a Samara resident, S. Kuzmina (employee of a Russian charity house), who had been held hostage for 779 days (5). In June, 1999, while going about the business of tracking down and liberating Russian servicemen taken prisoner by the Chechen militants, S. Kuzmina herself was captured along with the Samara-based reporter, V. Petrov. However, in June 2001, V. Petrov managed to escape from his captors. Importantly, the circumstances surrounding the release of S. Kuzmina continue to be rather murky: allegedly no ransom had been paid. The Novaya Gazeta reporter V. Izmaylov, who was involved in making preparations for S. Kuzmina’s liberation, said that R. Gelaev, who insisted that S. Kuzmina’s release should be arranged, had coerced the captors. On the other hand, in return for S. Kuzmina’s liberation, some non-governmental structures promised to assist in the effort to have a Chechen militant, L. Islamov, released from a federal prison. Therefore, certain elements of “horse-trading” continue to be applied in this area. In discussing Chechnya and the Caucasus region in general, we should be aware that various families and clans continue to maintain primitive slave holding practices. To provide an example to this effect, in early 1991, as he traveled to stay with a friend in Ulyanovsk to find a good-paying job, S. Yakovlev ended up becoming a slave. A casual co-traveler offered a “better deal.” As a result, S. Yakovlev found himself in the village of Tanghi-Chu in the southern part of Urus-Martanovsky district (Chechen Republic) with all of his documents taken away from him. Over the past years, he had been employed to tend the cattle and slept right in the cowshed. When one day he tried to escape, he was captured and nearly killed. He said that he somehow managed to talk his masters into keeping him alive. When the 1999 “anti-terrorist operation” was launched, a military scout team finally liberated S. Yakovlev (6). Russian-speaking residents of Chechnya had often been turned into slaves. For example, following the first Chechen war, the family of the former Grozny resident, Natalya S. (maiden name Grecian), was sentenced by militants to extermination because her husband (dead by that time) had worked for FSB (Federal Security Service). While her elder son was killed, her younger one was thrown into a dungeon. Natalya herself had all her teeth knocked out. She was beaten up and raped for several days. When her younger son tried to defend his mother, he had his rib broken with a rifle butt. Then, they were both turned into slaves and taken to a mountain village to do the dirtier chores. For the night, they would be forced into a deep pit. They were fed only once a day with meager leftovers. It was purely accidental that mother and son escaped from their captivity. In being pressed to repay a debt, the master offered his slaves in exchange. When they were shipped to their new location, Natalya encountered her former neighbor from Grozny. The latter helped her and her son escape by leaving the dungeon’s door unlocked for the night (7). On the other hand, it is not only in Chechnya that slave labor is in the Russian Federation. By way of example, the report from the Chuvash Republic tells of V. Yakovlev, who spent the last ten years laboring as a slave at a hamlet held by some Javdeth from Azerbaijan. It was only because of his mother’s persistent efforts that V. Yakovlev was finally liberated (8). Also, a Krasnodar-city resident, who had been kidnapped by “some Caucasians,” was taken to a construction site and forced to do odd jobs “in the company of transients,” according to the last Krasnodar regional report. The victim said, “They would beat me up nearly on a regular basis and give me just scraps of food to eat. I lost a lot of weight in that captivity. The security was very tight, and we were not allowed to leave the area. Communicating with the local boss would normally end up with another round of insults and beatings.” After a month, he was eventually freed. The case is being investigated. Disparate slave labor practices have been seen propagating through rather unconventional ways. Evidently, the experiences of the Chechen “anti-terrorist operation” have been telling of some of the elements of federal coercive structures. The Voronezh regional report carries a story of a certain Nikolay from Estonia, who had been held in slavery for close to ten years in Chechnya and finally happened to be set free by the Voronezh special police unit, deployed to Chechnya on a temporary assignment. When Nikolay was brought to Voronezh, he was given shelter at a locker lean-to in the Voronezh-based district police department office yard. He was tasked with standing watch and being a janitor. During the summer months, he was employed as a helper at private development projects pursued by the local police chiefs. Though Nikolay had a Russian domestic passport issued in his name (which was apparently to be some compensation for his being tolerant and useful), he has yet to receive it from his new masters. Numerous ethnic crime gangs (including Chechen) have been undertaking kidnapping operations for ransom money in other Russian regions as well, according to the local law enforcement authorities. For example, in 2001, an effort was undertaken in the Astrakhan region to put in check the criminal activity of a gang of eleven criminals of Chechen-origin, that had been involved in kidnappings and robberies since 1999. The case is being considered by the Astrakhan-based Trusovsky district court. The criminals kidnapped S. Utegenova (9 years of age), O. Shcherbakova (10 years of age), M. Pogosian, V. Jalilov and other children. The kidnappers had kept their “prey” for over half a year, demanding ransoms ranging from 3 500 to 150 000 US dollars. The most active member of the gang was R. Khimaev, public safety police inspector from the Astrakhan regional-based Chernoyarsk district police department, who did his best to take advantage of his connections in the local law enforcement structures. Clearly, this case provides an object example of regular criminal activity — taking hostages to secure ransom money. Though this type of crime has for the most part been attributed to Chechnya, numerous investigations of kidnappings by Chechen-based criminals have revealed that this conventional perception is not fully reflective of reality. Firstly, all those crime gangs have not been “ethnically homogeneous” — among those criminals would be found “Slavs,” who happened to be even more cruel to their prisoners than ethnic “Chechens.” Secondly, those kidnapped elsewhere in Russia would often be kept out of Chechnya, but threat messages were sent from Chechnya, where the bargaining was pursued. Importantly, Chechnya, where no steady rules had been applied and where the federal law enforcers had been ineffective, was important as a “safe haven” to keep (sometimes allegedly) the hostages and provide security for the kidnappers. It was sort of an “offshore zone” designed to assure links on prospective ransom deals. With that veritable “black hole” being essentially denied the “normal” functional capacity, the scope of “trafficking in humans” across Russia has been reduced. Obviously, this threat has been criminal, rather than “ethnic,” in character. A traditional community, where “customary law” is applied exclusively to “friends,” is reflective of the only “ethnic aspect” of slave labor. Members of such a closely-knit conventional community do not find it criminal to turn an alien into a slave. With Russian society becoming more retrograde, and given the current inefficiencies in the judicial system, “customary law” has been increasingly implemented. It has been internationally acknowledged that at a certain stage in its disintegration, a crumbling society produces unruly criminal gangs. It is against this backdrop that one should primarily view the information on slave labor used by the Roma. Reports discussing this, in particular, are coming from the Primorsky territory, Novosibirsk and other regions. “Regular” crime gangs have also been using slave labor. To provide an example, close to Vanino in the Khabarovsk territory (Vanino–Kholmsk ferry run is one of the major routes for moving illegal drugs to Sakhalin), the local drug dealers established a laboratory to produce hashish. When law enforcers uncovered the facility, they found four transients manning the laboratory. In order to keep them “on the job,” they were chained to the wall. During his seven-month captivity, one of the foursome — a seventeen-year-old resident of the Irkutsk region — made a number of unsuccessful attempts to escape. After being caught each time, he was severely punished. Some of the most atrocious forms of gang-related slavery have been sexual exploitation of women and minors. Examples to this effect are numerous. In the Altai territory, a criminal gang had operated for many months, tempting job-hunting girls with lucrative offers and taking them to Novosibirsk. There, they were eventually coerced into prostitution. One of the sex-slave girls was killed. On February 15, 2001, the gang’s principal players were apprehended. It is noteworthy that the city police were somewhat reluctant to put in check the crime gang’s activity, according to the Novosibirsk-based daily Svobodny Kurs. In a different case, two young female prostitutes from Omsk somehow got heavily in debt (9). They agreed to move to Moscow in the hope of making more money. Once in Moscow, they were put up in a two-room apartment along with 13 other girls. Their masters appropriately dressed them up and assigned them to “patrol” the area around “Dinamo” Stadium. Being unhappy with the whole arrangement, the two girls decided to run away. But it happened that they were harshly contacted in Omsk with demands of paying back 20,000 roubles for the outfits that they had allegedly stolen from their Moscow “landlords.” First, the girls were threatened and then beaten up. Then, one of them was forced to come back to Moscow. However, while en-route, she decided to go to the police with her trouble. In the end, some of the crime gang’s members were detained. Notably, juvenile prostitution has been growing at a very alarming pace. The St. Petersburg police and Leningrad region police have joined forces to apprehend the management of three dens for under-age prostitutes, where 14–16-year-old girls are kept by force. Pay for their sexual service was collected by their masters. Even an underground cellar was constructed for the more unruly girls to be punished. The pimps would make under-age prostitutes receive new clients and offer drinks that contained psychotropic substances. In January 2001, the police arrested A. Oshurkov, a pimp who “worked” with juniors. Under-age boys were directed to find their clients independently and then bring them to their manager to settle accounts (10). More often than not, it was alcoholic or drug-addict parents that send out their kids to “earn some money.” The incremental growth of juvenile prostitution in the city of Blagoveshchensk has been indicated in the Amur regional report. Monitors from the Novgorod and Rostov regions and the Komi-Permyatsky autonomous district have also noted this problem. Domestic sex trade and trafficking in humans, especially, trafficking in women, have resulted in Russian-origin females being exported to supply the increasing demands of the international sex industry. Notably, Russia and the former Soviet republics have been turned into suppliers of slaves and prostitutes, according to the UN and Interpol structures. According to L. Zavadskaya (American Association of Lawyers), head of the program for protection of women’s rights of the women quite consciously willing to be involved in that industry because of the intolerably low living standards in the post-Soviet arena frequently become victims of trafficking and enslavement. Given the circumstance, suggested amendments to the RF Criminal Code should “make unlawful trade in humans a criminally punishable act, even if the trader states that the “target” gave his/her consent (11).” Loopholes in the Russian law enable domestic recruiters (reaching a total of more than 300 firms) to operate in this line of business nearly freely and without any fear. The superior returns on investments are comparable with those generated by arms or illegal drug trade. This observation is substantiated by the fact that recruiting companies encounter no difficulty in providing clearances for young and single females wishing to travel to their destinations. The Leningrad regional report, for example, reads as follows: Members of the St. Petersburg city police department have been attending international conferences on issues relating to trafficking in humans. They have already established solid business contacts with their counterparts from the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany. However, the deals are yet to be fulfilled. One of the explanations for slow progress is that the recruiters apparently have police protection (12)/ To add, the problem of trafficking in human beings has become rather acute in the Russian Far East, especially in the regions close to Asia-Pacific countries. In July 2001, K. Chaika, Deputy Prosecutor General for the Russian Far-Eastern Federal District released statistics, which stated that over 15 thousand young Russian women and minors have been used as “sex slaves” in China. The local cities have as many as 149 crime groups (40 of those being international ones) engaged in that sort of business (13). Another rather common form of slavery (with primarily minors being the victims) is forced labor managed by assorted criminal structures. These “juvenile” earnings do not necessarily come from sex industry. Increasingly common is the phenomenon of begging (the fact being highlighted by the Amur, Novosibirsk and Chita regional reports). In the Omsk region, the growing incidence of juvenile begging is reported to be the result of increasingly large numbers of refugees and migrants arriving from Chechnya, Kazakhstan and other near-abroad lands. The police operation “Brodiaga” (“Tramp”) led to the detention of about a thousand beggars. Children (including infants) continue to be exploited by professionals. A recent police operation led to the apprehension of a 32-year-old woman from Kashkadair (Republic of Tajikistan), who “directed” a small group of children from five through seven years of age (14). However, there is no monopoly on the part of criminal structures for exploiting juvenile labor. Admittedly, some of these practices could be attributed to the governmental bodies’ inertia (since Soviet times) with regards to the use of forced labor. To provide a more common example, school children are frequently directed to carry out disparate chores for local organizations. For instance, in Bashkortostan prior to President Rakhimov's arrival to the city of Tuimazy, all local schools received the following instructions from the head of the Tuimazy administration: “From September 7 though September 14 daily clean-up activities shall be carried out from 09.00 to 17.00 hours to keep the assigned territories tidy. All school classes (except for junior school classes) within the indicated period shall be canceled.” While most of the schools had their lessons temporarily suspended, other educational establishments in the city of Tuimazy and local district had their classes limited to two–four periods in baseline subjects. School kids had been busy tidying up streets, yards and even entryways in some residential buildings. In the city of Vorkuta (Komi Republic), in September 2001, most local high school students had been directed to spend their Saturdays tidying up the city streets and parks. Notably, the entire effort came at the cost of school hours, with the students toiling for free. The Vorkuta authorities seem to have been repeating this practice for several years now, with the Komi Ministry of Education duly providing the needed authorization. All of the above cases can be categorized as either governmental or criminal (traditional) exploitation of slave or forced labor. To emphasize, the more alarming recent manifestations of slave and forced labor have been produced by the so-called “new economy” with its “new rules and codes.” Not infrequently a person newly hired might have his passport seized. This radically changes the quality of employer-employee relationship because, without an identification document, a person actually becomes a hostage to a bad-faith businessman or genuine criminal. The principal argument for maintaining the domestic passport system was precisely that law enforcers would be better equipped to fight crime (15). It is within this context that the country continues to be increasingly filled with migrants and the homeless. Migrants have generally become hostages to their employers because government (including law enforcement) officials look into cases of forced labor only when they are accompanied with especially fanatical cruelty. E. Gontmakher, head of the Government Department for Social Policies, admitted that the government has failed to make proper arrangements to assure registration of migrant laborers. The relevant regulatory vehicle is still pending official confirmation, resulting in a situation where just one migrant out of 7–10 foreign workers coming into Russia to look for jobs secures appropriate registration. This registration situation with migrants is unlikely to change for the better in the short term (16). Special mention should be made of an experiment conducted by a few Moscow-based reporters to find out why migrants from the CIS countries have been treated so arbitrarily in Russia. The reporters first tried to identify the Moscow-based municipal structure that could help the unfortunate migrants, who had been swindled out of their passports, assigned to specified jobs, maintained on poor diets for three months and eventually evicted without any compensation. Out of numerous Moscow governmental structures, only the social reception facility ¹2 of the Moscow police department displayed a measure of readiness to receive such migrants. The manager cautioned, however, that “they received undocumented foreigners suspected of misdemeanors and felonies. Within a space of a month, they would sort out all relevant issues, restore the documents and have those individuals dispatched to the places of their permanent residence. The living conditions here are comparable with a regular prison (17).” The Buryat Republic is a Russian province where illegal migrants (mostly from the People’s Republic of China) have been providing forced labor resources on an almost regular basis. During 11 months of 2001, the Buryat police had uncovered 304 illegal immigrants living and working within the region without appropriate registration. Following an investigation into the matter, 77 of those were found to have repeatedly violated Russian laws and were expelled from Russian territory. To provide another example, the non-functional Ulan-Ude-based “Buryatfermmash” industrial facility had illegally established a scrap-metal smelting operation, with undocumented Chinese migrants employed as forced laborers. The Chinese laborers had had their passports taken and received no compensation for four months. Fugitives would be invariably caught by security police on the border between the Zaigraevsky and Kizhinginsky districts and brought back to their facility by force. However, 24 Chinese workers (that were responsible for the maintenance of smelting operations in the unfinished Ulan-Ude-based motor-assembly plant) managed to get back to their homeland. To emphasize, all those Chinese had arrived in Buryatia on invitations from Nikonov, deputy head of “Vtormet” company. In Buryatia’s Pribaikalsky district, eight Chinese illegal workers were apprehended, all of whom had come on invitations from “Sputnik-Buryatia” travel agency. As it turned out, they had not obtained required registration with the local authorities and were engaged in work at a logging operation. Following completion of the “Regime” and “Volna” operations run by the local passport and visa service, penalties were assessed against Barguev, deputy director of “Burmanles” company, Pliusnin, director of “Druzhba-21” company, Korobets, head of TETs-1 power utility division, and Avdiushin, local entrepreneur. In the Khanty-Mansiisky autonomous district, some local companies are known to have made use of cheap labor provided by migrants from different CIS countries (Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). Notably, these affordable labor resources have been readily exploited not only by entrepreneurs, but also by some local town administrations, especially when it came to tackling such summertime tasks as planting trees and tidying up streets and yards. In these cases, the willing immigrants would be granted temporary registrations and allowed to enter into contractual arrangements with different employers. Paychecks, however, remained uncashed. The living conditions in which most migrants find themselves are awful: the dormitories’ rooms hold ten to fifteen tenants each, and hygiene and sanitary rules remain largely unobserved. Once their contracts (mostly for the summer and fall months) and registrations expire, these migrant workers do not even consider going back to their hometowns. They stay put in various cities and townships of the autonomous district, explaining their situation by the lack of money to pay for the trip home. Although local self-government structures do assist in funding deportations, foreign migrants keep coming back. The Amur regional report, for one, concludes that the meager paychecks collected by migrant laborers from either China or North Korea are conducive to their dealings in drugs as a means for survival. Incidents of transients and tramps being forcibly engaged in work have been regularly mentioned in regional reports. In the Krasnodar territory, local transients have generally been coerced into performing disparate activities. For example, P. Bezoit, member of the Leningradsky district council, informed the media that she personally had been to the onion plantations tended by transients who were working “for peanuts.” Local employers often attract these sorts of individuals to do “heavy-lifting,” with the latter advancing no particular requirements for pay levels or job conditions. In the Orenburg region, the local authorities openly use the services provided by teams of migrants or transients who earn their living by doing construction-related jobs. In exchange for the authorities officially extending (or rather, overlooking) their stays in the region, those “teams” are supposed to “do some painting, washing, cleaning or repairing jobs” as instructed by their benefactors. Regional reports for the year 2000 already mentioned local entrepreneurs not only disregarding the applicable labor laws, but also fraudulently coercing individuals (fearful of losing their employment) into paying compensations for imaginary losses allegedly suffered by employers. As a consequence, such laborers are actually turned into slaves. Also, in the Amur region, the former workers of the “Rossiya” company’s store ¹8 claim that they had been fired on fraudulent charges with no money paid. Frequent misuse of the so-called “probation period” has also been reported. In this approach, newly hired workers are so grossly underpaid that at the end of the month their wages fail to cover the cost of meals they received while working. (To clarify, the workers could not cook for themselves for lack of time (10–15 minutes) allowed for breaks during their shifts.) Concerning drafted servicemen, their forced labor has become so habitual that the topic seems to be no longer referred to the domestic regional human rights activists. There is no reason for optimism in the recent discussions of the alternative civil service issue. Military officials are apparently steadfast in their insistence for continued military hard labor that could be counterbalanced only by an equally hard labor alternative service. The aforementioned use of transients and migrants to perform odd jobs has likewise become generally accepted. The latest regional reports, however, have been somewhat different from the previous ones in that now some local administrations and law enforcement structures have increasingly employed this affordable labor resource. The need for effective involvement in these matters by such high-profile intergovernmental organizations as the UN, ILO and other international structures continues to be most pressing. This is especially so, given that neither Russia nor any of the other former Soviet republics are adequately equipped to effectively tackle these overwhelming problems in the near future. (1)The author thanks A. Cherkassov of the “Memorial” Human Rights Center for his assistance in drafting this chapter. (2) Just as in other former Soviet republics and “socialist bloc” countries. (3) K. Anokhin, “Government Tells of Korean Loggers.” Kommersant (August 8, 2001). (4) It is the former Dubrovlag penal colony — a specialized Stalin-era facility commissioned to hold political prisoners and dissidents under the Khrushchev and Brezhnev times. (5) V. Eliseenko, “Samara Resident Liberated from Chechen Captivity.” Vremya MN (August 9, 2001). (6) S. Pryganov, “XXIst Century Slaves.” Novoye Vremya (June 8, 2001). (7) Ibid. (8) “Azeri Prisoner.” Zhizn (January 30, 2001). (9) I. Barinov, “In Sexual Bondage.” Trud-7 (July 4, 2001). (10) “Pimp Caught in the Act.” Izvestia (January 25, 2001). (11) A. Kornya, “Don’t be a Hooker when You Go to Work as an Au-Pair.” Vremya MN (May 17, 2001). (12) D. Terentyev, “White Female Slaves.” Izvestia (August 6, 2001). (13) “Fifteen Thousand Russians Turned Slaves in China.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta (July 12, 2001). (14) B. Egorov, “Give a Penny for Bread.” Trud-7 (September 19, 2001). (15) O. Smirnova, “Slavery in the Regional Center and Outside Becomes a Fact of Life.” Komsomolskaya Pravda (July 18, 2001). (16) K. Anokhin, “The Government Tells of Korean Loggers.” Kommersant (August 8, 2001). (17) A. Dorofeeva, “Medvedkovo Laborers Turned into Tramps.” Moskovsky Komsomolets (March 5, 2001). Back |
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