|
English Language Page In 2001, media reports of deaths and attempts to assassinate well-known political figures of the Russian (regional) political elite made allusions to political motives behind such actions. However, we are unaware of even a single case where political reasons for a crime were treated by investigators and journalists as the main ones. Below, we shall consider in detail two examples from the North Caucasus. Political motives featured in the shooting episode of State Duma Deputy Bashkir Kodzoev, member of the fraction “Unity” and deputy chairman of the Committee on the Problems of the North and Far East. On March 14, 2001, in downtown Moscow, his car came under small arms fire, and he was wounded in the chest and arm. This was the first attempt at taking the life of a representative of the “presidential” faction in the State Duma. On June 15, 2001, in downtown Irkutsk, four gunmen armed with automatic rifles and pistols opened fire on the car of B. Kodzoev’s brother, Timur Kodzoev, and killed him. Among the different explanations circulating, the following was also mentioned: the Kodzoev brothers are in opposition to Ruslan Aushev (then the Head of Ingushetia) and had more than once publicly demonstrated this (1). At the same time, the motives most often put forward are criminal and economic. Bashir Kodzoev, who occupied a high position in the Duma, seemed to be an important politician, and Timur Kodzoev — a political opponent of the Ingush President Ruslan Aushev, ran for the presidency of Ingushetia and took part in the Duma elections. But a closer look shows that this clash for power can hardly be referred to as a political struggle. During the presidential elections, Timur Kodzoev used Islamic slogans, but his efforts were in vain — Ruslan Aushev beat him. At the parliamentary elections, Timur Kodzoev was campaigning as an absolutely “secular” politician. He was supported by “force trade unions,” “Afghan” veterans, “Chernobyl cleaners” and even… Ingush Cossacks (2). But this change in political orientation did not help him either: Alikhan Amirkhanov supported by R. Aushev became Duma Deputy instead. Some observers link Timur Kodzoev’s death with his participation in the elections, but “political assassination” or “assassination committed by the authorities” could hardly be the cause of this death. After the elections, the authorities did not bring any pressure against– Yevloyev, the most “disturbing” opponent of Amirkhanov, who rated fourth in the election, though before the elections this confrontation had been accompanied by shootings (3). Also, no harm was done to runner up Belkharoev, a “successful manager” of a greenhouse complex. Both Yevloyev and Belkharoev lived in Ingushetia and getting to them was easier, whereas Timur Kodzoev was killed very far away from this republic. Sources in Ingushetia and within the Ingush community of the Irkutsk region, where Kodzoev had lived since the 1980s, explain his death by the fact that he had been granted huge loans for the election campaign. The loans were supposed to be paid back with “administrative resources” (4) — and this is only one version of the events (5). The third of the Kodzoevs brothers, Murad Kodzoev, gave a news conference on March 20, 2001. The regional investigation department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is searching for this man in connection with Case the ¹43858, a theft of 15 billion roubles (1996 prices). The arrest warrant was issued, but the case was suspended “because Kodzoev was impossible to find (6).” Thus, the murder of Timur Kodzoev, which on the surface appeared 100% “political,” can be called such only in the context of today’s Russia. In June 2001, in Makhachkala, an explosion fractured Magomed-Salikh Gusaev’s leg. He also suffered minor burns. Gusaev is the Minister of Information, Foreign Relations and Ethic Relations of the Dagestan Republic. Though the report on the attempt to take his life stated that this action was linked to the Minister’s official duties, no specific details were provided to support this statement (7). Russian media often calls Dagestan one of the most criminal and corrupted regions of the Russian Federation. The national movements and their leaders control many positions and structures throughout the republic and locally, so to some extent they may be referred to as “the holders of power.” These groups control a sizable part of the economy of the republic. Some of them even have their own armed ‘paramilitary units,” legalized at the end of 1999. In confrontations between political, commercial, criminal interests (intra-system conflicts), explosives and firearms are used often (8). The “Vahhabbits” (extra-system opposition) do not hesitate to resort to arms either. People became accustomed to assassination attempts against Dagestan’s officials, who were considered to be “criminal and commercial.” Many commentators came to the conclusion that the attempt to kill Magomed-Salikh Gusaev was specifically the result of his being “criminal and commercial.” However, the attempted murder of Magomed-Salikh Gusaev must be singled out. There were in all probability political motives behind this attempt. The Minister of Information, Foreign Relations and Inter-Nationailties Relations in the government of Dagestan was operating not in the interests of individual clans but in the interests of the whole republic, working toward stability and integrity of the Russian Federation (9). Those two examples show that we may talk about “political assassinations” only after a thorough examination of each case. Similarly, to reliably identifing a murder (or attempted murder) as a “political assassination,” let alone to conducting an investigation, finding the criminals and bringing them to trial, is difficult everywhere in Russia, not only in Dagestan and Ingushetia. In Uglich (Yaroslavl region), the ñhairman of the district organization of the Union of the Right-Winged Forces (SPS), Boris Surkov, fell out of a hotel window on August 13, 2001 (10). His death triggered many rumors. He had entered politics on the perestroika democratic wave and for many represented quite an “inconvenience.” One journalist maintains that rumor had it that B. Surkov was in possession of information about a financial group that had acquired control over a very “lucrative” area, the Uglich river port. The leader of SPS, Boris Nemtzov, who expressed his condolences to Surkov’s family in a telegram, stressed that “taking into account the circumstances of his death, which appear to be very odd, SPS promises to keep a shrewd eye on the investigation.” Against this criminal and economic background, the “political” component of the activities of a politician is regarded as a “cover.” If a politician confronts criminal-economic structures and this consequently leads to a tragic outcome, it is likely to be explained by “gang against gang” reasoning. The model of an “honest politician operating on behalf of society” seems like a fairy-tale in this context. “Looks fine. I would like to believe it, but it is all a lie,” anyone would say (11). Unfortunately, such an approach applies to politicians not involved in criminal or commercial activities, and is shared not only by journalists but also by law enforcement and particularly investigative agencies. The best-known example is the investigation into the murder of the prominent democratic leader Galina Starovoitova (12). The investigation has been going on for years with no result. In March–April of 2001, reports appeared that there was some hope of cracking the crime “in the foreseeable future (13),” but this was not followed by any real results (14). Galina’s sister, Olga Starovoitova, who was a plaintiff in the case, and her lawyer, Yury Shmidt, in November of 2001 turned to the Dzerzhinsky district court of St. Petersburg, complaining against the refusal to be familiarized with the case files and to be issued a copy of the ruling extending the duration of the preliminary investigation (15): Under Part 1, Article 133 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedure Code, preliminary investigation of a criminal case must be completed within two months.” But in “exceptional cases” this term may be extended without limitation… Galina Starovoitova’s family and friends were patiently awaiting investigation results which never appeared. Numerous public statements were made by various law enforcement representatives who assured the public that some tremendous amount of work had been done and the murderer would finally be apprehended. Why have neither the killers nor those who had ordered the crime been identified and brought to court? Why do we have to believe words without knowing if all the investigative measures have been taken, if all the facts and versions of the press have been followed up (16). On March 23, 1999, the Constitutional Court confirmed the right of interested parties to bring complaints against “inaction on the part of investigatory bodies that result in endless extensions of the investigation” and reminded judges of their obligation to check if such endless extensions are justified. Olga Starovoitova believes that “there is no interest in resolving this case,” “as in many other well-known ordered crimes (17).” But her own assumptions are subjective and vague. She rejects “the established opinion about the “SPS-on-the-blood,” that is unification and strengthening of the Union of the Right-Winged Forces on Starovoitova’s blood,” and maintains that “there is another option more promising for investigators,” i. e., Deputy Starovoitova’s inquest into the activities of the National Security Academy (ANB) — a certain enigmatic body within the State Duma. Galina Starovoitova completed the investigation and made its results public through the Severnaya Stolitza newspaper. Participation in an investigation is sometimes dangerous for the investigators themselves. The March 2001 attack on Nina Tkachenko, investigator of the St. Petersburg prosecutor’s office within the department for investigation of grave crimes and banditism, is connected by her colleagues with her professional activities as a member. She is reputed to be one of the most skilled investigators and has taken part in investigations of the most prominent cases, including that of Yury Shutov’s (18) mob. The 51-year-old woman was cruelly beaten at midnight, next to the entrance to her house, 14 Pestel Steet. The criminal hit her several times on the head, grabbed her handbag, which contained documents and money, and fled. In the hospital, she was diagnosed as having “brain injury and a broken jaw.” Journalists link the attack with the recently completed investigation of the murder of the deputy of the St. Peteresburg Legislative Assembly, Victor Novoselov (19). The attack was committed during the period when the defendants were familiarizing themselves with the case files, after which the case was to go to the city court. Court proceedings on politically-tinged cases are also far from smooth. Let us take, for instance, the case of Dmitry Kholodov, Moskovsky Komsomolets’ staff-correspondent, who died as a result of an explosion. The explosion took place right on the premises of the newspaper, with the object exploding being a briefcase, which D. Kholodov brought to the office himself, believing that it contained some written materials of sensational character. The investigation of this murder case has been conducted for many months now by the Moscow military district court (20). However, the atmosphere surrounding this trial remains heated, which unfortunately does not predispose to fair court decisions. To label a murder as “political” is difficult because the term ‘political’ itself is considerably distorted in today’s Russia. Political and public activities in Russia today often go hand in hand with economic and criminal activities. On the one hand, there is a “hermetic” notion of “power” as something consolidated. On the other hand, “power” is clearly “atomized, fragmented” and businessmen and criminals are actively “privatizing” its separate parts. And some of the fragments not co-opted by criminals and business operate independently, pursuing their own interests, “converting power into capital,” and organizing their own business, sometimes by obviously criminal methods, but remaining part of the “power structure.” This understanding of an unbreakable triad — politics, business and crime is dominant in the public’s mind. Such linkage has become not just something common but indispensable: those who put themselves outside of this triad raise suspicion. As a result, it is easy to regard a “political” murder as a murder committed by hired killers in an “economic dispute” (if not a criminal “settlement of accounts”). For instance, the investigators on Galina Starovoitova’s case were persistently pushing an “economic” version: G. Starovoitova was allegedly carrying a large sum of money for the election campaign. It is equally easy to term a murder of an official involved in a criminal fight over property as a “political” assassination. It is hard indeed to single out a murder triggered by political reasons (or attempts to commit such murders) against Russian criminal background. For this reason, the “power” has every reason to say (and does say) that an ordinary criminal incident took place. Even if it is absolutely clear that a public figure was the object of a targeted attack, the “political” motive very often happens to be only one of many possibilities. The probability of pinpointing some “authorities” (they may be different!) ordered the which is also very low. However, there are two arguments which make it possible to considerably narrow down the scope of our focus. On the one hand, in 2001, we could say with confidence that in contemporary Russia (as a whole) political assassinations are not common or in any way broadly used tools of state management. The power elite is strong enough to use this strength itself as a sufficient instrument. During all of last year’s conflicts, both national and regional (for now, leaving the armed Chechnya conflict aside), opponents gave in under the pressure of arguments not as convincing as the proverbial “nine grams of lead (21).” On the other hand, in 2001, there were no groups, parties, or organizations in Russia that were in obvious opposition to the federal authorities, whose leaders and activists were in need of such strong persuasion. (The strong ones are within the system, and the radical and extra-systemic are weak and marginal.) In the process of consolidating “fragmented” power, it became evident that opponents deserving of such harsh treatment were non-existent. Repression (legal and illegal) did not generally become tools in the hands of the power elite in Russia. However, there is one exception, which may become a rule in the future and by all means deserves special consideration: i. e., the situation in the armed conflict zone in the Chechen Republic. Within the conflict zone, Russian federal authorities are represented by the Command of the Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus. This Command enjoys practically unlimited powers because of the law on countering terrorism. The federal forces do not stop at eliminating their opponents of the Chechen Republic (Ichkeria). The latter (as in any guerrilla movement) do not restrict themselves in any way and kill “accomplices” of the federal authorities. In Chechnya, both the motives and those who order killings are obvious. On the rather extensive list of those who were detained and then murdered in Chechnya are such prominent figures as Chairman of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, a minister, and the head of a rural administration (22). However, based on information coming from the Chechen Republic (23), we cannot say anything positive about the Russian Federation’s compliance with obligations imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 6, 14, 15) to prevent and oppose political assassinations and other killings committed in an extrajudicial mode. (1)“Deputy Kodzoev Was Deprived of His Immunity.” Kommersant (March 15, 2001, ¹45). (2) This Further proof of a merger between “public” and “commercial.” Ingush “Cossacks” operating in accordance with charter documents of Russia’s “registered” Cossack groups; they have the appropriate IDs. Local Cossacks are not “Russian speaking” people, but representatives of the “title” ethnic groups. On the territory of other subjects of the Russian Federation, Ingush Cossacks are engaged in commercial operations cooperating with local Cossacks (who evolved from public associations into “economic entities”). Cossacks’ IDs often protect them against police prejudiced against the so-called “persons of the Caucasus extraction.” (3) Amirkhanov’s proponents were distributing free flour to voters and Yevloyev’s supporters became indignant. The local branch of the Union of the Right-Winged Forces (SPS), which supported Yevloyev and consisted of wrestlers of Roman and Greek style. This “mixture of politics and sports” is typical of today’s political scene in Russia! (4) Yet another link between politics and business in Russia today. (5) The Kodzoev brothers were involved in seasonal deliveries to northern areas of the Irkutsk region. Murad Kodzoev took a loan from the Leninsk branch of Sberbank (Savings bank) in the amount of 300 million roubles, after which his cooperative was closed and all documents burnt, together with the accountant. In 1999 the brothers were suspected of having stolen 53 railroad cars with sugar, worth of 13 billion roubles. All witnesses have either disappeared or died, and relevant documents have been burnt. After Bashkir Kodzoev was elected Duma deputy and deputy head of the Duma Committee, criminal cases were initiated against all editors of the Irkutsk newspapers that had published materials about the Kodzoev brothers, under Article 129, Part 2: “Slander With Bringing a Serious Crime Charge” (L. Michurina, “The Kodzoevs Hunt Goes On.” Gazeta.Ru (June 15, 2001). (6) Baikalskaya Otkrytaya Gazeta (May 1, 2001). (7) I. Naumov, “The Explosion Blasted in the Morning. Luckily Nobody Got Killed.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta (June 9, 2001). (8) There were multiple attempts on the life of the Mayor of the city of Makhachkala (Dagestan Republic), Amirov. Two most drastic results of these attempts were as follows: his legs were paralyzed and one whole street was destroyed. (9) For instance, in the Fall of 1999, he aggressively curbed the attempts of Lakh and Avar (popular paramilitary detachments) to prevent Akkin Chechens from coming back to the Novolakk district, after Basaev and Hattab’s units had been ousted from Dagestan to Chechnya; at that time, this was done against the will of practically all the “movements” in Dagestan. (10) E. Mukhtarov, “Did He Drop Out By Himself Or Did Someone Help Him?” Trud (August 14, 2001). (11) In society, public interest is becoming a “denotation without a designator,” and that is cause for concern. (12) Murdered in November 20, 1998, in St. Petersburg, on the stairs of her apartment building. Her assistant was seriously injured. Investigations of such murder cases take years. In May 2001, the investigation was extended again, making its total duration 36 months. For more information, see: “Galina Starovoitova Case Investigation Extended Again.” Kommersant (May 18, 2001). (13) An abstract from the speech of the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of Detective Activities (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation), Colonel Alexander Kirushev. “There is Hope to Resolve Starovoitova’s Case in the Near Future.” Moskovsky Komsomolets (March 21, 2001). (14) In April of 2001, Vladimir Belyaev (nickname “Bob Kemerovsky”) was escorted from Kiev to St. Petersburg. Journalists were of the opinion that he had been involved in the killings of Vice-Governor of St. Petersburg, Mikhail Manevich, and Duma Deputy, Galina Starovoitova, based on a statement by the regional FSB head, Sergei Smirnov. See: P. Petrobsky, “Galina Starovoitova Case: We Are In for Sensations.” Parlamentskaya Gazeta (April 28, 2001). (15) As a rule, this document contains the reason for the extension. (16) M. Tokareva, “The Right of the Victim — to Be Patient.” Obshchaya Gazeta (November 15, 2001). (17) N. Korkonosenko, “Lethal Selection.” Versty (November 20. 2001). (18) Yuri Shutov, currently held in remand prison, was former deputy of A. Sobchak, Mayor of St. Petersburg until 1996. (19) V. Novoselov was killed on October 20, 1999, while riding in a car to his office. Artur Gudkov, who set off the explosive device, was arrested at the scene of the crime. He gave the names of some of his accomplices. Four persons were arrested. All of them happened to be former commandos. The investigators failed to find out who had ordered the murder but they discovered that the former commandos had committed two more ordered killings and three attempted murders. Among their victims were Arkady Solar, assistant to the former (1st and 2nd convocation) State Duma Deputy Vladimir Pchelkin (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), and businessman Evgeny Kasarov, who had been on the “wanted” federal list for fraud; the hired killers made two abortive attempts on the life of the criminal “baron” Victor Sloka (he was, by the way, murdered after their arrest), they shot at “Ocean” company director, Vasily Golubev, and were preparing an attack on former vice-president of the St. Petersburg Fuel Company Vladimir Barsukov (Kumarin). See: “Investigation of Medium Degree of Seriousness.” Kommersant (March 22, 2001). (20) E. Zapodinskaya, “FSB Dropped Out of the Kholodov Case.” Kommersant (January 23, 2001). (21) Usually, “black PR” in conjunction with “pinpoint accuracy” law enforcement was sufficient. (22) For more information, see “List of Civilians Detained in the Zone of the Armed Conflict in the Chechen Republic by the Federal Forces and Consequently “Disappeared” or Killed” compiled by the “Memorial” Human Rights Center and published at www.memo.ru (23) For this as well as for a detailed list of victims of politicals killings and assassination attempts in Chechnya, see the report on human rights in Chechnya, which is part of this Collection of Reports. Back |
Íàøà êíîïêà  |
|